Down The Memory Lane.

That was the "plan" by curators of 404 Nazis. If anyone forgot. 

Yesterday, there was a mass grave uncovered in Kursk Oblast--524 bodies of Russian civilians executed by NATO. Around one thousand is still missing. The Fourth Reich in action, but now it follows the path of its predecessor. Obviously, with Poroshenko being high on NATO Kool Aid promising this to Russians was a bad idea. 

In related news, in an attempt to alleviate the butt-hurt, the neocon central Newsweek ... lies. 

US hypersonic missile warship put to sea. A United States warship recently completed sea trials following upgrades to launch hypersonic missiles capable of striking targets at over five times the speed of sound. USS Zumwalt, one of three Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers, underwent modernization to become the first U.S. Navy platform capable of launching the Conventional Prompt Strike, or CPS, a hypersonic boost-glide missile designed to defeat enemy defenses.

I have news--the US doesn't have hypersonic weapons and is not going to have them any time soon. So, sticking some VLS for non-existent weapon to the white elephant is not producing "hypersonic missile warship", which, in the end is absolutely defenseless against real hypersonic weapons. Yes, the US Army announced the "fielding" of LRHW. Fielding being the term for all kinds of activities not related to actual weapon. But let me remind you about this weapon. 

Another Army officer at the event, who is not immediately identifiable, told Hegseth that Dark Eagle has a warhead “under 30 pounds,” which is relatively tiny for a long-range weapon — smaller in size than what’s found on an AIM-120 air-to-air missile, for instance. The officer stated the warhead is just to get its “projectiles out” and that it can deliver effects over an area about the same size as the parking lot they were standing on.

The Navy has its own program, Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Weapon System, as you might expect--the weapon also doesn't exist and when it will, nobody knows. But you can be assured of a variety of headlines and articles explaining how these weapons WILL work if they ever become actual weapons. But then we will have to get into the operational details of the modern naval warfare, where any US Navy's ship is nothing but a fat prestigious target and that in real world of conventional war it is not survivable. And then, of course, comes this issue of anti-missile defense and requirements for anti-hypersonic intercepts, but let's hope that the US and Russia (and China) find some modus vivendi. Otherwise it will take a long time trying to explain this. 

And what it all means for strategic balance. And I am not even talking about this. 

You have to explain to Pentagon that they need to attend elementary hyper-sonic school before trying to catch up. But no worries, the US military "is a finest fighting force in history"(c). 

People Are Talking About It. A Warning.

Let's recall what Colonel Douglas Macgregor, whose professional background is absolutely undeniable and he IS a real military expert, said about real war 8 years ago in his Time magazine piece. I quote:

In 110 days of fighting the German army in France during 1918, the U.S. Army Expeditionary Force sustained 318,000 casualties, including 110,000 killed in action. That’s the kind of lethality waiting for U.S. forces in a future war with real armies, air forces, air defenses and naval power. Ignoring this reality is the road to future defeats and American decline. It’s time to look beyond the stirring images of infantrymen storming machine-gun nests created by Hollywood and to see war for what it is and will be in the future: the ruthless extermination of the enemy with accurate, devastating firepower from the sea, from the air, from space and from mobile, armored firepower on land.

That, folks, is a real professional speaking, not some media clowns and self-proclaimed "experts" akin to permanently butt-hurt David Axe or his ilk. The reason I use Macgregor's quote is not because it tickles Russian rah-rah but because decision makers in the US, most of them with law and political science backgrounds, have no a faintest clue on how REAL war of the 21st century will look like between peers, let alone against power which is above peer level in some key technological issues of warfare. 

So, it is one thing when people with no academic and service military background sell military porn to teenagers, totally another when people, who usually stay behind the curtain, come out and say things which matter. So, couple of Ph.Ds in military science and associate professors (and senior officers) of Air Force Academy (Air War College) of Zhukovsky and Gagarin published the article in service magazine:

A war between Moscow and the West might start on the ground, but it would be settled in the air. That’s the verdict of two top Russian military strategists, published in a new analysis of how a putative conflict might play out.Writing in a new edition of the Air and Space Forces Journal, two associate professors at Russia’s pilot-training academy set out how any invasion launched against the country by NATO allies would depend on a massive aerial bombardment with warplanes and missiles. Vladilen Stuchinsky and Mikhail Korolkov say, however, that the approach isn’t foolproof.In order to disrupt the bombardment and frustrate ground-based operations, the analysts say, Russia should launch a colossal counter or pre-emptive strike to wipe out enemy hardware. This could be achieved, they argue, with the combined use of drones, missiles, cyber warfare and new weaponry, destroying Western equipment before it can even get airborne.

