About Power Projection.

And why it is done. Starting from 22:40 in otherwise excellent conversation between Larry and Alex Christophorou (of Duran), Alex makes an astonishing claim that in Mediterranean everything is lost for Russia and talks about sway and about Med being NATO and US lake.

For all my deep respect for Alex, here are some important points one has to consider and I will be blunt. 

1. Russians don't give a flying coitus about having sway anywhere--Greece, Germany or the US. Russia is not USSR and is not interested in the International Worker's Movement or International Socialist (and Communist) Movement. Russians don't give a fuck about being loved or respected in EU. Europe is Russia's existential enemy. Russia is strictly transactional--wanna do business? Fine. If you don't, well, feel free to find better deals elsewhere. Russians DO NOT buy all this crap about cultural "closeness", or common "Orthodox root" and shit like that--everybody has their price, look what $5 billion buys one in 404. Tsipras government demonstrated to Russians everything they needed to know about Greece. Tourism and a few Russophile clubs here and there in the EU are just that--clubs with negligible impact. 

2. As Paul Atreidis stated in Dune: "He who can destroy a thing, has the real control of it". Soviet/Russian projection of power was always NOT about bombing the shit out of locals--this is the American idea of "projection of power". Russian idea in Med since post WW II was about a) Shipping Lanes Of Communication (SLOC) and free movement of commodities between USSR/Russia and her clients, b) to prevent the Med's flank from resupplying NATO forces in case of WW III. And here is the issue:

3. Alex speaks from the POV of how NATO people think, that is the problem, because--this is the thinking from the XX century school of geopolitics, which ignores completely a simple XXI century fact that Russia can sink ANY combination of the NATO Fleets, including any number of the US Navy's Carrier Battle Groups from Gibraltar to Bosporus and NATO can do nothing about it. Zero, zilch. Combined West is simply stuck in the 1980-90s military thinking and technology. 

A single frigate of Gorshkov-class with a single pr. 885 Yasen-class SSGN can, in a single salvo of 4 3M22Zircon each destroy two US Navy Carrier Battle Groups--none of those CBGs will know what hit them. Moreover, what is also missing from this outdated POV is the fact of a term which Vladimir Putin and Russian military professionals saying about Oreshnik--read attentively--it is a HIGH PRECISION weapons. That means that Oreshnik's hypersonic maneuvering blocks with the range of 5,500 kilometers can hit any types of targets on the land or in the sea. NATO navies, including US Navy's CBG can huff and puff, can simulate Alfa-strikes but all this is for naught because since roughly 2018 there is no NATO "lake" in Med with or without Russian bases there, because all of those navies are nothing more than fat prestigious defenseless targets. What matters the most, those who are not completely brainwashed in NATO navies know this. And this is why any attempt to sabotage Russian commercial activity supported by Russian Armed Forces can start with the demonstration of sinking some Euro-chihuahua ship, say French or Spanish FFG as a warning. 

Too bad Royal Navy's ships do not go to sea anymore--no, really and, yes, I am being facetious about sinking those. So, in this case, after Syrians (or whatever they consider themselves now) made their choice. Now they, ahem... LOL))

The new Syrian authorities are calling on the international community to intervene and help it stop Israeli strikes, the head of the Hayat Tahrir-al-Sham (HTS) jihadist group, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, has said. In an interview on Saturday on the Istanbul-based Syria TV channel, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who is better known by his nom de guerre, spoke about Israel for the first time since taking over the country. Militant groups led by HTS launched an offensive against Syrian troops in November, capturing major cities and advancing towards Damascus. After the collapse of the Syrian military, Former President Bashar Assad fled the country and was granted asylum in Russia. Al-Julani said that “the Israeli arguments have become flimsy” and “do not justify their recent violations.” The HTS leader stressed that West Jerusalem has “crossed the lines of engagement” in the country, which might threaten an escalation in the region.

Don't you love it? Meanwhile Russia relocates a few assets to Libya, which is a critical location for expanding Russia's Saharan and sub-Saharan commercial and military activity. Just to demonstrate what Oreshnik's reach is in relation to Med...

Now, let's talk about whose lake the Mediterranean is. Remember: "He who can destroy a thing, has the real control of it"(c). Wise words. 

Military Newspeak, Same As Oldspeak.

