Translation: We quit INF Treaty, we are developing hypersonic weapons, systems of delivery by ballistic missiles... We will deploy same weapons, if necessary, in Europe to contain Russia.
Ahem, as I already stated it not for once, most US top political echelon speeches today have a surreal similarity to North Korean party gatherings in their sloganeering, catch phrases, but go even further from North Korea in a full detachment from reality. I listened to O'Brien's hollow boilerplate that you would spare your personal time by not doing this. But claim about hypersonic weapons was so ridiculous that Russians started... laughing. Sure, US threatening Russia with weapon systems it doesn't have is a good ol' American tradition. But, unlike it was with corrupted and cowardly Gorbachev and his surrounding, times are different in Moscow today and nobody, really, buys this BS anymore, because everyone knows that the gap is generational and the Air-Defense/Anti-Missile system which Russia deploys today, from a mind-boggling ABM position area around Moscow, which simply has no analogues anywhere, to systems designed specifically for working against perspective hyper-sonic weapons--S-300V4--S-400--S-500--is simply unbridgeable anymore. So, sure, a deployment of non-existing weapons is such a threat.
And here is the deal, me being a US citizen and having America as my (our) home, it is absolutely demoralizing and embarrassing to see these clowns, who are laughed at all over the world and who wouldn't be able to run a convenience store, much less nuclear superpower, who pretend that they know something. They don't, world at large has already figured it out. Russians know this for decade, Chinese too, so does Iran. Instead of initiating a global settlement between the Great Three, a globalist cabal in the US is not only driving the country into the ground but humiliates it constantly, first by cringe-worthy flattery and praising what is not there and never was, and then by parading it as an Exhibit A of political and ideological dysfunction and inability to govern itself. It is mind-boggling. There is nothing more pathetic than in the street fight some bully quitting a bloody bare knuckle pleasantries and suddenly stating that the fight should be fought differently and that he will call now a posse of transformers or Captain America if the opponent will not put his fists in the gloves. Hollow threats, hollow promises, now down right comical bluffing which both sides know is just that, a crock o' shit.
You already know that my third book is getting ready. I post here an excerpt, highly unedited (so, pardon my Runglish and punctuation), about American idiosyncrasies which lead today to what we all have on our hands--a systemic crisis of the United States. It is not a military analysis book per se. In fact, most of it about economy, culture, energy, what have you, but you know that I wouldn't be me if I wouldn't stick couple of chapters on RRMA, whose "evangelist" I was for many many years. So, here it is:
US Naval War College
publication NWCR (Naval War College Review) is known for decades
to publish wonderful introspective into the American military thought known as Newport
Papers, Newport, Rhode Island, being a location of the Naval War College. A
fascinating collection of thoughts and reports on war gaming was and continues
to be numbered. One such Newport Paper 20, submitted in 2004 was titled Global
War Game. Second Series 1984-1988. It is a monograph on global war-gaming
between NATO and Warsaw pact and as foreword to this paper states that it:
“…recounts
a uniquely interesting and challenging period in the Naval War College’s
engagement with naval and national strategies through the war-gaming process.
The games examined the ability of the United States to sustain conventional
warfare with the Soviet Union until full mobilization of the nation’s resources
could be achieved. Through a sustained set of sequential and interlocking
games, the Global process identified a number of important and controversial
findings. …these games pointed to the importance of offensive action, including
maritime operations; the ability of “Blue” (the West, broadly speaking) to win
without resorting to nuclear weapons; and the extensive planning necessary to
conduct high-intensity combat over a lengthy period.”[i]
The monograph is
instructive in many important respects, including an attempt to look at such a
massive conflict only within conventional, non-nuclear that is, framework. It
is also instructive in terms of a rather severe constrains which the
carrier-centricity of the US Navy imposed on an imagination of the American
planners who still could not recognize an unfolding of new paradigm. The most
peculiar phrase of the report on the mutual casualties of war is contained on
the page 134: “D+38 Red OSCAR SSGN launches only
successful ASCM attack of war.”[ii] It is an extremely
important note which tells that on the 38th day of imaginary, or
simulated if one wishes, 1984 war between USSR and the West, project 949
Oscar-class missile submarine scored the only hit by the anti-shipping
missiles P-700 Granit (NATO: SS-N-21 Shipwreck) on any NATO target of
significance. The brief review of the mutually inflicted casualties by no means
shows Western “technological superiority”, which was and continues to be tune
du jour since the early days of the Cold War, and even the main asset of the US
Navy, its aircraft carriers, is being torpedoed left and right and even being
heavily damaged by the salvos of cruise missiles by Soviet long-range Naval
Missile-carrying Aviation (MRA). It is a peculiar conclusion since unlike
Soviet MRA which at that time in 1980s carried very high supersonic (Mach=4.6) missile
Kh-22 with active radar homing warhead, its range was around 600
kilometers which was making the mission of Soviet carriers of this missile—Tupolev
TU-22—a very calamitous affair against any Carrier Battle Group if it was
on alert and had E-2 Hawkeyes and its F-14s Tomcats, with
allegedly effective, long-range Aim-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, in
the air and ready to take on those swarms of TU-22s. Soviets did
recognize that the early versions of a Kh-22’s homing devices were
vulnerable to jamming and serious losses were expected among TU-22s.
