Admiral Korolev About Russia's Navy.

As I stated not for once in the last several years--Russia is not interested in challenging US maritime dominance. There is simply no need to do that:

The Russian Navy doesn’t need to fight for a global sea control. The Russian Navy is not going to challenge the U.S. Navy’s global maritime dominance. The Russian Navy’s main task is to provide a reliable defense of Russia’s shores and avoid war by presenting a defensive and forbidding posture. The Russian Navy is an organic part of the larger military force of Russia, whose only concern is preventing a global conflict. In this sense, the Russian Navy is completely integrated into the Russian tradition of national security, which spreads across the wide spectrum of activities, encompassing diplomacy, coherent foreign policy, intelligence and military force—a set of security imperatives erroneously dubbed in the West “hybrid warfare.”

As famous Russian anecdote goes: no matter how many times Russians will assemble crib (or sowing machine in some versions), the result will always be the same--AK-74. Same with the Russian Navy, which can only exist as a Sea Denial force. As Russian Navy's Commander-In-Chief Admiral Korolev stated yesterday--non-nuclear strategic containment (deterrence) becomes Russian Navy's primary task and State Armament Program 2018-2027 reflects this in full. I already can hear sobbing and weeping of Russia's "navalists", especially those who never served a day on any naval ship and study military history from weapon systems' booklets handed out at arms exhibitions, or from (wrong) books, but Russia in this case acts precisely as she should. 

It is understandable that building aircraft carriers, and I mean Russian version of CVNski, in their opinion, is the only way to go since, again--in their opinion, this is the only way to have an "ocean-going fleet". This whole Russian "ocean-going fleet" fetish, which implies that Russia doesn't have one, on their part is a good sign of their lack of education on serious operational matters. Indeed, how can the Navy which has advanced nuclear submarine (both SSGNs and SSBNs) component which deploys regularly to the.... ocean be considered non-ocean-going fleet is beyond my feeble mind, but what do I really know. 

1. Even today Russia's Navy is an "ocean-going" fleet is one considers a very simple fact that it goes there in a manner which perfectly suits current Russian naval necessities. Indeed, can Russian Navy send ships to the ocean? Of course it can. Such as many deployments of Russian ships recently to this very "ocean". Such as this one. I will abstain here from speculating on how many Russian subs are currently on combat patrol in Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific oceans but this IS what is called an "ocean-going".  Russia does have number of those subs on patrol as I type this.

2. Korolev, however, does mention building of a Green Water Navy, which, by definition Russian Navy already is. Of course, the "thing" in this world of military lingo and generalizations is a Blue Water navy. That is the navy which can do, among other things, a global "projection of power". The question in this case is this: does Russia need such a global "power projection"? Answering this question competently is a must if one wants to remain well-grounded in operational reality. The answer is not as simple as it may seem. It must be nuanced. Regional? Certainly, such as a Mediterranean, as events in Syria have shown, but globally? Does Russia need "power projection" against Kongo? New Zealand? Absolutely not.

3. Yet, as Paul Atreidis's strategic dictum goes: "one who can kill a thing, controls a thing"(c). Russia builds the Navy capable to kill any navy in the world. This is Containment 101. This task is on several orders of magnitude more important for Russia than any "power projection" capabilities, which come a very distant second in the current global transformation the world is going through. The only difference in this unfolding reality is HOW FAR from Russia's shores will Russian Navy be able to destroy aggressor's navy?

As it stands now and as it projects itself to 2020-2022 Russian Navy's capability, augmented by other forces' capabilities, a reliable Exclusion Zone, or No-Go zone, will extend (very roughly, of course) up to 3000 kilometers (1620 nautical miles) from Russia's shores. It will be at this distance at which operations of heterogeneous forces (submarines, surface ships, patrol and missile-carrying aviation with its fighter escorts) will be able to deliver a salvo of missiles which will destroy any naval force deploying for attack on Russia. All this will be done in purely conventional (non-nuclear) framework. I described those A2/AD "bubbles" not for once. Those bubbles are not getting weaker or shrink, to the contrary--they are getting stronger and expand. While Admiral Richardson's statement:

Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missile systems are not impenetrable... Nor do formidable Russian... air defense systems such as the S-400... necessarily render the airspace they protect into no-go zones for the carrier air wing.  

May be somewhat true, under some very rare specific circumstances, introduction of hyper-sonic missiles renders the whole concept of a classic US Navy's CVN and its battle group completely obsolete. In essence a classic dichotomy of Shield vs Sword is not valid anymore. Modern hyper-sonic weapons will penetrate any air and missile defense of any modern navy and they will sink or kill a mission with very high probability. Those salvos will be launched from the underwater, ground and air and they will get through. This is a new paradigm in the naval warfare and it overturns completely any geopolitical designs American neocons had on Eurasia. This is a tectonic shift of historic proportions, but about this--later. 

