Russia Is Game.

Nikolai Patrushev already expressed himself (that means Russia's leadership position) on this AUKUS thing.  RT reports:

A new geopolitical deal that will see the US and UK team up with Australia to station nuclear submarines deep down in the Pacific Ocean is a hostile step aimed not only at Beijing, but at Moscow too, a top Russian official claims. Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of Russia's Security Council, told the Argumenty i Fakty newspaper on Tuesday that the pact between the three nations, known as AUKUS, will inevitably be yet another military bloc aimed at containing and confronting the two strongest non-Western powers.According to the interview, Patrushev compared the pact to QUAD, a strategic dialogue format between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, designed to strengthen Washington's position across Asia. According to him, the group is “a military-political bloc with a pronounced pro-American character.”“Just the other day, another military bloc was formed in the region – the American-British-Australian AUKUS, which pursues the same goals,” the top official went on. According to him, the new deal, which will see London and Washington hand over the technical know-how for Canberra to develop and deploy nuclear-powered submarines, is a threat to “the entire security architecture in Asia.”

Of course, it is a threat and Russia, being Asian power, I am sure, will aid China in this matter but for now we can only speculate what will Russia do specifically. As I stated before, the immediate focus is on pr. 971 Schuka (NATO Akula-class) SSNs, many of which are being upgraded to SSGNs. China has cash, a lot of it, Russia has technology and it is totally conceivable to see China seeking Russia's assistance in developing advanced SSNs. What forms will it take? We will see soon enough. I will address some tactical and operational issues re: Indian Ocean SLOCs later--here, China, indeed, faces odds stacked against her, since the US Navy can support, at least initially, guerre de course of submarines, including through deployment of CBGs, which will preclude effective actions of China's ASW/Patrol aviation. Base in Pakistan (Gwadar) thus could get a serious boost in turning it into a full blown Chinese naval base and that will help address a serious vulnerability of Indian Ocean SLOCs which for China have an existential importance. 

Meanwhile, refresh your memory with this piece from more than 3 year ago:

Harry J. Kazianis Really Needs A Muscle Relaxant-II, Or China The Omnipotent. 

The issue is NOT new. 

It Is Only Natural.

Let's throw away emotions and feelings and recall what I stated in my video and in discussion several days ago: 

Repeating Russian (Soviet)-India model of lease of nukes, about which I speak in my video. US Navy will have Block I Virginias reaching their 20-years service life equator by 2025 and do not forget that there are still plenty of Los Angeles-class which reached their 30 years service life. Plenty of goodies to go around.

Thanks to Bernhard of Moon of Alabama who does, as usual, an excellent job of monitoring media and analyzing facts, I personally became aware of this by the way of MoA from The Guardian:

The short-term leasing of nuclear-powered submarines from the UK or the US is being considered by the Morrison government but the Coalition insists nuclear weapons won’t be based in Australia.  

Let's take a look on what is at stake here.

1. This is an intensity of a marine traffic in the region around China.

 

As you can see, any kind of nukes (SSNs) based in Australia have an excellent and fast access to SLOCs both in Indian Ocean and into the deep areas of South China Sea. Operations on SLOCs are as old as navies themselves. China, obviously, depends on SLOCs and even 2-3 additional (Australian) SSNs with Harpoons and torpedoes on permanent patrol in the areas of interest can wreck a havoc on the flow of resources for China. They will also attract serious Chinese resources in terms of ASW. I am not going to discuss now purely tactical and operational issues, but in the minds of US planners this all makes sense.

2. Now, to the mechanics of all that. This is Chakra of Indian Navy. 

USSR/Russia and India have been at this "lease" thing since 1980s, with the first SSGN of project 670 officially joining the Indian Navy in 1988. So, nothing new, really, in leasing out state-of-the-art nukes to someone. If Russia and India can do that, US and Australia, who ARE brethren nations, certainly can. So, not really surprising in learning that the US will lease subs to Australia. In fact, emotions aside, it is the only natural way to increase the submarine force against China in such a way that it strains Chinese and PLAN's resources and, in case of war, helps to shut down SLOC's which are still crucial for China. Pure navalism, folks. 

3. Let's take a look at what is available in a short term. Granted, the Australian crews are getting ready or are already in training for running US nukes. I can tell you immediately--do not forget good ol' Los Angeles-class SSNs. Many of them are either in conservation, reserve or are about to be moved there. There are currently, if to believe WiKi 28 active Los Angeles class SSNs and 1 expecting decommissioning. SSNs 768 through 773 are reaching their 30 year old age but are still active and who knows what their fate will be with at least 8 Virginia-class SSNs being either under construction or announced. Those Los Angeles subs will need to go somewhere and this time it might not be to the scrap yard. Couple of early Los Angeles class subs SSN 719 and 723 are also planned for recycle in 2022. 

