There Is A Reason I Don't Take Mearsheimer's "Realism" Seriously.

Realistically speaking he is a second rate geopolitical thinker who loves to claim to be a realist. There are NO world-class geopolitical thinkers in the West today for reasons which I explained on many occasions: most "thinkers" do not grasp the nature of modern military power because they lack background for understanding all technological intricacies and ways escalation dominance affects the balance of power. Yes, there are very few people of the scale of Douglas MacGregor who get it, but these exceptions merely confirm the rule. The actual claim to "authority" in geopolitics by Mearsheimer has nothing to do with geopolitics (of what passes for it today in the West) per se but with his and Walt's famous work on Israeli Lobby in the US. 

Moreover, Mearsheimer was unlucky enough to graduate West Point in 1970 at the height of the America's humiliation in Vietnam and then served in the USAF precisely through the very end of America's Vietnam debacle in 1975. In other words, he was privy only to the US Armed Forces'  doctrinal confusion and the early start of third stage of technological development of warfare which would manifest itself only in 1980s and into 1990s. So, speaking plainly, he missed most of it and his pseudo-academic trope of "offensive realism" is nothing more than a euphemism for American exceptionalism based on ignorance of the outside world and, as a matter of fact, America's main geopolitical rival today, Russia. Here is his today's piece about escalation. 

I can easily answer his question about "where it all stops"--it is stopping now and those deliveries from NATO (and the US) make no difference whatsoever for the outcome and many in Washington begin to get it. But it is not what really makes it funny, no, it is the fact that he still uses beaten to death BS about "democracy". The fact that he doesn't understand how risible those statements about "democracy" and America's "desire to spread it" are, testifies to his lucid moments and grains of the common sense appearing periodically in his talking being merely sporadic, if not accidental altogether, touches with reality. The United States spreads not "democracy" but chaos and puppet regimes serving US' interests. He also needs to accept a simple fact of which I speak for many years now--NATO cannot fight the conventional war in Russia's geographic vicinity and hope to avoid catastrophic losses. Because of that the US will escalate to nuclear threshold because it is incapable of sustaining such losses on the battlefield and war effort economically. Mearsheimer doesn't understand that, as he doesn't understand the nature of escalation dominance. 

About it. Get this:

ST. LOUIS — The Biden administration's plan to sell four large, armable drones to Ukraine has been paused on the fear its sophisticated surveillance equipment might fall into enemy hands, according to two people familiar with the matter. The technical objection to the sale was raised during a deeper review by the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration charged with keeping high value technology safe from enemy hands. Previously the plan, which has been circulating since March, had been approved by the White House, three people said. The plan to sell Ukraine four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones that can be armed with Hellfire missiles for battlefield use against Russia was first reported by Reuters earlier in June. The objection to the export of the drones arose due to concerns the radar and surveillance equipment on the drones could create a security risk for the United States if it fell into Russian hands.

No, the concern about this "sensitive technology" falling into Russian hands" as a reason for snag is a complete malarkey, albeit I do not state that there are no such concerns, they do exist but they are not about "security" primarily. 

They are primarily about the fact that MQ1C Grey Eagle is not survivable in the real combat environment against Air Defense, Air Force and EW capabilities of Russia. Delivering those will simply add to an embarrassing "performance" of the US technology in Ukraine against Russian forces, with the latest US wunderwaffe such as vaunted Switchblade loitering munition which became a butt of jokes in Russia now because of its dismal combat "effectiveness" or, rather, lack thereof, amounting by different sources of SMO to a whopping... 20%. Clowns at Forbes rushed to do a damage control on the account of this munition, but the data (however incomplete) is already in and it is not good across the board for practically any type of the Western combat technology fighting in Ukraine. But then again, the problem is systemic and it cannot be resolved within present framework of America's combat technological culture which grew out of wars with grossly inferior enemies. One cannot buy this with money, period. 

