Ike, Strategy Rant #2

You can read the start on Eisenhower's strategic mind here and here. Sadly, international events unfold with such speed that I sometimes can not ignore (as much as I want to) them and have to react in some form or fashion, instead of concentrating on a host of subjects which give me a degree of comfort and even joy while discussing them. Eisenhower, certainly, is part of it. So, I am ranting again:

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As was stated in the previous rant, Marshall and Ike were not alone in understanding a decisive importance of European Theater. As early as ABC-1 conference--American, British and Canadian strategy consultations early 1941--even before United States were officially involved in WW II, it was clear that British intent was to guard the Empire, not to face Nazi Germany on Continent. The issue of Singapore and Ducth Indies was extremely important for London, it surely was not for the US. As Marshall noted in his rather abrupt rejection of British plan during consultations at Singapore :

While the two summaries were under study by Staff officers, who saw in this final paragraph the extent to which ABD had soared beyond American desires, further pressure for American aid to Singapore was being applied. A paper prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department and forwarded to the War Department suggested that the United States further Singapore's security by keeping three-quarters of the fleet based in Hawaii, sending more planes and submarines to the Philippines, and equipment to China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Singapore. To these suggestions General Marshall announced his opposition. He found nothing new in the facts cited, and no satisfaction in the conclusions. His own view was that "Collapse in the Atlantic would be fatal; collapse in the Far East would be serious but not fatal." 

It is easy today, having a luxury of a hindsight, to review those documents and decisions--it was not easy to make them then. It is to the highest credit of American officers from Marshall, Eisenhower to Embick and Gerow that they recognized real strategic importance of European theater even before Operation Barbarossa unfolded. With Germany's invasion of USSR it became crystal clear what theater has become decisive and by far. It would take Cold War, of course, to completely obfuscate or, when impossible to obfuscate--dull, a massive scale of the events and the nature of that war which had nothing to do with "survival of democracy" and was the war of annihilation. In 1989 late Paul Fussell, himself a  veteran of WW II and literary critic of some standing, in his Wartime: Understanding And Behavior In The Second World War, paraded pervasive general Western ignorance and kindergarten self-righteousness when stated:

Even the relative impurity of the Allied ethical cause once Joseph Stalin joined in seemed easily accommodated to the general high-mindedness. 

This certainly was not the attitude of Ike, especially when the first reports of staggering losses and atrocities committed by Nazis in USSR started to pour in Allied Camp. But how truly "allied" was this camp is a matter for serious debate. As ABC and ABD conferences have initially shown abundantly--Churchill's objectives were not to fight Wehrmacht on Continent. Hence, while debatable from the point of view of practical realization, a vigorous Sledgehammer was buried at the  Second Washington Conference in 1942 and was replaced with Operation Torch whose dubious strategic worth was debated ever since and played not a small part in developing later serious Cold War suspicions. What preceded this decision, however was completely devoid of any finesse and actual allied spirit. 

As many American officers noted, British behavior at the conference was arrogant, officers of British General Staff looked down at their American counterparts, and their opinions, with contempt. After all, what could those Americans suggest to people who at that time fought Nazis for two years. Americans complained but to no avail. Churchill persevered and ensured a dispersal of Allied resources to the strategically secondary theaters of operations. Secondary to the main political objective of defeating Axis forces, which could have been done only in Europe in general, and in Germany in particular. Especially when agreement on unconditional surrender of Germany was worked out between Russians and Allies--due to mostly FDR's fear of USSR cutting a separate deal with Hitler, a possibility which was debunked by Allied intelligence in 1942 against the background of appalling losses on both sides and of German atrocities on occupied territories. But Churchill needed Allied forces to guard Imperial possessions, up to the point of discussing a possibility, a rather dubious one, of Germans making it to India from their bases in North Africa. As I already pointed out in previous rant--with the burial of Sledgehammer, and, by implication, of the  Roundup, another Ike's plan, Ike's reaction to it, his passionate thrust in trying to realize war plans which could have eased substantially immense pressures under which Red Army was fighting in 1942, had an enormous human dimension, which in Russia's/Soviet case could not have been ignored. It was, and still is, impossible not to sympathize with Eisenhower and his both human and professional position, especially when one considers a strategic situation in Soviet Union with Battle Of Stalingrad approaching and a rather vigorous reporting on the events on the Eastern Front and Soviet people waiting for the real Second Front by nationally syndicated Leland Stowe. Obviously, today Stowe's first rate war reporting would be construed a "collusion" with Stalin, NKVD and devil himself. Yet, this was not a rarity in US then:
 

Soviet Union fought for more than just freedom--for survival.