So, there are options. It doesn't make France's life easier, for sure, but purely on the military merit, from the shores of Potomac it makes perfect sense. I have to admit, all things considered, it does make at least some sense. Of course, such an approach does not guarantee a success for a number of reasons, but keep in mind that anything based in Perth, as an example, becomes impervious to Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles because neither DF-21 nor DF-17 fly at 5,800 kilometers even when launched from China's south-most point. So, this is another key to this decision. The main issue, however, is this--does the United States think that it can control possible conventional conflict with China that it does not accelerate to a nuclear threshold? That is a huge question to ponder. And yes, China's nuclear subs are not as good as American ones, it is a hard cold fact. What will China do? Ask this question: what will Russia do?  Believe me, it is no less important, if not more. Recall few years back my reaction:

And here is the news, PLAN, for now, doesn't have submarine force which is even remotely competitive both in numbers and quality with the US Navy's submarine force. All bravado on both sides apart, US submarines in the Pacific are overwhelmingly superior to PLAN's nuclear subs (SSKs are a separate issue). Currently the US Navy operates 32 Los Angeles-class + 3 Sea Wolf-class + 15 Virginia-class SSNs = 50 SSNs ALL of whom, including older L.A. class SSNs are superior to anything PLAN can deploy in terms of nukes, which is roughly 9 nuclear subs, only 6 of which could be considered relatively modern (Type 093). Period. Yes, PLAN does deploy a substantial number of conventional SSKs, but again, this fleet of subs is good only for a relatively short distance deployments in defense of own littoral. We are talking here about overwhelming advantage US Navy enjoys over any PLAN's surface or nuclear power submarine force beyond the First Island Chain. I am not even talking here about remote segments of SLOCs. Yes, Chinese are improving, yes, they are gaining both capability (such as destroying US aircraft carriers) and some operational experience, but it takes much more than that to command the seas. I will also avoid describing some info (very reliable one), I just mention it, that testifies against Chinese tactical and operational maturity, for now--I underscore that, for now. But namely for now PLAN, for all US Navy's huge institutional problems, is not a real competitor in one domain, which today defines command of the seas--underwater. US submarine force is simply better, much better and that's the reality, which Admiral Lou should have considered and James Holmes remembered when trying to respond to Chinese naval officer.

And don't tell me that I didn't warn you;)) I sure did, wink, wink. It was only natural for the United States to start leveraging its one of a few remaining and significant advantages in combat technology, submarines, and I am sure people in Beijing and Moscow expected it. I am sure Moscow did. 

Is There Something In The Water?

Because one has to wonder why so many Russian Navy-related publications in a short period in the US media. It is one thing when some ignoramus such as David Axe writes all kind of Clanciesque drivel, totally another when retired Captain of US Naval Reserve and an intelligence "professional" Bradford Dismukes who marked his "presence" in 1979 by editing some monograph titled Soviet Naval Diplomacy, which, I am sure, had about the same academic "impact" as another similar fantasy by retired admiral Robert Hanks titled The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points. Pretty much same drivel based on wrong assumptions and very wrong intelligence about Soviet Union on general and the Soviet Navy in particular. Enter Summer of 2020. 

First, Dismukes publishes a meandering piece in Naval war College Review where he bloviates on the issue of a "strategic ASW" which is a pain in the ass issue because, while classic mathematics of the ASW didn't change much, weapons and platforms which carry these weapons did. With this change came reconfiguration of the battle-space for subs, which, of course, changes things on operational level. Well, on a strategic one too. This new reality, however, did not deter Dismukes who arrives to a very peculiar conclusion in his piece in NWCR. While lamenting, correctly, the failure of US "intelligence" on Soviet Navy (what's new?) and its intentions, he states:

Today’s planning for the wartime security of lines of communication in the North Atlantic shows a strong continuity with that of the Cold War, expressed in historical metaphor redolent of that continuity. The mission statement of the new NATO Joint Force Command in Norfolk includes that the command will “help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe, in a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.’” Recent comments by senior Navy officials have made clear that, if there should be a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” it will be fought against the Russian navy, which obviously would have to come out to fight it. Unfortunately, this line of argument comes dangerously close to echoing the errors of the Cold War. The Soviet navy never was coming out to fight, and the smaller, less capable Russian navy is even less likely to do so. One presumes that the aim of stating, nonetheless, the existence of a possible, even likely, concrete Russian threat to the SLOCs reflects non-threat-related objectives: to promote alliance solidarity and build political and public support in the United States for needed Navy programs. 

