Desperate Times, Desperate Measures, Or Should I Say Fantasies?

OK, I already stated a number of times that, bar some very few exceptions, The National Interest magazine is primarily a teenager-oriented publication and its military "experts" (apart from few real ones who contribute once in a while) are mostly products of "humanities" education who, for some unknown reason, think that they have faculties and backgrounds to comment on military "stuff". Such "experts" as Michael Peck (who is no expert) continue to "deliver". Here is the latest (cough...face-palm) from Peck based on some fantasy from DOD:

The U.S. Air Force has an idea: send out robot boats to detect sea-skimming missiles and give manned warships time to defend themselves.

He (Peck) bases his upbeat piece on this:

OBJECTIVE: Develop technologies to detect and track low radar cross section, high speed, low altitude weapons with unmanned surface vehicles over a large area of water.

DESCRIPTION: This SBIR topic seeks to identify and demonstrate technologies that can detect and track low radar cross section, high speed, low altitude weapons over a large area of water. Tracking on water ranges is limited by the inability of conventional radars to track over-the-horizon. This SBIR would address that limitation by utilizing unmanned surface vehicles. The system would need to be optimized for an unmanned surface vehicle that is approximately 10 feet long and 2 feet wide. The system must weigh less than 100 pounds and fit within a 6 inch by 12 inch by 12 inch payload box.

Obviously Peck lacks understanding of what is this all about and makes this hilarious statement: 

Sea-skimming missiles have been the nemesis of surface warships since the 1970s. Weapons such as France’s legendary Exocet, America’s Harpoon or Russia’s Zircon threaten even the most powerful warships with destruction.  

I would have called upon either Sir Patrick Stewart or Sergei Lavrov's "Fail" meme but I'll spend some time explaining (I doubt he will learn or even will be aware of my futile effort) to him why this statement of his (above) is preposterous.

1. Placing subsonic and fairly easy targets for advanced air defense such as Exocet or Harpoon in the same sentence with 3M22 Zircon, which is completing its trials and already reached speed in excess of M=8 is akin to putting 1960-s Volkswagen Beetle on the speed track of Formula-1 and asking to compete with team Ferrari or McLaren. And here is some basic physics, see below:

2. Since the times of high supersonic (M=3) SS-N-22 Sunburn (aka P-270 Moskit) anti-shipping missile, which is designed to conduct violent maneuvers on terminal, some teeny-weeny problem appeared with anti-missile defense of the fleet, any fleet. If my Alzheimer doesn't fail me, the ratio in terms of dynamic loads (aka g-forces) required for air-defense missile to intercept ANY anti-shipping missile are supposed to be 3 (three) to 1 (one), that is three times larger than that of the anti-shipping missile. Thus the issue was and is not just in early detection of an attacker (I am talking only about SINGLE missile now, for the clarity of picture, reality is--those fly in salvos), however crucially important in terms of time for developing firing solution this is, it is also about ability of air-defense missiles to guide themselves to the point of intercept of the ASM. 

3. If we are talking specifically about Moskit, the rumor has it that this missile can withstand sustained g-forces well in excess of 30g. Under this scenario, very-very roughly speaking, the intercepting missile must have the ability to maneuver with 30x3=90g loads sustained. Good luck doing this with short-burning AD missiles. As an example, superb Russian Tor air-defense complex' missile can maneuver with loads of up to 30g and take out targets flying with up to M=2. M=3 Onyx or M=2.9 3M54 Kalibr also maneuver violently at terminal. In general, the higher the speed is, the more g-loads maneuvering missile experiences.

4. Now comes this M=8+ maneuvering (look at air-ballistic Kinzhal which also maneuvers at M=10) Zircon and, if to omit a funny scenario when someone will try to shoot at it from behind Zircon's traverse course angles (+90 degrees from perpendicular to the missile, roughly speaking--a catch up mode) trying to catch it, which is impossible, even in the impossible scenario of literally shooting straight-ahead at approaching Zircon, one has to ask a question what are g-loads in this situation? Mind you, I am talking about grossly primitive, bordering on vulgar scenarios.

5. Of course, they in TNI do not know that AD missile do not fly in straight line and even in the case of straight flying M=8 target while shooting in a front sector of the approaching ASM the trajectory of the AD missile(s) will represent a curve towards point of intercept. Again, I underscore that these are vulgar scenarios, in real life, however, things will look very different because g-loads and approach trajectories of modern very high supersonic or hyper-sonic anti-shipping missiles are enormously complex and impose practically insurmountable limitation on existing Air Defense systems. 

