Yeah, Good Luck With That.

France, as was anticipated, started to complain and take "actions". 

French shipbuilder Naval Group has said it will send a “detailed and calculated proposal” to Australia after Canberra canned a $40 billion submarine deal in favor of a new pact with the US and UK, much to France’s dismay. On Wednesday, Naval Group CEO Pierre Eric Pommellet told France’s Le Figaro newspaper that Australia would be receiving a bill for the submarine contract which was cancelled last week. Pommellet said a “detailed and calculated proposal” would be sent to Canberra in the next “few weeks” which sets out the money it expects Australia to cough up for cancelling the 2016 deal. The shipbuilder chief said that such an eventuality had been planned for by the French firm.The bill will supposedly cover costs already incurred as well as those to come, with some “linked to demobilization of infrastructure and IT as well as the redeployment of employees,” he said, adding that the company will assert its rights.

Any chance of me getting on the French legal team which will be dealing with this issue? I expect a financial bonanza for lawyers in this matter. But, on the other hand, one has to keep in mind that at this level, same as was with hapless Mistrals' deal (awarded to France by Russia for "mediation" after Russian-Georgian War of 080808), geopolitics and operational realities play as large, if not larger, role as financial considerations, however important $40 billion are. As I continue to stress for the last week: we still don't have all facts on our hands in terms of American-Australian intentions and I want to underscore--we are merely speculating for now. If lease comes through, things will become much clearer. Some are even suggesting the possibility of US converted Ohio-class SSGNs leased out to Australia. I doubt it, but I could be wrong. Obviously with a single Ohio-class SSGN packing 154 TLAMs this is a concern for China. But then again--I stress it--for now it is mostly a speculation. 

 

I personally lean towards SSNs on SLOCs, but we just have to wait and see. As for French grievances, well, what can I say--geopolitical weight of players is too different, not in France's favor, for France to have any reasonable chances on substantial compensation, not to speak of a wounded national pride. Thanks to Larch for pointing this out. 

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) — The top U.S. military officer met with his Russian counterpart Wednesday, against the backdrop of U.S. struggles to get military basing rights and other counterterrorism support in countries bordering Afghanistan — a move Moscow has flatly opposed. The meeting in the Finnish capital, Helsinki, between Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov comes at a crucial time in the wake of the military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Without troops on the ground, the U.S. needs to forge more basing, intelligence sharing and other agreements to help monitor al-Qaida and Islamic State militants in Afghanistan to ensure they are not regrouping and posing a threat to America and its allies. Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said in July, however, that Moscow warned the U.S. that any deployment of American troops in countries neighboring Afghanistan “is unacceptable.” He said Russia told the U.S. “in a direct and straightforward way that it would change a lot of things not only in our perceptions of what’s going on in that important region, but also in our relations with the United States.”

As I am on record for years--I feel better when Russian and American militaries speak to each-other. Russia, obviously, is not going to allow US troops to be stationed in all those Stans, but I want to stress another tremendously important point: there IS a very real threat of Jihad and terrorism which should not be discounted against the background of the US escape from Afghanistan. We can only speculate (yet again) on a complexity of this issue, but it is an established fact that exchange between Russia and US regarding these matters exists and it is steady. Well, the United States can only blame itself for this development, with special thanks to Zbig, who due to him being a rather fanatical Russophobe and a pseudo-scholar thought that the United States can manage Political Islam it helped to create and fund. We all know how American political "science" works in real life, ask Fukuyama, late Huntington or present day Mearsheimer who got lost completely in their ignorance of the outside world.  But then again, it is a defining feature of American "academe" and elites. The proof, as it is known, is in the pudding, or as Hegel stated--practice is the criterion of the truth. Those who are not brainwashed are well aware of this truth.    

In related news, Russia continues to build and launch those pesky missile corvettes capable of carrying anything from 3M14M and 3M54M to Zircon, like there is no tomorrow. The latest one, two days ago was launched in Kerch, at Zaliv wharf. 