I don't know what this "naval intelligence" officer is getting at but the truth is, the interdiction of SLOCs was one of five main strategic tasks of the Soviet Navy which did have not only the largest submarine fleet in the world, bust since 1970s was developing fast cutting edge platforms and weapons precisely for cutting off supplies from the United States to Europe which was viewed as a main theater of operations. Dismukes case is highly unconvincing in terms of his accent and he, in the end, admits that:

These objectives remain as legitimate as they were during the Cold War. However, seeking to promote them by deviating from reality-based planning is unlikely to be effective. First, public support may be difficult to sustain in the face of criticism that the Navy is distorting reality on behalf of the service’s self-interests. Second, the time-honored principle that the planner above all must defend his own vulnerabilities provides fully sufficient grounds for acquiring needed forces and exercising them to maintain their readiness. The greatest American vulnerability at sea continues to be control of the North Atlantic (with regard to SLOCs, undersea cables, and possible future strategic conventional or nuclear threats to the continental United States). Moreover, that control remains an essential condition for the integrity of the alliance.

OK, fine. Reasonable enough. After all, the reason why these guys Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner were working on Project 60, which was in a effect a program of the US Navy's modernization to fight precisely on SLOCs against Soviet Navy explains that they knew about "greatest American vulnerability" and that the Soviet Navy will "come out" to fight.  But after this logical loop Dismukes, trying to present himself as a "reality-based" planner, produces a scenario of such a scale of delusion that one who followed my writing for years may finally calm down and exhale: whew, everything is back to normal US wet fantasies and distortion of the reality in the military and intelligence sphere, which long ago became a hallmark of American intellectual and professional decline. To understand why it is so, Dismukes, who allegedly should be much better prepared to speak professional language than ignorant David Axe, comes up with this "brilliant" assessment: 

Most importantly, the emerging strategic situation provides an alternative, offensive strategic use for forces that complements and promotes traditional SLOC defense. The rapid globalization of the world economy has made Russia far more dependent on the sea than in the past for the growth of its economy, in keeping with its aspirations as a great power. This suggests that the United States and its allies should adopt a blockade strategy in response. Neither Russia nor any other nation can use the surface of the world ocean except at the sufferance of the United States and its allies. In this sense, the West can be said to enjoy global command of the sea.  

This is one of those face-palm moments at which one has to ask Dismukes about how exactly does he view a real war, or real operations? Surely, one may play with all kinds of scenarios, including Russian and US navies combined operations to fight off alien invasion, but Dismukes obviously fails to understand that in fact, "rapid globalization" pushed Russia towards much greater self-reliance in economy and launched the process of "moving" main energy supply arteries deep within Eurasian land-mass, making them invulnerable for American meddling and attempts to sabotage them. Surely, Russia still uses SLOCs, including for delivery of the cargoes such as grain around the globe, but, if anything else Russia's use of SLOCs is not what Dismukes thinks it is:

The potential vulnerability of these assets should be exploited—for deterrence; for crisis response; or, if war is unavoidable, to fight and terminate it successfully. Let us examine briefly two examples of a blockade strategy in action—recognizing that blockade is likely to be more effective in “small war” situations, where the political stakes and the scale of military operations are limited.  

At this stage, to understand why Dismukes goes into this kind of teenage level "scenarios", one should look at his biography which reveals that he is a Cold War 1.0 hawk who is stuck at the level of platforms, weapons and operations of 1980s,  or 1990s at the most. Drawing strategic "lessons" from different era and circumstances and trying to apply them to the state of modern Real Revolution in Military Affairs is a fool's errand. We are not living in 1980s anymore and for Dismukes to really come face-to-face to the reality, he should recall that modern ASW, especially along well protected SLOCs Russia uses primarily, those being for once well within the ranges of Russia's combat aviation, but there is a gigantic difference between 110 kilometer range Mach=0.9 P-120 Malakhit anti-shipping missile of 1960s design, and M=2.6,  800 kilometer range (domestic version) of P-800 Onyx, just one example. For some reason Dismukes doesn't want to calculate--the only legitimate way of making any case on be that strategic ASW or "SLOC defense". 

Here is the example of proper presentation of the case. Recall The Proceedings' piece by Andrew Metrick last year. Here is a professional who, instead of waxing "strategic", gives concrete numbers which define a direct variation of complications for a "defending" side with the growth of the range of salvo. 