So, in this case Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a man who actually, unlike Mearsheimer, not only lived through but fought within new technological paradigm, contradicts Merasheimer dramatically, being, indeed, a true realist and a competent military observer. 

However, the effects of repeated strategic failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are cumulative. In the 1980s, General Motors wanted to dictate the kind of automobiles Americans would buy, but American consumers had different ideas. That’s why G.M., which dominated the U.S. market for 77 years, lost its top spot to Toyota. Washington cannot dictate all outcomes, nor can Washington escape accountability for its profligate spending and having ruined American prosperity.

Succinct, and that is why I am on record that the United States loses its wars due to ignorance and a systemic flaw in its strategic thinking and R&D and procurement philosophy, that is why I stated a few years ago that the United States lost the arms race to Russia, because it failed to adapt to fast changing realities of modern combat.

Read Real Experts.

Before flying out. The amount of BS and all those "military experts", such as Yuri Podolyaka spewing their strategic "wisdoms" from every corner (Podolyaka is not military expert, but Ukrainian "orange", first Maidan pusher), is staggering. Here is for your consideration opinions of the actual Russian General Staff officer-operator, Colonel Trukhan. In Russian (use google translate) under the title: We are not Americans. It is specifically about the objectives of war and how it is being prosecuted. It is prosecuted well  and as planned. 

I am on record--you can quote me on that--Western propaganda is good now only within the West. In terms of actual military literacy on any level, from tactical to strategic, not to speak of doctrinal and political, in the West when it relates to Russia... what can I say--it is pathetic. But then again, my, what amounted to trilogy, books are largely dedicated to this, even with introduction of basic minutiae of operations.  

Here is Chilean in Kiev who, certainly, has some ideas. Many of them correct:

In the US where military "expertise" is for a show primarily and long ago became a media product (shitty one at that), it is near impossible to explain how real wars are actually planned and fought and how forces are deployed. Too many computer games and "superficial" operational and strategy "engines", very little of understanding of how, as an example, Russians fight NOT on the tactical level. And even there, with some exceptions of US military history giants as David Glantz and Johnathan House, or some good work put into the explanations by such people like Lester Grau, US military "analysis", as many other things, is for show driven by the insatiable appetite for instant gratification, including creating own fictional wars and equally fictional ways of prosecuting them. We see this today on a full display. 

Recall, go back to the very beginning of this blog: information is NOT a knowledge, it becomes a knowledge after a very serious processing. The West long ago lost this ability (always lacking)--not surprising for a decision making circle dominated by political "scientists" and top brass completely detached from the realities of the 21st century warfare. But people want a show, they need instant gratification, and that is how Western propaganda machine is configured. In such configuration it can produce narratives only--observe what is said and shown and compare this with the progress of Russian and LDNR operation in Ukraine--the cognitive dissonance is inevitable.  So, here is colonel Trukhan for your pleasure. May be this will help to gain proper perspective.

Why They Are Nervous. Short Excurse Into the Modern War. Part 1.

Patrick Armstrong thinks that they simply ran out of options in terms of color revolutions and he justifiably mentions this: 

Former successes – in recent times, Ukraine twice, Georgia – are becoming failures: Hong Kong, Venezuela and Belarus. The targets have learned how to counter the attacks.

Read the whole thing--it is excellent, as is usual for Armstrong. Then, there is a good piece by Tim Kirby on current US foreign policy, which he calls "surprising" because it is, in many important respects, repeats that of the Trump Admin. As Kirby astutely concludes:

In this sense, it could be that ultimately, both Biden and Trump were tasked with managing a crumbling global empire, trying to keep the sinking ship afloat as long as possible waiting for something to change. Thus, their reactions to events and plans could look similar because of the similar causes that underlie them, even if the spirit behind the actions are radically different. Like it or not NATO may just be obsolete, Afghanistan may have just been too expensive, China may just be too powerful. The reactions to these situations could wind up being similar out of necessity or a lack of options. Both Trump and Biden faced these same realities.