I am always cranky whenever I see all kinds of taxonomies and "classifications", never more so than when those, mostly vague and, often, propaganda-driven distinction methods are applied to military affairs. Make no mistake, I am not against systematization, generalization and proper linguistic representation of military, or any other, phenomena--I am all for it, when done professionally, after all, there is a reason one of the first books on the table of any officer in Russian Navy or Army, as an example, is the small book called "Command Words" and phrases. Things, any things, need to be named correctly and have a very good reaction "path" to the brains of those to who they are addressed--be it a young soldier or an experienced rear-admiral. Clarity is the main requirement. Hm, maybe that is why I am published by Clarity Press. Maybe it wasn't accidental that I decided to go with them. 

Well, here I am again, ranting. This time I had it with the term Blue Water Navy. I opened Yahoo News feed today and, bang--Dmitry Gorenburg of Center for Naval Analysis writes this:

In the near to medium term, the Russian Navy’s role will be to serve primarily as a deterrence force to constrain U.S. and NATO operations in the eastern Mediterranean and to provide forward defense for approaches to the Russian homeland through the Black Sea. It will have some power projection through its ability to hold opponents’ territory at risk with its cruise missile capability, rather than through traditional naval strike groups. Out-of-area deployment capability will increasingly shift to smaller patrol ships and to submarines as Russia’s remaining Soviet-era large surface ships become increasingly less reliable. Over the last decade, there has been a transition in the Russian Navy’s future planning from unattainable blue-water aspirations to establishing a fairly capable green-water force. Its overall focus remains defensive in the near term, with the possibility of greater emphasis on power projection in the medium term as more Yasen-class nuclear attack submarines come online and older Soviet submarines are armed with Kalibr cruise missiles as part of ongoing modernization plans.

While Gorenburg's piece, surprisingly more-or-less balanced (for "American" analyst), is not wrong in a matter-of-fact way, passage highlighted in yellow makes by eyebrows being raised pretty high. For starters, what are "blue-water aspirations"? Let's see. We go to WiKi, and why not.

In public discourse blue-water capability is identified with the operation of iconic capital ships such as battleships/battlecruisers, aircraft carriers, and nuclear submarines.  

Public discourse, of course, is important but I was getting away from this term for a long time now, since it makes NO operational sense whatsoever if it is not judged relative to its mission against PROBABLE adversaries.  Here is how some people define these Blue-Water, Green-Water, what have you, capabilities. 

So, is the United States Navy a Blue-Water Navy? Absolutely--it is large, it can sail globally, it single-handedly can destroy some countries and in a civilian logic which still exists at the power-balance configuration circa 1999-2003 it is, it MUST be, a Blue-Water Navy. Well, I have issues with this statement in October, 2019. For starters, I took Stansfield Turner's (and not his only) operational truism to heart, long time ago. 

“It isn’t the number of keels, or size of ships that count. It is the capacity to do what might be decisive in some particular situation.”(c)

Blue-Water Navy's definition is as operational (or strategic, if one wishes) as it is a geopolitical qualifier and here is, where Gorenburg, while making his point within old, and, I would dare to say, obsolete cognitive apparatus, born primarily within deep recesses of Pentagonese Newspeak and fantasies taught as "science" in the Political Science courses in US Universities, is wrong. Blue-Waterness or lack there of is defined primarily by such tactical, operational, strategic and geographical term as the RANGE, distance that is. The further one's navy sails, the bluer this navy becomes. But as of lately, this range thing turned into a peculiar category. Just on this merit alone, as in the distance one's navy assets sail, we cannot be particularly sure, or otherwise, that Russian nuclear subs are not hanging out somewhere in the Gulf of Alaska, or at the entrance to Gibraltar. Who knows, but if the prior experience is any indication, chances are that they are there. So, in this respect, Russian Navy is a Blue-Water Navy because ANY Navy which has nuclear submarine forces equaling in capability Russian one is a Blue-Water navy by definition, since it sails its serious assets globally. So, Gorenburg, basically contradicts himself immediately following what I highlighted in yellow. This is not the way to conduct analysis by contradicting oneself immediately after making statements.