Russia’s new strike capabilities give its navy and, in particular, its submarine fleet a tremendous ability to influence the European military balance. The GIUK Gap will not provide a geographic crutch to help mitigate the threat, as long-range weapons allow Russian submarines to operate from the relative security of the Norwegian and Barents seas. For example, a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) with a range of 1,000 miles would give the Russian Navy a potential patrol area of 100,000 square miles from which it could strike Bremerhaven while remaining reasonably secure. 

Simple as that. It also becomes a truism that appearance of any hostile surface force within the range between 2 to 3,000 kilometers from Russian shores, a precise distance within which most of Russia's SLOCs are located, makes this hostile force, let's be direct here, a sitting duck for a variety of strike means Russian Armed Forces can bring to bear. That brings us to main point--how Dismukes sees, say, operations of US Navy at Northern Sea Route, trying to enforce a "blockade"--an act of war, mind you--there, or even in Mediterranean? Last time I checked, no US air defense system is good enough for intercepting a salvo of modern supersonic, let alone hypersonic, anti-shipping missiles and DOES NOT solve the main issue of surface warfare--a problem of a leaker (or leakers). Dismukes forgets that it is August of 2020, not August of 1985. Things changed, dramatically at that. I also "liked" a paragraph where Dismukes suggests not to "touch" Russia's SSBNs. Goodness gracious.

And here is the point, what the hell is going on in US media, especially Forbes, which publishes utter delirium from David Axe, now Dismukes with scenarios which are based on a number of utterly false assumptions and, frankly, childish wet dreams, as if not understanding a relation between ranges of modern weapons and required forces and operational sweeps to at least have a chance against a single sub armed with modern ASMs. What about two of them, what about three? Forget Russia's long-range aviation capable to wipe out any force in the ocean without even nearing farthest edges of air defense zones of any US CBG, forget about sinking de facto indefensible convoys. Is there something which is being put in the water that we have this one after another ridiculous pieces of mental masturbation? In the end, does Dismukes even understand how the world changed and with it changed a technology of sinking fleets. What is forgivable for a comic books' "artists" who has issues with basic understanding of arithmetic, is absolutely inadmissible for a person who is a naval "intelligence" professional, who, evidently, got stuck in 1980s and cannot face a reality of modern war.

In related news, as was expected the stream is large due to Army-2020 international forum, Russia (in Russian) begins to consider increasing missile load, from 8 to 16 on project 21631 and to 24 for project 11661 Gepard, with 21631 growing in displacement from 900 to around 1300 tones. It was also confirmed (contacts have been signed), that Russian Navy will receive 8 pr. 22350 frigates and more pr. 20385 corvettes, all carriers of coming 3M22 Zircon (in Russian). Continuation of the pr. 20385 is an extremely good news for Russian Navy because these are very capable platforms for surface warfare, air defense and ASW. One of the best corvettes in the world with enough strike power to sink aircraft carrier. 

But I am sure Mr. Dismukes knows all that.  

P.S. A classic case of intelligence operations is to publish some utter rubbish in media and expect the other side start debunking it hoping for it to "spill the beans". Oldest trick in the book even teenagers know about. Could this stream of BS be of this nature? Possible but I don't think it is the case here--most of it fits perfectly a general picture of insufferable butt-hurt and self-medicating. 

One Doesn't Need To Be...

An oil industry specialist (I am certainly not one--I stress it all the time), to understand how and why, as even oil-ignorant me warned about Saudis being royally fvcked once they initiated the oil war. Recall what I wrote exactly a month ago: 

My question in this case is this: didn't you, guys, see that coming? Have anyone in D.C. tried to mitigate the problem by engaging Russia, not Saudis, who is in real control of situation? Any diplomacy, any quid-pro-quo? No? Well, then I guess you have only yourself to blame for not having a faintest clue about Russia. Continue chest beating, while Russia will put Saudis on their knees and then will give the United States, yet another, chance to save face and come to the negotiating table.  

You see, even such oil ignoramuses like me knew that Saudis are minor players in this game because only people with nukes, navies, air forces and complex industrial economies of scale are major players. Well, guess what: 

China boosts oil imports from Russia, while slashing purchases from Saudi Arabia 

It is kinda self-evident that it is not enough to have product, one has to sell it, has market for it that is, and Russia has her markets, while Saudis are having a hell of a time trying to hold on to ones they...ahem, had. Don't trust me:

(Bloomberg) -- Oil-rich Gulf nations may turn to asset sales to complement an almost $50 billion debt spree to support economies rocked by the coronavirus pandemic and the collapse in crude prices, according to Citigroup Inc. Countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have “really attractive” government-owned assets, which could be sold to the public or partnered with other investors, Atiq Rehman, head of Citigroup Inc.’s emerging-market cluster for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, said in an interview.