And then, there is this, which brings us to the main point: 

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has been one of the most active backers of NATO's new master plan to counter Russia in case a military conflict breaks out between the sides. The strategy, which was agreed on Thursday, envisages the military alliance’s troops fighting Russian forces in the Baltic region and across the Black Sea, while also calling for non-conventional warfare, including nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks, and space military technology, to be employed.

Here is THE main point, as any Western politico with degree in political "science" (or politics), she cannot have a faintest idea what she supports or doesn't whenever it relates to any issue of warfare. And I mean zero, zilch--you cannot, you simply cannot, explain even in the most comprehensive briefings to any person with degree in "politics" and experiences with running basic fiscal-political "protocols" of the West's regional and national election pipelines, how tactical translates into operational, and how operational translates into strategic and, essentially, into the political level when war is involved. You could do this in 1914 and 1945, you still could do it in 1955, however barely, and then "something" happened--it became very hard, and by mid-1960s it all became an alien language to the main shakers and movers of Western politics--people whose only skill in life is how to re-elect oneself or how to navigate regional and national bureaucracies. Don't take it from me, take it from the US armed forces general with Ph.D in physics. These two pages written by a man who knows what he is talking about should be made mandatory for reading by 100% politicos and by about 99% of the  so called military "experts". 

In other words, no contemporary Western politician can have any sound idea on matters which, actually, are the main drivers behind global affairs, because they do not understand modern warfare. They cannot, you need a solid math, physics, engineering and tactical-operational experience as an officer to be able to grasp a profound connection between foreign policies of nations and the global power balance. Latiff laments that "serious scholarly books are written about war and its consequences, but the vast majority ignores them." Tell me about it. Can you imagine trying to explain to Rachel Maddow or this Germany's "defense minister" how the Probability Theory and Theory of Operations applies to modern politics in the times of hyper-sonic weapons, netcentric warfare, AI elements and over-the-horizon surveillance and anti-satellite weapons. Good luck with that, I heard some "political science" courses even include such things, of course, as Game Theory and... and... here is John Mearsheimer of University of Chicago and, allegedly, "realist" teaches this course:

Seminar on Nuclear Weapons and International Politics. 100 Units. The aim of this course is to examine how nuclear weapons have affected the conduct of international relations. Special attention will be paid to subjects like: 1) nuclear deterrence, 2) the causes of nuclear proliferation, 3) the consequences of nuclear proliferation, 4) strategies for employing nuclear weapons, 4) the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War, 5) how nuclear weapons will affect relations among the great powers in the emerging multipolar world, and 6) whether there has been a "nuclear revolution."    

The issue here is not that Mearsheimer can hold those seminars, it is the fact that despite him being a graduate of the USMA at West-Point, class of 1970, he hardly qualifies for any serious  military input because his record of "conclusions" regarding the only country which can wipe the US off the map, Russia, in the last decade demonstrates his complete detachment from the geopolitical reality in so far as the global balance of power and technological revolution goes. Which his latest disastrous and empty treatise proves without a shade of a doubt. A nauseating meandering dabbling into the pile of contemporary Western political and foreign relations theories none of which ever predicted anything. Not to mention the fact that few in the West really know how things work precisely because the only thing they know is how to obfuscate facts to fit narratives. We are not like that, we have some clue and there is no reason to produce a pile of BS for the sake of own academic sinecure, no matter how risible this doctrine-mongering is. In 99% of the cases it is preposterous. 

Now, that we have re-established the fact that Western politicos do not have a clue beyond general political, primarily media-driven, issues and that they can like or dislike anything related to warfare only based on how they are briefed and are told by people with a clue, let's explain now how even knowledge of basic facts of say Search Theory, ASW and physics and math of the modern warfare, namely Salvo model (missile exchange) gives us immediately an exceptionally clear glimpse of this capricious animal of strategy. You see, you need to know not only what to do, you need to know HOW things work and, especially, WHY they work. No course in history, political "science" or social sciences, supported by studying the statistics of GIGO (Garbage In-Garbage Out) can answer this. 