This one is named Askold after the famous Russian cruiser of Russo-Japanese war and of Gallipoli fame. It (she) still has to have navalized Pantsir and other systems installed. Can you imagine a ceremony at Zaliv when first project 23900 LHD will be launched? I hope to live to see this. I am sure HIMSELF will be present for this occasion. I am also in a desperate anticipation of Admiral Nakhimov getting more publicity and getting ready for sea trials in 2023. I cannot recognize this world anymore. The changes in the last 5 years are stunning and historic in scale and scope.

Dresden Opera Ball.

I am not going to lie--I am sill reeling after CIA recruitment video, because I know it completely degraded Russia's national security by means of disabling huge numbers of FSB officers from hernias they got from hysterical laughing from watching this video. 

I am Russian ethically and even I feel embarrassed by watching this shit of a patronizing wokeism and degeneracy, not that CIA is viewed seriously by real clandestine professionals around (ahem...) some continent for a while. It also hits home with Paul Craig Roberts' piece on feminization of Western man. Here is a comparison--no, it is not about gloating, it is about being warranted and irresistible--from Dresden Ball from Saint Petersburg where Russian Suvorov Military Schools, which are high schools with a serious military education in preparation to the entrance to military officer academies--no relation whatsoever to US "boarding schools" where they teach you nothing but marching and being a glorified boy-scout. These guys already know how to shoot actual weapons, know basic tactics, study calculus and physics and principles of leadership and squad and platoon command. Plus all combined arms manuals. The orchestra is German-Russian orchestra and the ball is in the best tradition of Russia's officerdom. 

This is how you grow a national elite, this is also how you prepare them for dying, if need be, for the country, because the country is a home to their first (or maybe second) love and I mean those young girls who are radiating femininity, joy and admiration for their uniformed gentlemen. Those girls are the future officer wives and mothers, but this ball will forever stay with them. Yeah, I know a little bit about it, just teeny-weeny bit))) Remember Chesterton--the soldier should not so much hate who is in a front of him as love what he leaves behind his back. You may continue to fill blanks to this post, I leave this space for you...... 

 

This is the conclusion (after) of this ball. Ah, those backward Russians not understanding all the benefits of being woke. 

Matthew Bodner Has Something To Say About Defense.

Of which he has no clue as is expected from a product of US "education" in the "political science" and persona associated with the liberal sewer of Moscow Times. Funny thing: here is the Russian comment from Bodner's article in Defense News, or rather its Russian translation on famous InoSmi (Foreign Media) website:

Я, может быть чуть более информирован, но меня, как российского гражданина, пугают не военные возможности НАТО, а его оторванность от реальности и от собственных народов. Есть у Запада такая склонность - упоровшись собственным величием, двинуться на Россию наносить добро и причинять освобождение.

Translation: Maybe I am slightly more informed, but I, as a Russian citizen, is more afraid of not NATO's military capabilities but of NATO's detachment from reality and own people. The West has this feature--getting drunk on own greatness, then moving to Russia and inflict the goodness and violently cause liberation.

A superb sarcastic summary by the Russian user with a handle of Jadefalcon. And here is my point--most of current American, so called humanities-"educated" (in reality dumbed down and misinformed) talking class is utterly unqualified for expressing their "opinions" on any issue related to actual defense and, least of all, on any issue related to Russia's defense policies and geopolitical status in particular. It is understandable that all kind of media outlets in US are always ready to publish any kind of contrived unprofessional trash, especially coming from "specialists" like Bodner who lives in Russia now for a whole three or four years and on this merit alone, supposedly, should know how defense policies are formulated, but no. The only degree most American "journos" and "experts" in Russia have could be identified as this: BS (or MA) in Rubbing Shoulders Inside Russian Uber-liberal "tusovkas" For Reinforcement of Western Narratives on Russia. Majors vary from Specialization in Solzhenitsyn and Russia-Mordor GULAG to Specialization In Listening To The Same Clueless Russian "liberal" Military Experts (Rumor-mongers) who Say What Is Expected From Them. 