Russia knew from the get go that China will have to reposition herself towards Russia's energy (and not just oil) because neither tanker oil, nor LNG can compete with pipelines, especially the ones which are already built and operational, not to speak of a cluster of gigantic Russian processing plants being built right on China's threshold to provide all needs not only in crude and gas but in high value added products of hydrocarbons processing. You know, like Amur Gas Processing Plant. And then, and then... there are Indian Ocean SLOCs which cannot be defended by China once mighty US Navy's submarine force is given the order to interrupt Gulf's oil supplies to China. And yes, there is always Russia and her Armed Forces which can secure supply of necessary energy to China. So, simple--just one look at the map is enough to understand. And we even are not talking about nuclear energy part. Yes, about that: reading today about Rosatom (in Russian), I stumbled on this startling number about legendary MIFI's (MEPhI) international enrollment. While all kinds of fraudster rating agencies in the West blow smoke up our assess creating all kinds of university ratings, among Turkish students the competition for a single vacancy in MIFI reaches 72 applicants. 

So, Russian-Chinese relations are going to be growing not just because out of pure economic sense but geopolitical too. Or geoeconomical one, if one wishes. It seems that China finally understood who real friends are or, as they say in Caucasus, close neighbor is closer than the remote relative. As for oil wars, they are just but one episode of a much larger (and by much I mean order of magnitude) global realignment which involves way-way more than just actual oil, not to speak of worthless speculative papers aka futures, but a strategic reorientation of the world towards nuclear energy and, eventually, transition to a manned exploration of the Solar System.  

Were There Any Other Options?

I don't buy for a second all those Russian-China economic "integrationism" arguments, despite obvious attempts by China and Russia to form some sort of common Eurasian market. Russia and China are neighbors and economic... competitors. But, right now many Russian-Chinese broad economic, social, scientific and military  contacts make total sense in a face of unruly and ungovernable United States. In fact, those are only natural. Yet, there is one item on Russian-Chinese agenda which sets Russia apart from everyone else for China. As South China Morning Post notes in its opinion piece: 

Beijing is stepping up efforts to seek support from regional and global players such as Russia and Central Asian nations as its geostrategic rivalry with Washington heats up. President Xi Jinping is expected to meet his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin next month, when he will also address the St Petersburg International Economic Summit, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov told state-run TASS news agency earlier....The latest flurry of diplomatic activity comes as competition between China and the US intensifies on several fronts including trade and technology, the South China Sea and the Arctic, where Beijing’s partnership with Moscow –funding and building ports, berths and icebreakers off Russia’s shores– has drawn criticism from Washington. It will be Xi’s second time at the St Petersburg forum, and observers expect the Chinese leader will reaffirm Beijing’s commitment to multilateralism and promote the nation as a champion of openness and cooperation.

Pay attention to the highlighted, as well as rather realistic assessment by this very same South China Morning Post in this title of its other analytic piece.  

Russia launches nuclear icebreaker Ural to exploit Arctic’s commercial potential – with two more to follow...The drive is part of a push to strengthen Moscow’s hand in the High North as it vies for dominance with traditional rivals Canada, the United States and Norway, as well as newcomer China.  

A-ha, warmer now. In continuation of my yesterday's piece on competitiveness and a series of my articles on this issue (such as this one), I suggest to pull back a bit and try to take a look at a larger picture. No, I am not talking about a Huawei affair dominating current headlines all over the world, I am talking about things even more important than US-China trade war--I am talking about fundamental conditions which will allow China to win this war. But first let's talk about conditions which already now prevent China from winning such a war. I wrote also, not for once, about it--China is not competitive with the United States where it really matters, Shipping Lanes Of Communications (SLOCs), especially Indian Ocean SLOCs, which are crucial for China's trade. PLAN is simply not a competitor for US Navy in the open ocean. For now. When and IF (I stress it--IF) PLAN will be able to compete with the US Navy underneath the waves, until then the Arctic looms large, very large, for China's sea trade. If the United States, in the feat of desperation (it is possible, but who knows how probable) decides to cut China's Indian SLOCs before a bulk of Chinese trade is removed within Eurasian landmass, the whole Huawei affair will look like a fart in the hurricane. 