Enter delivery systems and Washburn's classic equation for the so called Random Search in case the "flaming" datum (in our case the position of the submarine) is obtained because... how about the sub launches its anti-shipping missiles and gives itself away. Here we have to review two scenarios. 

a) the war breaks out with a very short escalation (threatening period) phase which sees a "moderate" ASW/Patrol aircraft presence in the area;

b) the breakout of hostilities is preceded by a fairly lengthy escalation (threatening period) phase which sees gradual but fairly fast increase of the ASW forces in the area. 

As you may have guessed it already, we are viewing possible (hopefully, impossible) conflict between NATO and Russia. Assume that in both scenarios you have this operational situation--it is not "strategic" yet, it will become soon. 

The five red circles (circumferences, really) are theoretical positions (done to be best of my ability to a real scale) of Russian Navy's SSGNs all carrying both 3M22 Zircon and 3M14 Kalibrs with P-800 Onyx. The range of roughly 950 kilometers (red circumferences) is given for 3M22. The area of each such circle is roughly 2,000,000 square kilometers (which is about the area of Greenland) and submarines, of course, are located at the centers of those circles. Small blue circumferences, however, in each of the circle are not related to subs, they merely show the scale (of around 50 kilometers) of the range of detection and main caliber gun battles between battleships of the closing period of WW II and they are there for comparison. 

The blue line which splits in two with the arrows at the ends are general routes of the US convoys to deliver reinforcements to NATO allies in case of the war getting (let's assume) into the more-or-less protracted mode, for now without nuclear weapons and the US navy is forced to fight yet another "Battle of the Atlantic". The straight green dashed line and two green rectangles (absolutely NOT to scale) are coverage at the ranges and hours on station (that is conducting some sort of ASW search) by a single P-8 Poseidon. As you might expect, the United States can fast increase the number of the ASW/Patrol aircraft in the area and we will talk about this too, but at this stage ANY scenario, even seemingly most realistic, is viewed ONLY for given the frame of reference, which Western decision-makers lack completely. What also has to be understood--those circumferences and rectangles they are not static, in real life they move, sometimes very actively, especially against the background of such advances in submarine quieting which allows dramatically increase "silent" velocities while being able to use acoustic detection capabilities without much interference. We discount here weather and hydrology factors for now. 

So, enter flaming datum formula. You can see the thesis by the officer of Chilean Navy Alberto Soto for Master of Science Degree in Operational Research (he had Bachelor of Science in Weapons Engineering) in US Naval Post-Graduate School, under the guidance of Dr. Washburn (page. 24, just in case). 

Average number of detections with the time z(t):

I once elaborated on this formula which is applicable to the so called Random Search (which also is applicable to a Parallel Search) and there is literally nothing complex in this formula despite the integral sign. As we already established z(t) is a number of detections by whatever (ASW Helo, ASW/Patrol aircraft etc.). So: 

R--is a detection range of our "cookie cutter" sensor. You may ask what the hell a kitchen device has anything to do with submarine hunting. The answer is very simple--all cookie cutters have sharp and well defined edges which are unchanged. In real life, of course, the detection ranges of any sensor, be that radar, sonar or FLIR are subjects to change due to weather conditions, radio-permeability for radar, hydrology for sonar and as a result, for our theoretical calculations we have to assume that ranges do not change and are as sharp and well-defined as the edges of a cookie cutter. (Hint: ASW is the most complex and daunting task in naval warfare). One of my favorite sketches. 

Ranges, of course, vary--if radar range is influenced, among many other things, by the elevation of its antenna and under some conditions could either lose or gain up to 20-30% of its range and its "cookie cutter" shape is circle, the range of, say, MAD, Magnetic Anomaly Detector is a "strip" whose width is the double range and it is not that huge (which will matter later) and varies say between 500 meters to 2 kilometers. Let's assume that it is one kilometer for the ease of calculations, so, in this case MAD's range will be 1 kilometer x 2 = 2 kilometers. It is all simplified, of course.

