This Is How They Teach ...

 ... the history of WW II Eastern Front in the West. Judging by the utter a-historic trash which still circulates among many US military professionals as a genuine history, you know some of those names, it is not surprising that they still cannot understand what hit them. When your world view is formed by fairy tales about WW II written by what amounts to Wehrmacht and SS "sources" and how NKVD "executed" 1 million Red Army soldiers--what do you expect? Here is a good tearing apart of a Hollywood BS whose scenario was "written" by the same people (or rather their ideas) who only read Solzhenitsyn and Soviet dissidents and believe that it was the US which defeated Hitler and that the Red Army was nothing but kettle prodded into the battle by evil commissars and NKVD. Luckily, there are still some diligent people out there who cannot tolerate BS and do something about it. 

Only two weeks old. Excellent job and a good overall discussion in the comments. 

Where, Let Me Ask, Where...

... do they take their numbers from? It is no wonder that US and UK run VSU "operations" are not only defeated, but expose a complete professional inadequacy of US and UK military operational planning. It is bad and unprofessional which calls in question military professionalism of those who "plan" them. Evidently, issues of awareness and knowing "thy enemy" are not taught in Anglo-American military educational facilities anymore. No wonder. Daniel Davies writes a fantastical piece in which he concludes:

Virtually the only way Ukraine could succeed in an offensive against Russia in Kherson region at this time would be if they pulled a page out of the Soviet playbook from July 1943. In the Battle of Kursk, for example, the USSR was willing to throw over two million men into the meat grinder against the German Wehrmaht in a massive tank battle. The Soviet Union sacrificed 800,000 troops lost, but inflicted upwards of 200,000 casualties on the Germans in the process. But the Red Army had more men than the Germans and Hitler’s troops were never able to recover from the loss of so many men and tanks, but especially they never replaced the experienced troops. From that point on, the Soviet army drove Germany all the way back to Berlin.  Unless Ukraine is willing to sacrifice upwards of a million men – something the Russians may not be able to match, regardless of how many planes, tanks, and rockets they have – Zelensky’s forces have no valid shot at driving Russia out of Kherson. 

I am not going to talk here about absolutely bizarre "interpretation" of Red Army's Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation July 5-23, 1943, how it was known in USSR and was in response to Wehrmacht's Operation Zitadelle (Citadel) and which saw human, armor and air carnage of unimaginable proportions, which resulted in final strategic shift of the WW II in Europe after which the Blitzkrieg met its match. But the issue, apart from Davies' obvious sheer fantasy about Kherson, is the fact of this, I quote it again:

In the Battle of Kursk, for example, the USSR was willing to throw over two million men into the meat grinder against the German Wehrmaht in a massive tank battle. The Soviet Union sacrificed 800,000 troops lost, but inflicted upwards of 200,000 casualties on the Germans in the process.  

Davies references the US History Channel, evidently not understanding, that most of the Anglo-American WW II historiography of the Eastern Front is based on... right, German sources, much of which are self-serving in trying to "explain" how, after what amounts in German "sources" of Eastern Front, Red Army was losing 1,000 soldiers for 10 of Wehrmacht's, of 100 combat aircraft for 1 lost Luftwaffe fighter, or 100 T-34s for 2 or 3 Tigers, those incompetent Russkies, somehow crushed unified forces of Europe, from Finland to Germany, to Italy, to Hungary, Romania and other armies and somehow, obviously because of "bloody Stalin" ended up in Berlin and hoisted the Red Flag over Reichstag in May of 1945. 

Well, we will start with this, and this is old, from 1996 by Glantz, who later, together with House elevated even more the Wehrmacht's "historical" perceptions' influences on the American view of the Eastern Front:

The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. 

But let's address the issue of Red Army's "sacrificed 800,000 troops". We will open the most authoritative source of Red Army's losses and this is, of course, Krivosheev's publications meticulously derived from all available Russian Defense Ministry WW II archives. Let's take a look at the "spread" so to speak of Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation, which could be counted as "Counter-Citadel." Here is the table from Krivosheev's 2001 Rossiya i SSSR v voynah XX veka: poteri vooruzhyonnyh sil. Statisticheskoe issledovanie (in Russian). Moscow: OLMA-Press. ISBN 5-224-01515-4.