The time is ticking away. Enter Russia, the issue here is not just Russia's massive, largest and most advanced ice-breaker fleet in the world, it is the fact that Russia develops her Arctic at a break-neck speed, developing both civilian and military infrastructure, including building fully operational airfields capable to base latest in Russian ASW/Patrol Aviation such as IL-38Ns and full blown Air Defense (S-400, S1, the works, a whole shebang) areas such as Kotelnyi Island, which pretty much explains what is Russia up to in terms of her capabilities in this very Arctic and why it will be almost impossible to rival those by anyone from USA to Canada, to China, not to speak of Norway. Considering also the way Russia treats her submarine forces, one may easily see that Northern Sea Route will be defended extremely well. So, there is very little, in fact zero, doubt that China is very interested in this route, because unlike in the Indian Ocean where US submarine forces may run rampant against China's marine commercial traffic and PLAN will have a hell of a time trying to do much about it, Arctic Route is a different game--friendly Russia is there and Russia's combat and patrol aviation, and submarine forces will be able to keep this SLOC opened for China, not for free, of course. 

Add now also a purely geopolitical aspect here. China only now begins to experience what Russia has an unrivaled experience in--a serious stand-off against major power(s). Russia's game till now was huge militarily--from Ukraine, to Syria, to Arctic, to new weapons systems, Russia is in a kinetic mode non-stop. China is yet to make a full claim to real superpowerdom and for that she needs Russia and her immense military potential, capable to defend most of Eurasia against any attempt on Eurasian integration. China doesn't have such capability and so the dance between comrades Putin ans Xi continues. No, of course, both men have excellent relations which can be called friendship, but Putin knows damn well that China needs Russia now in a really big way, including this very important moral support factor, which can be described in boxing terms as old experienced trainer patting his new talented protege, title challenger, on the back before his fight with an intimidating champion and telling him: "Don't worry, son. You'll be OK". People who underestimate an immense importance of  this moral support factor in international relations, they know very little about international relations. Enough to take a look at an insatiable American appetite for "high moral ground" and to be admired. Look what happened once this moral ground was lost--it is in a front of your eyes. 

So, China can win only with Russia's help which is expressed apart from, already mentioned, moral support factor in being cooperative with China's supply lines and throwing around Russia's significant economic and immense military weight. China, unlike the United States, does have geopolitical currency "to buy" Russia. But as any seller who knows a real value of what he (or she) sells, Russia will ask a "fair" price and China will agree. The world now needs Russian-Chinese close cooperation and, possibly, some form of a formal alliance, while transitioning into new geopolitical and economic paradigm. But as never before, it becomes clear that two great cultures and empires are on the even footing vis-a-vis each-other, far from wet dreams by many Western "analysts" predicting for Russia a complex of "junior partner" in relations with China, when in reality it is Russia who went to hell and back in 20th and 21st century who has a well earned privilege to pass judgements on how China may come of age as a true superpower by means of facing off with her largest foe. But then again, did China even have  options other than getting together with Russia whose energy and military power is and will continue to be one of the drivers of Chinese successful entrance into the ring with the United States for a real fight? I don't think so. After all, as Marx stated--the freedom is a comprehended necessity. 

P.S. Meanwhile, the video of the assembly of the first serial SU-57s. 

I am sure very many arm-chair aerospace "analysts" are about to make their "opinions" heard;))

My New Piece On Naval Strategy And China.

At Colonel Lang's blog at which I have a privilege and honor of being a contributor.  

Late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov at the peak of the Soviet naval development in late 1970s to mid-1980s continued to stress his seemingly simple idea, first officially articulated in his 1976 treatise The Sea Power of the State, that modern (Soviet) navy must be balanced.[1] Gorshkov's idea of balanced fleet was that of a navalist, who envisioned modern navy capable to conduct global operations ranging from amphibious landings, to global anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, to nuclear deterrent. Yet, throughout Gorshkov's long tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy one platform above everything else remained dominant in his thinking—a submarine. Unsurprisingly, 1968 Time magazine cover featured image of Admiral Gorshkov superimposed on the background with a submarine at the periscope depth. With all the Soviet Navy's impressive development of its surface fleet at that time, these were primarily submarines which USSR developed at a break-neck speed and eventually equaled or surpassed US Navy's submarine forces not only in quantity but in quality too, with even US Navy grudgingly admitting in 1988 that project 971 (NATO Akula-class) nuclear submarine being the best in the world.[2]  

This is an excerpt. 

Some Fast Thoughts On 2nd Fleet.

In the news since last week is the revival of the US Navy's 2nd Fleet, as reported by Fox. 