To understand what I am talking about, here is a link to a previous--free access--issues of this magazine and, yes, this is not some political BS or fashion rag. It is in Russian but has English summaries to many of its articles. People without physics and mathematics background may find the magazine intimidating. Here is December 2020 issue. This is a type of a magazine serious intelligence analysts are paid to read.  So, when these professors talk, we better listen. The summary of their article is rather simple: any NATO target will be detected, tracked and annihilated in case US and NATO decide to do a stupid thing. Hm, this is not the news, really, because when even RAND and its aerospace experts arrive to the same conclusion one has to think that, yeah, they have a point. Remember?

Of course, the US is not fighting on its own turf here. Neither do the RAND team explain exactly how America ended up fighting a hypothetical war thousands of miles from home. But defense money is defense money, and the researchers were keen to paint an apocalyptic picture, no doubt timed to coincide with the 2020 military budget, released on Monday. “We lose a lot of people. We lose a lot of equipment. We usually fail to achieve our objective of preventing aggression by the adversary,” RAND analyst David Ochmanek told a security conference on Thursday. “In our games, when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it.”

It is very reassuring that professionals on both sides arrive to the same conclusion and it is especially significant against today's statement by Russia's Defense Minister that:

МОСКВА, 9 февраля. /ТАСС/. Основу сил неядерного сдерживания составят гиперзвуковые комплексы различного базирования.

Translation: In the foundation of the Russian forces of non-nuclear containment will be hypersonic weapon complexes of different basing. 

This is what Shoigu told to the participants of the operational-mobilization meeting of the command corps in Moscow. Now, the mathematics of the conventional war in Europe (and against the US proper) in case US and NATO decide to suicide themselves was in place for years. And it changes non-stop towards dis-balancing constantly, because Russia's Armed Forces are in a perpetual technological and operational evolution, which is the first sign of a healthy and cutting edge military. So, can Russia deliver an Alpha-strike at any combination of NATO forces in Europe? Evidently she can, since stand-off high precision weapons are being delivered and deployed constantly and, given those systems very long ranges and very high probabilities of acquiring targets and "leaking" through NATO's air/missile defenses, one can, with a solid reliability predict that on the modern battlefield, survival of the stationary targets (such as airfields, troops assembly areas, field HQs etc.) without top level integrated air/missile defense is getting exceedingly low. 

NATO doesn't have air/missile defense which can handle massive cruise missiles salvo, let alone any hyper-sonic weapon. Even considering the inevitable degrading of the C4ISR, including low-orbit space recon assets, modern means of detection, air defense and targeting allow Russia to see aircraft at the runways as far away as Netherlands. What could be a result of such an "Alpha-strike"? It is easy to predict--a massive loss in personnel and hardware. How massive? Let me get out on a limb here and give the order of magnitude of personnel losses--many thousands from the first strike. Those air assets which will manage to get airborne will have to fight in the environment they never experienced before: aggressive ECM-ECCM, multilayered Air Defense, including AD ambushes and, in the end, facing off with a world-class RuAF operating from well defended airfields. Yes, folks, Russia is not Iraq. She is not even Iran. Moreover, she is not even China. That is a whole other level of military preparedness and firepower.  And then, of course, there are naval assets of NATO. What would NATO do if it loses a division-size force (across all domains) in a first strike? Your guess is a good as mine.

The importance of this article, however, is in fact that it is a warning, primarily. A very professional one, from people who are actual, active experts capable to speak from the background which involves also the highest level of clearance, which also tells us that by far not everything is articulated. But what is, is enough to give a pause to NATO and that is good enough for Russia. I go back to Elmo Zumwalt, again, and will continue to do so. As early as 1970 he was forced to contemplate the scale of the crisis if the US Navy lost one of its CVNs. Hence Project 60 and ideas on Sea Control Ships to screen US Navy's carriers from what already then was fast evolving anti-ship missile technology. Today? You all know what is today. Tomorrow? The end of a warfare as we know it by means of AI-driven, new sensors and combat networks equipped, delivery with precision of a massive conventional firepower to the ranges which ten years ago seemed inconceivable. Recall this? It is all in serial production. This also explains why China may really want to get into the military alliance with Russia. The tray of goodies is simply too tantalizing to bypass. But we knew this all along.         