Allied general staffs were aware of the situation on the Eastern Front. In layman's lingo Allied strategic discussion looked like this:

1. FDR was ambiguous, his officers, apart from naturally Pacific firsters, wanted to go in (Europe) decisively ASAP;
2. Churchill's calculus was drastically different and was revolving around impossibility of landing in Europe in 1942 and in 1943. 

In what would become one of the most controversial (a euphemism for military crime) attempts to discredit the very idea of viability of European landing, a sacrifice of 5000 Canadians was made at Dieppe in August of 1942. In early 1990s, the CBC made a hour long documentary in which placed the blame for failure squarely on Churchill and Dudley Pound (not the first time Pound's name will appear in connection to "controversy"), Russians, understandably, were livid but so were many in American camp. As was reported by National Post at 70th anniversary of Dieppe Raid:

What remains to be answered is if there was another element at play shaping events. The late Brigadier General Forbes West of Toronto thought so, identifying a political reason for the raid’s launch. “I feel that from the day planning began, it was intended to be a failure,” he revealed to me in his home 23 years ago. “Perhaps not as costly a failure, but a failure nevertheless. The British were being pressed by the Russians and Americans to open a second front, so we were put in with the firm intention of being destroyed. Men at the Chiefs of Staff level would consider 4,000 casualties a small price to pay for convincing the Russians and Americans an invasion would be a disaster.”

Dieppe debacle took place when the Battle of Stalingrad began, Casablanca Conference was held in January 1943, when the fate of the Stalingrad was decided, with it the fate of Wehrmacht at the Eastern front was sealed and with it--the outcome of war in Europe. And it will be there, at Casablanca, where the "primrose path" memorandum by US General Stanley Embick of Marshall's OPD would openly accuse Churchill of sabotaging any real attempts at fighting Germany where it mattered most. Italian Campaign would prove this point unequivocally when all facts would be collected properly after Battle of Kursk, they would show Ike's foresight and will explain why Stalin wanted American general officer leading Overlord...  

To be continued.... 

Ike, Strategy Rant #1

Late Stephen Ambrose, who for a while was considered America's foremost scholar on Eisenhower, not for once commented to the effect that Ike was not necessarily that great of a strategist. These comments, evidently shared by some other American historians, good and bad, all derive from the Caesarist  (or Napoleonic, if one wishes) view of the warfare. American military bias to Napoleon and his campaigns is not surprising, Carl Sandburg in his Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (if my Alzheimer doesn't fail me. If mistaken I will correct the reference later)  wrote about frustration of US West Point-graduates with the fact that they, instead of studying Napoleon campaigns, were forced to study this Russian Suvara (Alexander Suvorov). Indeed, ideas of beautiful maneuvers, lightning strikes or strategies developed by a single brilliant military mind were all good for wars fought using linear tactics and cavalry, with set-piece battles. Yet, even those set piece battles culminated in a slaughter on unprecedented scale during the Battle Of Borodino and, in the end, tore away the mantle of pure strategic genius from Napoleon. Brilliant tactician certainly he was, a strategist? A strategy as a system of (military) measures designed to achieve  political objectives of a war (Clausewitz inspired definition, later adopted by Marxists) was something else completely and, when judged against the result achieved, tactical and operational brilliance means very little when the war is lost. 

