How Not To Do Military Reviews.

Or why amateurs, especially from Western military cultural milieu don't get it. People already posted here somewhere this video of new iteration of a venerable TU-160 Blackjack strategic bomber, TU-160M.

For more than 9 minutes they talk about how great this aircraft is, which it is, especially its new fully computer driven version TU-160M, but when it comes to actual capability of all TU-160s they mention good ol' Kh-15 and this:

Seriously, that's it? "Kh-55 family" with the range of 311 miles (500 kilometers). Really? First, those fanboys, evidently, have no idea that no matter how good and sophisticated TU-160(M) is, and it is, it is a PLATFORM whose combat value is defined by weapons it carries. And sure as hell, even the range of "Kh-55 family", namely Kh-555 cruise missiles (one of many) TU-160 carries is much longer than 500 kilometers. Namely it is 3,500 kilometers. But, of course, TU-160's MAIN strike weapon is Kh-101(102 in nuclear variant) cruise missile whose range is in excess of 4,500 kilometers, while its latest iteration has the range in excess of 6,500 kilometers.  

While reviewers marvel at TU-160 capabilities as platform, they forget the main reason platforms exist and that is to carry and shoot weapons. And here we reach the main point--while all kinds of fanboys, including those who actually did or serve in NATO AF, masturbate to all kinds of impressive things of modern bombers, they forget the main thing: even good ol' non-stealthy, loud, rumbling Bears (TU-95 MCs) with their 1950s design can take off from ANY airfield in Russia and without even leaving Russia's airspace launch a salvo of 6,500 km range cruise missiles at any target in any NATO country, US included. Moreover, even SU-34s are capable now of such strategic strikes. And here is the point--the US is nowhere near to this arsenal. It simply doesn't have anything comparable to Kh-101 (X-101) in its previous or latest variants. 
 

This is the sight, not just the sight of magnificent TU-160s, which gives Pentagon chills, because Russia has many of them, while the US continental Air Defense is an exercise in wishful thinking and futility against salvos of low flying, smart and stealthy Kh-101s. In the end, why do you think venerable B-52s still fly? Good platform if the US gets its hands, maybe, in a distant future, on something like Kh-101M. But don't hold your breath, Russia long ago won the arms race of ranges and, most importantly, air defense. 

P.S. A truckload of Bears also undergo modernization--new navigation-targeting complex and EW for, and you guessed it, Kh-101s. 

To Give A Proper Perspective...

As you know, yesterday the Black Sea Fleet took the delivery of the latest of the project 20380 corvette Merkurii. Now, the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sokolov, speaking to the Red Star informed, with pleasure that by the end of 2023 three more project 22800 Karakurt-class small missile ships will join the fleet. 

That means additional 24 Kalibr-Oniks or Zircon missiles in the first salvo, but then Sokolov disclosed a very interesting piece of information:

Speaking about ships only--namely SSKs, FFGs and MRKs of the Black Sea Fleet--Sokolov pointed out that they struck MORE than 180 objects of VSU critical objects, and then added that BRAV (Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops) struck more than 70 objects. Now, let me decipher a little bit why this is startling. Even militarily illiterate people understand that, depending on the object, ranging from AD radar to position of troops, let alone production plant, one has to strike them not with one or two missiles, but with the salvo. So, what is, then, the expenditure of missiles by Black Sea frigates, subs and small missile ships? I will go out on a limb here and will tell you that the average number will range from 4 to 16 missiles. I would propose to consider as an average a standard salvo load of 3M14 Kalibr by SSK of project 636, which is 6 (six) missiles. 

So, that gives us the average expenditure of missiles as 180 x 6 = 1,080 missiles. We add here those 70 objects struck by BRAV--primarily Oniks (of Bastion complex) and Kh-35 (of Bal complex) and we can say that plus-minus this adds another 200-300 missiles. Add all this together and we can see that the Black Sea Fleet alone launched around (plus-minus) if we round it: 1,100 + 300 =1,400 stand off high precision weapons, aka cruise missiles. Do not also forget that the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet was and is also involved in SMO, but this data is unavailable for now. What is known that SU-30SMs (and some SU-24) of the 43rd Fighter Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet are engaged constantly in combat missions. 