"Experts".

Kyle Mizokami, who "blessed" many of us at some point of time with his "expert" opinions while writing for tabloid The National Interest, does it again. This time in Popular Mechanics. He, obviously, doesn't get, which is expected from the guy with some funny background in some "security", that the main issue are not some "hyper-sonic" weapons related to a rather bizarre concept of Prompt Global Strike but a completely different fruit altogether.

As the Union of Concerned Scientists points out, hypersonic weapons traveling at Mach 5-plus experience a whole new level of heat buildup. While a ballistic missile warhead might spend only seconds exposed to air friction, hypersonic weapons experience air friction throughout their entire flight. Chemical reactions with the surrounding air even create a plasma around the hypersonic weapon, which can interfere with the object’s ability to reference GPS or receive outside course correction commands. That’s not all. Hypersonic travel is so brutal that an object traveling at such speeds slowly tears itself apart during flight as the speed magnifies heat, wind, and other environmental factors. This gradually alters a hypersonic weapon’s flight dynamics, making accuracy an increasingly difficult problem.

Based on that triviality, he concludes, that hypersonic weapons "are not accurate". There is one issue, though, with this whole "expert" opinion--not only those hypersonic weapons are very accurate and have confirmed their accuracy, but are already deployed on a combat duty. So, what's the problem then? The problem is that Mizokami writes about hypersonic gliders which in Russia are known as fully combat ready Avangard system and which the United States tried to create (still tries) under different programs. The fact that, as is now traditional, Mizokami has no idea what he is writing about is mentioning of GPS. Sure. But Mizokami, he is an "expert" after all, must know that both in ballistics and hypersonic weapons (call it a hunch) one of the main correction channels is optronic one, including, but not limited to, capability to get celestial correction, as well as final capture (lock) of the target. But even this is not the main point. The main point is THIS:

WASHINGTON — In a move with sweeping consequences for the U.S. Navy’s battle force, the service is canceling plans to add 10 years to the expected service lives of its stalwart destroyer fleet, a cost-savings measure that would almost certainly hamper plans to grow the size of the fleet. In written testimony submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy’s Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts said performing service life extensions on Burkes designed to bring them up from 35-year hull lives to 45 years was not cost-effective.

One may ask a question--WHY? It is a good question and part of the answer to this question is undeniably fiscal. The United States realistically is bankrupt, while its technology, even a good one as those handsome Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, is insanely expensive. This is to put it politely. But the other huge part of the answer is in this passage:

Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said the cuts were a necessary step. Clark recently authored a study with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments that called for canceling the DDG service life extensions. “It’s crazy to throw good money after bad for a bunch of ships you say you don’t need,” Clark said. “I think the Navy is coming to grips with the fiscal realities; the unsustainable nature of their current plan; and the recognition it is going to have a need for fewer large surface combatants in the future and needs to husband its resources to build a larger fleet of smaller surface combatants. Those are going to be the bulk of the distributed force they intend to have.”

Ah, that is much-much warmer. The reason for that is a simple fact that large and expensive surface combatants are not survivable in the modern naval combat, unless they have weapon systems which can fight REAL hypersonic weapons such as fully combat ready and deployed Kinzhal, 3M22 Zircon or even nearing M=5 X-32 anti-shipping missiles. That is the real hypersonic threat, not those exotic Avangard gliders which merely exist to forestall the appearance in the future of similar systems in the United States and, if it ever materializes (I doubt it, but who knows) some sort of strategic anti-missile system. Unlike Avangard, which is a nuclear deterrent, another one in Russia's arsenal, Kinzhal, X-32 and Zircon are actual weapons designed specifically to fulfill a classic Sea Denial (or, if one wants an exercise in Pentagonese from me--Battle Space Denial) in both conventional or nuclear variants. They, not the Avangard, are the weapons which, being tactical-operational ones, achieved already a strategic and even doctrinal effect and these weapons are extremely precise. United States knows that. Liana, as Shoigu reported recently, namely last Peon NKS is nearing completion (in Russian), that's what is going to complete creation of Liana, which will (already does) provide detection, tracking and targeting for hypersonic and supersonic weapons against any targets.  

