Yeah, Sure.

 He was a good NCO who was on a sightseeing trip, not. 

Puzzling, isn't it? I have, as many others, a theory that this was not NCO-level guy, but likely some senior officer and that "testing a new defensive capability" has very little to do with 404 and UK, but likely with "capability" of Russia. These dudes of UK orgs such as Special Boat Service or SAS (and MI6) still think that they play a videogame and that they are still in John le Carre novel about 1980s. I have a bad news for them--Russians know their identities, they know who they are and where to find them. 

As Ron Paul's Institute correctly pointed out:

When you authorize naval-drone terrorism against Russian civilian oil tankers in the Black Sea, don’t whine when Moscow redraws the coastline. You wanted escalation? Fine. Now watch your proxy lose Odessa, and with it access to the Black Sea.

Not only Moscow will redraw  it, but some people may begin to suffer some strange accidents such as falling out of the windows or deciding to end their lives just because. Terrorism does not have statue of limitations, but that is the ONLY capability London has. I speak about it in my today's video about Royal Navy, its submarine "force" and why its delusions of grandeur are a reaction to an ongoing implosion of Old Europe and its becoming a totalitarian concentration camp with no future. 

But They Are ... Unglamorous.

Correct, they are, but as the USS Princeton learned it the hard way in 1991, without the minesweepers, also known today as anti-mine warfare ships or MCM (mine counter-measures), you are toast in the littoral and if not for the Canadian Navy's minesweepers, which took Princeton out of the area, this Aegis cruiser could have been stuck in the area for much longer time. And it was a complete incompetence and technological backwardness of Iraqis, and pure luck that it didn't get hit by anti-shipping missile. 

Well, now Royal Navy, or whatever is left of it, laments. 

The Royal Navy is giving up one thing in which it led the world. I hope it can recover

I don't know why the author of this opinion piece claims this (unless he means WW II period, then yes), but in terms of the largest mine-sweeping operations in post-WW II period we can recall the US Navy's operation Nimbus Star in demining the Suez Canal, with Soviet Navy's task group joining in later in 1974 in demining Southern approaches to Suez Canal. Both US Navy's Task Force 65 and Soviet force with a notable presence, among other ships and minesweepers, of the Helicopter Carrier Leningrad, used helicopters for minesweeping. 

But it was clear--the main force in clearing mines remained minesweepers. So, this guy from The Telegraph laments:

Sea mines are ubiquitous, lethal and ignored, all in equal measure. There hasn’t been a maritime conflict in the last 100 years where they haven’t been used, nor will there be in the next 100. If the purpose of navies is to command the sea, then their ability to defeat this cheap yet effective threat is a must. ... But their job is clearing mines, and there are only so many ways to do that. The US Navy has long clung to the idea that it can be done from helicopters, but that ran into the same problem that most air operations do – lack of persistence. Hunting mines using sonar is a slow business. If your chosen method for moving the sonar along in the sea is “non-persistent”, as when dangling it from a helicopter, you are not going to get much done. As for confirming that sonar blips are actually mines and destroying them, forget it.

Well, he has some point, but as is the case with any search and destroy operations--it is a slow process and must involve a complex approach in case of minesweeping. And here is the point, current state of the Royal Navy is not that of the global force, to put it mildly, and the only dedicated MCMs it has one venerable Sandown class MCM (HMS Bangor, M 109) and 6 downright ancient Hunt-class MCMs. How many of them are actually sea-worthy is unknown. 

So, what do British do? Well, they couldn't man this beautiful vessel (commercial, mind you) before transferring it to the Royal Navy, and designating it HMS Stirling Castle. 

They say she holds the promise for MCM operations. Well, RN is plagued with severe budget constrains and the whole situation with transferring this vessel to the navy and using it as MCM is ... well, make you own conclusions. 

Ah yes, the comparison is coming. Damn Russkies, Putin's "regime" was supposed to be gone by now and Russian economy be in tatters, but, quoting Forest Gump, for no particular reason at all(c) Russian Navy launches these state-of-the-art and largest composite hull vessels in the world, like there is no tomorrow. These are Alexandrit-class (project 12700) MCMs, 9 of which are already serving, while 31 more are being built or planned. 

Do not forget, though, Russian Navy still operates some other types of MCMs, including 2 active Gorya-class and then, there is a huge number (around 20) of active old pr. 1265 Base MCMs, and, of course, venerable and tough Akvamarins (pr. 266) MCMs--some 5 of them remain in service. 