So, now, just by counting what the ships and BRAV of the Black Sea Fleet do, one can definitely get the economic framework, so to speak, or scale of the military-economic potential Russia brings to bear. Mind you--this is JUST the Black Sea Fleet, alone. If one looks at the US very own UGM-109 Tomahawk per Raytheon:

Tried-and-true: U.S. and allied militaries have flight-tested the GPS-enabled Tomahawk 550 times and used it in combat more than 2,300 times. Its most recent use came in 2018, when U.S. Navy warships and submarines launched 66 Tomahawk missiles at Syrian chemical weapon facilities.

Considering the fact that GPS-guided Tomahawks have been introduced in 1993, 30 years ago, it gives you a proper perspective of the scale of SMO. And, mind you, Russia still didn't introduce her main forces into the battle. It also gives you some explanation of the complete unpreparedness of the Western so called intelligence community and Pentagon (I omit here morons from media and politics) to face modern warfare and economic realities. This is your Sunday primer.

A Short Note About... Mobilization And Math.

No, not the one which Ukraine and Washington want.  A popular Russian media outlet Arguments of the Week published this. 

Армия России регулярно наносит удары по целям на Украине квазибаллистическими, аэробаллистическими или крылатыми ракетами оперативно-тактической, средней и большой дальностей морского, наземного и воздушного базирования. Противник всё ждёт, когда они закончатся, но этого не произойдёт никогда – промышленность уже вышла на такие обороты, что покрыла массовый расход ракет и различных корректируемых боеприпасов первых дней СВО. Сейчас их производство превышает ежесуточное расходование. То есть арсеналы этого оружия, наоборот, растут.

Translation: The Russian army regularly strikes targets in Ukraine with quasi-ballistic, aeroballistic or cruise missiles of operational-tactical, medium and long range, sea, land and air based. The enemy is still waiting for them to run out, but this will never happen - the industry has already reached such a rate of production that it covered the mass consumption of missiles and various guided munitions since the first days of the SMO. Now their production exceeds the daily consumption. That is, the stocks of these weapons, on the contrary, are growing.

Well, don't tell me that I didn't warn;)) In the end, even Russia's heads of administrative units--krais, oblasts etc.--meaning governors and their deputies take courses in Russia's Academy of General Staff. I wonder why, wink, wink. The astonishing number of cruise missiles Russia expended since the start of SMO, which started to circulate recently in Western media, of around 2,500 is already more than the number of Tomahawks the United States spent in all of her military campaigns combined in the 20th and 21st centuries. Anyone remembers issues with TLAM stocks by the 78th day of NATO's gang rape of Yugoslavia in 1999? I do, many do. Well, there you go. A famous Chinese proverb says that if you sit long enough at the shore of the river, you will see, at some point, a corpse of your enemy floating past you. It is much easier to observe the process when you have industry pumping up those high-precision stand-off weapons in, well, industrial quantities. 

Hm, maybe it is this "covert mobilization" Ukie "intelligence" is talking about? I kid, I kid. Frank captured the mood perfectly.

 

Just, please, send in the clowns...

Why They Are Nervous. Short Excurse Into the Modern War. Part 3.

This is a first Soviet submarine launched (submerged, mind you) anti-shipping missile P-70 Amethyst (Ametist):

It was a further development of a venerable P-15 Styx. P-70 had a maximum range of 80 kilometers (Wiki as always is full of shit) and was subsonic at M=0.9. This was 1968. In 1972 more advanced anti-shipping missile P-120 Malakhit started to be procured both on surface ships and submarines.

Malakhit, with its range (launched from submerged SSGN) of 120 kilometers and traditionally massive (500 kilograms) conventional warhead (it could also be a nuclear one) presented a new challenge to the US Navy. A single Charlie-class (pr. 670) SSGN could carry 8 of Ametists for this sub first versions, or 8 Malakhits for Charlie II (pr. 670M). 

While the problem of Flaming Datum (recall, it is when sub is detected while launching its weapons) for all navies was well known before. It was one thing when a submarine launched a salvo of even long-range torpedoes, thus creating a Flaming Datum, a swarm of 40 kilometers range and around 40 knots torpedoes was bad enough problem in and of itself (especially when armed with nuclear warheads), but it was a completely different situation when there was a salvo of missiles, flying with the speed of a fast commercial jet, and which created a datum in a very respectable distance from target. That was a whole new game.  

