Thanks to Brian Fruman, who pointed me towards initially piece by well known clown and amateur military porn masturbator David Axe who in his piece in Forbes informed us about this:
The U.S. Navy Submarine Force Could Sink The Chinese Fleet And Save Taiwan, But At The Cost Of A Quarter Of Its Boats
But these were not his ideas--I doubt he understands the difference between the Operational Sweep in ASW and Swiffer for the floors, although both are related. No, he described to the best of his very limited abilities by far more interesting paper from real military professionals from CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) which is called The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. You can download the paper (PDF) and read summary here:
CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is therefore not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.
Putting aside all those traditional tropes about China and BS about "international relations", whose real study doesn't functionally exist in the US anymore--died out together with always substandard US "diplomacy"--there are reasons to view paper with interest and it is absolutely normal to game possible wars and everybody does it. So, in this respect this paper is interesting.
I am not going to review all of it, but apart from interesting admissions such as these:
1. Shift to smaller, more survivable ships and develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled ships and multiple sinkings. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, with the United States typically losing two carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations.
2. Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms. Submarines were able to enter the Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese fleet, but numbers were inadequate.
3. Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are niche weapons. Their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.
among many others, the paper continues to emphasize this:
There is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan.
One may ask what is this "Ukraine Model"? If the authors and CSIS gamers (this time it is a respectful term) mean that the US will have to physically become a full blown party to the "defense of Taiwan", well, they have a point. But other than that, what is perceived as a "Ukraine Model" didn't complete forming itself. Far from it, albeit I do personally view a direct US participation in SMO as unlikely. But, but, that is the other issue altogether--even authors of paper admit some extremely serious military-industrial limitations of the United States, especially in terms of stand-off weapons, and mind you--the US has zero supersonic anti-shipping missiles, forget about hypersonic ones. And not only that, when discussing possible involvement of the United States in Taiwan's war, one has to seriously consider a strategic ambiguity in Europe, as IN WESTERN Europe, due to SMO and it, seemingly, growing scale.
Yes, the United States has a very good, top notch submarine force--I write about it for years--but what will be the effect of the US losing completely in 404, and then in Europe? And that is not just in Kremlin's plans, it is being done as I type this. What are those "black swans", what are those random variables thrown into the mix, considering a historic strategic miscalculation the US committed when getting involved in perversion of 404 and NATO? There are many interesting points to discuss in this paper and, unlike David Axe's sophomoric writing, this paper certainly deserves to be discussed. So, the link is there, download and enjoy, if you will. I already briefly browsed it, many interesting admissions. And yes, "Ukraine Model" needs to be discussed too.
In the end, look at the dynamics of rebuilding of Russia's Pacific Fleet, especially subs and surface carriers of 3M22 Zircons, and expansion of both strike combat aviation and delivery of Novella-equipped IL-38N ASW and patrol aircraft. Russia is anticipating some events and if Russia backs China up in this conflict, which is very likely, boy, we may see some spectacle for the ages. But, I am also on record, that PLAN nuclear submarine force is no contest to the state-of-the-art US Navy's subs and well trained crews and the issue of ASW against such a force is of a strategic importance to China, as is of Air Defense. China has very little time to get ready. I am sure Xi and Putin discuss this often.