Who Will Take The Part...

... from Russian side during Xi's visit. While losers from AP bemoan Xi's visit to Moscow: 

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Chinese President Xi Jinping plans to visit Moscow next week, offering a major diplomatic boost to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the same day the International Criminal Court announced it wants to put the Russian leader on trial for alleged war crimes. Xi’s visit was the latest sign of Beijing’s emboldened diplomatic ambitions, and came amid sharpening East-West tensions over the war in Ukraine, now in its 13th month. The U.S. on Friday said it would oppose any effort by China at the meeting to propose a ceasefire in Ukraine as the “ratification of Russian conquest.”

They fail to understand, which is natural for Western office plankton due to it being uncultured ignoramuses, that it is, actually, the other way around. And here comes a bit of a framework. This is not me talking, this is real Sinologist:

Профессор РУДН Андрей Виноградов уверен, что США не хотят воевать с Китаем, но создают институты, которые нужны в условиях перехода к многополярному миру. "Их нельзя назвать в полной мере конфронтационными, но они будут противодействовать китайскому влиянию в Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе", — поясняет китаист.При этом Виноградов считает, что у КНР не так много вариантов ответа. Гонка вооружений выгодна скорее американцам, чем китайцам, которые должны решать проблему модернизации экономики. "Пекин не хочет повторить опыт Советского Союза, но Штаты ставят его в невыгодное положение. Китай мог бы противопоставить AUKUS если не собственный союз, то хотя бы военно-политическое сотрудничество с сильными игроками. Можно договориться с Москвой, но в нынешней ситуации есть риск, что это навредит", — отмечает эксперт.Как бы то ни было, США и их союзники продолжат окружать китайцев военными блоками. А те вынуждены будут проводить внешнеполитический курс, которого придерживаются с начала 1980-х: представлять интересы развивающихся стран и выступать за мирное урегулирование конфликтов. Пока у Пекина нет других вариантов, заключает Виноградов.

 

Translation: RUDN University professor Andrei Vinogradov is sure that the United States does not want to fight China, but creates the institutions that are needed in the transition to a multipolar world. “They cannot be called fully confrontational, but they will counteract Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region,” the sinologist explains. At the same time, Vinogradov believes that the PRC does not have many options for an answer. The arms race is more beneficial to the Americans than to the Chinese, who must solve the problem of modernizing the economy. “Beijing does not want to repeat the experience of the Soviet Union, but the States put it at a disadvantage. China could oppose AUKUS if not its own alliance, then at least military-political cooperation with strong players. It is possible to agree with Moscow, but in the current situation there is a risk, that it will hurt,” the expert notes. Be that as it may, the United States and its allies will continue to surround the Chinese with military blocs. And those will be forced to pursue the foreign policy course that they have been adhering to since the early 1980s: to represent the interests of developing countries and advocate for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. For now, Beijing has no other options, Vinogradov concludes.

I largely agree with Vinogradov here, with some minor caveats, and I write about it for years. Some of those things I wrote and continue to write often are met with disdain and disbelief by many enthusiastic supporters of China but I will repeat it again: China is still not in the same league militarily as US and Russia, granted that the US is in the process of departing from largely self-proclaimed military superiority. Still, China has a long way to go here. And that is where those first signals started to be sent out by Russia, such as yesterday with Konstantin Biyurulin of KRTV articulating the readiness of KRTV to transfer hypersonic technologies to friendly countries. Now Ria published the list and it is a peculiar one for special meeting in a limited capacity. There will be meeting in an expanded capacity too.

МОСКВА, 17 мар - РИА Новости. Зампред Совбеза РФ Дмитрий Медведев, глава МИД Сергей Лавров, вице-премьер Дмитрий Чернышенко, глава ЦБ Эльвира Набиуллина, министр обороны Сергей Шойгу, глава Роскосмоса Юрий Борисов и директор Федеральной службы по военно-техническому сотрудничеству Дмитрий Шугаев примут участие в первом раунде российско-китайских переговорах, которые пройдут 21 марта, заявил помощник президента по международным делам Юрий Ушаков."У нас намечено с учётом важности визита большое представительство... Переговоры в узком составе - в них предполагается участие Медведева, Лаврова, Чернышенко, Шойгу, я буду участвовать, Набиуллина, Шугаев, Борисов и посол Моргулов. Круг участников позволяет подсказать, какие темы могут быть затронуты", - рассказал Ушаков журналистам.

