... do they take their numbers from? It is no wonder that US and UK run VSU "operations" are not only defeated, but expose a complete professional inadequacy of US and UK military operational planning. It is bad and unprofessional which calls in question military professionalism of those who "plan" them. Evidently, issues of awareness and knowing "thy enemy" are not taught in Anglo-American military educational facilities anymore. No wonder. Daniel Davies writes a fantastical piece in which he concludes:
Virtually the only way Ukraine could succeed in an offensive against Russia in Kherson region at this time would be if they pulled a page out of the Soviet playbook from July 1943. In the Battle of Kursk, for example, the USSR was willing to throw over two million men into the meat grinder against the German Wehrmaht in a massive tank battle. The Soviet Union sacrificed 800,000 troops lost, but inflicted upwards of 200,000 casualties on the Germans in the process. But the Red Army had more men than the Germans and Hitler’s troops were never able to recover from the loss of so many men and tanks, but especially they never replaced the experienced troops. From that point on, the Soviet army drove Germany all the way back to Berlin. Unless Ukraine is willing to sacrifice upwards of a million men – something the Russians may not be able to match, regardless of how many planes, tanks, and rockets they have – Zelensky’s forces have no valid shot at driving Russia out of Kherson.
I am not going to talk here about absolutely bizarre "interpretation" of Red Army's Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation July 5-23, 1943, how it was known in USSR and was in response to Wehrmacht's Operation Zitadelle (Citadel) and which saw human, armor and air carnage of unimaginable proportions, which resulted in final strategic shift of the WW II in Europe after which the Blitzkrieg met its match. But the issue, apart from Davies' obvious sheer fantasy about Kherson, is the fact of this, I quote it again:
In the Battle of Kursk, for example, the USSR was willing to throw over two million men into the meat grinder against the German Wehrmaht in a massive tank battle. The Soviet Union sacrificed 800,000 troops lost, but inflicted upwards of 200,000 casualties on the Germans in the process.
Davies references the US History Channel, evidently not understanding, that most of the Anglo-American WW II historiography of the Eastern Front is based on... right, German sources, much of which are self-serving in trying to "explain" how, after what amounts in German "sources" of Eastern Front, Red Army was losing 1,000 soldiers for 10 of Wehrmacht's, of 100 combat aircraft for 1 lost Luftwaffe fighter, or 100 T-34s for 2 or 3 Tigers, those incompetent Russkies, somehow crushed unified forces of Europe, from Finland to Germany, to Italy, to Hungary, Romania and other armies and somehow, obviously because of "bloody Stalin" ended up in Berlin and hoisted the Red Flag over Reichstag in May of 1945.
Well, we will start with this, and this is old, from 1996 by Glantz, who later, together with House elevated even more the Wehrmacht's "historical" perceptions' influences on the American view of the Eastern Front:
The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality.
But let's address the issue of Red Army's "sacrificed 800,000 troops". We will open the most authoritative source of Red Army's losses and this is, of course, Krivosheev's publications meticulously derived from all available Russian Defense Ministry WW II archives. Let's take a look at the "spread" so to speak of Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation, which could be counted as "Counter-Citadel." Here is the table from Krivosheev's 2001 Rossiya i SSSR v voynah XX veka: poteri vooruzhyonnyh sil. Statisticheskoe issledovanie (in Russian). Moscow: OLMA-Press. ISBN 5-224-01515-4.