As you can see yourself, at Kursk Red Army had total 1,272,700 personnel on three Army Groups (Fronts) at the front with a width of 500 kilometers and with retreat of Red Army forces upon defensive operation between 12 to 35 kilometers. Total "non-returnable" (KIA and MIA) losses in 19 day of this operation amounted to 70,330. Sanitary losses amounted to 177, 784, which in summary gives us 177, 847 total Red Army losses at Kursk. OK, but one may ask, but what if, what if History Channel also counted Red Army's losses in the immediate follow-up, in fact overlapping with Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation, Orlov Strategic Offensive Operation "Kuuzov", which lasted from July 12 through August 18 of 1943? OK. It is not exactly Kursk Battle but let's take a look:

As you can see yourself Red Army sustained 112, 529 KIAS and MIAs, Sanitary--317,361 and total of 429,890. But even if sum those TOTAL losses we still get 607, 737 for all duration of the Kursk Battle from Jule 5 through August 18. Of course, we need to add Belgorod Strategic Operation (Operation "Rumyantsev") which lasted August 3 through 23 and then arithmetically we may get somewhere around 800,000, but, pardon my French, where did they find 2 million men, when in reality the number of Red Army combat troops never exceeded at the peak 1.4 million. But while we get very accurate numbers of Red Army's losses and forces, once we get to Wehrmacht, we get thrown immediately into the German military casuistic approach to "statistics" and, often, down right "estimates" (a euphemism for falsifications) which are the ones which continue to dominate American views. 

 

Davies states that Wehrmacht sustained 200,000 casualties at Kursk Battle. Hm, we need to start from the start because at Kursk Red Army fielded in reality (per Glantz, House and declassified Soviet General Staff documents), get this: Red Army total: 1,337,166 of which combat troops were 977,219. Wehrmacht, combat troops: 777,000. As you can see yourself the ratio is not what Western historiography really mentions, preferring to use German numbers, much of which tend to minimize own losses and grossly inflate losses of the Red Army and these numbers migrate constantly into Anglo-American historiography and are utterly unreliable from purely military point of view, unless one wants, indeed, to subscribe to a view that average Wehrmacht soldier was killing before being killed himself 5-6 Red Army soldiers. But here is the trick, if one considers inevitably higher losses of attacking side during offensive, we DO have a reliable number of specifically Wehrmacht's (minus Axis allies) losses in the period of time which covers precisely both Stalingrad and Kursk Battles. Namely from 1 September 1942 through 20 November 1943 Wehrmacht's total of non-returnable (KIAs, MIAs and disabled) on the Eastern Front amounted to 90% of all casualties in that period: 2,077,000 x 0.9 =1,870,000. It amounted to permanent (irrevocable) losses of Wehrmacht alone on the Eastern Front to 6,923,700. And we use here Earl Ziemke's numbers.

 

In fact, 200,000 Wehrmacht's "losses" in Kursk Battle is utter fiction. Real number of Wehrmacht's irrevocable losses is around 430,000 per Military-Historical Journal («Военно-исторический журнал», 1960, № 5, стр. 86—87) which explains WHY Kursk Battle, together with Stalingrad, were decisive in destroying Axis forces strategic offensive poyential on the Eastern Front and lead to a turning point in WW II. It is not just some statistical trick, it is tactical and operational military reality corresponding to numbers, or, vice-versa, if one wishes. But it inevitably raises the question: if one draws strategic and operational picture based on Nazi "statistics" and beaten to death cliches about Red Army, it is INEVITABLE that such versions of "military science" and operational art are bound to produce time after time, both gross overestimation of own capabilities and gross underestimation of such of the enemy. Patton's Syndrome. We saw it in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and we observe it live in Ukraine with NATO C2 parading itself as a bunch of amateurs. 

 

Listen to excellent discussion by Alex and Alexander. 

They speak precisely about this issue, with such military planners who are behind VSU, no wonder the US cannot win any war in the last... well, fill in the blanks yourself.  One cannot learn anything when one's lessons are primarily made of fantasies. It is a good advice to get one's facts straight before expressing historical views such as Daniel Davies did about Kursk Battle. But then again, in the world where Wehrmacht sustains 200,000 casualties in total in one of the most decisive historic victories of the Red Army, it is also normal for said Red Army to "rape" 2.5 million German women and Russian Army "run out of ammo and smart weapons"... three months ago. 

P.S. See about fake Wehrmacht "statistics" in VPK-Kurier written by professional (in Russian). The Price of Kursk Battle (Part II). A methodical military-scientific demolition of BS from Wehrmacht's cooked books, including their Anglo-American sycophants who created a caricature from the war.