Let us also be very clear--American Russian military "expertise" even among actual professionals is not that great, now comes the class of American political "scientists" who never served a day in any military capacity and have zero military academic, which is on several  orders of magnitude more complex and difficult than any BS degree in political science, background continuing to pontificate on issues they have no clue about. I have news to Mr. Bodner--to concentrate visiting Moscow's wonderful theater and gastronomical scene with his Russian "military experts" since this is the only circle of people Mr. Bodner can have legal access to in Russia, not to speak of most important thing of them all--there are NO real military experts in category of public Mr. Bodner gravitates to naturally. 

Here is an example, from his latest piece:

NATO has long been Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favorite foreign boogeyman and, as far as political footballs go, this one has been easy and fruitful to kick around at home.Most of Putin’s legitimacy in recent years has been rooted in a well-designed domestic narrative of Fortress Russia under siege from foreign powers — with NATO being the focus of concern.

This could have been written only by a complete ignoramus of Russian history and of Russian people (expected from US-"educated" Moscow Times' material) since NATO is NOT Vladimir Putin's "favorite foreign bogeyman" but it is sure as hell favorite "bogeyman" of overwhelming majority of Russian people who ARE NOT in communication circle of Mr. Bodner, which, I am 100% positive, consists of Russian liberal West's sycophants whose only real skills are in distinguishing Glenlivet from Johny Walker's Black Label. My suggestion to Mr. Bodner would be in this case to visit, when he has a time away from writing his sophomoric "military analysis", Poklonnaya Gora Memorial Complex or Piskarevskoye Cemetery in St.Petersburg. Not that it will educate him on anything--the level of ignorance of the body of "political science" in US of a warfare is appalling, but maybe it will give him some insight. I don't hold my breath though. I have some news, however, NATO was a real threat to Russia even in Soviet times. As recent (20+ years) history showed, Russians had ample reasons to be worried. They sure as hell got all evidence they need.

Bodner proceeds then to offer Vladimir Frolov's ("independent political analyst") opinion on Russia's grand strategy:

“Even the shouting match over the 2 percent spending, not to mention Trump’s lunatic call for 4.5 percent, is a significant concern for Moscow,” Frolov said. “Were Germany to start remilitarizing, approaching the capabilities level of the Cold War, we should be worried. And we would hate to see Poland emerge as the new Germany for U.S. forward basing and positioning.”   

I don't know what stone Mr. Frolov lived under last 20 years but I may remind him and Mr. Bodner that it was NATO's barbaric acts against Yugoslavia in Spring 1999 which became the last straw in Russia's reassessment of herself and served as grounds for soft removal of drunkard Yeltsin and emergence of Vladimir Putin, as representative of Siloviki power block at the top of the political power. By 2008 reassessment was largely complete and after War of 080808 there was no turning back in relations with the West. I guess Putin's 2007 Munich speech could be a clue? No? Well, then... So, I have news for Mr. Bodner--while Russia is always open for business dialogue, no ONE of any serious position of influence and, especially so within the power structures which formulate Russia's defense and foreign policies, have any freaking illusions on the nature of the West in general and US in particular. Hence Russia's rearmament and military reforms, which, of course, due to hubris and ignorance were misrepresented and misread in the US, the same goes for the massive shift in Russia's economic policies, which also were misrepresented and misread by all those American Russia "scholars". Russia is playing for both remilitarization of Germany (what and how is that is a separate issue altogether) and absolutely 100% for Poland becoming a forward basing and positioning for US mostly ABM and other components. 

But Bodner doesn't stop here and adds another "brilliant" insight:

The Kremlin has made confrontation with the West a cornerstone of its domestic legitimacy. Western politicians and pundits have honed in on Moscow with an intensity that makes their Russian counterparts nervous. And Trump cannot realistically deal with Russia in any way the Kremlin would like to see.    