NORFOLK, Va. –  The U.S. Navy formally re-established its 2nd Fleet on Friday, intensifying its focus on the North Atlantic Ocean where the Russian military is operating at a pace not seen since the end of the Cold War. The change is mostly organizational. It revives an Admiral-level command dedicated to overseeing American warships as they deploy between the U.S. East Coast and the Barents Sea, off of the coasts of Norway and Russia. The revived fleet also reflects a broader change in U.S. military strategy. The nation's primary concern is shifting from terrorism in the Middle East to America's growing competition with Russia and China.

Putting all this BS mambo-jumbo about "democracy" and values aside here we may all come together in admitting that in one assessment US Navy is absolutely correct--the era of a great power competition is back. Speaking in purely military, not ideological terms, the 2nd Fleet will have to, as was stated:

Having a 2nd Fleet allows the U.S. to work more closely and effectively with its NATO allies, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Gary Roughead said in an interview. And they will be better prepared to respond to potential Russian aggression.

So, what this "potential Russian aggression" is? Very simple, and hear me out, unlike US Army or USAF which are known to be "defending" the United States anywhere but near the United States, the US Navy IS an actual defender of the nation and North America. It doesn't mean that US Navy doesn't participate in good ol' American business of bombing weak nations into the stone age, but operationally and strategically US Navy is, indeed, the force which is tasked with defense of US proper, including from this hypothetical Russian aggression. 

The potential "Russian aggression" has a very specific name--Russia's submarine forces, ranging from upgraded project 949A (Oscar II-class SSGN) capable of carrying up to 72 Kalibr-family missiles, to the Project 885 (Yasen-class SSGN) capable of another 32 missile mix, including Oniks, which is also capable of TLAM function but with a shorter range than 3M14. 2nd Fleet will have a gigantic area of responsibility if it wants to counter Russian subs which, inevitably, will go into the areas suitable for launch at targets inside the US and, knowing those ranges, one can easily imagine where a line going parallel in roughly 2400 kilometers from the US East Coast will be. It is a very large area and it will require a rather impressive operational sweep to keep it under some control against very silent Russian subs. 

While there is a lot of talk about Sea Control, the funny thing here is that in this particular case 2nd Fleet will be more in a Sea Denial, rather than Sea Control, mode. One of the reasons for that being the fact that famous GIUK Gap, a proverbial choke point of the Cold War 1.0 and of late Tom Clancy's wet dreams, loses all of its appeal for a number of key reasons most important of them being:

1. Russia is not fighting this "Fourth Battle of Atlantic" as some top brass in US Navy declared. It is a load of propagandist contrived crap. As the crow flies, the distance from Murmansk to the East Coast of Iceland is about 1,200 miles. 1,200 x 1.6=1920 kilometers. Do you get my drift? Now ask yourself a question why suddenly Norway came into focus. 

2. This means NO serious surface NATO component (in case of, God forbids, things going "hot") will survive the "breaking through" salvo of Kinzhals, X-32s and, well--you get the picture...

3. That means a much freer passage of Russian subs into the Atlantic Ocean than it was the case during the Cold War 1.0 when massive NATO ASW and other surface and submarine forces were operating in this Gap. 

4. Russia is not really fighting this war because Gorshkov Soviet Navy's Flank Strategy (Med in the South and Baltic and Atlantic  in the North) is not necessary anymore--Russia is not intent on "invading" Europe nor support her "socialist" (nowadays all NATO members) flanks by means of interdicting Atlantic SLOCs, considered crucial for Western Europe to resist those nasty Russkies about to invade (from 1945 through 1989) Western Europe. 

Russian subs are needed in Atlantic to keep a revolver to the temple in case of not hypothetical but a very real aggression from the US. Obviously all kinds of combinations are possible here, including (who knows--I just speculate, don't take it too seriously) a possibility of Avangard being deployed on some of Russian Navy's strategic missile subs, together with a growing fleet of strategic bombers capable of carrying a very long range missiles. So, from this point of view US Navy does face an actual strategic task to hunt down those Russkies to prevent, at least from the ocean, a very probable retaliatory salvo if someone in Washington will go completely mad. Russia is not going to attack unless attacked first. That means a lot of ASW and a lot of other operational and, most importantly, psychological adjustments for US Navy, which in this case finds itself in a very unusual role--facing real no-go exclusion zones and a range of missile threats inconceivable even 10 years ago. Will 2nd Fleet be up to the task? I guess we'll see. I hope good movies will come out of it, if we all survive...

Moving Stuff.

Stumbled upon this interesting piece and discovered for myself that the situation with US merchant fleet is even grimmer than I expected.

“It’s been an 80 percent reduction in the overall global (U.S. military) footprint since circa 1990,” said Eric P. Ebeling, chief executive of American Roll-on Roll-off Carrier Group out of Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey, the third-largest U.S. flag carrier in international trade. “When cargo goes down, that’s less cargo on U.S. flag ships.”