Translation: MOSCOW, March 17 - RIA Novosti. Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, Head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Head of Roscosmos Yuri Borisov and Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugaev will take part in the first round of Russian-Chinese Presidential Assistant for International Affairs Yuri Ushakov said. "We have a large representation planned, taking into account the importance of the visit ... Negotiations in a narrow format - Medvedev, Lavrov, Chernyshenko, Shoigu are supposed to participate in them, I will participate, Nabiullina, Shugaev, Borisov and Ambassador Morgulov. The circle of participants allows us to suggest what topics can be touched upon," Ushakov told reporters.  

Ushakov is correct--easy to understand once you see these names: Shoigu, Borisov and Shugaev. Those are movers and shakers of Russia's Armed Forces and Military-Industrial Complex and I can guarantee you that in Xi's shopping list there will be many very advanced toys present which China will need to push back on the US in general, and AUKUS in particular. Those toys will also serve as a deterrent. It is absolutely clear that China will ask for hypersonics and for aviation. Now, will China ask for S-500? Recall, that India stated that she will be the first recipient of this complex. China DOES need Russia's support and it will be fascinating to hear and see the results of this undeniably monstrously important summit in Moscow.  Per space--yes, I am sure the commitment to new space station and Lunar permanent station will be confirmed.

Oh, Not Again.

Another one of those pieces by some Pentagon's big honcho about this and that. Pentagon's R&D Chief Mike Griffin waxes exceptional and writes another, in a row of now tiresome, platitudes about how US Armed Forces are great... sort of. He starts with a predictable fodder of Berlin Wall:

Nov. 9 marked the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event followed within a couple of years by the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the freeing of the Eastern European vassal states. Francis Fukuyama thought we had reached “the end of history,” that global great power conflict was at its end and that the ascendancy of the Western liberal concept was the permanent future. “We won the Cold War” — it says so in all the history books. Winning is great, except for the part where the losers retreat, rethink, retrain and try again; while the winner thinks the race is won once and for all — which is why the United States now finds itself running from behind in certain aspects of today’s great power rivalry. How did we get here, and what should we do about it?

I have news for Griffin: Fukuyama is a classic representative of the American so called political pseudo-science class and could serve only as an Exhibit A of sheer ignorance, expected from the guy with no particular education or coherent analytical skills. Obviously, neither Fukuyama nor Griffin are good scholars of Clausewitz who is explicit in that: in war the outcome is never final. (c) Oh boy, was Clausewitz a Marxist? I though in a 200 years since Vom Kriege was penned we all should have developed some degree of recognition of what works and what doesn't in Western Civilization's most important work on war. No wonder Lenin was a huge fan of good ol' Carl. But that simple fact aside, there is one thing which Griffin, himself a superb engineer with a stunning array of STEM degrees and former NASA chief must know that his this statement is trivial at best:

Equally critical was the ability to prevail against a larger force in a conventional fight. The U.S. seized the advantage with precision, with a precise conventional strike, enabled by pattern-matching seekers. With a global positioning system to guide force projection to the right place, stealth technology to hide our aircraft from enemy radar, encrypted high-rate communications to enable superior command and control, electronic warfare to deny that advantage to our enemies, unmanned aerial vehicles for both reconnaissance and force projection, and the uncontested dominance of the space domain to tie it all together, we prevailed.

It is becoming downright nauseating reading these Clanciesque pop-warfare narratives since most of them are not true. I don't know if Griffin's tenure at NASA taught him anything but NASA being a paying customer of Russian rocketry for years now, he surely must know that the age of precision guided weapons originally was started by Nazi Germans in WW II when they sunk Italian battleship Roma with radio-guided Fritz-X bomb. But these were Soviet who developed an astonishing array of anti-ship missiles in post-WW II period and I am sure Griffin should know that those by definition are precision guided weapons. It just happened so that the United States was not even a competitor in this field from the inception, lagging badly in development of combat missile technologies in which Soviet Union and Russia had and have a dramatic technological lead, which today may have become insurmountable for the United States. In terms of air defenses the United States military is not even a competitor having nothing even remotely comparable to S-3XX-4XX-5XX systems, not to mention systems of A-235 Nudol. I will skip talking about hyper-sonic weapons here altogether. I will just add that Russians were involved with satellite-based navigation since the same time US got involved with GPS--early 1970s, such as Parus. GLONASS followed in 1982. Griffin surely must know about TU-143 Reis or even ancient LA-17R too. You know, drones.

My question is not even with Griffin's statement such as this:

In brief, the United States no longer possesses the unquestioned technical superiority to dominate a future fight.

