Why The Interrogation Of This ...

 ... 404 POW is important in operational sense. 

It is obviously in Russian, but if anyone wants to listen to the whole thing you can follow this link to Russian MoD TG channel. But why it is interesting. It is interesting due to this and many other 404 POWs testimonies of the dominance of Russian artillery on the battlefield. This is for those who still continue to masturbate to UAVs not understanding that Fire and Strike impact on the battlefield is called "complex" because of its heterogeneous nature, meaning the use of a variety of means and artillery (both "barrel" and rocket, aka MLRS) remains a decisive factor on the battlefield providing proper fire productivity. 

Here is one of many videos of Russians tankers (this one is T-80BM) explaining how they work from both ZOP (Enclosed Firing Positions) and directly. 

Here the guys explain how they finished off one of the Leopards which was "de-tracked" by Russian infantry using Kornet and then T-80BM crew destroyed it through UAV's fire correction at the distance of 9.5 kilometers. Everything works as a system, and this is just the part, in this particular case, of ROK--Recon Fire Complex. To those who still don't get it--a reminder from Colonel Jacques Baud. 

And then there is a lot to be said about Joint Force, a REAL one. 

RUK/ROK At Work.

This is why not having real AD, which neither 404 nor any NATO country have, concentrating oneself in predeployment areas, is not a good idea as 516 Battalion of Special Forces of the 1st Independent Brigade of VSU learned the hard way in Sumy Oblast. 

Good hit at ammo depot. Up to 130 personnel KIAs, 23 armored vehicles, special automobiles--15 and 10 trucks. All goners. RUK/RUK--Recon Strike/Frappe Complex. Recon and targeting from drones, satellites, recon units, EW etc. Sensor fusion at its best, after that--firing solution and off Mr. Iskander goes. The power of the stand-off, SMART hypersonic munitions. Now imagine this thing from hell increasing its combat radius to 1,000 kilometers. Already happened. 

About Maneuverable Warfare.

You can maneuver in the XXI century ONLY if you fight a third-rate opponent. In reality, you will be detected, and targeting will be provided and after that--well, the fate of the whole Ukie (US) column of HIMARS MLRS battery. You end up dead. Same goes for any armor. RUK/ROK. 

This is the demonstration from Kherson today. Do not maneuver if you fight Russian Army and want to live. 

They Do Have A Very Bad Time...

 ... I mean HIMARS. Another one is a goner after either Mr. Iskander or Mr. Tornado visit. Likely Iskander.

RUK/ROK or RUOK if one wishes in action. Remarkably, in many respects the search of the area by several recons means ranging from visuals by Russian DRGs and UAVs makes now any kind of movement (ANY) by VSU impossible. 

Here is another example of VSU tactical mastery, sort of--the ukie column gets into 810th Marines Brigade ambush--gets blown up, remnants try to maneuver to the flank and get the rest of column destroyed. I deliberately give only the link, because due to many VSU KIAs in the video Blogspot will kill the post (they already killed one). It is a safari now in Kursk. Elsewhere? Boy, those arrows are definitely getting bigger, seriously bigger. I am planning to talk about it in my tomorrow's video.

With Genuine Respect For Laymen...

... and this is in some sense a repetition (or reiteration) of what I am writing about for years and what happens when the issue is being obfuscated without proper understanding of the issue. I am talking about writing of some Simplicius guy (whoever he or they are) about some "revelations" on the issue by some colonel Falichev whose real biography, except that he was an editor of a number of military publications, is completely absent, except that he was a military journalist and was in some hot spots. The whole writing discusses what basically amounts to comparison of satellite constellations of Russia and the US (NATO) with obvious advantage to the US in, and I underscore it, NON-war conditions and discussion of the tactical front end of what amounts to a battlefield management system also known in Russia as ASU--Автоматические Системы Управления--also known as BIUS (Боевые Информационные Управляющие Системы), aka CICS (Combat Information Control Systems). Oh, look, someone on the tactical level introduced "symbol"  on some pad and it went out--cool, netcentric warfare. Well, not so fast and I have good friends, former senior officers who graduated both military officer college of communications and then famous Academy of Communications (Signal Corps) (2 year war college) of Budyonny. Has a shitload of combat awards and some serious wounds. We discussed these things. 

