Why I Pay Little Attention To Explosions And Military Porn.

Yesterday, one of our friends, Andrew, provided a link to a wonderful discussion between Col. Macgregor and LTC. Shaffer:

Is the Outcome of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Preordained? Col. Douglas Macgregor and LTC Tony Shaffer

It is an excellent discussion of two professionals, granted I strongly agree with Macgregor on George C. Marshall and, naturally, completely disagree on Patton complaining about "constantly relieving everybody". Patton wouldn't last a month on the Eastern Front. Here is the video extract of the audio of this very same podcast, which is crucial in identifying operational and strategic realities of SMO. 

It is crucial because Macgregor correctly points out the fact of ISR complex being continuously employed by Russian forces and providing targeting 24/7. What Macgregor doesn't call by its name is, in fact, a first strategic use in history of fully networked battlefield against NATO, which, naturally, thought that it knew how to fight Netcentric war. 

I dedicate a large portion of my second book describing what it is and how it works. I explained, giving a proper due to late Admiral Cebrowski, that already in Soviet Union issues of netcentricity were being developed at a very rapid pace, without calling them such. Russians certainly used the term "network" (сеть) but didn't call it netcentric yet. 

Such an idea is not a new one. The Soviet Navy realized similar principles in its premier anti-shipping missiles of the 1980s and 90s, P-700 Granit (NATO SS-N-19 Shipwreck), which were fully networked in the salvo, able to communicate with each other, and capable of completely autonomous operations, including targets’ distribution within the salvo, and Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM), and they were fully shoot-and-forget weapons. For the mid-1980s this was an extremely impressive and, in many senses, revolutionary capability which was due to an explosive development of data processing technologies. 

We also should not forget MiG-31 and its ability to serve as a node in the network of up to six similar fighters and ability to distribute a salvo of air-to-air missiles. And, of course, Soviet Air Defense was into both networking and sensor fusion since 1960s. And that is what Russia's ISR complex does in SMO--it "leverages" netcentricity and provides excellent sensor and data fusion. Macgregor speaks about only 7 minutes it took Russian Navy from receiving the intel about VSU moving its forces into one of the storage facilities near Kiev, receive targeting, develop firing solution and launch. Macgregor admits that this is an impossible task for the US Forces. 

This, not some explosion of the NATO equipment propagated by all kinds of TG channels, is what drives NATO completely mad. This, plus the fact that Russian forces operate on a completely different strategic and operational logic which is NOT present and developed in the Western militaries. The fact that national economy, armed forces, foreign policy, security apparatus and political top operate as a unified and well coordinated mechanism is beyond West's in general and American in particular experiences. It is simply NOT there. 

So, start your stop-watches, ladies and gentlemen, before two Euro-poodles, Macron and Von Der Lugen, will be told by Comrade Xi to go pound sand when they visit Beijing in a desperate attempt to... whatever those Euro-losers are trying to accomplish, which is primarily a PR. Can you imagine a 6 year old kindergarten kid trying to sell penny-stock to a 60 year old successful hedge fund manager? There you go. It is the world of  tangibles, not BS. And winning the SMO is the most tangible of them all and they sense it in the West now. But it is too late.