But, of course, Alexandrits are now the backbone of Russian MCM fleet and their number only grows. You can dub this video (3 years old) which does review of these unique and powerful MCM ships. 

Fiber-glass hulls (vacuum-infusion), state-of-the-art electronics and yes, Russia will have around 40 of those with new modifications will follow for sure down the road. Ah yes, so unglamorous, yet indispensable force which no serious navy in the world can live without. And I can feel Royal Navy's pain (I really do--nobody is going to deny its glorious history), but transfer of the essentially commercial vessel to the Navy and hoping it can address an obvious shortage of the MCM forces is a first indicator of a bad shape Royal Navy finds itself in, which is merely yet another manifestation of the deep crisis which affected United Kingdom. 

No Surprise Here ...

 ... when one looks at the state of the Royal Navy. 

The Royal Navy’s only amphibious warship has been declared unsafe to put to sea. RFA Argus is unable to leave the Portsmouth Naval Base because maritime authorities have said the ship is unfit to sail. The inability of Argus, currently designated as the naval service’s sole amphibious warfare vessel, to put to sea means the Navy has no ships capable of delivering the Royal Marines en masse into war zones.

This is hapless Argus. 

But apart from a decline of the UK as a whole, with Royal Navy being one of the symptoms, one still has to ask the question of the utility of such vessel for a country which struggles with deploying a single combat ready brigade. In comparison:

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГ, 27 июля - РИА Новости. Пять бригад морской пехоты РФ будут преобразованы в дивизии в ближайшее время, две из них - уже в 2025 году, заявил президент России Владимир Путин. Путин в воскресенье обратился к участникам оперативных учений "Июльский шторм" по видеосвязи. "В ближайшее время пять бригад морской пехоты будут преобразованы в дивизии, при этом две из них - уже в 2025 году", - сказал глава государства.

Translation: PETERSBURG, July 27 - RIA Novosti. Five Russian marine brigades will be transformed into divisions in the near future, two of them - already in 2025, said Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin addressed the participants of the July Storm operational exercises via video link on Sunday. "In the near future, five marine brigades will be transformed into divisions, two of them - already in 2025," the head of state said.

For those who still don't understand the scale--a division is the first formation, after brigade, which is OPERATIONAL-tactical formation, meaning it can conduct independent operations because of TOE. Five marines' divisions is essentially a marines army. But then again, Russia is not UK or any other European country, Russia dwarfs any of them in terms of economy and ability to maintain a massive force across all domains, from space down to underwater.

The Telegraph, LOL))

Being British "elite" nowadays is not fun. You are the butt of the jokes and constantly embarrass yourself as a military amateur. 

Royal Navy submarines have suffered a few mishaps recently, but the country’s Trident programme shows we’re still a potent threat. Despite the vessels’s age, Rear Admiral Chris Parry, who served in the Royal Navy for 37 years from 1972 to 2008, agrees completely with the Prime Minister’s view that despite their age, the Trident submarines really do worry the Russians. “One Trident submarine has the ability to incinerate 40 Russian cities very quickly. That is a lot of food for thought for Putin and that should make any world leader fearful,” he tells The Telegraph.

No, you are not! Because the credibility of a deterrent comes from two things:

1. Its total independence from other party in terms of its production and deployment.

2. Constant confirmation of its technical (euphemism for combat) readiness. 

UK does not meet any of these criteria. Royal Navy's SSBNs carry only four SLBMs in their tubes. Obviously, UK doesn't have full control of US produced SLBMs Trident II D5. The latest attempt by RN's SSBN to launch (first time in 8 years) one of its Tridents ended up in snafu. And then, the game of SSNs and SSKs starts (in Biscay as an example) where French and British SSBNs patrol primarily, but there is another thing--it is called Early Warning and ABM--UK has neither. In fact, most of UK command corps doesn't have enough qualifications to grasp that:

1. All 40 MIRVs from UK sub if it manages somehow to survive to launch will have to meet Russian ABM--it ranges from full capability against ICBMs MIRVs as A-235 Nudol to S-500 and S-550, all of which are in serial production. 

2. Russia can burn, in her turn, 40 British cities even without nukes, while a single salvo by any Borei-class SSBN can turn every military installation of significance in the Air Strip One into ash. 