He also forgets to mention that Project-885 (Yasen-class) SSGNs are armed not with just 3M14 but primarily with 800-km range capable P-800 Onyx supersonic anti-shipping missiles with 1000-km range 3M22 Zirkon slated for the first underwater launch from this very same class of subs next year. So, a single Yasen-class SSGN with Zircon creates an exclusion zone of area A=pi x r^2= 3.14 x 1,000^2=3.14 million square kilometers. "Parked"  somewhere in or "near" GIUK Gap a single Yasen creates A2/AD "bubble" from roughly Greenland to UK. That is if this (or these) sub(s) operate there, if it moves beyond GIUK Gap in the  South-Western direction roughly  700 miles (around 1,000 km), two subs of this class can completely wreck havoc on Atlantic SLOCs. If that is not Blue-Water operations, I don't know what is. Mind you, those have nothing in common with "power projection", those will be good ol' classic SLOCs' interdiction operations and, frankly, sinking the enemy fleet. That is how real wars are fought. As we may all know (not from me) US Navy has no viable defense against salvos of high supersonic missiles such as P-800 Onyx and will not have viable defense against hypersonic missiles any time soon. So, where all this leaves us with this Blue-Water thing. Here is what Dmitri Gorenburg thinks:

The Mediterranean will play a key role in Russian naval strategy because of its strategic significance as an access point to southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. For Russia, the Mediterranean symbolizes the larger competition between Moscow and Washington. By building up its naval forces, Russia is hoping to circumscribe NATO access to the region, protect Russia’s southern flank, and assist its current and potential future client states in the region. At the same time, maintaining forces in the eastern Mediterranean is less of a priority for Russian strategy than defending the homeland. Maintaining naval presence in the Mediterranean is a far more effective strategy for the Russian Navy than pursuing a globally active blue-water navy because Russia has neither the resources nor the global ambitions to challenge U.S. naval supremacy around the world.

Here is a conundrum, for Gorenburg and the US Navy--Russia does not need a clone of US Navy to deny its "supremacy" which was, apart from being grossly overstated, dramatically reduced by consecutive denial its "Bluishness" by means of creation of vast impregnable exclusion zones around Eurasia. What's the point of moving enormously expensive assets, such as US Navy's CBGs, into such zones where they (CBGs) are simply not survivable, forget any effective use of their weapons. With Russia's M=10+ capable Kinzhal having own range of 2000 km (up to 3,000 with MiG-31K range), or X-32 with own 1,000 km range with TU-22M3 combat range of 2,500 kilometers, or with recently paraded China's DF-17 2,000 kilometer range hypersonic missiles, what kind of "supremacy" Gorenburg is talking about? What does this "supremacy" even mean? Russia doesn't really care if US Navy exercises its supremacy anywhere other than in a Russia's (and generally Eurasia) vicinity. South Atlantic sounds fine, Pacific Ocean? Sure. Hawaii is a lovely place. Why should one build a vast, ungainly, ridiculously expensive and dubiously combat effective force to meet a challenge, when the US Navy, for all its glorious combat history and impressive visuals was turned obsolete for a minute fraction of a price by introduction of weapons, force structure and operational concepts which created a synergistic effect? The answer is obvious--there is no justification for such a ridiculous waste of money and resources, not to mention the fact, which Gorenburg accurately omits, that the United States itself has no resources to support its grossly unrealistic ambitions. The nation is simply bankrupt and demoralized. But sure, US Navy still maintains "supremacy" in numbers of platforms most of which are fat and prestigious targets for new weapons which drive Real Revolution in Military Affairs.

So, what is a Blue-Water Navy then? The answer is simple--it is not what one may think or try to express it in Pentagonese or Political Scientinese. It is really sad that many complexities of modern warfare (and of geopolitics)  have been reduced to a couple of obvious, to just about anybody, traits and memes while Turner's brilliant operational truism 'It is the capacity to do what might be decisive in some particular situation' was discarded in favor of propaganda expediency and inherent ignorance of political "scientists", which is in the foundation of the American economic, military, moral and intellectual decline. As per the American field of the so called "Russian Studies", as I stated it not for once--it is a wasteland of pseudo-"science", pseudo-"history" by pseudo-"academe" about the country which realistically never existed and which continues, being a civilization, to masquerade itself as a nation. As per warfare and "supremacy", reduced to a simple truism (or meme), this is how it is done, too bad few people took the lesson to heart. Maybe they need to learn a new language?

Carriers, Again.

Again!?

 

MOSCOW, July 26. /TASS/. The Russian Navy should operate at least four aircraft carriers, Scientific Head of the Krylov State Research Center Valery Polovinkin told TASS on Thursday. The Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets "should have aircraft-carrying ships by definition," the expert noted.

The reason of my frustration is not this never-ending aircraft carrier saga of Russian Navy. Economy, sanctions et al considered. It is obvious that it is better to have carriers than not having them. But as I wrote for years—Russian Navy has issues not with technology, after all, if it puts its mind to it, Russia will build 3-4 of those ships eventually. No, in the end—the problem is mental, it is the issue of operational concept for these ships and forces required to form Carrier Battle Group(s). 

