A Sh.tstorm Corvette.

No, really, these Project 22160 patrol boats did create a shitstorm among Russian naval professionals. I, at some point of time, simply stopped issuing my opinions on the matter and reverted to a pop-corn observer status because this whole thing started to remind me so much of an endless Littoral Combat Ships saga (or acrimony, if one will) in the US Navy. For starters--realistically nobody in public space knows for sure what the hell those combat packages (containers) for 22160 are. Well, except for 3M14 and 3M54 Kalibr family of weapons in those containers. Those who know--they keep silence. There is, however, a consensus that having engines in a single compartment is not a sign of a naval ship--I agree with this. Survivability should be above all. In the same time, it is clear that these corvettes were conceived in the times when Russian Navy after decades of rusting away suddenly started to get so much desired cash flow. People got drunk on so many ideas and decided, hell, why not make some Russian version of LCS in a more modest displacement and dimensions and call this contraption a Patrol Ship. 

Ok, these are actually very attractive boats with a good 76-mm gun and decent electronics suite, which immediately makes them excellent picket ships capable for provision of targeting to a whole lot of platforms, plus...yes, killing pirates. Good escort boat for all kinds of a commercial traffic on the seas. 

And yes, did I mention those are really handsome boats;) 

Second of the series Dmitry Rogachev in Sevastopol. Thanks to Igor84 from Airbase.

Here is video (in Russian) on completion of trials of Vasily Bykov (a first hull of 22160) in Novorossiisk yesterday. 

And while a shitstorm rages because of these controversial ships, 6 of them (full series) will be finished opinions of many professionals regardless and those, when armed with Kalibrs, anti-mine, ASW and other packages, in addition to their organic helicopter could be of a multiple use, especially in the times of crazy state and non-state actors ready to go to any length to undermine Russia's borders and commerce. BTW, did I mention that they are handsome boats? 

Vasily Bykov

So, I guess will see how, obviously US Navy's, late Admiral Cebrowski's idea, which went astray in LCS, will perform in Russian Navy and who knows, maybe Lazarus (those who need to know, they know) will finally find peace and a good empirical argument. Meanwhile, shitstorm continues.

Why Mathematical Models Break Down. And Why Our Life Depends On That-2

Continuation, see the beginning here: 

So, let's be REAL now and, using our American-Chinese example of calculations of the Status S(t), go directly to the inherent weakness of this XM which we assumed equal for the United States and China. In reality, this index is radically non-equal, with the United States (for now) holding an overwhelming advantage over China in some key military aspects. If you go back to the formula you will see that it is not well thought out. We start, of course, with one thing which actually reduces large advantage the United States has over everybody else, since American M1 is largest in the world and by far. American military budget is colossal and on this merit it, as many math and economic purists would suggest, should clearly indicate American overwhelming military advantage over anyone. Indeed, if to follow SIPRI's numbers US military budget is $610 billion/$228 billion = 2.68 times larger than that of China and, considering the fact that in this formula:

 

X with M1 subscript (these are military expenditures) multiplies everything within the bracket (simplest distributive property) look at how Chinese and American XM, that is militaries, would compare. Assuming China's all Ms equaling 1 and equaling the same on the American side, it goes without saying that American XM, that is military potential, will be 2.68 times larger on the merit of military expenditures alone. Compare now American military expenditures to those of Russia—Russia's military expenditures are dwarfed by those of the United States, with the US having them 10 times larger. But things are NOT as they seem and let US Marine Corps Captain Joshua Waddle speak:

Judging military capability by the metric of defense expenditures is a false equivalency. All that matters are raw, quantifiable capabilities and measures of effectiveness. For example: a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier that can be bested by a few million dollars in the form of a swarming missile barrage or a small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capable of rendering its flight deck unusable does not retain its dollar value in real terms. Neither does the M1A1 tank, which is defeated by $20 worth of household items and scrap metal rendered into an explosively-formed projectile. The Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization has a library full of examples like these, and that is without touching the weaponized return on investment in terms of industrial output and capability development currently being employed by our conventional adversaries.