Same way as creation of modern rifles and machine guns forced infantry to abandon linear tactics and reduce its battlefield "footprint" by spreading (distributing) itself over distance, inevitably same distribution over area, including reduction in size and, inevitably, tightest control of emissions is one of the ways for surface combatants to increase their chances of survival against weapons which cannot be stopped and will not be stopped for some fairly long time by the US Navy. This is why, the United States lacking those capabilities, is destroying START treaty by demanding to include in it such weapon as Kinzhal. US also increasingly nuclearizes its own posture precisely because it lacks those conventional capabilities. Russia was ready to talk about Avangard and even offered a "discussion" on Kinzhal, but all those "discussions" today come with many strings attached and price to be paid, and Russia, certainly, is not discussing Zircon.  The United States is not ready to pay this price. This is the point Mizokami misses when discussing hypersonic gliders, which are not even that important against the background of a real RMA which completely changed power balance globally. 

In related news, it will be Severodvinsk, not Kazan, which was initially planned, to launch Zircon soon (in Russian), while Admiral Gorshkov will continue testing of this weapon this year. Several launches are announced. Zirconization of the Russian Navy proceeds apace. Well, that, plus global de-petrodollarization. We are at the threshold of the brave new world, or should I say: Brave New World? No, not Huxley's novel, but Iron Maiden's album, wink-wink;) Judging by modern day "experts" this future seems assured for us and it will require a lot of bravery to face it. 

Severodvinsk

Desperate Times, Desperate Measures, Or Should I Say Fantasies?

OK, I already stated a number of times that, bar some very few exceptions, The National Interest magazine is primarily a teenager-oriented publication and its military "experts" (apart from few real ones who contribute once in a while) are mostly products of "humanities" education who, for some unknown reason, think that they have faculties and backgrounds to comment on military "stuff". Such "experts" as Michael Peck (who is no expert) continue to "deliver". Here is the latest (cough...face-palm) from Peck based on some fantasy from DOD:

The U.S. Air Force has an idea: send out robot boats to detect sea-skimming missiles and give manned warships time to defend themselves.

He (Peck) bases his upbeat piece on this:

OBJECTIVE: Develop technologies to detect and track low radar cross section, high speed, low altitude weapons with unmanned surface vehicles over a large area of water.

DESCRIPTION: This SBIR topic seeks to identify and demonstrate technologies that can detect and track low radar cross section, high speed, low altitude weapons over a large area of water. Tracking on water ranges is limited by the inability of conventional radars to track over-the-horizon. This SBIR would address that limitation by utilizing unmanned surface vehicles. The system would need to be optimized for an unmanned surface vehicle that is approximately 10 feet long and 2 feet wide. The system must weigh less than 100 pounds and fit within a 6 inch by 12 inch by 12 inch payload box.

Obviously Peck lacks understanding of what is this all about and makes this hilarious statement: 

Sea-skimming missiles have been the nemesis of surface warships since the 1970s. Weapons such as France’s legendary Exocet, America’s Harpoon or Russia’s Zircon threaten even the most powerful warships with destruction.  

I would have called upon either Sir Patrick Stewart or Sergei Lavrov's "Fail" meme but I'll spend some time explaining (I doubt he will learn or even will be aware of my futile effort) to him why this statement of his (above) is preposterous.

1. Placing subsonic and fairly easy targets for advanced air defense such as Exocet or Harpoon in the same sentence with 3M22 Zircon, which is completing its trials and already reached speed in excess of M=8 is akin to putting 1960-s Volkswagen Beetle on the speed track of Formula-1 and asking to compete with team Ferrari or McLaren. And here is some basic physics, see below:

2. Since the times of high supersonic (M=3) SS-N-22 Sunburn (aka P-270 Moskit) anti-shipping missile, which is designed to conduct violent maneuvers on terminal, some teeny-weeny problem appeared with anti-missile defense of the fleet, any fleet. If my Alzheimer doesn't fail me, the ratio in terms of dynamic loads (aka g-forces) required for air-defense missile to intercept ANY anti-shipping missile are supposed to be 3 (three) to 1 (one), that is three times larger than that of the anti-shipping missile. Thus the issue was and is not just in early detection of an attacker (I am talking only about SINGLE missile now, for the clarity of picture, reality is--those fly in salvos), however crucially important in terms of time for developing firing solution this is, it is also about ability of air-defense missiles to guide themselves to the point of intercept of the ASM. 