  

As Was Expected. Not Really A News.

As I reminded here, Russia proceeds with the modernization of at least some Project 949A  (Oscar II-class) SSGNs and Project 971 (Akula-class) SS(G)Ns by upgrading those with Kalibr missile complex, apart from other upgrades including new navigational complex and signal processing suite. In all, 10 subs of both classes were planned for upgrade. Probably one of the Project 945 (Sierra-class) SSNs will make the list too. So far it is known for sure that 2 Oscars are being upgraded. Plans may change, of course. But this is not the point--the point is in the practical arrival to a common sense decision both financially and operationally. 

Apart from the tragedy with sinking of K-141 Kursk  in August of 2000 and the loss of all hands, Oscars (Russian: Anteys) have a good reputation in the fleet, despite some harsh words towards this design from some experienced Russian submariners, such as Vice-Admiral Ryazantsev, who wrote (in Russian) a scathing review of Northern Fleet's combat training practices and procedures in the wake of Kursk disaster. Ryazantsev, who commanded several nuclear subs and eventually a division of those, not without justification, points out to Oscars' major drawback--these are colossal submarines, displacing 24 000 tons. Size in ASW does matter and it's always a compromise between the size of sub and its combat capabilities. 

       

Yet, Oscars are very silent subs and, I would assume, after undergoing deep modernization will reduce their physical fields even further. With maturing of Kalibr complex what used to be considered  Oscars' weakness becomes a serious advantage. In accordance to different sources, after modernization Oscars will be able to carry 72 missiles. This is 3 times the load when compared to Oscars' traditional 24 P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) missiles.  While P-700's conventional warhead of 750 kilogram of "sea mix" is larger than about 450 kilogram warhead of anti-shipping 3M54, the difference, however, between the two is startling. Oscars will be able to carry a thoroughly modern Kalibrs in different configurations, still providing for a massive anti-shipping salvo, while carrying also a conventional (or secondary nuclear) deterrent of dozens of land-attack 3M14. This is a massive and deadly firepower. With 3M14 range of (officially) up 2500 kilometers, conventional strategic containment or, in layman's lingo--the ability to blow the shit at enemy's coast and deep inland is simply unrivaled in platform-to-platform comparison. Strategic implications of this are enormous. With upgraded Akulas getting presumably 12-14 Kalibrs each,  Russian Navy gets not only massive fire-power but a great deal of flexibility, which was delayed due to a catastrophe which befell Russia in 1990s. 

Obviously, the program of modernization of submarines of these types pursues the objective of a conventional strategic containment. Combined with a very long range cruise missiles' capabilities of Russia's Air Space Forces, these become a stabilizing factor in Russia's defense against  any kind of "democratization" or "humanitarian bombing". But behind that, what emerges or, rather, reemerges is a traditional Soviet/Russian post-WW II view on sea-denial. Russia's evolving submarine force is the same old tool from Sergei Gorshkov's tool box. In some sense it is his vision updated to the realities of the early 21st Century. Gorshkov, certainly, wanted a "balanced Navy"--a force capable of both Sea Denial and, regionally, Sea Control (Blagopriyatny Operativnyi Regime--Favorable Operational Regime). Sea Control idea at that time required a massive investment in the surface fleet with aircraft carriers being a pinnacle of such a fleet building effort. Yet, throughout this effort in 1970s and 1980s, Gorshkov never relented on a massive, in fact, highly prioritized development of submarines, long range naval aviation and cruise missile complexes they carried. Today, under new geopolitical and technological realities it becomes obvious that this was a correct accent. 

1. Aircraft carriers will inevitably devolve or, rather, transform  into a  smaller and less expensive "stability" platforms capable both of limited power projection and, most importantly, ASW. They also will work with a surface fleet in support of its SSGNs.

2. All submarines, of all major types, with the exception of SSBNs, will become cruise-anti-shipping and land-attack missile carrying platforms. They also will become (if not already) fleet's main conventional striking force both against enemy's fleet and land targets.

3. We can only try to imagine what will become of fleet once weapons such as Zircon and even faster and deadlier missiles will get on-line and this reality is not coming--it is already here. It also remains to be seen what would happen with carrier aviation with navalized versions of air-missile-defense complexes S-400, let alone S-500, being deployed to sea. 

As Commanders Joseph A. Gattuzo  and Lori Tanner, both carrier aviators with an immense experience, noted more than a decade and a half ago:

"Money spent furthering manned aircraft technologies and programs—the CVNX (proposed Nimitz-classcarrier replacement) being one of them—is like polishing cannonballs so they will fly a little farther."

They saw it coming. Russian Navy knew it all along, despite ever emotional clash between submarine and carrier lobbies--yes, Russian Navy does have its own "trade unions", if to quote Elmo Zumwalt. That is what limited and precious resources do to one--give birth to a new fighting doctrines.