Yet Another Dud?

Here is the biography of the author, who is praised in The American Conservative for his new book Last Stands: Why Men Fight When All is Lost. Here it is:

Michael A. Walsh is an American music critic, author, screenwriter, media critic, and cultural-political consultant. 

In other words, he is a man who knows about military and warfare primarily from the books and movies. Fine. There is a cultural aspect to the warfare and last stands when everything is lost often are connected to the sense of brotherhood in arms with buddies in the unit and of the esprit de corps, and of simple masculine doggedness, which often manifests itself in extreme circumstances such as war, where defiance in a face of death is well documented. But that is all well-known and books on the warfare and acts of defiance and heroism are plentiful. But Walsh decides to concentrate on such acts, in the words of the reviewer, for: 

A new book takes stock of history's last stands and draws questions about Americans' will to defend their nation today.

Here is where the whole thing goes haywire immediately, while Bradley Anderson who wrote the review continues:

The qualities of which Walsh writes are real, and they are every bit as vital to a civilization as he says. They are, however, virtues that can be cynically exploited by those who have little interest in the defense of the United States against the kinds of existential threats that would inspire American men to take up arms and go willingly to their deaths if need be.   

Wait a minute, what? There is no doubt that US Armed Forces have enough courageous men many of who did perform acts of an incredible heroism, be that men of 2nd and 99th Divisions in Ardennes in December 1944, or the crew of immortal USS Samuel B. Roberts DE 413, just to name a few acts of American heroism in WW II. But we are talking about different times and different circumstances. The truth is, that what Walsh tries to explain in his book, all those last stands, were driven by more than just masculinity-based cohesion of the unit and courage. This is not the whole story and it never was whole behind what Tolstoy--yes, this unremarkable artillery officer, who wrote few unremarkable books, nobody knows about, in which he specifically pointed out to: 

The question that had perturbed Pierre on the Mozhaysk hill and all that day now seemed to him quite clear and completely solved. He now understood the whole meaning and importance of this war and of the impending battle. All he had seen that day, all the significant and stern expressions on the faces he had seen in passing, were lit up for him by a new light. He understood that latent heat (as they say in physics) of patriotism which was present in all these men he had seen, and this explained to him why they all prepared for death calmly, and as it were lightheartedly. 

Yep, this thingy, which usually comes from primarily sense of duty and love for the nation, country, when they are in the grave danger. And here is a thingy, of which I speak ad nauseam--the United States lacks this "thingy", since no American soldier ever fought under the circumstances (not since 1814) of the United States proper being under any danger which comes with enemy's victory and him occupying the country. This distinction is crucial in psychological terms and it was and is being demonstrated since Korean War, because unlike most occasions which Walsh chose to describe, the United States remains impervious to any invasion and a nightmare which follows and can afford to lose interest in wars, which in the American case are all, without exception in the XX Century, were wars of aggression and conquest. 

But then again, Walsh is a... music critic by occupation and expecting prudent and precise view on the history of wars and human condition in them from such a "historian" is an exercise in futility, and Walsh aptly proves it. He decides to review a famous Pavlov's House defense during the Battle of Stalingrad, whose description is drowned in ideological noise, and then Walsh blows in a spectacular manner:

He uses grossly inaccurate, politely speaking, Hollywood BS of a movie as a historic reference point. The myth of Red Army soldiers having one rifle for two conscripts is a purely Western propaganda creation which was debunked so decisively that it is inconceivable that the man, a music critic by occupation no less, who decided to write anything on Stalingrad, doesn't know it. But Walsh, certainly, doesn't. Obviously, Western military "historians" never could understand that the only complain General Vasily Chuikov had in his memoirs was about shortage of fully automatic weapons, which were better for the fight in the rabble of Stalingrad, in famous Rodimtsev Division. But the Red Army fighters all had their rifles and enough munition to fight off the onslaught of the Paulus' 6th Army and its allies. This, so called, "black myth" (in Russian) is yet another demonstration of a deliberate distortion used by the Western "historians" to portray Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the victory in the WW II as merely through piles of dead bodies and rivers of blood. Using Hollywood's grossly inaccurate propaganda as a source for conclusions on a matter of a serious military history arouses immediate question--why music critic by education decided that he can pass any sound judgement on matters which require a serious knowledge and experience within military? I don't know, but that is what general American view on war is--a Hollywood picture. 