3. If we are talking specifically about Moskit, the rumor has it that this missile can withstand sustained g-forces well in excess of 30g. Under this scenario, very-very roughly speaking, the intercepting missile must have the ability to maneuver with 30x3=90g loads sustained. Good luck doing this with short-burning AD missiles. As an example, superb Russian Tor air-defense complex' missile can maneuver with loads of up to 30g and take out targets flying with up to M=2. M=3 Onyx or M=2.9 3M54 Kalibr also maneuver violently at terminal. In general, the higher the speed is, the more g-loads maneuvering missile experiences.

4. Now comes this M=8+ maneuvering (look at air-ballistic Kinzhal which also maneuvers at M=10) Zircon and, if to omit a funny scenario when someone will try to shoot at it from behind Zircon's traverse course angles (+90 degrees from perpendicular to the missile, roughly speaking--a catch up mode) trying to catch it, which is impossible, even in the impossible scenario of literally shooting straight-ahead at approaching Zircon, one has to ask a question what are g-loads in this situation? Mind you, I am talking about grossly primitive, bordering on vulgar scenarios.

5. Of course, they in TNI do not know that AD missile do not fly in straight line and even in the case of straight flying M=8 target while shooting in a front sector of the approaching ASM the trajectory of the AD missile(s) will represent a curve towards point of intercept. Again, I underscore that these are vulgar scenarios, in real life, however, things will look very different because g-loads and approach trajectories of modern very high supersonic or hyper-sonic anti-shipping missiles are enormously complex and impose practically insurmountable limitation on existing Air Defense systems. 

Recall what numbers (I tend to support at least the order of magnitude of those numbers) circulate about key characteristic for 3M22. I quote myself:

If to believe probability of a single Zircon intercept by the latest US-NATO missiles such as SM-6 as P=0.02 through 0.03 (0.012-0.005 for distributed targeting), we get dismal numbers for a defending side. Even if we assume that those numbers are wrong (or do not consider all necessary coefficients) and we increase these numbers by the order of magnitude--we still end up with the death sentence for defending side even with the salvo of 2-3 missiles.  

While early detection is important, under present and foreseeable level of intercept means it becomes an absolute impossibility to intercept modern true hyper-sonic weapons. I'll explain it with the numbers in hand. Let us assume that modern and best US Naval air defense system's single missile has a probability of intercept of a single 3M22 Zircon 10 times (10!!! I deliberately change the actual order of magnitude) better than it is known to really be. Let this probability of intercept of single missile Ps=0.3. How many air-defense missiles then will be needed to intercept a single (again, unrealistic scenario)  3M22 with reliable probability of kill (defeat) Pdefeat=0.95. Let's write formula:

Now we plug our numbers:

                            0.95= 1- (1- 0.3)^n

                            0.95=1-0.7^n

                            0.05 = 0.7^n

We logarithmize both sides:

                       ln0.05=ln0.7^n

                      ln0.05=n*ln0.7   

Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.356675)

                   n= -2.995732/-0.356675=8.4

So, it takes roughly 8 missiles to defeat a single 3M22 under the ideal imaginary conditions and with capability of an air defense complex increased 10 fold--way in excess what even the most advanced (and non-existent, I may add) means may provide. Considering even this fantastically ludicrous scenario it comes as no surprise that the salvo of say 10 hyper-sonic missiles on CBG will require pretty much a whole Arleigh Burke-class Flight III DDG having nothing but AD missiles in its MK-41 90 cells, granted that this too is impossible scenario since all ships, other than CVN, in CBG carry other means, such as TLAM, in their MK-41s. Plus, no one puts AD missiles (you may check times required for their salvo on you own) on a single platform--those are distributed between escort ships and that in itself imposes other limitations. But, as I stated from the beginning--these calculations were done based on simply ludicrously favorable for defending side scenario. 