Russians, unlike British, do not fight civilians and Russia's nuclear doctrine is honed primarily for Counterforce, not Countervalue. But if London insists, 160 hypersonic maneuvering blocks from a single Borei (Russia has 9 of them plus other delivery systems) can multiply UK as a whole (using Russian parlance) by 0. In other words, such a country will simply cease to exist. I am sure Admiral Perry knows what Search Theory and ASW are in the year of 2025 and, frankly, UK will have neither Navy nor Patrol Aviation by the time the only patrolling RN's SSBN will be detected, tracked and sunk. But in the end, Mr. Poseidon has its own ideas on how to deal with that. But what do I know, really. What do I know ... 

No, They Are Not Ready ...

 ... they are full of shit. 

Britain's rapid deployment troops are "ready" to board and seize Russian ships off the coast if there is evidence they are damaging undersea pipelines and cables. The prospect, described as a ‘worse case scenario’ response, follows renewed US warnings that Russia is secretly and systematically mapping the UK’s undersea cable and pipelines using electronic markers in a secret operation to prepare 'target plans’. Last week defence secretary John Healy was forced to send a clear warning to Putin, stating: “We know what you are doing and we will not shy away from robust action to protect this country.” He revealed that military chiefs had ordered the Royal Navy to intercept Russia’s Yantar spy ship in the English Channel in November - sending the frigate HMS Somerset and the UK’s new underwater surveillance ship Proteus, which carries sub-sea robots. Yantar is one of more than 50 vessels operated by Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, Gugi, and has the capability to deploy robots deep into the English Channel and North Sea Though not officially part of Russia’s navy. Gugi draws personnel from the 29th Separate Submarine Division and answers directly to ​Moscow's MoD.

Yes, those ships also carry marines' special forces, just in case some cretin in UK MOD decides to try to "board" such a ship, plus, of course, Royal Navy should keep in mind that what passes in UK for Navy has about how many combat ships ready? Russia can greatly reduce that number and that will be done really fast. As per Yantar, as I stated recently--it was surveying the wreck of Ursa Major which, it looks like, was sunk by those unknown guys who are now very worried that they will be not just accused but charged in absentia with maritime terrorism--the only activity London is capable of. After all, three consecutive explosions in engine room, almost instantaneous listing ... tsk, tsk, tsk. The lady doth protest too much (c). UK should simply fade away and turn already what it is turning into--a third world shithole with some nice football stadiums and pastoral landscapes. 

How Appropriate.

No, I mean it. A reporter for The Telegraph Alan Tovey wrote today a piece which we will review below, but it was this journalist's name which attracted my attention immediately. Could it be a coincidence? Here is why it struck me, because name Tovey is a huge name in the world's naval history. I am talking, of course, about Admiral John Tovey. Whatever the coincidence or, possibly, blood relations, Alan Tovey wrote an interesting piece. Tovey reports:

Britain should double the size of the Royal Navy to boost its shipbuilding industry, a prominent Conservative MP has said. Tobias Ellwood, the chairman of the defence select committee, said the UK did not require many complex and expensive warships, but should build a greater number of low-end ships – both for its own Navy and for exporting. He said: “The big question is: what is the threat we are facing and how do we design our defence posture accordingly? The threat we prepare for – high-risk maritime events that require top-notch vessels – is a low probability. We need a force presence to fly the flag and the ability to call in back-up.”

I don't know exactly why there is a degree of prejudice towards "low-end ships" in both Royal and the US navies, but truth is, the time of the "visual" navies are long gone and if history ever teaches us anything it is the fact that large platforms go only so far in carrying out a variety of naval tasks among which bombing the shit out of defenseless nations and launching TLAMs are just a s mall share of increasingly complex and deadly naval (multi-domain, damn, I used Pentagonese) warfare. Recall CG 59 USS Princeton of Ticonderoga-class and the events of 18 February 1991. I quote from WiKi. 

On the morning of 18 February 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, Princeton was patrolling 28 nautical miles (52 km) off Failaka Island in the Persian Gulf, on the west side of the decoy United States Marine Corps and naval invasion forces afloat. At exactly 7:15 AM local time two Italian-made MN103 Manta bottom-mounted influence mines detonated, one just under the port rudder and the other just forward of the starboard bow, the second explosion most likely being a sympathetic detonation caused by the first. The blasts cracked the superstructure, buckled three lines in the hull, jammed the port rudder, flooded the #3 switchboard room through chilled water pipe cracks, and damaged the starboard propeller shaft. Three crewmembers were injured, one seriously. Despite the severe damage, the forward weapons and the AEGIS combat system were back online within 15 minutes.

