Now They Are Talking.

As you may have already learned in the past few years--I am not exactly a believer in Russian-Chinese symbiosis, especially military one. Economic? Only if I stretch my imagination and make some truly bizarre allowances--such as Russia, out of charity, which is a euphemism for insanity, providing China with secret metallurgy, advanced materials, modern jet-engines and know-how for S-500 among many other things and technologies. I cannot see that happening but who knows, maybe Russia one day will forget lessons of 1990s and out of own sadomasochistic tendencies will decide to run to Golgotha yet again, just for the heck of it. Other than that--no. Nor, as you may all know, do I hold all kinds of Ph.Ds in political "sciences" in any high regard (same goes for Ph.Ds in Philosophy and Aesthetics), yet, even from those corners of grossly imprecise pseudo-sciences some sober and relatively accurate thoughts do appear. 

Dmitri Drobnitsky is a political "scientist" and passes in Russia for Americanist--some of Drobnitsky's observations on the United States are succinct, others, like his recent statement on Trump's economic "successes" can only bring a smile to a face of anyone who deals with every-day American reality consistently. Yet, Drobnitsky just wrote an interesting piece about models--Western (not so) liberal and Chinese allegedly despotic meritocracy. I can say in advance--it is worth reading (Google Translate will do good enough job) and giving it a thought.

Эпоха импорта моделей развития заканчивается (The epoch of export of development models is ending).

I don't know if they read my books in Russia but it was my consistent position for years that Russia, with or without China, is a separate power pole once her real economy and military power are considered. I am also on record when explaining (for years, again) that unlike China, Russia can and already generates a model which is alternative to both rotting liberalism, which inevitably will end up in totalitarianism, and to Chinese "growth" model. Somebody, finally, shared this POV inside Russia among "intelligentsia". Here is Drobnitsky verbatim:

К попыткам навязать России чужие модели надо относиться спокойно. Каждая конкурирующая система заботится о своей внешней привлекательности и стремится предложить если не универсальное решение для всех, то, во всяком случае, вовлечь в свою орбиту как можно больше последователей. Именно поэтому нашей стране надо позаботиться о собственной модели. Ее наличие – не достаточное условие успешной конкуренции на мировой арене, но совершенно точно необходимое. В ней обязательно будут изъяны. Но если анализ опыта наших китайских и западных партнеров о чем-то нам и говорит с определенностью, так это о том, что изъяны – это нестрашно. Страшно отсутствие собственной модели.

Translation: One should treat efforts to impose alien models calmly. Every competing system takes care of its outward attractiveness and tries to offer if not universal solutions for everyone, then, at least attract, as many followers in its orbit as possible. This is precisely why our country (Russia) should develop own model. The existence of this model is not a sufficient condition for successful competitiveness at world's arena but it is for sure a necessary one. This model definitely will have its flaws. But if the analysis of experience of our Chinese and Western partners tells us anything with certainty it that flaws are not to be feared. What needs to be feared is the lack of own model. 

I wrote already two books and am contemplating the third one precisely on this Russian model which is neither "Western" nor Chinese. But before any political scientist begins to elaborate on Russian model they, those "scientists" have to understand that all of them, without exception, have to have a epiphany or a Winston Smith's moment with: two plus two makes four. If that is granted, all else follows. (c) So far this is not the case with political "science" and "scientists" in Russia most, not all, of who continue to operate within the definitions paradigm developed and imposed by this very Western model which stopped working in general, and at the level of political "science" in particular.  

Russia can exist only as a military-economic superpower or she will not exists at all. Superpowerdom implies things which are, except for a very general, simplified, if not to say vulgarized, concepts of technology, real science, warfare and economy are beyond the grasp of political "scientists". That is why Drobnitsky, for all his good intents and correct, I may add, assessment of China can not see Russia's model as a a combination of traditionalism mixed with yet to be fully defined share of state in economy which allows for both robust social safety net and stable technologically advanced economy. This model already exists. One thing, however, is a already clear--Russian state is in control of most of strategic resources and real industries and this is a necessary condition for survival of Russia as civilization, because it is this combination which allows Russia to produce state-of-the-art military which is in the foundation of Russia's existence.  