V--of course is velocity because our sensors move: radar on ship moves with the speed of a ship and leaves behind itself a "strip" with the area of V x 2R, because any sensor looks on "both sides" thus doubling its range (see above about MAD's range). If our radar detection range on the ship is 40 kilometers and the ship moves with the speed of 20 kilometers per hour, that means in one hour it will "cover" the area of 40 x 2 x 20 x 1= 1, 600 square kilometers. If the double width (2R) of our MAD is 2 kilometers, then P-8 Poseidon, flying with speed of (roughly) 400 kilometers per hour, will cover the area of 2 x 400 = 800 square kilometers. 

This "scary" Pi x y(t)^2 is nothing more than the formula of the area of the circle you know from the middle school and it is nothing more than 3.14 x r^2, where our r in this case is an expanding radius of a search circle (with the center of datum) at any given time (t) which is velocity of submarine time time at any given moment starting from the moment Tau (a funny lower case letter at the lower limit of integration of our integral) and it is nothing more than the delay time, between the time of datum--the sub blows its own cover by a missile launch--and the moment helicopter or P-8 Poseidon (or P-3 Orion) arrives at the circle to start its search, or hunt. Say, the sub launched missiles and was detected (Flaming Datum) at noon, 12:00, Poseidon arrives at the expanding circle at 12:30, our tau (delay) thus is 0.5 hours. If the submarine was moving all this time with "let's save our asses" speed (velocity) of 20 kilometers per hour (roughly 12 knots) then the radius of the circle in which Poseidon will have to search is y(t) = 20 x 0.5 = 10 kilometers, thus the area of this circle is Pi x y(t)^2 = 3.14 x 10^2=3.14 x 100 =314 square kilometers.  

This is all tactics but it becomes a serious operation with enormous strategic ramifications once the search (hunt) starts because at this stage a truckload of factors begins to affect all this chaos and we get to see the numbers which today can make any serious American military professional feel very uncomfortable, because once the latest anti-shipping cruise missiles such as 3M22 or Onyx get involved, mathematics becomes insane and ASW operations begin to look daunting, to put it mildly. Because Probability of Detection (POD) of the enemy (Russian) submarine, which is calculated like this:   

Is the major reason behind many recent statements and actions on NATO's part, because it is difficult to fight a war, when you know that you will get defeated badly. But about this later. Waiting for your feedback if I need to continue with this, because real analysis has to have some numerical framework, which is also comprehensible to a well educated layman, who can do basic calculations. 

To Be Continued (maybe?)...

P.S. Someone may say that I gave John Mearsheimer a bad rap, I don't know how anyone who for the last 10 years was on record about "mediocre" Russian Armed Forces and who obviously lacks understanding of physics and mathematics of delivery systems, which ARE the foundation of a nuclear deterrence (anyone can make warhead today), can teach and hold any seminars on nuclear deterrence. Can he answer the question if Kinzhal is a deterrent?  

Scratching My Head.

Ahem. I don't know how to read into this.

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is taking major steps in an attempt to shake off years of false starts and setbacks with the Littoral Combat Ship program, an effort Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said he’d oversee on his watch. In an exclusive interview with Defense News on July 16, Gilday listed LCS as a major priority, saying he will turn up the heat on efforts to get the ship to become a major contributor to fleet operations.“There are things in the near term that I have to deliver, that I’m putting heat on now, and one of them is LCS,” Gilday said. “One part is sustainability and reliability. We know enough about that platform and the problems that we have that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them resolved.”

My take on this whole spike in activity regarding these very expensive and grossly under-gunned, putting it politely, ships is related to news from Russia who started trials for her combat modules for project 22160 patrol ships.