Basically, Waddle's succinct observation boils down to the rejection of the monetary (false) "value" of the military and to the implicit call for looking at:

1. REAL capability and REAL effectiveness, which are (see below) matters of….

2. Doctrines and of Tactical, Operational and Strategic concepts, and…

3. Technological and procurement policies. 

Once those things, INSUFFICIENTLY spread among M2, M3 and even M4 (nukes) "potentials" (where Air Forces and Air Defenses have been lost in this formula—is a mystery), are considered one begins to really question the whole wisdom of a direct monetary relation between expenditures. Here is a demonstration of a fallacy of such an approach which absolutely, even when using a "Potential" index, reflects a complex relation between real capability and "Potential". Let's get away from China for a second and get to a now classic example of highly misleading M1 index.

This is LCS-1:

This is LCS-2:

The US Navy has both active, building and orders for 29 of those Littoral Combat Ships. We are going to round up costs of these ships to about $650 million a pop for either version and based on that we may calculate the cost of the whole program: $650 mil * 29 = $18.85 billion. Everyone knows by now that these ships are known sarcastically as "self-propelled 45-mm gun". A very expensive, I may add, 45-mm gun. This is not to mention never-ending issues with Combat Modules and other "lovely" things these, otherwise nice looking ships, became known for.

Here is Project 22800 Missile Corvette of Karakurt-class.

This ship, which costs approximately $300 million boasts not only deadly long range anti-shipping and land-attack missile complex, it also has a very respectable air defense and is equipped with 76-mm gun, not to mention a state-of-the art EW complex among many other features. Currently 9 of 18 planned are already afloat or are being built. So, the cost of the whole program, thus, is $300 * 18 = $5.5 billion. Let us recall here also 11 active or being built, even less expensive, albeit still very impressive Project 21631 Buyan missile corvettes—those will run within (plus-minus) $200 million price-range. The program cost: $200 * 11 = $2.2 billion. Add two programs (incidentally—same 29 ships as LCS) together: $5.5 + $2.2=$7.7 billion. Comparing the two classes (programs) is easy: US Navy spends $18.9 billion for ships none of which would survive encounter with any group of Russian missile corvettes which will meet LCS precisely where LCS title (Littoral Combat Ship) suggests it should operate—enemy's littorals. This is, of course, if we are talking about a completely improbable scenario of LCS engaging Karakurts in naval combat, since such an engagement is simply inconceivable—in case of serious war LCSs will be sunk, with no chance of defending themselves, by modern long-range anti-shipping missiles from platforms hundreds of nautical miles away.  

But comparison of the "potential", however, is legitimate here and precisely for the purpose of getting anywhere close to some numerical coefficient which will be appropriate for comparison and adjustment of the "potentials" or "combat capabilities". Comparison of LCS and of Karakurts (and Buyans) is simply a good example and here is the issue—yes, we may easily come to the monetary ratio of the costs: $18.9 billion/$7.7 billion = 2.45. That is, Russian Corvettes program is to LCS program (in US Dollars) as 1 to 2.45. But that is the issue here and that what Captain Waddle talks about and that is what I wrote the book about—combat capabilities of Karakurts dwarf those of LCS, which are way more expensive than those incomparably more capable, and less expensive, and dangerous Russian ships. If you think that the comparison here must go by mere counting of missiles on the ships (well, LCSs do not have any), or by caliber of the gun—think again. Real comparison starts with those funky and highly classified mathematical expectations for each of the missions and those vary wildly and dramatically. About this—later but some hint--it is not at all linear. 

To Be Continued....           

So, It Is Naval Strike Missile For US Navy, After All.

US Navy chose Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) for US Navy's LCS program. Kongsberg touts this missile in no uncertain terms as:

NSM is the only fifth generation long range precision strike missile in existence as per today. Already chosen by the Royal Norwegian Navy for its new frigates and new coastal corvettes, the NSM will be fully operational on these ships when they enter service in the near future. The NSM is also selected by the Polish Navy for use on its new coastal artillery installations. 

