Sunday, October 22, 2023

They Begin To Suspect Something...

No, really. 

„Können keinen Unterschied machen“: Kommen US-Abrams-Panzer für die Ukraine zu spät?

Translation:  “Can’t make a difference”: Are US Abrams tanks coming too late for Ukraine?

After that, this German outlet begins to wax all tactical-operational (translation). 

The tanks give the Ukrainian armed forces a valuable boost for combined arms maneuvers against Russia. However, some Western experts and Ukrainian officials believe that the volume, timing and problematic logistics do not currently allow for the impact that the Abrams could have for Ukraine. A total of 31 tanks "couldn't make a difference," although Kiev was "very grateful" for the supplies, said Oleksiy Honcharenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament. This year, it looks like the Abramses are coming too late to really counter Ukraine's grueling efforts in the south and east of the country, the lawmaker told Newsweek. At the same time, it is also clear that the war will continue next year.  

So, on, and on, and on--non-stop coping  with the destruction of the myths of NATO TOE and even Mark Galeotti, this sleek fellow whose "expertise" is primarily in writing about Russia's organized crime--I have no idea how writing about racketeering or money laundering makes one a "specialist" in combined arms operations--figured it out that:

I speak about it in my latest video. And as I am on record for years--NO weapon system, short of nuclear weapons, in NATO's (primarily American) arsenal can make a difference in the outcome. Wars are not fought the way it is taught in ANY Western military institution. Until Western military leaders throw away everything they know about war, starting from the WW II and the way USSR fought it, and learn the actual history and how they misconstrued West's "victory" in the Cold War, nothing will allow them to see the military reality. 

Yesterday, while visiting Barnes and Noble I bought Douglas Macgregor' Margin of Victory. I already covered the most important parts of it and I am disappointed, despite my respect for him and his stance on war. But, recall what I said recently about all those rankings? Ranking anything is usually when someone has nothing to say and Macgregor's book's full title is:

Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War

Sadly, my suspicions have been confirmed:

1. Macgregor is simply illiterate in anything concerning Russia/Soviet history and continues to reside in the Solzhenitsified and Beavorised version of this pop-history. While he gives his dues to Operation Bagration, he completely loses the plot insofar as Deep Operations (Deep Battles) are concerned because the genesis of all that is in WW I Brusilov's Offensive whose scope and scale, including development of new tactics for artillery (Wall of Fire) and superb operational planning by Russians paved the way to the ideas which later manifested themselves already at Kursk. This monstrous battle by Brusilov and Russian Army  even in the words of a late Russophobe John Keegan was described as: "the Brusilov Offensive was, on the scale by which success was measured in the foot-by-foot fighting of the First World War, the greatest victory seen on any front since the trench lines had been dug on the Aisne two years before". How Battle of Mons, which was dwarfed in scale and consequences by Brusilov and Russian Army, entered the list is known only to Macgregor himself. British didn't really change any face of war in terms of ground operations in the XX century, Russian wrote a book on it. 

2. And, of course, Battle of 73 Easting. I understand that Macgregor who fought it with his formation has a special spot for it, but in a larger scheme of things, insofar as the US combined arms warfare is concerned, it was an anomalous battle which merely confirmed what was known by anyone who ever served in military--Iraqi Army was a backward, badly trained, consummate third world military incapable to fight modern war. Lieutenant-General Klokotov's conclusion should be repeated by any American officer who really wants to know what REAL war is, but it will not be.

“I would like to emphasize here that the Persian Gulf war was taken as the standard in studying the strategic nature of possible war. It would appear that this position, adopted in the draft ‘Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine,’ is dangerous. The fact is that this war [was] ‘strange’ in all respects [and] cannot serve as a standard.”

Stated in 1992 this cannot be anymore construed by anyone as the case of a professional envy by Russians--Russian military history dwarfs that of the US, especially wars winning record, but as a warning. Macgregor's conclusions, especially in terms of force structure for the US and possibility of the full spectrum domination are reasonable, but impossible to realize because the US is simply not wound as a nation for REAL continental wars. And even American ground war technology reflects it through all those weapon systems which belong to primarily parades or attacking civilians. 

The issue of combat air is altogether--a separate can of worms. In the end, however, the United States doesn't have General Staff and has no experience of command-controlling and building armed forces as Russia does. Frankly, I was disappointed, for all my respect for the Colonel. Until the US Army exorcises myths about Patton, Gulf War and similar PR events and learns real military history, it will not be able to fight anyone better than rag-tag forces. Maybe, it is for the better. 

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