Recall what numbers (I tend to support at least the order of magnitude of those numbers) circulate about key characteristic for 3M22. I quote myself:

If to believe probability of a single Zircon intercept by the latest US-NATO missiles such as SM-6 as P=0.02 through 0.03 (0.012-0.005 for distributed targeting), we get dismal numbers for a defending side. Even if we assume that those numbers are wrong (or do not consider all necessary coefficients) and we increase these numbers by the order of magnitude--we still end up with the death sentence for defending side even with the salvo of 2-3 missiles.  

While early detection is important, under present and foreseeable level of intercept means it becomes an absolute impossibility to intercept modern true hyper-sonic weapons. I'll explain it with the numbers in hand. Let us assume that modern and best US Naval air defense system's single missile has a probability of intercept of a single 3M22 Zircon 10 times (10!!! I deliberately change the actual order of magnitude) better than it is known to really be. Let this probability of intercept of single missile Ps=0.3. How many air-defense missiles then will be needed to intercept a single (again, unrealistic scenario)  3M22 with reliable probability of kill (defeat) Pdefeat=0.95. Let's write formula:

Now we plug our numbers:

                            0.95= 1- (1- 0.3)^n

                            0.95=1-0.7^n

                            0.05 = 0.7^n

We logarithmize both sides:

                       ln0.05=ln0.7^n

                      ln0.05=n*ln0.7   

Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.356675)

                   n= -2.995732/-0.356675=8.4

So, it takes roughly 8 missiles to defeat a single 3M22 under the ideal imaginary conditions and with capability of an air defense complex increased 10 fold--way in excess what even the most advanced (and non-existent, I may add) means may provide. Considering even this fantastically ludicrous scenario it comes as no surprise that the salvo of say 10 hyper-sonic missiles on CBG will require pretty much a whole Arleigh Burke-class Flight III DDG having nothing but AD missiles in its MK-41 90 cells, granted that this too is impossible scenario since all ships, other than CVN, in CBG carry other means, such as TLAM, in their MK-41s. Plus, no one puts AD missiles (you may check times required for their salvo on you own) on a single platform--those are distributed between escort ships and that in itself imposes other limitations. But, as I stated from the beginning--these calculations were done based on simply ludicrously favorable for defending side scenario. 

Let us now try way more realistic numbers for Ps=0.05 and see where this whole thing takes us in first approximation. 

 0.95= 1- (1- 0.05)^n

                            0.95=1-0.95^n

                            0.05 = 0.95^n

We logarithmize both sides:

                       ln0.05=ln0.95^n

                      ln0.05=n*ln0.95  

Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.051293)

    

                  n= -2.995732/-0.051293=58.4

So, as you can see it would take (again, under ideal conditions) roughly 58 AD missiles to defeat a single Zircon. Judging by a huge wave of alarmist pieces in US mass-media about hyper-sonic weapons, the level which I never encountered in my long years in the US, the message is definitely sinking in. This is not to mention that one is really pressed hard trying to imagine simultaneous launch of even 25 AD missiles from all escort ships in CBG, let alone 58 or even more (in hundreds) required to defeat a salvo of hyper-sonic attackers on CBG. It is all simple fantasy having no relation to actual real life and combat.

Even in this simplest model (distributed salvo is calculated with a more complex formula--not the point here) it is clear that even under the most favorable conditions, Michael Peck's grasping for the last exceptionalist straw:         

But radar robot boats would give their targets a little more time to prepare.  

Is nothing more than hack's delusion in a desperate attempt (a feeble one) to put a lipstick on a pig of a new warfare paradigm and now very real Revolution in Military Affairs which is sweeping the globe, changing with it the whole balance of geopolitical power. But I wrote one book about it and am writing another one (should be done by Summer, otherwise my publisher will strangle me) precisely on this topic. Let's hope that this Revolution will serve as a starting point for new, much calmer and much saner world without bullies and where great powers can find a new equilibrium, a peaceful one. 

Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't-II

Elmo Zumwalt, who probably, should he be still alive today, would hate to see what kind of ships' class was named after him, had some ideas about naval warfare which certainly did not and do not fit US Navy's preferences of, as either Hyman Rickover or Arleigh Burke (do not remember from the top of my head) stated, "the US Navy got used to traveling the first class". The "first class", of course, being large and expensive, or rather very expensive, combatants. There always existed this contradiction between Arleigh Burke's "we need numbers" and this very "traveling the first class". Indeed, it is very difficult to have both and especially so when the foundation of contemporary operational culture of US Navy is classic Nimitz, and upcoming Ford-classes CVNs who pack an immense punch against inferior nation and her fleet but also are immensely, in fact--outrageously, expensive. They are not only expensive in themselves, let alone with organic air wing on and under their decks, but they require a constant escort of several other very expensive and sophisticated AEGIS ships equipped with the  SPY-1D,  and its further modifications, radar. Of course, the issue of ASW of Carrier Battle Group follows not far behind. This is an antithesis to a US Navy's contemporary slogan of Distributed Lethality.  

Enter Elmo Zumwalt and his tenure as CNO (Chief Of Naval Operations) in early 1970s. As one of the truly great US Navy's historians, George Baer, wrote: "The colossal expense of each heavy nuclear-powered carrier (1.44 billion in 1977) and many years it would take to replace one if it was sunk, had become reasons for being more cautious about using such carriers on the offense. To be sure, carriers retained a much debated value as politically unencumbered strike bases, but their use increasingly depended on existing Sea Control and on the ability to defend them. Further more, Zumwalt's thinking went, the technologically complicated carrier (and the similarly sophisticated and expensive nuclear submarine) required Navy personnel to go early into intensive specialization. Officers and sailors were thus forced to adopt a narrow, operational focus to form "unions", particularist and exclusive communities within the Navy that closed minds and limited vision". ("One Hundred Years Of Sea Power, The US Navy 1890-1990". George W. Baer, pages 402-403). Needless to say, US naval aviators "union" is immensely powerful and influential. Yet, it is one of the major obstacles to US Navy's achieving even a slight departure from its manifest carrier-centrism towards true Distributed Lethality. 

Zumwalt understood this problem in late 1960s. As much as some still thought (and some still do) about naval warfare in WW II carrier paradigm, facing technological reality was inevitable: once the ranges of the anti-shipping missiles reached the vicinity of deck aviation's ranges, the game was up. Russians, initially, called their first crude Anti-Shipping Missiles (ASMs) an airplane-shell (samolet-snaryad), which pretty much summed it up. Initially crude and short-range, those ASMs still represented the threat to US Navy's assets which it never encountered before. Those assets could be hit from relatively afar not by real aircraft and required a very different approach to the defense of US Navy's most prized possessions--aircraft carriers. Here is a dilemma which US Navy faced: in good old times of naval gunnery (with the exception of tragic HMS Hood and Russian humiliation at Tsushima)  the exchange between two adversaries was pretty straight-forward--they pummeled each-other with relatively inexpensive (when compared to the cost of some battleship or cruiser) shells until one of them was either sunk or quit but it was quite often after dealing a lot of damage to the victor. So, all in all, the side that lost could at least claim a good fight, granted that often victors, indeed, did require either serious repairs or, altogether, a withdrawal from the operation for a very long periods of time. ASMs changed all that on 21 October 1967.  Then, of course, came Operation Trident with same good ol' P-15 Termites (NATO Styx) ASMs doing the trick on Pakistan's Navy ships and HQ in Karachi. The whole notion that several small 183-ton displacement ships carrying ASMs could wreck the havoc on the enemy came as a surprise to US Navy. Yet, US Navy still decided to stick to its carrier-centric template. USSR, on the other hand, continued to develop a whole line of ASMs, ranging from cumbersome P-6/P-35 (NATO Shaddock) to, later, first ever submarine launched ASMs P-70 Ametyst, later substituted with more advanced P-120 Malakhit (NATO SS-N-9 Siren). Here was a serious change in the paradigm. Consider this: the older, however powerful,  Shaddocks carried a ton of explosives to a distance of 450 km but they had one huge drawback since required Echo-class (Project 675) SSGNs to surface and remain surfaced for a significant periods of time to provide guidance to ASMs until they could be guided by TU-95RTz hanging near US Navy's CBGs. The chances of Echoes to survive this ordeal were, frankly, very modest. Once surfaced they could be relatively easy to detect, both visually and by radar, and to launch US Navy's first Harpoons, which, at that time were carried by P-3 Orion patrol (ASW) aircraft. Actually, this is how AGM-84 (also RGM and UGM) Harpoon came into existence, not least through efforts of Admiral Zumwalt, who headed  at that time the division of System Analysis. Here is what Zumwalt had to say:

 
As you can see, "carrier union" at that time was so confident (arrogant?) in the power of its wings that it didn't pay too much attention to some funny weapon such as ASM. Well, the reality, however, was not that bright. Here was a weapon which for a tiny fraction of cost of its carrier could badly damage or eliminate altogether US Navy's most prized and most expensive possession--an aircraft carrier. Here is a simple math: 

 The case of Echoes SSGNs. 