Gilday’s goal of fielding the mission modules is well along already, according to two sources familiar with the progress, who spoke to Defense News on condition of anonymity.The mine-warfare mission module is on track for a final test and evaluation by the end of this year, a source with knowledge of the program told Defense News, and the individual components have already passed testing and are in initial low-rate production.End-to-end testing of the mine-warfare mission module is set to begin in fiscal 2021 and is on track to have its initial operating capability declared in 2022, another source said.The status of the ASW mission module, which has been a regular target of Congress-imposed budget cuts, is a little less clear.

Let's face it--the issue with combat modules for LCS is nothing new, as is the issue of preposterous costs for such a ship, in excess of $700 million per hull. What may become an issue, and a huge one at that, will be if Russians will succeed (I am pretty sure they will) with testing of their own modules, including ASW one, and appearance of project 22160, say in Mediterranean, carrying containers with Kalibrs or P-800s, or 3M22s together with ASW packages. This WILL create a shitstorm in appropriate Committees and subcommittees in Congress--remember, pr. 22160 are shitstorm corvettes--because the question will be this: why those fvcking Russians managed in few years to come up with several working modules for what amounts to their version of LCS (of sorts) and we cannot do it for more than a decade? I would say such a question, actually, will be a legitimate one. But then guess what--have you heard about F-15X lately? I heard:

And now the Air Force is doing just that. Last week, the Defense Department announced in its daily digest of defense contracts awarded that Boeing will produce an unspecified number of F-15EX aircraft over the next three years, at a total cost of $22.89 billion.

Oh baby, for around $90 million a pop for a venerable and slightly up-gunned F-15 that looks so...so... Pentagonish. But isn't it how the whole US Defense Budget is spent? I omit here all those "doctrinal" decisions such as producing a rather mediocre aircraft such as F-35, but it will do for attacking third world nations, and calling it "Stealth" because 1950s radar cannot "detect" it, but generally one has to wonder "where's the beef"?  Argument of "complexity" of US weapon systems is a complete bunk--I write about this for years and people at TAC question this too.

How Bells, Whistles & Greed Blew Up the Defense Budget. The hawks say we need to spend $740B a year because our weapons systems are so much more complex now. Here's the real story.

OK, let me cut to the chase--most American "hawks" are not hawks but chicken-hawks most of who do not know shit from shinola when dealing with military, because they lack proper education and experience which would allow them to pass sound judgements on the issue of actual warfare. US weapon systems are no more complex than many from Europe, let alone Russia. Term "sophisticated" is a false equivalency and is used merely to impress dumb-asses who sign the checks for Pentagon. Criteria of Combat Efficiency of the system has long been discarded in the US in favor of monetary gain (through ridiculous unreal costs) and making Hollywood movies. The issue is not even that SU-35C, not speaking of SU-57, will tear F-35 a new one, or that Patriot PAC whatever the version, looks like, using Publius Tacitus terminology, a Nerf Gun when compared to Russian Air Defense systems. The issue is that the US simply cannot produce decent weapon system on time, on budget and, most important, cannot make it combat effective in real combat environment. 

Come on, Russians know this, so do many many people in DoD in the US, but they are not talking because US warfare long ago became about money, appearances and propaganda, not about defense. Come to think about it, not about offense either, since the US military record as of lately is not that impressive. Ridiculous price tags of US weapons didn't help much in Afghanistan or Syria, once Russia got involved there. Well, as one of the pundits concludes:

Wood’s argument that the only way to deal with adversary technology is with better technology is also false. We don’t need to out-engineer the Russias and Chinas of the world, we need to out-think them. For virtually every high-tech weapon, there is a low-tech counter. Our struggles to deal with IEDs in Iraq is the perfect example of this. The Pentagon spent $20 billion to develop counter-IED systems only to come to the realization that nothing worked as well as a dog.