As you already know, something like P-120 Malakhit was creating the necessity for, say Carrier Battle Group, to be on alert constantly and have enough ASW capability to sweep a moving area of A=3.14 x 120^2= 45,216 sq. kilometers practically non-stop. In general, any CBG always looks like a floating ASW and Air Defense theme park. This is how CBG looked in 1970s and continues to look with some "adjustments" (some of them inspiring awe in their recklessness) even today. 

Theoretically, for any Charlie SSGN in order to kill a carrier, it needed to get in between the Zone of Close and Remote ASW, granted this Charlie (or Charlies) could sneak pass the ASW aviation in the Zone of Remote ASW (patrolled by S-3 Vikings from carrier and P-3 Orion "on call" if need be). Vikings were no joke and, of course, provided a very good operational sweep (I know someone whose heart will be filled with nostalgia and joy), but if that zone was overcome and targeting was received it absolutely didn't mean that this Charlie was out of the woods. Far from it--not only those Vikings were still on station, now Charlie had to face those pesky SH-3 Sea King ASW helos. All in all, it was an extremely hazardous undertaking for those Soviet SSGNs but the real clusterfuck would have unfolded once the salvo was launched from beneath the waves. 

This meant an immediate giving up of own position and creation of a Flaming Datum in most cases (not all). Not only launched missiles would leave a lot of "clues" on the surface, including the registration of a salvo by the E-2 Hawkeye's Radar but the launch would be a significant acoustic event. So, here we are--enter the Flaming Datum. What happens next? Easy: CBG has around 120 kilometers : 1100 (around M=0.9) kilometers per hour by Malakhit = roughly 0.11 of an hour, or about 7 minutes before missiles arrive. So, the Air Defense gets all excited, all those Sea Sparrows air-defense complexes on Spruance DDGs in carrier's escort, as well as Talos (Later, Terrier) AD complexes on USS Long Beach (remember these are early to late 1970s we are talking about) all go on-line. Those airborne F-14 Tomcats start their supersonic dash towards the assumed route of those Malakhits, hoping to intercept them using their AIM-9 Sidewinders, AIM-7 Sparrow or AIM-54 Phoenix missiles. So, whatever it takes and the ballet ensues. 

Meanwhile, those Sea-Kings they already know fairly accurately where the hell broke loose and what do they do? Right, they go for jugular of the Flaming Datum and rush there to do their thing, depending on the range from Flaming Datum and with their maximum speed of 260 kilometers per hour, they can reach datum in anywhere between 20 to 5 minutes. Let's be reasonable and say 15 minutes--this is our Time of Delay or proverbial Tau. As you might expect, Charlie which just launched is now in a full break-off mode and CO and the crew of Charlie know damn well that they need to rush and each minute of Tau increases their chances, especially since Sea Kings do not have MAD and everybody on board Charlie prays that S-3 Vikings will be held at their stations because of the tactical assumption that this salvo could be merely a distraction and even bigger game expects CBG down the road. Like this:

So, for anyone who wants to experience all the "beauty" of operating a dipping sonar, they can get a kick out of ASW by reading this:

Where to Dip? Search Pattern for an Antisubmarine Helicopter Using a Dipping Sensor. 

Or get the load of joy by looking into the theory of sonobuoy barriers, believe me--it is a lot of "fun". I know, my graduation thesis had a lot to do with ASW and those dippings. But as the thesis by Yoash, Atkinson and Kress states: 

A perfect cookie-cutter sensor is a significant simplification. In reality the dynamics of sonar detection are quite complicated and depend upon the acoustic properties of the environment, which impact the transmission loss between the target and sensor (Lee and Kim, 2012). However, cookie-cutter sensors are commonly used in many maritime search and detection applications to generate insight. Random search, the cornerstone model for many search analyses, is based on a cookie-cutter sensor (see Chapter 2 of Washburn (2002)) and often provides similar results to more complicated and realistic detection dynamics (Lee and Kim, 2012). Furthermore, many ASW models use cookie-cutter sensors, including Danskin (1968), Shephard, et al., (1988), Baston and Bostock (1989), and Washburn (2002).