Let us now try way more realistic numbers for Ps=0.05 and see where this whole thing takes us in first approximation. 

 0.95= 1- (1- 0.05)^n

                            0.95=1-0.95^n

                            0.05 = 0.95^n

We logarithmize both sides:

                       ln0.05=ln0.95^n

                      ln0.05=n*ln0.95  

Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.051293)

    

                  n= -2.995732/-0.051293=58.4

So, as you can see it would take (again, under ideal conditions) roughly 58 AD missiles to defeat a single Zircon. Judging by a huge wave of alarmist pieces in US mass-media about hyper-sonic weapons, the level which I never encountered in my long years in the US, the message is definitely sinking in. This is not to mention that one is really pressed hard trying to imagine simultaneous launch of even 25 AD missiles from all escort ships in CBG, let alone 58 or even more (in hundreds) required to defeat a salvo of hyper-sonic attackers on CBG. It is all simple fantasy having no relation to actual real life and combat.

Even in this simplest model (distributed salvo is calculated with a more complex formula--not the point here) it is clear that even under the most favorable conditions, Michael Peck's grasping for the last exceptionalist straw:         

But radar robot boats would give their targets a little more time to prepare.  

Is nothing more than hack's delusion in a desperate attempt (a feeble one) to put a lipstick on a pig of a new warfare paradigm and now very real Revolution in Military Affairs which is sweeping the globe, changing with it the whole balance of geopolitical power. But I wrote one book about it and am writing another one (should be done by Summer, otherwise my publisher will strangle me) precisely on this topic. Let's hope that this Revolution will serve as a starting point for new, much calmer and much saner world without bullies and where great powers can find a new equilibrium, a peaceful one. 

Grain Of Salt.

All right, I get it--China does grow her naval muscles, it is absolutely obvious. I also liked Chinese response to overly impressionable Aussies: 

News Corp Australia noted the admiral’s statements on Sunday in the context of the news that Australian warships had been “challenged” in the waters. The meeting of the two navies was downplayed by the Australian Navy, but hyped in the media as a sign of China’s growing assertiveness. Chinese state media took offense. "If Australia considers exchanges between countries as interference, it should lock itself up in the dark room,” China’s Global Times quoted the Chinese foreign ministry as saying about what has been described as a “standoff” between the Chinese and Australian ships.

The statement Australia's media are referring to is by, here is excerpt:

If Chinese leaders thought that saying goodbye to their least favorite US military commander, current US Pacific Command chief Admiral Harry Harris, would mean a more amenable replacement is on the way, they had better guess again. The nominee to take the spot when Harris becomes ambassador to Australia is sounding the alarm bells about China’s operations in the South China Sea, calling for the US to maintain a strong presence in the region and step up advanced weapons development. In written testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee released last week, the likely pick, Admiral Philip Davidson, said that China has already taken control of the South China Sea. “In short,” he wrote, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”

If by control Admiral Davidson means ability to deploy increasingly impressive Chinese surface naval component--absolutely. Moreover, China was investing like crazy into state-of-the-art air superiority component and in developing a genuine A2/AD capability, not least through a variety of anti-shipping missiles. At some point of time it was inevitable that US and allied Navies will encounter China's Fleet-In-Being. There is, however, one field where US Navy is simply in a different league with PLAN--it is nuclear submarine component where US Navy holds for now overwhelming technological and operational advantage over PLAN beyond realistic ranges of PLAN's SSKs and patrol aviation. How long this gap will continue to exist? I don't know. I'll go out on a limb and say 10-12 years. So, if Davidson is concerned with the "security" of Oceania (boy, did those bells ring with Orwellian melody immediately), I would take those concerns with a little grain of salt.

The issue is larger than Oceania--it is global and, apart from significant traditional threat inflation for monetary (budgetary) gain, is about overall naval strategy and doctrine. Davidson was to the point when describing technological approach:

Regarding military technology, Davidson outlined a number of crucial areas in which to invest. “A more effective Joint Force requires sustained investment in the following critical areas: undersea warfare, critical munitions stockpiles, standoff weapons (Air-Air, Air-Surface, Surface-Surface, Anti-Ship), intermediate range cruise missiles, low cost / high capacity cruise missile defense, hypersonic weapons, air and surface lift capacity, cyber capabilities, air-air refueling capacity, and resilient communication and navigation systems.”