At great peril, the Canadian destroyer HMCS Athabaskan moved north through the minefield to deliver damage-control supplies to the severely damaged Princeton, which remained on station for 31 hours until she was relieved. Princeton's commanding officer, Captain Edward Hontz, specifically requested the assistance of Athabaskan despite the latter not originally assigned to the area. Unlike most ships of her size, Athabaskan could simultaneously operate two large CH-124 Sea King helicopters, which could search out mines for long periods. As a gesture of solidarity, Athabaskan winched over several cases of beer for the crew of Princeton, since United States Navy vessels were dry.^[1]

Princeton, which suffered from a locked starboard propeller shaft and a locked port rudder, was guided through the minefield by the minesweeper Adroit. Temporary repairs were conducted first in Bahrain, and then in the port of Jebel Ali near Dubai by the duty destroyer tender Acadia, and finally in a Dubai drydock. After eight weeks, Princeton returned to the United States under the ship's power for additional repairs. The ship and her crew were awarded the Combat Action Ribbon.

You see, how those quirky Canadians came in handy, not to mention mine-sweepers and other "low-end" tech which effectively saved Princeton. Yes, all those inglorious boring tasks of ASW, mine-sweeping, anti-diversionary operations, scouting, oh boy, you name it. But as I said it many times, ships are just platforms, and it matters HOW effective they are in what they do, not how they look like. Of course, I smile at Britain's statements about becoming a "shipbuilding superpower", but truth is, even in the hypothetical fanboys' scenarios such as "who is better", I wouldn't even allow any of my squadron's assets near anyone's littoral before having couple of these guys doing their "unglamorous" thing:

Not to mention the fact that in the missile exchange scenario between this $4 billion monstrosity:
 

And this "low-end", which is more than 10 times less expensive

Guess which one will come out on top. Do you need a hint? 

I totally get UK's phantom pains from once great, now gone, empire and a glorious naval history but in terms of "low-end" let me remind desperate British one little low-end ship which bathed itself in glory and her ungainly appearance could never eclipse the fact of its excellent crew and skill, together with ability to do what's needed when it was needed to be done. HMS Petard (G56).

Petard had the distinction of sinking a submarine from each of the three Axis navies: the German U-559, the Italian Uarsciek and the Japanese I-27.  Members of the ship's crew recovered from U-559 a new, four-wheel Enigma cypher machine and the books to go with it, albeit at the cost of the lives of her First Lieutenant and an Able Seaman, both of whom were drowned when the U-boat they were searching sank with them inside. 

Not bad, not bad for mere 1700 tons of displacement. I guess it is what you can do which matters in the end of the day, and there is nothing "low-end" about it.

How "Stretching" Looks like.

Andrei Raevsky (The Saker) made an astute operational-strategic observation yesterday when noted that:

I can speculate about one interesting option: the real goal of these moves might be to force the Ukrainian to keep forces stationed along the coast to try prevent a Russian amphibious assault (not that I believe that any combo of Ukie forces could do that).  The more forces are guarding the coast, the less forces are available for an attack on the LDNR.  Also, since the Ukies (and the US+NATO) can easily track these ships, the Russian could decide to march them up and down the Ukrainian coast in order to a) keep the Ukrainian guessing where the supposed landing might be and b) to have these forces ready to support a LDNR or even Russian push towards Mariupol and further (Nikolaev, Odessa).   

Now you can see how it looks like, observing how 4 Baltic and Northern Fleets' BDKs (Large Amphibious Ships) pass through Bosporus yesterday on their way to the Black Sea.

These ships are of a good ol' Ropucha-class (pr.775) of the Soviet times (many of them were built in Poland) and are capable of hauling a variety of armored vehicles ranging from tanks to APCs and 300+ personnel of naval infantry (marines). So, once you add these guys to the already substantial organic amphibious component of the Black Sea Fleet, now augmented with 10 or so of Serna-class fast landing craft. Well, you get the idea--Russia can land, if need be, at least one full brigade of marines anywhere along the Black Sea coast and Ukraine, certainly, is forced now to consider what it has to do and what forces it needs to allocate along its coast to at least hold this force off for a little while. 

All these deployments are performed by Russia in order to remove any idiotic thoughts from whatever is running Ukraine from Kiev and make sure that they do not attempt any moves on LDNR. Some people go further and even propose that Russia, actually, has everything in place to solve Ukraine's issue once and for all. Yes, that is true, Russia has enough forces to dispose of the proto-Nazi Ukrainian state but will she? I don't know, but it is an option which people in Kiev view as not entirely improbable, so it remains active and contributes to Ukraine's strategic confusion (not that they ever resided outside this confused state), which plays in favor of LDNR. 

