Some Points Of Import.

First, we should start with Algeria contract with Russia about which Algeria Times broke the news a few days ago. Here is the summary (in Russian, use Google Translate) of this news in one of Russian media, and it speaks about the contract between $25 to $37 billion. When speaking about this news, not to mention a rather convoluted way it was allegedly signed, with Algeria's Defense Minister flying to... Brazil to use intermediaries to sign it with Russians... So, sounds really fishy. Moreover, last September Russia and Algeria DID sign $7 billion (still huge) contract and it elicited a serious butt-hurt reaction from Florida cabana boy Marco Rubio.

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Marco Rubio (R-FL) sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken calling for appropriate designation of parties whose significant purchase of Russian materiel enable Russia’s destabilizing actions. 

• “Russia is Algeria’s largest military supplier. Algeria is also among the top four purchasers of Russian arms worldwide, culminating with a $7 billion arms deal in 2021. Influx of money from any source to Russia will only further enable Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. Yet, sanctions available to you have not yet been utilized.”

• “I encourage you to take the threat Russia continues to pose to global stability seriously and to appropriately designate parties whose significant purchase of Russian materiel enable Russia’s destabilizing actions.”

So, when  Rubio complains about Russia being Algeria's largest military supplier, he doesn't lie.  Enough to take a look at Algeria Armed Forces to recognize an overwhelming dominance of Russian equipment, be those numerous MiG-29s and SU-30s, or Algerian Navy's submarine force--all of it is Russian-made--to see the pattern. Many Algerians, as an example, graduated my naval academy.

Considering the fact that the contract has been signed roughly in September 2022, 7 months since the start of SMO, one can easily foresee what is in this contract, whose content otherwise is closed to public, apart from traditional modernization procedures for a huge number of Algeria's T-90 and T-72 tanks. It is absolutely clear that seeing the performance of Russia hardware in SMO Algeria wants a lot of stuff, including the "graduation" from still superb S-300PMU2 to S-400, from SU-30s to SU-57s and things of this nature. 

Could it be that latest developments in SMO convinced Algeria to expand already existing contact? Certainly, possible. It is clear that performance of Russian combat aviation, especially in terms of BVR operations, are simply unmatched with SU-35s and SU-57 simply not allowing any combat aircraft from 404 to stay airborne any meaningful time after the take off. The performance of air defense is simply stunning considering the scale of SMO. Will Russia satisfy  increasingly growing appetite of many (do not forget Turkey) abroad for latest Russian weapons systems, which now demonstrated their combat effectiveness in real war? I assume Russia can ramp up production of export versions of such items as SU-57 or S-400, among many, in the mid to long term, or, rather, once hostilities begin to wind down somewhat. But we have to wait and see if this Algeria contract will stay at $7 billion or if it did indeed grow to this rather very large sum. There is little doubt, however, that Algeria can afford a long term contract of this scale. So, stay tuned. 

Another point of interest is Rostislav Ischenko's attempt to delve into Pentagon's calculations regarding SMO (in Russian). He concludes: 

Конечно, уровень американских политиков и дипломатов критически снизился за последние тридцать лет, но в распоряжении США остались вполне профессиональные частные аналитические центры, государственные разведывательные службы и, наконец, военные, которые, может быть, и не гениальны, но простому расчёту потенциалов враждующих сторон обучены — не бог весть какая сложность. Откуда же эта критическая ошибка, стоящая США практически моментальной потери надежды на победу в глобальном противостоянии?

Translation: Of course, the level of American politicians and diplomats has dropped critically over the past thirty years, but at the disposal of the United States are quite professional private think tanks, state intelligence services and, finally, the military, which may not be brilliant, but they are trained in a simple calculation of the potentials of the warring parties. - God knows how difficult it is. Where does this critical mistake come from, costing the US an almost instantaneous loss of hope for victory in the global confrontation?