Such statements from the above are not the first time representatives of Krylov State Research Center throw into the Russian media. Enough to take a look at the promotion of this:

The Krylov State Research Centre has developed and presented to the public at large the conceptual design of an aircraft carrier for foreign customers, which was earlier offered for the domestic fleet as well. The Project 23000 was called Shtorm (Storm). The conceptual design envisages the aircraft carrier to displace 80,000-90,000 tonnes and feature a combined powerplant (a nuclear reactor and a gas turbine engine). The ship’s air group should comprise up to 60 aircraft.

"Sublime" isn't it?

But if you get my drift, here IS the real problem with this representative Polovinkin's statement:

 Speaking about the US Navy, which currently operates 11 aircraft carriers, the expert noted that the United States had an excessive number of carrier-led groups but the availability of only one aircraft carrier was a "deadlocked situation."

The issue is not a deadlocked situation with Russia's sole and barely (sometimes) operational carrier Kuznetsov—in this I agree with Polovinkin. My issue is in constant invoking of US Navy's experience with carriers. This is wrong, since the only REAL interest this experience should invoke is purely organizational and operational, not the force structure whenever the talk is about one existing and, possibly, future Russian Navy's carriers. And here is a single example of WHY realistically Russia needs carriers as a NICHE system-- specifically in Mediterranean, apart from Northern and Pacific Fleets. For starters, Polovinkin should learn the latest news that the ranges of modern anti-shipping missiles are either equal or greater than ranges modern carrier-based strike aircraft provide. The dynamics of missile development today testifies to the fact that in the nearest future (10-15 years) those missile ranges will only grow. Hell, they are growing already. This moves carriers into the niche of what US Navy was doing since 1950s—projecting carrier power against third-rate powers with barely any, using modern parlance, A2/AD, forget full blown Sea Denial capabilities. 

But here is the news: since 2011 due to Obama's criminal actions (and inaction)—the whole of Maghreb and Middle East got destabilized through the so called Arab Spring, and, as events in Syria show, it requires a serious military (combined with other means) effort to stabilize the situation and preserve political forces capable to run a country and fight off armies of Jihadists (supported by the US, Europe and Gulf satrapies) which now operate in every single country on the Southern coast of Mediterranean, from Algeria, to Tunisia, to Syria. So, the question is—granted that Europe is realistically militarily impotent and culturally (and gender-wise) confused, at best, in reality suicidal—why not to have a "fire crew" in Med in case one needs to prop up any political regime against terrorist Jihad forces? This is precisely the case for having those pesky MiG-29Ks and Ka-52s on station for immediate reaction to any Jihadis' advances. Hmm, what does this remind me? Ah, yes—Fifth Operational Squadron of the Soviet Navy of 1970-1980s. Are those disturbing events coming in Maghreb? Hell, they are already happening. So, it is "power projection" after all. In the end, Kuznetsov's deployment to Syria was ordered by Putin personally.

I omit here any discussion on the possible Northern and Pacific Fleets' carriers—this is not the point—Russia's A2/AD and Sea Denial clout at those theaters of operations grew exponentially since 2017 and, ironically, put the issue of carriers on the back-burner. But Mediterranean and what is coming there—a reality obvious to anyone with even rudimentary forecasting apparatus—does, indeed, bring the issue of future Russian aircraft carriers to the fore. As Libya and Syria, and, in the end, Yugoslavia in 1999, with NATO gang-raping Serbia for the benefit of Kosovo Jihadists and organized crime, showed it will be wise for Russia to have full blown Mediterranean Operational Squadron back to the full strength and that automatically means at least two aircraft carriers. And while Mr. Polovinkin is very busy trying to promote Krylov Center's "perspective" carrier, he should recall a simple military truism that the best ship is the one you have now, as opposed to sometime in the future. That brings up the most important issue in all of this: what will be that sensible compromise which will allow both to develop and built those ships when needed (soon), with effective technology, on a sensible budget within a sensible operational concept. What they will be: CATOBAR, STOVL or whatever else is not for me to suggest. At least MiG-29K is a very decent aircraft and it does exist and it is a good place to start from.   

On Kuznetsov's Deck

As for the rest, Polovinkin may consider a simple fact that a squadron of MiG-31Ks with Kinzhals at Khmeimim Air Base covers practically whole Mediterranean up to Mallorca against any combination of threats (targets). Just saying. In the end, Russia is NOT an Imperial power nor should she be a global policeman, but it becomes increasingly clear that Russia's main geopolitical export today is political stability and this product is in demand and the rate is going up daily.