Moreover, last stands while having not just your buddies, but your home, your families, you loved ones, your culture is what drives men to perform acts of self-sacrifice in those proverbial last stands when everything seems to be lost. This is not the experience the United States military can relate to, despite having its own share of heroism and sacrifice, but in the end, as, I believe, Chesterton stated--the soldier must not so much hate what is in a front of him, as love what is behind his back. This is precisely why the United States couldn't win in Korea, lost in Vietnam, lost Iraq and lost in Afghanistan, because as this insignificant combat officer noted:       

"But all the general and soldiers of [Napoleon’s] army…experienced a similar feeling of terror before an enemy who, after losing half his men, stood as threateningly at the end as at the beginning of the battle. The moral force of the attacking French army was exhausted. Not that sort of victory which is defined by the capture of pieces of material fastened to sticks, called standards, and of the ground on which the troops had stood and were standing, but a moral victory that convinces the enemy of the moral superiority of his opponent and of his own impotence was gained by the Russians at Borodino…The direct consequence of the battle of Borodino was Napoleon’s senseless flight from Moscow… and the downfall of Napoleonic France, on which at Borodino for the first time the hand of an opponent of stronger spirit had been laid" 

But what does he really know, this loser Tolstoy, he didn't have Hollywood to refer to, because we all know, Hollywood can always "vividly illustrate" just about any bullshit it wants to. That's the entertainment.

Facepalm Of The Week.

Richard Haas wrote yet another (many others wrote similar crap, see Fukuyama's recent piece in this very same Foreign Affairs, among others) pretentious meandering piece on, what else, global "order", or disorder if one wishes, and continued a glorious tradition of American political "scientists", "diplomats" and other former bureaucrats in avoiding speaking about real reasons for decried by them "decay" or this global order. Haas starts with a wowser of generalizations in his piece titled How a World Order Ends:

• A stable world order is a rare thing. When one does arise, it tends to come after a great convulsion that creates both the conditions and the desire for something new. It requires a stable distribution of power and broad acceptance of the rules that govern the conduct of international relations. It also needs skillful statecraft, since an order is made, not born.

I don't know if Haas senses a deep sarcasm in this his statement but the point is--those who proclaimed themselves the enforcer of this "order" succeeded gloriously in destabilizing the world they thought they "won" by the end of the Cold War. Since the times after late George H.W. Bush, that is starting from Clinton getting to power, terms "skillful statecraft" and the US can not be used in the same sentence since the degradation of American elites responsible for this alleged "craft" is nothing short of catastrophic both for the US and for the world. Haas is one of those "elites". So, to prove that he is "elite" and "intellectual" he, of course, waxes "historical". He gets to the point by predictably asking:

What lessons can be drawn from this history? As much as anything else, the rise and fall of major powers determines the viability of the prevailing order, since changes in economic strength, political cohesion, and military power shape what states can and are willing to do beyond their borders.  

He goes onto drawing parallels and looking for power balance symmetries in the events of the 19th century and this is where most American "thinkers" make huge mistake. History really teaches very little (albeit some generalizations, of course, are possible and even necessary for human nature is slow in changing), it certainly taught very little people like Haas, or Fukuyama who time after time buy into own pseudo-intellectual constructs trying to rationalize a subject which neither Haas, Fukuyama, Allison and most of the crop of the American, ahem, scholars have no clue about--the nature of military power and its application. It is simply not there; not having this clue about what, actually, always defined, defines and will continue to define balance of power, global "order", what have you in the foreseeable future, is rather peculiar feature of American (and Western) political scientists. Of course, appeals to history are cute, knowing few facts more about Metternich or about wording of some 19th Century treaty than your opponent makes a good background for "intellectual" exchange, debate and, eventual arrival to some form of intellectual "discovery" (especially if a good Scotch and cigar are involved) but in order to learn actual history one must learn real military history with all that it entails.They also must understand this simple (can I be arrogant and claim it?) Martyanov's axiom--world class military power is a function of the world-class nation-state, especially its economic and scientific potential. Both cannot exist without each-other.