Yet, the
appearance in 1980 of the project 949(A) Oscar-class anti-shipping
cruise missile submarines, which were called carrier-killers, together with
less-flattering moniker of nuclear loafs, due to their enormous width
for housing of the revolutionary anti-shipping missile complex P-700 Granit,
was one of the major factors contributing to the appearance of the
Aegis-equipped cruisers of Ticonderoga-class and of the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers. Both ships were designed with a strong emphasis on
AAW (Anti-Air Warfare) and despite their ability to carry many Tomahawk cruise
missiles, were and are primarily viewed as an organic integral air-defense and
anti-submarine escort of the aircraft carriers. First Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga-class
cruisers began to be deployed since 1983 and instead of being equipped with MK-41
Vertical Launch System (VLS) carried outdated and slow MK-26 dual-rail
launchers for its Standard MR SM -2 anti-air missiles—system simply not
designed to deal with a massive salvo of anti-shipping missiles. Not until the
end of 1986 would the US Navy see new ‘improved’ Ticonderoga-class
cruisers, starting from USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), entering the fleet. These
ships carried much more ‘productive’, meaning higher rate of fire, MK 41 VLS.[iii] Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers would not appear in the US Navy until 1991 altogether. Moreover, the
issues with much touted Aegis combat control system build around SPY-1
Radar would not only continue to plague it early on, but the whole system
failed to intercept even slow and ‘one-after-another’—a scenario excluded from
real combat—missiles in tests. Out of 16 missiles launched ‘one-after-another’
only 5 were shot down--a dismal and a deadly failure in case of a real war.[iv] Yet, even set in the realities
of 1984 military-technological paradigm, US Naval War College assumed that some
of its carriers will be damaged by torpedo salvos from Soviet submarines, while
remaining largely impervious to newest supersonic and highly resistant to
jamming state-of-the-art M=2.5 capable missile designed to operate in a artificial
intelligence network of a large salvo, with missiles capable to communicate
between each-other in the salvo, reassign targets by importance and decide on
the further course of action. The whole notion that torpedo attacks from maximum
distances of 30-40 kilometers, in reality much closer than that, at aircraft
carrier would be more effective and less dangerous for the attacking submarine
than a salvo of 10-12 supersonic P-700s from a distance of 300-650 kilometers,
650 kilometers being maximum distance at which such missile could be launched, seems
at best contrived, at worst—delusional.
There is a vast
record of foreign and domestic submarines breaking through ASW screens of the
American carriers and ‘scoring’ a torpedo hit on them.[v] But that was under the
conditions of however intense but simulated combat. Real life combat would make
such a torpedo attack extremely dangerous for attacker which would have to face
an intense search operation from both escorts and US submarines operating with
the carrier battle group. Anti-shipping cruise missiles were invented and
evolved specifically as stand-off weapons ensuring much better chances of
survival for an attacker.
A favorite and false premise of the American strategists that modern
wars will be fought by traditional weapons revealed a very American
idiosyncrasy—lack of desire to adapt. It was this lack of desire which
prevented the United States to see and follow an easily predictable evolution
of the missiles and enablers, such as highly successful ‘Legenda’ to a
modern fusion of sea, ground, air and space-based sensors capable to deliver a reliable
targeting for any kind of modern supersonic and hypersonic weapons, capable to
strike anywhere around the world.
[iii] The Naval
Institute Guide to Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet. Eighteens Edition.
Norman Polmar. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2005, 138-142.
[iv] Lessons
Not Learned: The U.S. Navy Status Quo Culture. Roger Thompson (Naval
Institute Press, 2007), 176-177.
So, here it is. US "elites" on display, who still live in their little bubble and who do not care about how they look from the outside. A complete intellectual and moral collapse.
.jpg)
_underway_at_sea%2C_circa_1988-1991_(NH_97206-KN).jpg/1024px-USS_Wisconsin_(BB-64)_underway_at_sea%2C_circa_1988-1991_(NH_97206-KN).jpg)