As was already stated, after the launch Echoes remained a sitting ducks for approximately half-an-hour, providing guidance to their missiles. Obviously the time varied with the distance of salvo or how close (or far) was one of the TU-95RTz. And here we can do some pretty simple modelling for, let's say, the range of salvo by Shaddocks of about 300 kilometers. This is by no means to make actual calculations but to merely give a very simplified impression of what went into considerations at the dawn of serious ASMs. The truth was that with Echoes the task of defending a CBG was a twofold:

a) to conduct a real ASW search of the area where submerged Echo or multiple Echoes could be;
b) to shoot down incoming Shaddocks and to detect and destroy surfaced Echo(es) in order to prevent either a second salvo of 4 Shaddocks or prevent a first 4 missile salvo altogether.   

If to consider the range of salvo to be 300 kilometers and to mentally freeze sailing CBG we get the circle with the radius of r=300 kilometers. Let's use good ole area of the circle formula and calculate what area should CBG's escorts and aviation cover (conduct search) to detect Echos. 
 

Not a small task, if to consider that this search area is about half the size of France. For now we we'll omit all those Detection Probabilities and Operational Sweeps but we, certainly, can easily calculate the time it is required for a single aircraft with, say, MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detector) which is a corroborative but extremely important search sensor for submerged subs. To properly detect a sub, a patrol aircraft with MAD has to be pretty low (hundreds of meters) and with the range of MAD, say, R=2 kilometers we can easily calculate Sweep Width (W), which is:

                      W=2R=2 x 2 = 4 kilometers

Now it is time to calculate Sweep Rate (R) which is R=WV, where V is a speed of a patrol aircraft. Let's say that this aircraft has a speed near surface V=250 kilometers per hour. It will be a bumpy ride, but then again--patrol aviation lacks this glamour of fighter jets, yet it is this aviation which often carries out the most important mission.  So, the Sweep Rate (R) for this patrol aircraft will be: 

             R=WV= 4 x 240 = 960 square kilometers per hour

Here, using the formula of the time for search per specific area, we get:   

294 hours--not a pretty picture, to put it mildly, but, of course, in real life the issue is addressed by the increase of the number of patrol aircraft operating both from carrier and from nearest bases, organic to CBG attack subs also conduct their own sweeps, as well as the surface ships, thus increasing Sweep Rate dramatically. But this is as far as the submerged Echoes go. Once on the surface to launch this ever important Sweep Width (W), grows tremendously for patrol aviation since it can detect Echoes by visual and radar means. Radar changes equation and here we are talking Sweep Widths jumping into many tens of kilometers. Consider the range of patrol aircraft radar when detecting a surfaced Echo at the range of 50 kilometers, suddenly the equation changes for R, since on higher elevations patrol aircraft fly faster, say 400 kilometers per hour, and see much further:

    R=WV= 100 x 400 = 40,000 square kilometers per hour 

This is a totally different game. But it also shows what a dramatic, revolutionary really, change came about when first Ametysts, and, later, P-120 Malakhits started to be launched by new Project 670 (Charlie-class) SSGNs from the submerged position--this changed the game completely, but especially so when P-700 Granit (SS-N-21 Shipwreck) came online in early 1980s. Their operational range was 600+ kilometers and that made a Search Area a whopping 1,130,400 square kilometers. Even for mighty US Navy's CBGs of 1980s this was not an easy task, to put it mildly. But that is what makes Zumwalt such a remarkable naval thinker, he foresaw the coming of missile paradigm in 1960s and he knew, that the real fight for Sea Control, especially closer to the Soviet Navy's bases was impossible within old WWII carrier paradigm. Elmo Zumwalt was not "distastefully arrogant"....  


For those who want to get acquainted in general with some ASW and Search Theory issues, a superb presentation of a renown Professor Alan Washburn of Operations Research Department of US Naval Postgraduate School can be of help.   


To be continued....