And here where he makes a crucial mistake about "private think-tanks" and, even, the US military. He also misses the fact of a strategic miscalculation across the board because of... OK, I wrote three books on that and this blog exists now in its 9th year. It is precisely about the fact of not only incompetence of institutions Ischenko lists but also about operating with the data of the lowest reliability. It makes no difference explaining to modern young Wall Street broker, CIA officer and some Lieutenant Colonel from Pentagon that they do not have proper data, both on Russia and the US, due to a complete bunk of most models, be them economic or military, which are used in the US. I do not even mention those "think-tanks" which is a euphemism for pseudo-academic whoring and selling snake oil, especially in so far as the military realities are concerned. 

But in the end, any operational planning of the campaign the scale of SMO requires not only sheer numbers, it requires a profound understanding of the issues of combat effectiveness and proper operational criteria used in the planning phase and during the operations themselves. No NATO country, including the US has such an experience other than the white board theories, much of which have their roots in beating the shit out of "small fish" opponents.  

When one's planning is based on "then a miracle occurs" and on the assumptions that George Patton was a "tactical genius" one will always get Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and other campaigns of such nature with more than obvious results. And that will be you Saturday primer.

Larry Fires A Salvo.

That's what I am talking about. A little review of operational planning from Larry Johnson. 

PATTON, the movie, was a masterpiece of entertainment. It is not historically accurate on many points and that is a problem with respect to Ukraine. What? I suspect some of you believe I have really crossed over to crazy land, but hear me out. Remember that scene when the Germans launched the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 and Patton saved the day by “immediately” diverting his Army 90 degrees to head north and rescue the beleaguered paratroopers of the 101st and 82nd airborne regiments (note, the paratroopers insisted they did not need to be rescued, but that’s another story for another day)? That cinema account of how Patton planned and shifted the axis of attack of his troops is presented as something hastily put together. The German offensive started on 16 December and Patton met with Eisenhower on the 19th of December and received orders to relieve Bastogne. Patton’s troops moved out on the 22nd of December and reached Bastogne on the 26th. What the movie account fails to convey is that the planning for moving his Army north began on December 9, ten days before the emergency conference with Eisenhower.

Add today, of course a much more powerful air transport component, modern ISR and and C4 and you get:

Larry continues:

The planning process Patton followed is similar to what the U.S. military uses today. The current system is known as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System aka JOPES. I have been involved in scripting and executing over 240 crisis response exercises. I worked for 23 years for the man who wrote JOPES, so I have some insight to the process. He beat it into me. It starts with an Alert Order (e.g. Be Prepared to Act) usually followed Warning Order (e.g., Houston we have a specific problem, tell us how you plan to solve it). The military command that receives the warning order immediately tasks it staff to prepare Courses of Action aka COAs.

Read the whole thing at Larry's superb blog. Here is how he concludes, rightly, his excellent professional insight. 

...the Russians knew it was coming and chose to let the Ukrainians flood the zone in order to eventually hit the Ukrainian forces with a massive counter attack. The Ukrainians are no longer in fortified defensive positions and their lines of communication to support the forward troops are now defined precisely. The Ukrainian attack has not destroyed nor disrupted Russia’s air, artillery, rocket and missile assets. Attacking the Ukrainian units is an easier task, not more difficult. I am not privy to the Russian plan. But what I do know is that the planning process required to deploy the troops and equipment moving into Kharkov was not a panicked response. Hollywood can create the illusion of rapid movement of military troops, but the real world requires alerting units, making sure they are properly supplied and then undertaking the logistic task of moving those units into combat. This means the planning was deliberate, not a crisis response.

For people who continue to rely upon TG channels and "reporters", I have to go with my friend Vladimir Trukhan's suggestion--just give those "experts" the combat veteran status--many of them richly deserve it--award them with some combat medals, but forbid them to speak on operational and strategic matters. Many people still don't get it--personal courage under fire is NOT a substitute for military operational and strategic competence. Larry gave one of its important facets a real professional treatment.