Why Mathematical Models Break Down. And Why Our Life Depends On That-2

Continuation, see the beginning here: 

So, let's be REAL now and, using our American-Chinese example of calculations of the Status S(t), go directly to the inherent weakness of this XM which we assumed equal for the United States and China. In reality, this index is radically non-equal, with the United States (for now) holding an overwhelming advantage over China in some key military aspects. If you go back to the formula you will see that it is not well thought out. We start, of course, with one thing which actually reduces large advantage the United States has over everybody else, since American M1 is largest in the world and by far. American military budget is colossal and on this merit it, as many math and economic purists would suggest, should clearly indicate American overwhelming military advantage over anyone. Indeed, if to follow SIPRI's numbers US military budget is $610 billion/$228 billion = 2.68 times larger than that of China and, considering the fact that in this formula:

 

X with M1 subscript (these are military expenditures) multiplies everything within the bracket (simplest distributive property) look at how Chinese and American XM, that is militaries, would compare. Assuming China's all Ms equaling 1 and equaling the same on the American side, it goes without saying that American XM, that is military potential, will be 2.68 times larger on the merit of military expenditures alone. Compare now American military expenditures to those of Russia—Russia's military expenditures are dwarfed by those of the United States, with the US having them 10 times larger. But things are NOT as they seem and let US Marine Corps Captain Joshua Waddle speak:

Judging military capability by the metric of defense expenditures is a false equivalency. All that matters are raw, quantifiable capabilities and measures of effectiveness. For example: a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier that can be bested by a few million dollars in the form of a swarming missile barrage or a small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capable of rendering its flight deck unusable does not retain its dollar value in real terms. Neither does the M1A1 tank, which is defeated by $20 worth of household items and scrap metal rendered into an explosively-formed projectile. The Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization has a library full of examples like these, and that is without touching the weaponized return on investment in terms of industrial output and capability development currently being employed by our conventional adversaries.

Basically, Waddle's succinct observation boils down to the rejection of the monetary (false) "value" of the military and to the implicit call for looking at:

1. REAL capability and REAL effectiveness, which are (see below) matters of….

2. Doctrines and of Tactical, Operational and Strategic concepts, and…

3. Technological and procurement policies. 

Once those things, INSUFFICIENTLY spread among M2, M3 and even M4 (nukes) "potentials" (where Air Forces and Air Defenses have been lost in this formula—is a mystery), are considered one begins to really question the whole wisdom of a direct monetary relation between expenditures. Here is a demonstration of a fallacy of such an approach which absolutely, even when using a "Potential" index, reflects a complex relation between real capability and "Potential". Let's get away from China for a second and get to a now classic example of highly misleading M1 index.

This is LCS-1:

This is LCS-2:

The US Navy has both active, building and orders for 29 of those Littoral Combat Ships. We are going to round up costs of these ships to about $650 million a pop for either version and based on that we may calculate the cost of the whole program: $650 mil * 29 = $18.85 billion. Everyone knows by now that these ships are known sarcastically as "self-propelled 45-mm gun". A very expensive, I may add, 45-mm gun. This is not to mention never-ending issues with Combat Modules and other "lovely" things these, otherwise nice looking ships, became known for.

Here is Project 22800 Missile Corvette of Karakurt-class.

This ship, which costs approximately $300 million boasts not only deadly long range anti-shipping and land-attack missile complex, it also has a very respectable air defense and is equipped with 76-mm gun, not to mention a state-of-the art EW complex among many other features. Currently 9 of 18 planned are already afloat or are being built. So, the cost of the whole program, thus, is $300 * 18 = $5.5 billion. Let us recall here also 11 active or being built, even less expensive, albeit still very impressive Project 21631 Buyan missile corvettes—those will run within (plus-minus) $200 million price-range. The program cost: $200 * 11 = $2.2 billion. Add two programs (incidentally—same 29 ships as LCS) together: $5.5 + $2.2=$7.7 billion. Comparing the two classes (programs) is easy: US Navy spends $18.9 billion for ships none of which would survive encounter with any group of Russian missile corvettes which will meet LCS precisely where LCS title (Littoral Combat Ship) suggests it should operate—enemy's littorals. This is, of course, if we are talking about a completely improbable scenario of LCS engaging Karakurts in naval combat, since such an engagement is simply inconceivable—in case of serious war LCSs will be sunk, with no chance of defending themselves, by modern long-range anti-shipping missiles from platforms hundreds of nautical miles away.  