Obviously, once mighty Albion, after Biden Admin recalled two US Navy DDGs from their Black Sea deployment, decided to show that London still matters and Royal Navy announced that it will be sending two Type 45 destroyer and Type 23 frigate to the Black Sea in an apparent show of support for Ukraine's regime:

Royal Navy warships will sail for the Black Sea next month amid rising tensions between Ukraine and Russia, The Sunday Times has reported. Citing senior naval sources, the newspaper said the deployment was intended to show solidarity with Kiev and Nato allies. One Type 45 destroyer armed with anti-aircraft missiles and an anti-submarine Type 23 frigate will leave the Royal Navy’s carrier task group in the Mediterranean and head through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea, according to the report.

Type 23  frigates are good ol' work horses of Royal Navy and are used primarily in ASW role, granted that they carry good ol' Harpoons (8 in total) and Sea Ceptor AD missiles, claimed to be able to fight off "saturation attacks" by super-sonic anti-shipping missiles. Type 45, which is much newer class of destroyers, carries the same Harpoons (8 in total) and is known as a dedicated air-defense ship carrying Aster AD complex. So, just another (European) iteration of US Navy's DDG of Arleigh Burke-class, albeit with a smaller AD missile load. Russia is trembling from fear and is sending diplomatic mail to London constantly begging for this terrifying British naval might to be recalled (wink, wink). I, personally, think that London, sending these two ships to the Black Sea, simply wants to remind everyone that it still exists and is somehow relevant to a massive geopolitical game three giants of US, China and Russia are playing. You know, glorious history, phantom pains from lost empire and greatness. Well, you get my drift. Moscow is "impressed", not. 

Alexander, being a British analyst and journalist has a better insight into the British thinking. So, listen to his excellent description of British reasons. 

I am glad that Alexander mentions Crimean War and its history and Tennyson (or Iron Maiden, depending on preferences) and the Light Brigade. Enjoy his voice from within UK.

So, What's The News?

The news hit the telegraph tape. Urgent. 

The US and British navies sailed into the Barents Sea to conduct maritime security operations in the Arctic Ocean, US Naval Forces Europe-Africa said in a release Monday. US Navy destroyers USS Donald Cook, USS Porter, and USS Roosevelt and the British Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent, supported by fast combat support ship USNS Supply, sailed into the Barents "to assert freedom of navigation and demonstrate seamless integration among allies," the release said. The Barents, part of the Arctic Ocean, is north of Norway and Russia. Russia's Northern Fleet, which maintains the country's naval strategic nuclear forces, has its headquarters at Severomorsk on the Barents. The US Navy said its surface ships haven't operated in the Barents since the mid-1980s and that it notified Russia's Ministry of Defense of the operation on May 1 "to avoid misperceptions, reduce risk, and prevent inadvertent escalation."

I am sure in Kremlin they are drafting now the declaration of the unconditional surrender and are preparing to surrender city keys from Murmansk and Severomorsk. Reality, of course, is much more prosaic--navies go wherever they can go and as long as they remain outside territorial waters of any state and do not violate status of the exclusive economic zones--they are free to roam whatever they want. Nor, this BS about "since mid-1985" corresponds to reality since submarines of the US and Royal Navies are not rare guests in those altitudes. In this particular situation, however, it is an attempt to demonstrate flag, "send the message" and other PR objectives, including initiating some news stream, to demonstrate a dispirited public that NATO exists still, sort of, and that NATO fleets still have operational assets.

This action has no military meaning since any surface force sent to actually fight--from launching TLAMs to conducting ASW operations--to Barents Sea in case of actual war has the staying power approaching zero and time counted in minutes it takes to receive targeting and launch, and Russia has in Arctic more than enough to launch to ensure that no hostile surface force in any combination survives. Just recall basic (of course it is slightly more complex that that but still, gives a good impression) factors which I wrote in my last book about:

This is what makes, as an example, Northern Sea Route so attractive to China and its commercial traffic, granted China can sustain pressure and possible expropriation of assets of its pro-American elite, the one which until very recently was viewing China as an extension and, eventually, substitution for the United States economically. There are many of these guys, and their children, in the US and they own a lot. Once the United States decides (not out of realm of possibilities) to cut Indian Ocean SLOCs for China, the whole thing will become really interesting. The United State, by the looks of it, is getting ready to coerce China and squeeze it for everything she has got. Rumor has it, Xi must face still powerful radically pro-American (some call it a Chinese "Komsomol" elite, I can see the relation) economic block which cares only about its pockets. 