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article210623279.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article210623279.html#storylink=cpy

Obviously, the United States is a SLOC-dependent nation but, of course, naval, that is military, considerations are also at a prime and reflect a rather moribund concept of US Armed Forces fighting some conflict which would require a steady supply train of merchant marine vessels to Europe. It is a moribund doctrine since, while implying that US will be fighting in Europe (a suicidal scenario), presumably Russia, and will require an intense operations on Atlantic SLOCs, forgets how things changed since the good ol' Cold War 1.0. It doesn't mean that Russia will not try to interdict those Atlantic SLOCs, but as even some US experts admit:

Some experts said that in a world of hypersonic missiles, laser satellites and smart bombs, discussion of ships and long land wars may seem obsolete.

“People today don’t have the same sense that they did in the 1950s or before then of the possibility of a large-scale conflict. They say, ‘Uh-uh, no way,’” said Seth Cropsey, a former deputy undersecretary of the Navy now affiliated with the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington. For his part, Buzby said future conflicts will carry additional risk if the Pentagon must send cargo on foreign flagged vessels – especially if enemy vessels try to stop the supplies.

“What other country is going to want to stand up and say, ‘Yeah, I’ll carry American stuff’ and get potentially shot at?” Buzby asked.

It has to be stated very clearly that the United States simply has no real resources to fight any REAL war against Russia in Europe, because:

1. Russians are absolutely not interested, nor intent, in attacking, or invading, or what have you, anything in Europe unless, see below...

2. NATO commits suicide and does attack Russia, as some people in D.C. and Brussels are convinced they can. Well, in this case no amount of supplies will help them. US simply has no military hardware for sustaining a large conventional combined arms war against such peer as Russia. Why so--is a separate issue here.

3. Russia is certainly not going to interdict Atlantic SLOCs in a peace time.

Reality, however, is rather simple and reduces all this strategic maritime (mambo-jumbo) talk to a few simple facts:

1. Mediterranean is already largely (Eastern and Central parts) "closed" for any combat activity and in case of real war (God forbids) will be closed up to Majorca or even Gibraltar by merely deploying a squadron of MiG-31K (yes, that is official now--MiG-31K)  with Kinzhal to Khmeimim Base in Syria. 

2. Northern "approaches" are also "controllable" both on water and on land by a variety of means ranging from already proverbial Kinzhal to a variety of stand-off land and ship attack weapons carried both by Russian Navy and VKS. 

So, one may ask, what's left then for US Merchant Marine? The answer is simple--get competitive and try, by whatever means necessary, to restore American civil shipbuilding industry. In the end, the United States has some very legitimate commercial interests which are tied to SLOCs and nobody, at least not in the Atlantic, is going to mess with them. The faster this delusion that US can fight the war in Europe will be dispelled the better it will be for the shipbuilding industry. For now, however, this is a situation:

One move is afoot to stimulate shipyards by again requiring some energy exports to sail on U.S. flag vessels. Garamendi said he will introduce a bill in the House later this month that would require a growing percentage of LNG and other energy exports to move on U.S.-built ships, starting at only 1 percent and slowly rising to 30 percent.

“We would simultaneously rebuild the American fleet and the ability of our shipyards to produce blue water ships,” Garamendi said.

Shippers said the 2015 end to the ban on U.S. energy exports hit them hard.

“It caused a huge reduction in the demand for American-flagged tankers. But nobody ever talks about that stuff in Congress,” said Crowley, who called the move “highly disruptive.”

“Some companies scrapped ships,” he added.

His own company laid up two tankers for up to a year for lack of work.

“Everybody suffered because the revenue per ship dropped dramatically because there was more capacity,” Crowley said.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article210623279.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article210623279.html#storylink=cpy

So, it is yet to be seen if the US, once mighty, merchant shipbuilding industry and Merchant Marine will recover, but there is very little doubt that this, unlike many insanely dubious and useless military programs, is a worthy goal to pursue. I, somehow, prefer economic competition to military one. As Garamendi's Bill state:

“We’re the most powerful nation in the world, but 99% of our trade travels on foreign-flagged ships,” continued Garamendi. “To develop the kinds of jobs that will keep the American economic engine moving, we need to right this ship and grow America’s maritime sector.”

I have some news for Garamendi, however, "most powerful nations in the world" do not have 99% of their trade traveling on foreign ships. The faster this will be understood and BS mantras of American exceptionalism be dropped--the faster this nation will find much needed real economic recovery.