But comparison of the "potential", however, is legitimate here and precisely for the purpose of getting anywhere close to some numerical coefficient which will be appropriate for comparison and adjustment of the "potentials" or "combat capabilities". Comparison of LCS and of Karakurts (and Buyans) is simply a good example and here is the issue—yes, we may easily come to the monetary ratio of the costs: $18.9 billion/$7.7 billion = 2.45. That is, Russian Corvettes program is to LCS program (in US Dollars) as 1 to 2.45. But that is the issue here and that what Captain Waddle talks about and that is what I wrote the book about—combat capabilities of Karakurts dwarf those of LCS, which are way more expensive than those incomparably more capable, and less expensive, and dangerous Russian ships. If you think that the comparison here must go by mere counting of missiles on the ships (well, LCSs do not have any), or by caliber of the gun—think again. Real comparison starts with those funky and highly classified mathematical expectations for each of the missions and those vary wildly and dramatically. About this—later but some hint--it is not at all linear. 

To Be Continued....           

Why Mathematical Models Break Down. And Why Our Life Depends On That-1.

It is in human nature to quantify things—nothing is wrong with that. Quantification allows us to see some order in otherwise seemingly chaotic things, it also allows to predict the outcomes based on those quantifications. Sometimes predictions pan out but often they do not. As the events of the last 20 or so years showed us, no mathematical model, no matter how sophisticated, can properly predict global strategic balance, even despite availability of what became known as a "Big Data". Two things do not allow to trust such a modeling fully:

1. It matters WHAT data and WHO counts it. A famous meme of GIGO—Garbage In, Garbage Out did not appear out of nowhere—recall a complete trash all US pollsters were providing prior to the latest US Presidential Elections. This example alone is a good illustration of a dreadful influence biases provide even in something as large politically as electing POTUS. Then, of course, comes WW II and how it was "interpreted" in the West. 

2. Anything related to strategy and military is inherently human at the very foundation, and as such it is stochastic in nature, that is susceptible to the introduction of random variables and those variables sometimes become this proverbial monkey wrench which screws up all, even perfect, plans. In the end, the data itself MUST be full and reliable—otherwise one gets Wall Street reports on the state of economy, which are as reliable and are as connected to the actual reality as I am a NASA astronaut. 

For a former military professional who had to deal with some operational issues and who survived the collapse of the USSR, it was always fascinating for me how the outcomes may be influenced by accumulation of sometimes really insignificant disruptors which literally change the state of the affairs almost instantaneously and dramatically—in global matters a decade or two is not that long, really. In historic terms it is altogether—an instant. Dmitry Orlov is very good in describing some of the factors which, in particular, influence collapse on a societal level. But my point here is simpler—it is to give some insight on how things go haywire in military-political field and how they lead to a gigantic outcomes. 

I am aware--people do not like math. But hear me out here, the math presented herein is not really that difficult. At least, I tried to exclude any kinds of even remote references to differentiation (and integration) which necessarily accompany all kinds of models—it will all be within very basic algebra of a middle school level, at least I tried to keep it there. So, here it is: The Global Status of the Nation. One of the methods (models), which is based on the body of works by all kinds of geopolitical thinkers from Mahan, Morgenthau and, eventually, RAND Corporation. Some notable Russian thinkers also contributed to it. It is, indeed, natural for people to have a number on anything. So, many thought for more than a century about how to put "a number" on the might of the nation. In my book I gave a brief review of the CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) and reviewed some of the predictors for military victory as well as the components of the status of nations. 