See highlighted in yellow? As I encountered last week some stupid (I am sure by one of those "experts" from US tabloids masquerading as "analytical" magazines) parallel: Speed is a New Stealth?  "Is"? Really? And since when "Stealth", much of which is PR, was the "thing"? It was and is always a speed, and these are hyper-sonic weapons and upcoming extremely capable Air-Missile-Defense complexes which already redefined naval warfare and with it the global balance of power. It will be rather fascinating to observe the US Navy's anti-shipping missile development. As recent events in Syria has shown, LRASM (a derivative of JASSM) is obsolete on arrival--it simply doesn't measure up to modern AD and EW capabilities of Russian or Chinese Navies. To have a real punch--one must today get into the Mach=3+ and highly maneuverable salvos' territory and this is not going to be easy. Not at all. US still commands an impressive scientific and engineering competence, but it will be not easy to close the gap in weapon systems which for all intents and purposes were viewed in US Navy as institutional threat to Aircraft Carriers. But it seems we really are nearing the moment of truth. 

RMA.

I understand that long forgotten art of simplest, middle school level, linear extrapolation based on two or three, or four data points is only now being resurrected in American top policy (or lack thereof, rather) circles. But it seems General John Heyten tried to deliver the "news" (those are the "news" only for Washington political "elite") yet again at Space Symposium on Tuesday. 

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — The head of U.S. Strategic Command would not say whether the United States has seen evidence of Russia’s “invincible” hypersonic missile, but the U.S. military has observed both Russia and China operating hypersonic missiles of varied capabilities, he confirmed Tuesday. “I won’t give you any specifics about the means we use to watch that. I won’t give you any of the technical specifics about the capabilities of those missiles,” Gen. John Hyten told reporters at the Space Symposium. “But I can tell you that we have observed both Russia and China testing hypersonic capabilities.”

The Kinzhal hypersonic cruise missile, which will be able to be equipped with both a nuclear and conventional warhead, can “overcome all existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems,” Putin said then. Whether that missile is in its developmental stages or actually undergoing operational tests, Hyten wouldn’t say. But it was obvious he took Putin’s claims very seriously. “You should believe Vladimir Putin about everything he said he’s working on,” Hyten said. “Now, the operational status of a lot of those capabilities…that’s a different issue. But everything that he’s said, I know that Russia’s working on, and we watch them very closely. We also listen to what they say very closely, and none of what he did and none of what he said surprised me.”

The issue here is extremely, like almost kindergarten level, simple—the US and her so called Russia's "military expertdom", bar some very few (and I mean a very small number: 5-6 at most, if not fewer) real professionals and true experts, is pathetic. It has a "stellar" record of neither predicting nor understanding Soviet/Russian military-technological realities nor operational, strategic or political ramifications of just about anything Russia (or USSR) ever produced in her military technology. It is akin to explaining the aliens from other galaxy who procreate by spawning what is the meaning of unprotected sex. 

Soviet Union lead the United States in supersonic cruise missiles for many decades. Kinzhal or no Kinzhal, 3M22 Zircon or no Zircon, an overwhelming lead by USSR in this field became clear already by 1970s. M=2.5 at high altitude capable P-700 Granit became the mainstay of anti-shipping and secondary TLAM capability in Soviet Navy by 1980. West had nothing comparable. By the time P-800 Onyx (Oniks) came around in late 1980s only moron couldn't see where this all was going. The race was always for hyper-sonic speeds to limit reaction time of whatever air-defense systems NATO fleets would deploy and to deny any "traverse", let alone "catch up" intercepts in case of relatively high densities of AD means, such as the case with US Navy's CBGs. 4-6 3M54 missile salvo, especially from underwater, provides very high probabilities of at least the leaker or two, that is missiles which break through AD screen and hit targets, 10-20 missile salvo spells the doom to any group of the ships, including aircraft carrier. Zircon or Kinzhal make any group of surface ships simply defenseless. 