Because most of "unquestioned" was primarily, up to late 1970s, in processing power and electronics, but in the fact that Griffin narrates totally made up history of US weaponry which, bar few limited fields, was neither "unquestioned" nor dominant. Even US jewel of a true technological excellence, it's world-class superb nuclear submarine force experienced a serious technological push-back since late 1970s which resulted in at least technological parity by 1990s. My quarrel is with this "creative" history of the warfare as a narrative of only American ingenuity and pioneering--this is absolutely false. Those challenges Griffin talks about--and they ARE challenges in every sense from technological to doctrinal--they didn't appear out of nowhere in an instant. All those challenges gestated and grew out of these very Russians understanding the nature of the warfare and doing their due diligence in R&D and fighting doctrine field. The roots of those "challenges" are in 1970s and 1980s, not in 2010s. Well, what do you know--I just wrote a book on the nature of real revolution in military affairs. It is precisely about what Griffin talks. But in the end, these ad nauseam trivialities, such as this:

What near-term risks are we willing to take, and what current systems are we willing to let go, so that we can invest in capabilities that will impose costs on our adversaries and deter them from starting a fight because they know they cannot win? This is the critical national security challenge of our time.

Invoke only one question--under what stone did Mr.Griffin spend last 20 years in order to not recognize the fact that it is the United States who unleashed non-stop violent wars and coups all over the globe and made sure that people will start the fight once they recognize that their livelihood and sovereignty is under attack by the United States. Luckily, the instruments to defend themselves against American military aggression are better than those of the aggressor and that what saddens US establishment, which has no idea what real war is. Or maybe they do? And that is why they are sad.

This brings me to another point, of Michail Khodaryonok today making a statement to RT:

An attack by NATO on Russia’s westernmost exclave Kaliningrad – a scenario that’s been speculated about in the media lately – would lead to a nuclear apocalypse and affect even countries not involved in a hypothetical conflict.International media have recently made regular publications on how Kaliningrad – the Russian outpost in Europe – could be ‘captured’.Such publications serve the interests of NATO members’ military and industrial complex, according to Kaliningrad’s governor Anton Alikhanov.

What Khodaryonok forgets to mention is that Russia has enough conventional deterrent to not go for the nukes. I may understand (I think) where Khodaryonok is coming from but he, as a graduate of the Academy of General Staff, should know that conventional step in the escalation process in case NATO wants to commit suicide, is, in fact, an additional deterrent and adds robustness to Kaliningrad's defense. Khodaryonok writes:

Now, a few remarks on the message posted by China’s Eastday.com. It says that if NATO and Russia went to war, the bloc could seize the Russian region in a matter of two days. Our Chinese comrades are a little off with their timeline. The operation would not actually take this long, and the result would be very different. It would take Russia no longer than 40-45 minutes to launch a nuclear strike, and after that we would be able to do only one thing – discuss the peculiar aspects of the modern nuclear apocalypse. To sum it up, the battle for Kaliningrad would under no circumstances remain an isolated military conflict. It would become just an episode of a global nuclear war. And even the countries not involved in this conflict would suffer the consequences. Unfortunately, these are the effects of using strategic nuclear weapons.

While Khodaryonok is absolutely correct in stating that such a conflict will not stay local, I don't know if he missed Valery Gerasimov's statement (in Russian) couple of years ago that already then Russia had enough cruise missiles deployed on critical strategic directions for a complex deterrence by means of high precision weapons. A lot of time passed since then and when even RAND admits impossibility of involving NATO in a conventional conflict with Russia:

“We lose a lot of people. We lose a lot of equipment. We usually fail to achieve our objective of preventing aggression by the adversary,” RAND analyst David Ochmanek told a security conference on Thursday. “In our games, when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it.”