So, here is the (Nation's) Status Model developed within the framework of the massive project titled Complex System Analysis and Modelling of Global Dynamics, which was done on the base of the world-renown Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of Russian Academy of Sciences. A lot in this model also was taken from RAND's estimates of national might. Well, here is this general formula. 

Don't despair—this formula is as simple as a toilet. To get to the value of Status at any given time you have to merely multiply the values. In it, S(t) is a measure of a nations global status. S(t) merely stands (as a function of time) for Status of the nation in given time. In this formula FA(t) is a value (again—time dependent, hence (t)) of a function of "influence" which is not related to geopolitical factors and accounts for the product of values obtained for quality of governance, economic and military independence, plus additional factor of being in coalition etc. The formula for this is not difficult, albeit long, and with a calculation of a factor of governance based on expertise. We will omit reviewing this factor and go directly for G(t)—a geopolitical potential of the nation. Here, we go for the formula and this is how it looks:

In this formula all Xs with subscript stand for shares of the nation in global indices of: T-territory, D-demography, E-economics, M-military. Numbers above are exponents or the power to which those indices must be raised. These ARE very easy indices to find since all of this data is in the open. That is with a huge exception of the Military index. But let's do some simple math exercise—let us compare G(t)s of say US and China, accepting FA(t) for both of them as equal and thus easily disposed of in our basic analysis. Let's see how the United States looks in its main Xs in G(t) formula. For that we go to Internet and get data there, let's count things for the US and China:

T--territory for the US will be almost the same as China's, both have about the same size of territory, but let us be anal about it and go for 9.147 million square km for the US (and, consequently—9.326 for China). Consequently the SHARES in the global scheme of things are as follows: US—6.13% of global land mass (I use round number of 149 million for the World's total land mass) and China's-6.26%. 

D--demography, easy. The United States' population is 322 million, China's—1,404 million. Consequently the SHARES in the global population are as follows: US—4.31% of total population (I use round number of 7,467 million for the World's total population) and China's-18.8%.

E—economy. Easy again, we go for PPP as normal people do and here it is: US GDP is (per CIA)—19.36 trillion, China's—23.12. Consequently the SHARES in the global GDP are as follows: US—15.24% of total GDP (I use CIA's round number of 127 trillion for the World's total GDP) and China's-18.2%.

M—military. Before I announce a train wreck here, ask yourself a question when looking at the formula of G(t) why XM, that is military component not only has the largest exponent (0.43) of them all, beating even Economy and why Military needs its own formula for calculation? Here is the formula: 

Where M1 is a Share of the nation in global military expenditures (I need to hear warning bells and sirens going off like crazy now) M2 is a military potential of the nation's Army, M3 is a military potential of nation's Navy and, finally, M4 is a potential of a strategic nuclear forces. The immediate question which arises here is HOW does one calculate PROPERLY all those indices. Let us calculate comparative G(t)s and, as a consequence, S(t)s for the US and China based on assumed military parity, that is American XM=Chinese XM=1. Just an example, not real indices. So, G(t) for the US will be, using basic scientific calculator: 

0.5*(1+1^0.43)*6.13^0.11*4.31^0.19*15.24^0.27 = 

0.5*(1+1)*1.22*1.32*2.09=3.366  

For China this will look like this:

0.5*(1+1^0.43)*6.26^0.11*18.8^0.19*18.2^0.27 = 

0.5*(1+1)*1.22*1.75*2.19=4.676

As you can see here, China squarely beats the United States for a title of the nation with the most geopolitical status, granted that we initially assumed that both nations have the same value of function of influence FA(t) and that their  XMs are equal--but they are not and the main REAL, tangible, component which will define most of those status bids is precisely this very XM and how it is interpreted correctly by serious analysts. That I will review in the next post. Needless to say, however, any calculation of national power and status without serious review of doctrinal, strategic and operational issues is a complete baloney--but that is what Western so called "expertdom" was doing for the last few decades. We all know the (catastrophic) results...

To Be Continued...