Read attentively, especially highlighted in yellow--this is where in real life tactical acumen of submarine's CO and his crew, training and technical parameters of a sub begin to play a huge role and often draw the line between life and death, between triumph and failure of the hunter and the hunted, who often exchange roles in an instance.  here is a food for thought to you. Think about it, wink, wink. 

FOC (Furthest On the Circle). We will need this reference when we will talk about our times, in 2020s. 

To Be Continued...

Real Friday's Akulas.

And I mean the way they were and are known, not some Typhoon (after the missile complex) moniker. Project 941 Strategic Missile Submarines, Akula. I post here some photos which convey better than anything I ever saw the mammoth size of those beasts. First is pretty much generic view of those subs near pier.

   

Now to how people look in comparison:

#1

 and 

             

#2

The question is, even considering the fact that those are very expensive ships to maintain, and plans exist to scrap two out of remaining three, what is going to happen, if somebody among the powers that be decides that it is too early to scrap those beasts? Yes, I am aware that they are not as silent as their younger heirs but Dmitry Donskoi, which underwent a refit as a Bulava SLBM test platform, is still around and doing well. And there were calls from some quarters (in Russian) to retain remaining boats Archangelsk and Severstal' for, and you may have guessed it already, not SLBMs but as Kalibr (and possibly Zircon) carriers. After modernization, of course. You know what is approximate number of cruise (land-attack, anti-shipping and anti-submarine) missiles such a boat can carry? In accordance to Alexandr Mozgovoy, one of the most competent observers of Russian Navy, the number is 396, yes, you are not mistaken three hundred ninety six cruise missiles. This is a devastating fire power and, yes, let's face it, a submerged and very Russified version of a US Navy's good ol' idea of Arsenal Ships.  

Of course, one may (justifiably, I may say) raise the issue of first four Ohio-class SSBNs converted to SSGNs but the similarity between the two will be very superficial. To start with, the idea of Arsenal ship hasn't been born in a vacuum, Soviet Navy's Project 1144 (Kirov-class) nuclear battle cruiser can easily claim the fatherhood of arsenal ships concept since were conceived as...well, arsenal ships, albeit for a Sea Denial mission. But much more is important, when comparing 154 Tomahawks, carried by Ohio-class SSGNs and any Russian Navy's concept or actual sub is the fact that all modern Russian subs carry or will carry large quantities of extremely capable anti-shipping missiles--this is full blown Sea Denial mission, which in layman's lingo means sinking enemy's ships and subs. If sinking is done by current 660 kilometer (350 nautical miles) range P-800 or 3M54 or whatever comes soon in the shape of 3M22, Sea Denial and A2/AD implications become more than just operational or strategic, they become political. Potentially, even a single Akula in Cruise Missile configuration (allegedly Project 941 KU) becomes, after proper modernization, a massive factor without even leaving relatively comfortable confines of the Russia's fleet and ASW patrol aviation zones. 

Are these fantasies or a viable operational (and technological) concepts? Difficult to say, but Russia employed unorthodox technologies not for once, be it on land, in the air or in the sea. Will such a hypothetical modernization of remaining Akulas be expensive? Hell, yes. But so is modernization of Peter The Great, not to mention Admiral Nakhimov. I think those underwater mastodons didn't say their last word yet and considering financial restraints for building a whole new fleet of yet another SSGNs, apart from actively building Yasen-class (Project 885) SSGNs, using of the good ole' Red Oct....forgive me, Akulas doesn't seem to be such a far fetched idea after all. In the end, a decision (a correct one) to modernize a fleet of Project 1155 Large ASW ships is being implemented. You all know a very old principle--If Ain't Broke Don't Fix It. One may add--use it.

On US Missile Defense In Poland And Romania.

Today, in Sochi, Vladimir Putin held the meeting with Russia's security council where the activation of US missile defense sites in Poland and Romania was discussed. Well, the larger issue here IS NOT much touted (or, rather, marketed) missile "defense" shield--that is not an insurmountable problem at all and, shield or no shield, all necessary targets will be destroyed in case of conflict. The problem here is different--Russia is worried about the use of launchers for very different, other than anti-ballistic, missiles. We are talking about the first strike weapons, which are medium and short range missiles. These are not "defensive" weapons.  These are first-strike weapons. The piece from US News & World Report to which the link is provided is very vague in describing Russia's real concern. Here is a piece in Russian and Putin's quote from Russian President's site:

Второе: это явное нарушение Договора о ракетах средней и малой дальности, потому что пусковые установки, которые будут размещаться после введения в строй РЛС в Румынии и Польше, могут быть легко использованыдля размещения ракет средней и малой дальности. Причём это переоборудование происходит в очень короткие сроки, и для нас с вами этобудет действительно незаметно, что там происходит. Мы даже не сможем это контролировать. И это дополнительная для нас угроза.  