Khodaryonok  retired from the Armed Forces in 2000. 19 years ago. Since then one could observe a dramatic change in Russia's doctrinal thinking with introduction of "strategic force deterrence by high-precision weapons" already in 2010 Military Doctrine. One couldn't fail to notice that these were primarily conventional forces that Russia was improving and updating since early 2000s. This was done primarily to be able to fight a conventional, not a nuclear, conflict. So, if Mikhail Khodaryonok thinks that in case of NATO attacking Kaliningrad, Russia is going to go for nuclear jugular immediately, I have a bit of disagreement with him, because the first thing which will be done will be a conventional strike on NATO's infrastructure and for that Russia has enough force to disrupt NATO's C4ISR architecture and inflict major losses. That is precisely what is called a "strategic force deterrence" by means of stand-off, precision-guided weaponry. In the end, rearranging stones in D.C., Brussels or London in purely conventional way is nothing that 3M14 or X-101 cannot do. It is also a good way to avoid apocalyptic scenario by inflicting a lot of pain for aggressor to have second thought about escalation. It is so self-evident from Russia's military development since mid-2000s, that it is strange that Khodaryonok had to reply in this manner to some strategic delusions by some butt-hurt "strategists" who lost every single war they were involved in since 2000 and who still are dreaming of some revenge out of desperation after seeing the myth of their conventional military power blown to smithereens. In the end, even R.D. Hooker's "opus" is about "defending" Baltics and cannot be taken seriously from any professional point of view. Khodaryonok, evidently, forgot Macron begging not to sink French frigate or harm any forces in April 2018. They are not complete idiots there, yet. They can calculate and know, as an example, that NATO's fleet combat life in case of attacking Kaliningrad will be counted in tens of minutes before Kinzhals or P-800s arriving. Khodaryonok MUST know these things. As for nuclear war. Well, no special commentary is needed here.   

On Russia And China (Again).

Do you recall this? 

 Or this: 

     Putin’s Shame: Russia Is Becoming China’s Junior Partner. 

Or many other things of similar nature, so you get the gist of propaganda which was pushed for years at Western and, by design, Chinese, Russian and other consumers of Western mass-media sewer and "analysis". While I may disagree (and radically at that) with Andrei Raevsky's (The Saker) definition of Russian-Chinese relations as symbiotic and as double helix, I feel a need to address the latest events in Russian-Chinese relations and namely a stunning revelation by Vladimir Putin that Russia effectively builds a Chinese (SRPN) Missile Attack Early Warning System. But not only that, once one considers WHAT military and civilian technology Russia increasingly begins to offer for export. 

It is an established fact that Chinese economy is about four-five times larger than that of Russia, with Chinese population being 10 times that of Russia. It is also an established fact that Western assessment methods of the actual power of the states are an institutionalized fraud built around dubious at best, deliberate lying at worst, criteria, which are also aggravated with, pardon my French, very shitty so called "intelligence."  So, in order to measure actual power and status of the state one must be able to unify economic, soft and military power much of which rests with what time after time, using numbers and opinions of people of such scale as Sergei Lavrov, always comes down to Corelli Barnett's prophetic: 

 power of the nation-state by no means consist only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight and resolution with which its foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political organization. It consists most of all in the nation itself, the people, their skills, energy, ambition, discipline, initiative; their beliefs, myths and illusions. And it consists, further, in the way all these factors are related to one another.  

In modern world it is the ability to build machines, amazing machines, which counts hugely towards the status and real power. I addressed not for once this issue. Time to address again. Russia produces machines China cannot. Those machines unlike undeniably impressive China's commercial technologies, such as 5G, massive commercial shipbuilding or high-speed trains, directly change global balance of power. Russia has a state-of-the-art system which enhances China's global position dramatically, in fact, in revolutionary way, Russia shares (some of) this system with China--this is unprecedented historically. Chinese know that, they also know that it will be Russian aerospace industry, through joint venture which will produce CR-929 with Russia responsible for wing, center section and PD-35 engines for this aircraft. And, of course, Russia supplying domestic versions of SU-35 and S-400 to China. 

The question which MUST be asked here is not who is "junior" or "senior" partner in this now almost official alliance, but what technologies and machines Russia is NOT exporting to China. Once this issue is pondered, one will stop driving this propaganda BS about Russia being a "junior" partner. This is not how it works and it becomes increasingly clear that it is Russia's technologies which increasingly drive the emerging security arrangement of Eurasia and globally. China, of course, contributes too, not least through mutual cooperation, such as direct investment into Russia and trade. Enough to take a look at some of the massive gigantic cranes at new Russia's monstrous shipyard Zvezda in the Far East, those cranes and control systems were made in China. 

This dated photo merely shows cyclopic Chinese-made cranes, the area today is occupied by the hulls of few new Aframax tankers being built at Zvezda. So, in general, Russian-Chines cooperation, including military one develops extremely well. Obviously, for the combined West which sees the surrounding world only as a place for zero-sum interactions, such a level of relations is simply beyond the grasp. But latest events have shown that "revelation" in terms of Russia's technologies will continue and they will continue to shake and reshape the world in the most profound way. So much for a "junior" partner. So, West's propaganda campaign, against Russian-Chinese relations failed miserably and, in the end, can West provide China with what Russia can--an enhanced security? No, in fact, it becomes increasingly clear that there are no machines in the West which can do that, especially against newly emerging technologies. As, forgive me, I predicted years ago.  

