A Pure Unrefined Military Porn.

There is nothing like this in NATO, period. No, some may have similarities in function but Tor-M2 proved itself an absolute monster of short range AD. Not that others, like S1 Pantsir, did worse. They also performed brilliantly. But here is the combat work of two Tor-M2 systems. 

Another thing about Tors is that they can launch while moving and, as you may have guessed it, they are fully netcentric. Plus, IRIS-T and NASAMS performed in VSU primarily as useless targets for Russia's stand-off weapons thus providing dismal, in fact embarrassing, combat record. This also doesn't mean that VSU doesn't have a leaker here and there--once in a while they get some Storm Shadow hitting children's campground, or HIMARS hitting some bridge, sometimes, very seldom, they score a hit on Russian military. But primarily most of them (90-95% at least) are getting shot down. Tors play a huge role in this combat score. 

So, what's the future for Tors? It is bright, as it is for Buk-M3 and S1 Pantsir--they provided an outstanding shield for Russian forces on and around battlefield, not to mention an immense data which already allows to introduce even more deadly and advanced upgrades. I talk about short to medium range systems. And then there are those monsters such as S-350, S-300s, S-400 and S-500--that is a whole other story of Soviet Union/Russia pursuing non-stop for more than 70 years a complete domination of the air-defense field. The combat performance of Russian Air Defense has been outstanding, to put it mildly and there is very little doubt that the integrated system will continue to evolve and improve with some systems we haven't seen yet going on-line and completely overthrowing NATO air and space operations concepts and making them completely obsolete. This we can already observe today, in real time. 

In the end, even technology savvy people from USAF have to admit:

The need to address all-domain authorities has emerged as a common theme during recent Tier 1 exercises, US Air Force wargames, and experiments. Joint all-domain command and control’s lateral connectivity, where every sensor is connected to every shooter, begs the issue of command and control: Who makes the decision to shoot? When, where, and with what? Today’s C2 construct puts each service component and domain into its own silo where they work in parallel as deconflicted by the Joint combatant or Joint Force commander. Yet this current C2 construct is seen as antiquated and too slow for the anticipated speed, range, and multidomain nature of a future great-power conflict. In an era where all services and domains are connected and speed is a priority, the question becomes, Who gets to command and control all-domain fires? The answer to this question has huge implications for air component Airmen. 

I have news for the author of this piece, USAF Colonel (ret.) Thomas Cantrell--the US has no speed, range nor multidomain experience and only now begins to see what it is when looks at 404 and SMO. In other words--remove Douhet writings and Doolittle experiences into the museum where they belong because modern battlefield "of a future great-power conflict" will look nothing like what they teach in NATO war colleges, and combined NATO will lose advantage in numbers of air power in the first 48-72 hours of such a conflict.  This is not a theorem, it is an axiom now. What will be the situation in Washington when NATO loses 40-50 F-35s and 3-4 E3 Sentry in the first 24 hours? Exactly... Is S-600 coming?