Translation: Second: this is an obvious violation of the Short And Medium Range Missile Treaty, since these missile-launchers which will be deployed at the sites in Romania and Poland upon activation of the Radars there could easily be reconfigured for short and medium range missiles. This reconfiguration of the launchers could be done in a very short time and for us it will be impossible to see what is going on there. We will  not be able to control (used as "monitor" semantics) it and this is an additional threat to us.   

The first question which should be asked here is this: is United States really planning to go as far as to deploy these short and medium range missiles? By now, for anyone who didn't spend last 15+ years under the stone (or stoned) it is increasingly clear (and I know that it is painful for many true American patriots to swallow and I understand them) that making any kinds of treaties with US is a waste of time and paper. Current US power "elites" are not trustworthy. They are also incompetent and increasingly irrational. So, the answer is, yes, absolutely. It is in the nature of the beast which combines in itself massive military-industrial-media-political complex interests with pathological inability to learn. Thus the question becomes a purely military-technological one. 

I am not going to go deep into the technological and tactical nature of the issue but I, certainly, can testify to the fact that Putin's words about finding a solution are not an empty bluster. In the end, the issue here is in numbers and the essence of US shield in Europe which is, indeed, anti-ballistic in its nature (for now) and is based largely on naval technology of Aegis and Spy-1 radar. 

   

Deveselu, Romania Air Base, yesterday.

 
Here is one of the latest developments in Russia which may give some insight in what is already in store for these sites, if, God forbids, things go hot between NATO and Russia. I am talking for now about conventional high-precision response. These sites, of course, are simply incapable of intercepting hyper-sonic maneuvering blocks of latest Sarmat ICBMs, as an example, nor of Iskander's Mach=7 and maneuvering missiles. But possible appearance of the short and medium range missiles is already being countered, among many other things, by the start of production of missile corvettes Project 22800 Karakurt in Crimea. I already mentioned these brand new ships in one of my Mosquitoes related threads.  At least 18 of these corvettes will be built and, I assume, they will be equally distributed between Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. Adding here 6 brand new SSKs (Project 636, NATO--Kilo) and already deployed two Project 21361 Byan missile corvettes at the Black Sea, and three brand new Project 11356 Frigates, we are talking, roughly, 100 Kalibr missiles in the first salvo from the naval bases and patrol zones in the Black Sea which are well within both the range to Devesulu Air Base where the launchers could be (or will be) located and well within the Air Defense zone of Russia's Air Space Forces' units based in Crimea. This is the most likely scenario against Romanian site, since Iskander's missiles have the range of 500 kilometers--it is more than enough to address the threat of the Polish missile installation from Kaliningrad District but is not enough to do so from Crimea against Romanian installation. 

Once the first salvo is launched from the Black Sea, the "mopping up" of remaining missile launchers and missile-defense (or air-defense) installations could be done by the salvo of X-101 missiles launched from deep within Russian territory by strategic bombers. It is a nightmarish scenario which will see many, not just NATO, but specifically serious American casualties. The escalation will follow and what will be its dynamics is unknown but it doesn't take a military professional to understand that it will be bad. What should also be understood that Russia will not attack first unless attacked. Evidently this simplest fact is beyond the grasp (or otherwise--deliberate calculations) of NATO, whose demoralization and slow rotting away can only be delayed, not prevented or reversed, for a little short while. But it seems Washington is hell bent on creating a situation when things may get out of control. The only difference today with the Cold War 1.0 is the fact that Russia does possess massive conventional stand-off capability. In fact, real military professionals in US do know that NATO can not win conventionally anything in Russia's immediate vicinity. This fact doesn't sit well with many in Washington, the same as the fact that no one in their own mind and with even a hint of competence in Russian elite will trust any US worthless "guarantees" anymore.