Harry J. Kazianis Really Needs A Muscle Relaxant-II, Or China The Omnipotent.

Two things coincided today after I and Arctic Fox had short exchange on the issue of US Navy and WestPac and I think it is a good idea to give this issue a separate post and discussion. First, what attracted attention was this piece in Russia's Vzglyad with a symptomatic title of Real Combat Capabilities of China's Navy Are Obviously Exaggerated (in Russian). The piece is written by a Russian naval architect Alexander Shishkin and, despite some debatable claims, raises some very important questions about what I was writing for years now and what my second book is about—that is the REAL balance of (military) power. Enough to quote here Shishkin's conclusion which I support completely.

Проблема № 1: подводные силы

В ходе строительства Большого флота у Китая не все идет гладко. Китайцы строят его, широко применяя испытанный метод «клонирования» (реверс-инжиниринга). Однако для этого необходимы исходные образцы, которые в ряде случаев невозможно получить ни за какие деньги и никакой хитростью. Прежде всего сказанное относится к технологиям, связанным с атомными подводными силами. По данным военно-морской разведки США (ONI), современные атомные лодки ВМС НОАК (пр. 094 и 093) по уровню шумности сильно уступают даже советским аналогам третьего поколения (пр. 667БДР и 671РТМК), в то время как у нас уже серийно строятся корабли четвертого поколения (до которых китайцам как до Луны) и корректируется аванпроект ПЛА пятого поколения.

Все объясняется просто: начав проектирование первой отечественной атомной лодки еще в 1952 году, мы уже не останавливались, несмотря ни на какие невзгоды, включая обрушение судпрома и обвальное сокращение ВМФ в «смутные времена». Да, корабли почти не строились, но в боровшихся за выживание НИИ и КБ, зачастую на чистом энтузиазме, продолжались работы над усовершенствованием паропроизводящих установок ядерных реакторов, паровых турбин и редукторов (ГТЗА), подшипников, гребных винтов, насосов, вентиляторов, амортизаторов, звукопоглощающих покрытий, гидроакустических комплексов и много чего еще. В результате в муках был рожден «Северодвинск» – возможно, лучшая многоцелевая атомная лодка в мире и родоначальница серии себе подобных, а китайцы остались далеко позади. Ходят слухи о готовящемся прорыве, начале крупносерийного строительства китайских атомных подводных сил. Бесспорно, производственные и финансовые возможности для этого есть, но как обстоят дела с техническими решениями? В научно-технический гений ученых и конструкторов КНР, способный обеспечить паритет по ТТХ с Россией и США, верится с трудом – иначе китайские товарищи не закупали бы и не копировали образцы иностранного вооружения и военной техники. Возможно, прорыв действительно произойдет, но уж точно не завтра, а когда в Китае появится Наука с большой буквы, на что уйдет не один десяток лет. А пока атомная подводная армада, представителей которой противник будет обнаруживать значительно раньше, нежели они его, будет играть роль бумажного тигра, пригодного разве что для парадов

Translation: Problem #1: submarine forces. Not everything is going according to plan in Chinese building of a Big Fleet. Chinese build this fleet using widely proven method of cloning (reverse-engineering). For this method, however, one needs source specimens, which are often impossible to obtain no matter how huge the sums of money or ruses are involved. This is especially true for nuclear-powered submarine technologies and forces.  In accordance to US Naval Intelligence, PLAN's modern SSNs of types 093 and 094 in terms of quieting are lagging substantially even behind Soviet third generation subs such as SSGN pr. 671 RTM(K) (NATO: Victor III) and SSBN of pr. 667 BDR (Delta-III), all this is while Russia builds series of 4^th generation nuclear subs, with China being nowhere near (in text: as far as the walk to the Moon) these technologies, with Russia already working on a technical project of the 5^th generation SSN.