Once such a commitment to actually learning stuff is made, one inevitably will arrive to conclusions on HOW and WHY "rise and fall of major powers" happens and this is a tricky and very sensitive issue for the United States because she is NOT a continental warfare power. With the exception of a turkey shoot of a third rate Saddam's Army in the Gulf and, granted, a magnificent victory in the Pacific during WW II, all other military events in the American history were of secondary importance when ranked against the background of a global military history. US "victories" in both WWI and WWII were coalition victories with the US arriving very late to the fight. American Civil War, while of importance as a first bona fide war of the industrial age (well, Crimean War certainly qualifies too) was primarily internal US and, to a degree, British endeavor. In other words, America's rise as a global power was predetermined primarily, apart from undeniable American technological and industrial genius, by a combination of very unique favorable circumstances in which NOT fighting a continental war with all it entails was a defining factor in American emergence as a true global player after WW II. Hence a rather foolhardy attitudes towards a war in the US because people who call on it all the time, including Haas (he wanted the US to be a global sheriff), Kagan cabal, US policy-makers and other public "servants" know extremely well that in case of war their asses will still reside in the safety of the America-proper while American GIs will die for whatever BS doctrine is a fad any given day in D.C. 

Haas needs, however, to justify the failure of the American doctrine-mongering (he knows about this failure, if he doesn't--then it is the case for medical psychology, not history) and he does what most of them do, he deludes himself with this:

Although Russia has avoided any direct military challenge to NATO, it has nonetheless shown a growing willingness to disrupt the status quo: through its use of force in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014, its often indiscriminate military intervention in Syria, and its aggressive use of cyberwarfare to attempt to affect political outcomes in the United States and Europe.   

It is a very telling (false through and through) passage since it discloses a nagging, barely hidden under the surface, complex of inferiority they feel. It is schizophrenic really, akin to Russophrenia--when one has to both proclaim the US the "greatest" power that ever was, while having zero evidence of this power's military successes in the second half of the 20th and, especially, 21st centuries to support such claims. So, Haas and his keen of "intellectuals" who influence US foreign policy need to use a mental therapy by inventing things which are not there:

1. For starters, there is nothing, zero, "indiscriminate" in Russia's participation--Russia was invited to Syria by this country's legitimate government, does Mr.Haas know this? Russia kills in Syria, using a lot of SMART munitions, a Jihad Internationale ranging from ISIS, Al Qaeda to other unicorns ("democratic" head choppers supported by the US and her allies). US desperately wanted Russia and Assad government to fail--but since they didn't study military history they knew very little about what Russia's objectives were and how she fights in Syria. So people like Haas are really pissed--yet another of their forecast didn't pan out. 

2. Russia didn't really use her force in Ukraine. Yes, Russia, obviously, supports LDNR republics but I wouldn't call it use of force since if the force would have been really used, Ukraine would cease to exist as a state really-really fast with NATO getting a western rump of this largely failed state, while LDNR with Russia's help would reconstitute something new in the East and South of present day Ukraine. So, why Haas writes an obvious BS in supposedly scholarly magazine is a mystery. Self-medicating mentally? Possible.   

3. Ah, yes, Russiagate, Russians "meddling" in Western "democracies". Surely both Russia and US conduct cyber operations but this whole circus with Russia "influencing" outcomes is really pathetic (did Haas call Muller recently, I am sure after two years of "investigation" we all will get "evidence" about Russians subverting US "democracy" any minute now) and characteristic of a lack of any self-respect and huge insecurity of US "elites" who long ago hit the bottom and are on the level of travelers to Roswell in their attempts to connect spiritually with aliens. 

In general, there is nothing scholarly in this continuous, often murky, stream of recent American "thinkers" theses, ranging from magazine articles to books, since in their continuous lament about collapse of Pax Americana, or "global order", or "liberal order", whatever the moniker they want to slap on the global chaos the US is trying to perpetuate in an attempt to save its hegemony, they continuously forget to mention one simple military fact. This fact is the loss of American insulation from conventional warfare (who wants to fight a nuclear war, no, really?) she enjoyed since WW II and facing a very grim reality of getting conventional strikes on US Command and Control and military industrial infrastructure in case of igniting conventional conflict with, say, Russia. It is this massive change in military-strategic paradigm, driven this time by a very real, not contrived, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which the US appeared to be not ready for. This is what drives this mass hysteria among those who want to blame their own lack of knowledge, education, foresight and of this proverbial statecraft on everyone else but themselves. Indeed, with "scholars" and "thinkers" like Haas (or Fukuyama, or Allison, or.....theirs is the army) there is very little surprise that the United States finds itself where it is. In other words, those "scholars" should have known better but they haven't and for that they have only themselves to blame, even if hiding behind pseudo-scientific rhetoric about "global order", because in the end one reaps what one sows.