And here is the deal. US Dollar is a currency which today is supported by nothing but trust in US military power. Once great industrial empire, which was responsible in late 1940s for well over 60% of global GDP (measured in real numbers of manufactured goods) is gone. De-industrialization continues apace and we all live on the top of colossal financial thermonuclear bomb, which will go off inevitably. Once it goes off, the US financial markets will be done de jure, not just de facto. The only thing which prevents many from dumping US treasuries--the main instrument, together with printing press, of financing US as a nation, from collapse is US military, or rather what it supposed to be capable of conventionally. Nobody is interested in nuclear option. US military is sure as hell capable of turning conventionally a lot of third world countries and whatever passes there as armies into dust. But Russia is not third world and neither is China (but China is a separate case). Well, frankly, US military power wasn't faring that well, to put it mildly, as of lately. And then, of course, Syria happened and the whole hell broke loose precisely because of understanding (or, in most cases, sensing) the simple fact that there is another military power which fields very comparable, to put it mildly, conventional military capabilities. This is a clear and present danger, a massive threat, to US status as the owner of global reserve currency, which rests on US being conventional military superpower. The less US produces, the more is the share of military factor in the "trust" in US economy and financial system. It is also a threat to a livelihood of US 1% who did develop addiction to viewing themselves as militarily, hence financially, untouchable.

Consider this. Prior to the Soviet collapse and well into the 2000s, unless everyone talked about nuclear annihilation, which was understood as unacceptable by all sides, the whole notion of conventional response at US proper was seen as a fantasy at best. The only stand-off weapon, Soviet long range submarine-launched cruise missile S-10 Granat capable of long range conventional strike...well...all efforts were made not to allow this weapon  to be properly procured. Things changed since. The appearance of X-101 missiles with ranges exceeding 5,000 kilometers, to Kalibrs (with the range of 2,500 km.), to new cruise missiles whose range is reportedly up to 10,000 km--we are talking here the change of military paradigm since suddenly the conflict could be conceived (it doesn't mean that it should) within purely conventional framework. But that is what the US wanted all along for the last 25 years at least--all of this desire based on perception that no peer-to-peer power will match US conventionally in a foreseeable future. Yet, the shock was and still remains so great that Caspian Flotilla was mistakenly named a fleet. Obviously, Caspian Flotilla is just that--operational unit, while Fleet is, by definition, is operational strategic unit. Deploying such weapons--it is being done as I type it--on nuclear submarines, such as Oscar-II SSGNs, brand new Yasen-class SSGNs or perspective SSKs with air independent propulsion make conventional precision (emphasis on precision) strike on US territory a reality. This is a bottom line, anyone who says otherwise is full o' sh.t amateur or being totally in denial. It was none other than general designer of Bulava SLBM Yuri Solomonov who in 2008 predicted that US will offer in some form to get rid of nuclear weapons based on perception of own advantage in high precision weapons. Solomonov made a mistake in only one sense--that the offer will be made openly. In reality the US was moving into conventional paradigm for quite a while now, enough to take a look at really rundown state of US nuclear deterrent. 

Suddenly, US is facing a conventional mid-life crisis. Those damn russkies not only have the most advanced nuclear deterrent in the world but have beaten US at its game of conventional high precision weapons. Now, what is going to happen is very simple. If US deploys medium to short range missiles both in Poland and Romania, the production of TU-160M2 strategic bombers will be greatly accelerated, 5th generation submarines will also be put in production as a priority, plus new.....Well, I will abstain from all those Russia-strong scenarios for a simple reason, I live in the US and my American friends, colleagues--decent and wonderful people--are as dear to me as my friends and even some relatives in Russia. For me any notion of US and Russia getting into the open conflict is blasphemous. I tremble at the thought that some moron in high corridors of power would make a stupid mistake. But it matters today that such a moron (or morons) exist mostly in US corridors of power. In this case, for all those fat cats who never served a day in their life and who try to provoke Russia day and night it is going to be a good reminder that, should they do a stupid thing, they will experience exactly what people of Serbia, Iraq, Syria or Libya experienced--destroyed property, killed relatives, horrific injuries. The only good thing about it, though, will be the fact that the world will have a chance to rebuild and go on living without fear of radiation poisoning, after hanging those who brought such a calamity to their own nation and I don't mean Russia.  As for Europe...who needs their opinion.