The explanation to this situation is simple: We (Russia) started working on the first SSN in 1952 and since then never stopped, even despite all calamities, including the collapse of shipbuilding industry and precipitous reduction of the Navy during 1990s (Dark Times).  Yes, few ships were being built in those times, but often through sheer enthusiasm, the work on improvement of steam generators, nuclear reactors, steam turbines, gear systems, bearings, screws, pumps, fans, acoustic coatings, sonars and many other systems continued in many institutes and design bureaus. As a result, through hard labor, the Severodvinsk-class of SSGNs has been born—possibly the best nuclear submarine in the world today. Chinese were left far behind. The rumors of a coming breakthrough in a large series construction of Chinese submarine forces have been circulating for a while. Undeniably, manufacturing and financial capabilities are in place for this, but what about technological solutions? It is difficult to believe in scientific-technological genius of Chinese scientists and designers, which will be able to achieve tactical-technical parity with Russia and the US—otherwise Chinese comrades wouldn't be buying and cloning samples of foreign military technology. May be the breakthrough will happen eventually but assuredly not tomorrow but only when the Science with the capital S will appear in China and that will take not one decade. Meanwhile, PLAN's submarine armada which will be detected much earlier than it will detect the enemy, will continue to play the role of the paper tiger good only for parades.

There are many other valid points, including the issue of operational experience, which Shishkin makes in his rather very symptomatic piece and here is the REAL issue: yes, China is an economic giant with some of her achievements inspiring nothing but admiration. But being a military superpower is a very special kind of superpowerdom and especially within naval affairs where one faces, depending on geopolitical scenarios, such a massive naval superpower as the United States. Yes, US Navy has many problems, no larger ones than the issue of a doctrine and force structure, but as I stated not for once—the US Navy's crown jewel of its submarine forces is so impressive and is so much more advanced, for a foreseeable future, than its PLAN's counterpart, that it allows to speak of PLAN mostly in terms of A2/AD (much of which is dependent on Russian technologies). 

Impressive On The Surface

Yes, PLAN is able to build a tonnage equal to that to US Navy's, especially with PLAN investing hugely in its DDG and FFG surface force but HOW good is this surface force—nobody knows for sure. Yet there are reasons to suspect that Chinese weapon systems, which are knock-offs of Russian and Western technology, deployed on those ships do not have any record of combat use whatsoever and, actually, are not that good. Once all those factors are considered, I, personally, don't see (God forbids, of course, such a scenario ever becoming a reality) any way of how PLAN can possibly push US Navy (I omit here legal and moral issues) out of Western Pacific. This is an interesting issue to ponder, of course.

The second thing which coincided was, oh goody, Harry Kazianis, whose writing I described as alarmist 6 months ago precisely on the issue discussed above, yesterday went even further in envisioning a Russian-American Alliance against China. No doubt, China is a huge global player today but Kazianis goes a little bit overboard here, me thinks.

Next, there is the unfavorable balance of military arms that, as the years go on, will not favor Moscow. As China continues to receive some of Russia’s most advanced pieces of military equipment, like the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jet, China will most likely pilfer and reproduce such technology as it has done in the past—only to include it in indigenous weapons systems or sell it for far cheaper prices, competing directly against Russia in the lucrative arms sales market. Even more dangerous is that Russia’s own military technology could be used against it if a clash between the Russians and Chinese ever occurred—and history shows that is not out of the question.

I am sure Russia is very grateful to Mr. Kazianis for his sincere concern for Russia's competitiveness against China on the international weapons' markets but I am sure those in the know would still prefer a "Real McCoy" whenever deciding to buy big items such as state-of-the-art air defense systems, cutting edge fighter aircraft or submarines. It is simply the matter of quality and reputation. Russia's quality and reputation in this field are well-established. Moreover, I don't see how Russia and the US, after what have happened in the last 10 (in reality 25) years, can possibly be allied in any meaningful sense. For now avoiding a war could be a huge achievement in itself. Could China possibly, in the future, become a threat to Russia? Absolutely, and Russians know this but this does not necessarily involve the US. In the end, Russia finally has her civilizational project—Putin at Valdai was explicit about it. And, as is being discussed above and in a number of my posts in this blog, and in my new (hope to finish earlier next year) book on Balance of Power, China, for all her massive achievements is not yet true military superpower and it has nothing to do with the ability to project force, after all—Russia cannot do it globally too. Yet, few would doubt that Russia is a military superpower. 

So, Alliance between Russia and US, the thing of my naïve dreams in 1990s and early 2000s, the alliance which is predetermined historically and geographically, yet…here we are. The world as we know it is collapsing, the new, truly multi-polar world is emerging. In this world new balance of power will be very intricate and it will take some time and effort in allowing this new world order to settle without unleashing Armageddon—this is the most important foundation on which any kind of trust between US and Russia could be rebuilt. About alliances--later.