This is not to say that the United States is in a good shape herself. And, in the end, China can always go ALL IN for petroyuan and the de facto fragmentation of the energy, and with it a whole, market will happen. The infrastructure for killing petrodollar in Eurasia is already in place, so it falls, naturally, to Russia to make sure that any moves on the American part stay non-military in nature. As for demonstration of the flag, sure, why not--it is always a great opportunity for Russian VKS and Navy to train on actual potential targets--business as usual. Nothing to see here, folks, move along, move along....

John Moffat, You Will Live Forever.

Sad news. On December 11, at the age of 97, John Moffat of Royal Navy, a pilot who launched that torpedo which finally sunk Bismark, departed this world to forever fly his Swordfish in heaven. I salute you, Lieutenant Commander. You will be remembered and missed. 

     

.......  

Another UTTER uber BS

I have no respect for The National Interest magazine nor for pseudo-military (and pseudo-scientific) BS it spreads. I also view (in)famous Jane's with a great deal of irony, politely speaking--these were the guys, who on the eve of Debaltsevo disaster were spreading Ukronazi propaganda about how the victory for criminals in Kiev was at hand. But I DO respect Royal Navy.  It is a Navy with glorious history and one which, actually, has the experience, however bloody, with modern naval combat--a true, however limited, one. So, when I read this: 

"NATO submarines are seeing “more activity from Russian submarines than we've seen since the days of the Cold War,” Royal Navy Vice Adm. Clive Johnstone, commander of NATO's Maritime Command told IHS Jane’s. He added that NATO submarines are encountering “a level of Russian capability that we haven't seen before.”

NATO's Nightmare: Russian Sub Activity Rises to Cold War Levels

I understand that neither Mr. Majumdar nor TNI's staff  know what Коэффициент Оперативного Напряжения--КОН (Coefficient Of Operational Tension (Strain)) is, but I fully expect Royal Navy's Vice Adm. Clive Johnstone to know that. Let me elaborate:

КОН, to put it in layman's lingo, is the ratio of the days a ship is on the combat patrol (at sea) to the number of days in a year. So, when we say that this coefficient is 0.5 it means that the ship is in the sea for 365/2=182.5 days. It is one of those operational coefficients which are considered strongly when planning combat training and operations in the sea (ocean). Yours truly had experiences with KOH=0.7, while I also knew some conduits for suffering who had this greater than 1. Yes, I know and their family life was not exactly exemplary. Now, consider this: even a brief excursion into Wiki, gives us a number of the Cold War Soviet Submarine Fleet for 1990 at:

Soviet Navy 

63 ballistic missile submarines
72 cruise missile submarine
64 nuclear attack submarine
65 conventional attack submarine

--------------------------------------------

264 subs of all types.

Now a military "secret".... drum roll....the KOH for Soviet subs varied. For example, for older SSBNs (boomers) of Delta-I class it could be as low as 0.2, meaning that this class was on patrol only for 73 days out of 365. It means that while some subs were on patrol, others were in the dock or in refit. For younger Deltas-III (667 BDR) or even younger Delta IVs (667 BDRM) the KOH could be higher, sometimes substantially higher. As per multipurpose Victors-III (671 RTM) or Akulas (971) this KOH could be even higher. And then were those SSKs--that is a separate story altogether. So, in order for us to be objective, let us assume a very low KOH=0.3 for all classes of Soviet Cold War subs. Let's multiply: 264 x 0.3 = almost 80. This means, that NATO navies had to deal with 80 Soviet subs on patrol every day, from Soviet littoral to Pacific and Indian Oceans. Which rings about right for this old fart cold warrior like me. FYI, US Navy's boomers had a higher KOH, as an example. 

Now, going back to Wiki, for the Russian Navy:

Russian Navy

60 subs of all types. Let us assume KOH for those of 0.4 (newest types are still on trials). Well, you know the answer, don't you? 60 x 0.4 =24, and even this number is way too generous. In reality, it is smaller than that, probably about 20 at best. So, if Admiral Clive Johnstone thinks that having 4 times less combat patrols is comparable to "the days of Cold War", I don't know, really. But it is in the open and fanboys of all colors will get on it shortly. Meanwhile, life is full of BS and there is NO reason whatsoever to propagate even more of it, especially when detached from the larger framework of doctrines (in Russian Navy's case--of Sea Denial) and operations. As per Russian subs--yes, they are pretty good but then again, what did they expect--that Russian Navy would fight with 14" guns and steam? No, really........