Out-think is a fancy euphemism for coming to terms with military reality and facing facts, which for Pentagon will be really painful and goes completely against Modus Operandi and Vivendi both in US military and the US Congress agreed upon for the sake of keeping a gravy train running. Well, the run may continue but the US realistically cannot win a war with the peer. In fact, it will sustain colossal materiel and reputational losses gigantic price tags of its weapons notwithstanding. Just yesterday I listened to one discussion between some totally delusional "Marxist" Alekseev and former Colonel from General Staff Vladimir Trukhan, who apart from wiping the floor with Alekseev, noted that as a former Officer-operator of General Staff he doesn't take militarily NATO seriously. Or as he said: "we don't even break sweat". He has a point, but then again, I can only repeat myself--the real danger is in the United States stumbling into open military confrontation with China, let alone Russia, see its expensive military hardware destroyed en masse, not to speak of human losses, and being pushed to the threshold of the unthinkable. This is the only "out-thinking" the United Sates is capable of today and that makes me scratch my head. I heard there was a proposition to put a ballistic missile on Zumwalt-class DDGs to enable these three white elephants with a whopper of a price tag to have missiles capable of carrying hyper-sonic glider vehicles within Prompt Global Strike paradigm. If that is "out-thinking" what can I say.... Sergei Viktorovich, help!   

Cutting Empire To Size, Or Yet Another "National Security" Crisis.

It becomes really redundant by now and, frankly, tiresome. 

WASHINGTON — America’s military superiority has “eroded to a dangerous degree,” leaving the U.S. in a “crisis of national security,” especially if faced with more than one conflict at once, a new congressionally-mandated report concluded.“The U.S. military could suffer unacceptably high casualties and loss of major capital assets in its next conflict,” reads the report, issued Wednesday by the National Defense Strategy Commission. “It might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia. The United States is particularly at risk of being overwhelmed should its military be forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously.

Truth is, there is no "crisis of national security" in the US--nobody is intent on attacking the US or cut vital for the US Shipping Lanes Of Communications (SLOC), other than some terrorists, but FBI can handle that; US Navy, despite all of its very real problems, is still a very potent navy, especially its submarine component, to do the job of keeping SLOCs open. Neither Russia nor China are intent to interdict these SLOCs unless the United States decides to start a war on them, then, of course, if the US, say, tries to attack Russia, things change. Other than that--there is no crisis. Russia can obliterate the US today, she could do it yesterday, and she will be able to do it tomorrow, the same goes the other way--this is MAD, folks. But Russia explicitly doesn't want to attack the US. So, what's the fuss is all about? 

The fuss is about this (from the article):

But the authors worry that the department, as it is structured both strategically and financially right now, would not be able to successfully manage two conflicts at once – or be guaranteed victory in even one, should it come down to a fight with Russia or China.

Talk about folie de grandeur of unimaginable scale (see Report). One may ask the question on how those people in National Defense Strategy Commission really envision, say war against Russia alone. It is really a fascinating, for all the wrong reasons, scenario since, I am sure, these guys (such as former CNO Admiral Gary Roughead among other 11 members of this Commission) try to play this scenario strictly in conventional framework, because otherwise the United States as a state will cease to exist. 

I was thinking about this, not to mention getting tired of reading all kinds of alarmist, justified and not, as in this case, "reports" and here is my simple take. 

1. United States never fought against first-rate, well-trained, equipped and determined adversary which can match US capabilities across the whole spectrum of modern warfare. US fought in Vietnam where it lost to determined but largely peasant force with only some very few capabilities of a first world army, it fought in Korea where it ended with bloody stalemate and, of course, US had its turkey shoot against grossly incompetent Saddam's Army. US armed forces never fought in their modern history against the adversary capable to strike (conventionally) to the strategic depth. That means under no conditions were US troops, their rear services, bases, strategic command and control assets, ammunition stocks etc. subjected to a serious (and sustained) fire impact since one day Pearl Harbor affair.  Of course, we do not even talk about US proper.