The immediate question one has to ask is this--what is "fifth" generation anti-shipping missile? What ARE real requirements for a missile to become "fifth generation"? Stealthiness? Well, F-35 is "stealth" and is "fifth generation", it flies, however, in such a way that makes all those 1960s and 1970s old timers sitting under the Arizona's burning sun in retirement laugh sarcastically. Maybe the fact that claimed "long range" of 100 nautical miles for such a missile is considered something special? I don't know. This is not impressive, even considering "stealth" and possibly improved signal processing and EW resistance for this missile's homing device. 

But the main issue is, of course, speed. It is again subsonic, granted presented as "high subsonic", and that means, even considering NSMs sea-skimming profile--the issue of modern and competent air defense comes up immediately. No doubt, such a missile will be very effective against commercial traffic and against naval targets with weak, or altogether absent, dedicated air defense but if this is a "distributed lethality", it is, certainly, not a very impressive one. I have, in this case, go with what is stated in Ronald O'Rurke's Report for Congress in which he states some rather startling facts about new FFG(X) ship (allegedly Frigate) which is supposed to be main carrier for this missile:

The ship is to be a multimission small surface combatantcapable of conducting AAW, ASuW, ASW , and EMW operations.

·

Compared to the FF concept that emerged under the February 2014 restructuring of the LCS program, the FFG(X) is to have increased AAW and EMW capability, and enhanced survivability.

·

The ship’s area defense AAW system is to be capable of local area AAW, meaning a form of area-defense AAW that extends to a lesser range than the area-defense AAW that can be provided by the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers.

·

The ship is to be capable of operating in both blue water (i.e., mid-ocean) and littoral (i.e., near-shore) areas.

·

The ship is to be capable of operating either independently (when that is appropriate for its assigned mission) or as part of larger Navy formations.

   

The new FFX(G) is supposed to have scaled Aegis and even Standard and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. This is all fine and dandy once one considers the next entry which, and I quote:

                     Follow-On Ships

The Navy wants the follow-on ships in the FFG(X) program (i.e., ships 2 through 20) to have an average unit procurement cost of $800 million to $950 million each in constant 2018 dollars. By way of comparison, the two LCSs that the Navy requested for FY2018 had an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $568 million each, and the two DDG-51 class destroyers that the Navy has requested for FY2019 have an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $1,764 million each.

Get it? Almost a billion a pop. Now get this simplest scenario: Littoral, say of some Zamunda, which has procured P-800 Onyx both on land (shore) and on some small 5-6 missile boats unit of its minute navy. And there is no any US Navy's CBG in sight--after all FFX(G) is supposed to be a bigger, better, badder LCS--that is LITTORAL Combat Ship. So, what are the chances of these FFG(X) getting into battle with such hypothetical "flotilla" which can launch a salvo of  Mach=3 capable sea-skimming missiles from 600 kilometers and surviving? What if this salvo consists of 8 P-800s. You know the probability of sinking such an FFG(X) in such a salvo? I don't, but my gut tells me that in case of even two FFG(X) group we may have a very high probability of a leaker, may be two. Remarkably, the only anti-surface weapon these FFG(X)s will have against Zamundian flotilla will be allegedly "long range" (that is less than 185 kilometers, compare to 600) and very slow for modern AD systems Naval Strike Missiles. We, obviously, can play here with salvo model and Fractional Exchange Rates (FERs) but this is beyond the scope of this piece. My point is very simple--unless one talks about sinking some third world weak navies, subsonic anti-shipping missiles become increasingly a niche weapon (for sinking smaller ships) and it is really strange how, yet again, US Navy immensely expensive combatant doesn't stack that well against what is en vogue today and will remain in a foreseeable future--these are high supersonic and hyper-sonic, long-range anti-shipping weapons. For such weapons sinking a billion or two of technology armed with a morally obsolete "fifth generation" missile will be not a big deal and this paradigm is not coming, it is here.