So, what's left for Pentagon to do in this case? As Russians themselves admitted, the United States works hard on some kind of hyper-sonic system but it is highly doubtful that it will come on-line, at least in IOC, such as Kinzhal has already, any time soon. As simply sensational performance of Pantsir S1 in Syria recently demonstrated, the fact US media are desperately trying to hide from public, any subsonic target for such systems is simply not a serious target, especially in the case of full integration into Russia's vast and powerful C4ISR complex. Starting from the third hull of Project 22800 Karakurt, all ships of this class will have navalized version of this very Pantsir, which will make those numerous ships not just capable, both anti-shipping and land-attack, missile platforms, but excellent air-defense screens. Pantsir, obviously, had no difficulties dealing with allegedly "Smart" and "stealthy" JASSMs (or naval version—LRASM). For now, the only weapon which is high supersonic on any US carrier is an aircraft carried HAARM missiles. The launch of such a weapon against the most likely background of pr. 22350 Gorshkov-class frigates, acting as a core of Ships Strike Group, armed with Redut AD complex mitigates any launch of HAARMs since requires any HAARM carrier to enter kill-zones and that is just one of the scenarios which doesn't account for impressive ECM-ECCM capabilities.  

Will the US at some point of time procure something more powerful and capable than venerable Harpoon or Tomahawk? Stop-gap measure of using SM-6 as "anti-shipping missile" is not being taken very seriously, at least not in Russia:

The US Navy is seeking to adapt the Standard 6 (SM-6) missile for use against ships. If this modification is successful, the range of the SM-6 will be increased from 250 km to 370 km. This is a new anti-ship mode that can shoot down airborne threats, and now the same missile can attack and destroy a ship at long range. The Navy wanted to spend $2.9 billion over the five years FY17-FY22on the modified SM-6 as part of its “distributed lethality” initiative. This new anti-ship mode makes the SM-6 highly lethal due to its speed and agility and nearly overnight doubles the purpose of every such missile used across our fleet of Aegis destroyers. Boeing’s (BA) Harpoon anti-ship missile has a range of about 67 nautical miles, less than 130 km. 

It is inevitable that US will get it done at some point of time but with modern Russian anti-shipping missiles hitting already launch ranges of 800+ kilometers, while improving the lethality of their AD systems, it really makes those stop-gap measures look merely as "doing something". This is WITHOUT consideration of Kinzhal and what it brings operationally and strategically. With Kinzhal and eventual deployment of MiG-31BMs which carry it to Syria, one can easily understand gigantic geopolitical ramifications. Perspective Russian destroyers, yes-yes, I know the score with those—long a tedious process of design, re-design and re-design yet again, with all those Design Bureaus showing off their models and exercising in PR, should be armed with either navalized S-400 of latest versions or, if available by then, navalized S-500, the whole concept of war in the ocean (and land) will be completely changed. Well, it already is changed—but who knows, we may indeed, be facing the final coming of long awaited but never materialized in 1990s and 2000s RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). Who would have thought that it would be Russia, not US, who brought this about.   

UPDATE: Oh, goody, here we go again.  

Washington (AFP) - The US Air Force is awarding almost $1 billion to Lockheed Martin to design and develop a hypersonic missile that can be launched from a warplane.

The contract follows repeated warnings from senior defense officials about rapid advances by China and Russia in the field of hypersonic weaponry, where missiles can fly at many times the speed of sound and dodge missile-defense systems.

This, of course, was totally expected and predicted. 

Gary Pennett, director of operations at the Missile Defense Agency, recently said enemy hypersonic weapons -- which could be launched from planes, ships or submarines -- would create a "significant" gap in US sensor and missile interceptor capabilities.  

In related news for Gary Pennett, the gap "would not" be created, it has already been created. I am not sure, however, about China's real, not claimed, capabilities. They were doing their thing for a while too. Now, as was discussed on this blog not for once--what would US Navy's Carrier Union do, when its very own carrier offsprings, highly experienced carrier aviators, Commanders Joseph A. Gattuzo and Lori J. Tanner brought this issue up like this in 2001:

“In the past, the successful nations were those who best tailored force structures to meet political objectives... Cruise missiles will replace manned aircraft and sink the ships that carry them... Money spent furthering manned aircraft technologies and programs—the CVNX (proposed Nimitz-class carrier replacement) being one of them—is like polishing cannonballs so they will fly a little farther.”

Ah-h, this ever annoying force structure issue.