2. United States doesn't have effective battle field air defense capable to prevent such a (stand-off) impact--no US AD complex is capable to reliably intercept most Russia's stand-off weapons thus exposing every single US combat asset on the theater of operations. 

3. A painful issue of US air assets--good luck dealing with the best air-defense in the world. A single regiment of S-300 PMU2 in Syria shut down Israeli Air Force (equipped with much vaunted F-35) operations over coastal Syria. 

4. Ground forces? Another wowser since nobody knows how US ground forces will fare against steady and fast attrition of its assets against arguably best anti-armor and area-impact weapons in the world. US simply has no historic experience with that under the conditions of very limited resources and manufacturing base being destroyed (conventionally) domestically. 

So, how this Commission envisions such a war is a really funny question. They do state, however: 

We recommend that DOD more clearly answer the question of how it intends to accomplish a core theme of the NDS—defeating major power rivals in competition and war. Without a credible approach to winning a war against China or Russia, DOD’s efforts will befor naught

Apart from fluffy (and expected) pseudo-military BS, I have question to this Commission--do they have any idea how it will feel, if they imagine a set-piece (totally unrealistic scenario) battle at Russia's borders in purely conventional way, to lose, say, 150,000 KIAs alone just within one-two months of "fighting"? You say impossible? I would say I am being way too cautious. After all, this is US Army Colonel speaking in 2012 BEFORE certain events unfolded:

In 110 days of fighting the German army in France during 1918, the U.S. Army Expeditionary Force sustained 318,000 casualties, including 110,000 killed in action. That’s the kind of lethality waiting for U.S. forces in a future war with real armies, air forces, air defenses and naval power. Ignoring this reality is the road to future defeats and American decline. It’s time to look beyond the stirring images of infantrymen storming machine-gun nests created by Hollywood and to see war for what it is and will be in the future: the ruthless extermination of the enemy with accurate, devastating firepower from the sea, from the air, from space and from mobile, armored firepower on land.

This should be emblazoned on every wall of any US military-related "think-tank" or "commission" because reality will be even grimmer once one understands that in order for US (NATO) to fight Russia they will need to come into Russia's backyard (Russia is not going to occupy or attack anyone unless attacked first) and people way more capable strategically and tactically than those in Pentagon tried it, not for once, and ended losing not only wars but their armies and  states. US military "thinkers" evidently have no grasp of what even conventional war with Russia may bring to the American side--the scale of attrition which will make Vietnam an easy stroll in the park in comparison, albeit Americans who fought there were tough soldiers and good leaders on tactical level. This is not the case today. But General Van Riper's lessons still must be studied to avoid a catastrophe which expects any adversary deciding to fight Russia in her vicinity. 

But what is this "crisis" really about? It is actually about not willing to face reality and fight a real war (it is scary and is pregnant with major political consequences), as opposed to comfortable rolling over grossly inferior adversaries. It is about constantly diminishing military capability margin, which was grossly inflated to start with in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and which now is getting to be more proportional to the Empire which is being "cut to size" by geopolitical, economic, military, technological and human reality. So, no--United States is not capable to fight either Russia or China separately, let alone those two simultaneously--this delusional idea was born out of ignorance, hubris and, frankly, lack of knowledge of the real warfare with capable adversaries. Projecting (lack of) "lessons" from Iraq or Afghanistan occupations and (not)fighting there in what is a medium to low intensity conventional (COIN) conflicts onto modern 21st century warfare against nuclear superpowers--it is either, indeed, folie de grandeur or a sign of a mental disorder among those who have to face reality of American very real economic and, with it, military decline. United States either learns to live within its by far not limitless means and accepts the new geopolitical reality, thus preserving own status as one of the few true global superpowers, or it will destroy itself completely trying to retain which it thinks, wrongly, a providence-bestowed crown of hegemon. I feel it is time to address some issues of possible casualties in a conventional conflict. I will do it later.