By WW II, strategic thought became what we know it today--a function of military power, which, in its turn, encompassed a huge spectrum of national capabilities ranging from industries to public education and culture. Real strategists saw the world in a very different light than Napoleon saw it. Modern armies and navies required now immense industries, massive logistical chains, originating in national centers of industry and agriculture, new weapons such as radio, tanks and combat aviation changed the outlook of the war dramatically and changed the way armies were commanded and controlled. WW II was the first war with a full blown C3ISR complex becoming a decisive factor. To command a massive army group of 800 000 troops simultaneously required more than just ability to conduct brilliant maneuvers or inspire troops with pep-talks on the even of the battle, it required a profound understanding of the mechanisms of such a command and control and that, on a strategic level, that is level of large bodies of troops capable to influence the dynamics of a whole campaign, it meant the ability to harmonize a huge number of political, purely military, human and other factors. By 1939 to have such an ability one had to be extremely well educated not only as a good field officer, one had to have a serious both education and pedigree in (general) staff work. 

The fact that Ike graduated first out of 245 officers in Command And General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, in 1925 should be emphasized together with Ike's serious staff pedigree prior to WW II. Yet, the shtick of many in contemporary (since WW II) US historiography, let alone vast US military history amateur circles, is pointing out that prior to WW II Ike didn't (field) command anything larger than tank battalion. But that immediately raises a question, why then, a number of battalion commanders want to attend General Staff  academies in any serious Armed Forces? It is because they know that these are academies which open the door to the command of a much larger units. How being a superb and experienced staff officer is considered a disadvantage, while, if anything else, it is an imperative for anyone who is to be considered a serious military strategist. One of the examples of such General Staff leap into the cohort of outstanding military leaders is Marshal Vasilevsky, who, and you may have guessed it already, never commanded, before entering in 1938 the world of General Staff, anything larger than regiment. Yet, one of the most outstanding military leaders of WW II emerged back into the full field command during Red Army's operations in East Prussia. All that, after Vasilevsky planned and coordinated such battles as Moscow 1941 counteroffensive, Stalingrad, Kursk and Operation Bagration.  Not too shabby for a staff officer. 

How Eisenhower's staff pedigree could be a disadvantage, as many profess, in the war where strategic inception (Zamysel) required immense planning, hence large staffs, remains a complete mystery to me. How being a star graduate of what amounted to Russian (Soviet) equivalent of General Staff Academy is not a perfect pedigree for command of large complex forces and being a good level strategist is also a mystery to me, when speaking about Ike who has an overwhelming empirical evidence in his favor. Serious wars are not fought without serious plans and Eisenhower sure as hell was a good military planner with a good grasp of what was at stake in WW II. It couldn't have been otherwise, since in many important respects serving under George C. Marshall's command was more than ample evidence of Ike's talents. Illiterate references (in many US sources) to Ike's "administrative", a euphemism for staff officer, talents merely underscore a complete lack of understanding what is involved in serious operational and strategic planning and Ike sure has done more than his share of it. He ended up, finally, the greatest American practitioner of military strategy, which becomes even more evident against the background of many today's general officer mediocrities whose "planning" (in reality promoting their own careers) helped to squander American resources and embroil her in useless and unwinnable wars globally. 

Yet, Ike's first attempt on real strategic planning was both noble and professional. The first thing Ike understood--a fact which is largely downplayed or deliberately ignored in many American sources--was the fact that successful Allied strategy in Europe hinged on Red Army. Compare this view with the view of then Senator Harry Truman: "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible." The contrast in attitudes and the level of a strategic thinking couldn't be starker, when Ike wrote in his diary in July 1942, after the Second Washington Conference rejected his and Marshall's Operation Sledgehammer Plan, in favor of Torch.  Depressed and dejected Ike wrote that the prize "we seek is to keep 8 million Russian soldiers fighting Germany. Failing to provide help to Russia will constitute one of the gravest mistakes in history" (need precise quote, this one from memory, but almost exact). You can find this entry in same Stephen Ambrose's national bestseller "The Supreme Commander". Ike's prophesy will come true but Cold War ideological realities helped to not only obfuscate but essentially completely reverse the clock work of the early WW II to a such degree that, in the end, real events and strategic discussions between Allies in 1941-42 have been completely overtaken by Hollywood imagery and a mythology which only now, not least thanks to immense academic efforts of Colonel David Glantz and Lt.Colonel Jonathan House, is being penetrated with the actual facts "on the ground".  

To Be Continued...