And here is where despicable me comes in and says that it is all fine and dandy: satellites, CICS and netcentricity, but as practice of Russian RUK/ROK in SMO has demonstrated, including the reduction in reaction time from 7 minutes to less than 1 minute it is Russia who teaches the United States with all of her satellite constellations and hare-brain schemes of C4ISR what real netcentricity is and how it is applied in REAL operations of scale, also how it evolves. And here comes this, o-o-o-o-h, secretive secret of warfare (not really, but you have to have serious military background to know it and I wrote a book about it)--ISR exists for... drum roll--RESOLUTION of UNCERTAINTIES, and without understanding what it is, which is probabilistic matter, which is a measure of uncertainty, all these talks about satellites and pads are meaningless because what matters is what happens in the back-end of all those symbols, pads and targeting. Here is one of the pages with partial table of content of February 2024 issue of Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought):

As you can see yourself it all is highly mathematical. Just to give you example of the background, apparatus behind C3 and how it relates to networks, that article from the same issue:
 

So, four Ph.Ds in technical and physics-mathematics sciences, all four cadre senior officers, one of them general, write about all those Graph Theory, networks, constrains et al. These are the solutions which bring about proper technology through realization of the concepts. Here is another example, directly related to Bayesian and Kalman Filters which are critical in such things as targeting, guidance, netcentric operations and other military applications:

Everything in the modern war is about resolving of uncertainties and this is what is studied in serious military academies, not how to push buttons. And while at it, I want to reiterate, if you look at the "core" of modern C2 and netcentric operations it is all about, and I reiterate, what, what kind of info you feed into the data links and how this information is processed and uncertainties resolved. After that comes data/sensor fusion. Boy, that shit is funny. Here is US Navy explaining it on fingers:

Often, multiple sensors may be looking at the same contact—radars on different manned and unmanned surface vehicles in a group, for example, or different types of sensors, such as radar and SIGINT, on the same platform. In the next phase—sensor- data fusion—the AI brings together and evaluates all the relevant data streams, to produce a more comprehensive score for the commander. Sensor-data fusion assigns weights to each of the data streams, largely based on the quality of its data. There are a number of reasons why sensor data quality can vary. For example, one sensor might generate a lower resolution than others, based on its location. Or, the sensor might be older, and have a lower sensitivity than newer versions. Some sensors—such as those on unmanned vehicles—may have smaller optics than large, complex sensors, and so might generate less robust results. Once the AI assigns weights to the different data streams—based on their strengths and weakness—it fuses the results, refining the overarching confidence score.

Ah yes, weighted data, data streams, probabilistic analysis--yep, that is what military staffs used to do--fusing data from sensors for developing tactical and operational decisions. Today computers help to do so within combat networks. Of course a pompous title of "AI" is not really an AI but simply algorithms which handle inputs, but I let it slide--this is all fad. So, what is it in the end about these satellites' constellations and the piece of Colonel Falichev which Mr. Simplicius quoted? I would go out on a limb here and say that it is the tempest in the teacup, especially after Russian RUK/ROK and their performance provided a cultural shock to Pentagon, which has about zero experience with combined arms and netcentric operations of such scale as SMO, while the state of Russian industry and science allows to confidently state that the armed forces of Russia which are emerging through SMO not only already are the most advanced armed forces in the world with arsenal which is unrivaled by anyone, but with its ISR complex improving not only qualitatively, but in quantity. Just to demonstrate:

Today, Roskosmos published photos from Russian "research" and totally civilian (wink, wink), no, without jokes--it is civilian, satellite Canopus-B of the hapless Baltimore bridge and Dali vessel which destroyed it. Ask yourself a question, if civilian Russian satellite has a pretty darn good resolution, what do those Russian military satellites see. I'll give you a hint: in real war, suitable time stamped photo with acceptable data obsolescence even from Canopus will be more than enough for provision of targeting for any Russian made anti-shipping missiles against any surface ship. In related news, Iran also has Canopus (titled Khayyam) operating since 2022 and plans three more. Just a message. A hint... about resolving uncertainties. Now, if anybody would find me the background (what he graduated, when, what is his VUS--military-registration specialty et al.) of this Colonel Falichev. But I don't hold my breath.