Continuation, see the beginning here:
So, let's be REAL now
and, using our American-Chinese example of calculations of the Status S(t), go
directly to the inherent weakness of this XM
which we assumed equal for the United
States and China. In reality, this index is radically non-equal, with the
United States (for now) holding an overwhelming advantage over China in some
key military aspects. If you go back to the formula you will see that it is
not well thought out. We start, of course, with one thing which actually
reduces large advantage the United States has over everybody else, since American
M1 is largest in the world and by far. American military budget is colossal
and on this merit it, as many math and economic purists would suggest, should
clearly indicate American overwhelming military advantage over anyone. Indeed,
if to follow SIPRI's numbers US military budget is $610 billion/$228 billion = 2.68 times larger than that of China and, considering the fact that in
this formula:
X with M1 subscript
(these are military expenditures) multiplies everything within the bracket
(simplest distributive property) look at how Chinese and American XM, that is
militaries, would compare. Assuming China's all Ms equaling 1 and equaling the
same on the American side, it goes without saying that American XM, that is
military potential, will be 2.68 times larger on the merit of military
expenditures alone. Compare now American military expenditures to those of
Russia—Russia's military expenditures are dwarfed by those of the United
States, with the US having them 10 times larger. But things are NOT as they
seem and let US Marine Corps Captain Joshua Waddle speak:
Basically, Waddle's
succinct observation boils down to the rejection of the monetary (false) "value"
of the military and to the implicit call for looking at:
1. REAL capability and
REAL effectiveness, which are (see below) matters of….
2. Doctrines and of Tactical,
Operational and Strategic concepts, and…
3. Technological and procurement
policies.
Once those things, INSUFFICIENTLY
spread among M2, M3 and even M4 (nukes) "potentials" (where Air
Forces and Air Defenses have been lost in this formula—is a mystery), are
considered one begins to really question the whole wisdom of a direct monetary
relation between expenditures. Here is a demonstration of a fallacy of such an
approach which absolutely, even when using a "Potential" index, reflects
a complex relation between real capability and "Potential". Let's get
away from China for a second and get to a now classic example of highly
misleading M1 index.
This is LCS-1:
This is LCS-2:
The US Navy has both
active, building and orders for 29 of those Littoral Combat Ships. We are going to round up costs of these ships
to about $650
million a pop for either version and based on that we may calculate the
cost of the whole program: $650 mil * 29 = $18.85 billion. Everyone knows by
now that these ships are known sarcastically as "self-propelled 45-mm
gun". A very expensive, I may add, 45-mm gun. This is not to mention
never-ending issues with Combat Modules and
other "lovely" things these, otherwise nice looking ships, became
known for.
Here is Project 22800
Missile Corvette of Karakurt-class.
This ship, which costs
approximately $300 million boasts not only deadly long range anti-shipping
and land-attack missile complex, it also has a very respectable air defense and
is equipped with 76-mm gun, not to mention a state-of-the art EW complex among
many other features. Currently 9 of 18 planned are already afloat or are being built.
So, the cost of the whole program, thus, is $300 * 18 = $5.5 billion. Let us
recall here also 11 active or being built, even less expensive, albeit still very
impressive Project 21631 Buyan missile corvettes—those will run within
(plus-minus) $200 million price-range. The program cost: $200 * 11 = $2.2
billion. Add two programs (incidentally—same 29 ships as LCS) together: $5.5 +
$2.2=$7.7 billion. Comparing the two classes (programs) is easy: US Navy spends
$18.9 billion for ships none of which would survive encounter with any group of
Russian missile corvettes which will meet LCS precisely where LCS title
(Littoral Combat Ship) suggests it should operate—enemy's littorals. This is,
of course, if we are talking about a completely improbable scenario of LCS
engaging Karakurts in naval combat, since such an engagement is simply
inconceivable—in case of serious war LCSs will be sunk, with no chance of
defending themselves, by modern long-range anti-shipping missiles from platforms
hundreds of nautical miles away.
But comparison of the "potential",
however, is legitimate here and precisely for the purpose of getting anywhere
close to some numerical coefficient which will be appropriate for comparison
and adjustment of the "potentials" or "combat
capabilities". Comparison of LCS and of Karakurts (and Buyans) is simply a
good example and here is the issue—yes, we may easily come to the monetary ratio
of the costs: $18.9 billion/$7.7 billion = 2.45. That is, Russian Corvettes
program is to LCS program (in US Dollars) as 1 to 2.45. But that is the issue
here and that what Captain Waddle talks about and that is what I wrote the book
about—combat capabilities of Karakurts dwarf those of LCS, which are way more
expensive than those incomparably more capable, and less expensive, and dangerous Russian ships. If
you think that the comparison here must go by mere counting of missiles on the
ships (well, LCSs do not have any), or by caliber of the gun—think again. Real
comparison starts with those funky and highly classified mathematical
expectations for each of the missions and those vary wildly and dramatically.
About this—later but some hint--it is not at all linear.
To Be Continued....