Obviously, Bodner is lost completely in Russia's political, cultural and historic realities--a normal thing for American Russia "scholars", such as clown Michael McFaul, who still thinks that Russians are about to rise up since they want Pride-parades, multiculturalism, "democratic" reforms and other "values" which basically are killing the US--but last time I checked, May this year, and I know about Russia on several orders of magnitude more than Bodner will ever do, not to mention my background--yes I am talking about it--Russians in general were way more sophisticated and, I may say educated, than to be used as pawns in the "confrontation with West". I have some secrets to break to our Moscow "correspondent-political scientist":

1. Even Moscow's metro has free Wi-Fi and Russia and Russians are an extremely "plugged in" society and have, in actuality, better access to more competent and freer opinions than, say, Americans who simply are tuning out from hysterical and incompetent US media, who, as Mr. Bodner demonstrates, push same old tired Russia "narrative". Well that, plus Putin controlling everything in US and is being about to destroy US "democracy".

2. OK, here it comes, current Russian military and political analysis (and I don't mean Russian "liberals"--those are largely intellectually challenged and are badly educated) is on the order of magnitude better and and more competent. Why it is so? Well, because I know of very few Russian "political scientists" who actually comment much (again, with exception of Russian "liberals") on defense issues since this, for the most part, is reserved for people with actual military backgrounds and many of them (there are exceptions, of course) are either good or damn good. Example of a damn good political analyst without direct military background is Rostislav Ishenko who is not just some top notch political analyst but a historian with a good grasp of warfare and its evolution. That is what makes him so good. 

3. In general, with some minor exceptions, most what was or is being written on Russia's military, be that doctrinal, social or technological dimensions, is utter trash. Part of it is butt-hurt, part is hubris but most important part is that most political scientist in the US have no clue on the nature and application of the military power and, in general, will have issues with grasping even simplest technological, tactical and operational concepts reduced to a comic book and all mathematics removed.  

So it is difficult for me, in this case, to convey to Mr. Bodner how the necessary force (Naryad Sil) and its requirements are identified and calculated and how the levels of readiness are implemented especially in the country which has a military history which dwarfs anything the US ever experienced and which has ZERO illusions on NATO and is getting ready to face the worst possible scenario. But I am sure that Matthew Bodner will get to the bottom of it, after all, political science is such a great tool in getting force structure right or winning actual wars, right? Nah, I am being facetious--they can't handle the truth.     

UPDATE: Here is another "military expert" from a clownish organization known as STRATFOR. Omar Lamrani. Read attentively his CV.

Omar Lamrani focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific. Mr. Lamrani previously worked as an intern with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, where he was assigned to the Afghanistan desk. He was raised in Morocco and is a native speaker of Arabic and French. He has lived and worked in Europe, the United States and Thailand.

AREAS OF EXPERTISE: Military doctrine, Naval strategy and technology, Logistics, Asymmetric warfare,The Syrian Civil War

I would love (not really--I prefer not to waste my time with amateurs) to talk with this hack about this:

“Physically the Russians really can’t do anything to stop that strike,” said Lamrani. “If the U.S. comes in and launches cruise missiles,” as it has in past strikes, “the Russians have to be ideally positioned to defend against them, still won’t shoot down all of them, and will risk being seen as engaging the U.S.,” which might cause U.S. ships to attack them. Lamrani pointed out that in all previous U.S. strikes in Syria, the U.S. has taken pains to avoid killing Russian servicemen and escalating conflict between the U.S. and Syrians to conflict between the world’s two greatest nuclear powers. “Not because the U.S. cannot wipe out the flotilla of vessels if they want to,” said Lamrani, but because the US wouldn’t risk sparking World War III with Russia over Syria’s government gassing its civilians. “To be frank, the US has absolute dominance” in the Mediterranean, and Russia’s ships won’t matter, said Lamrani. “The U.S. would use its overwhelming airpower in the region and every single Russian vessel on the surface will turn into a hulk in a very short time,” if Russian ships engaged the U.S., said Lamrani.

This is a perfect case in point since all those "strategy" and "technology" scholars with useless degrees in International Relations do not understand what they are talking about. They do not teach such things as Combat Stability (Ustoichivost') and how it forms in Vienna Diplomatic Academy, nor Mr. Lamrani has any clue on the issues of "leakers" and how configuration of salvo changes probabilities dramatically, especially in EW dense environment, but again--this doesn't prevent glorious amateurs and sophomores from offering their utterly uninformed--I am not talking about higher issue of knowledge--rubbish as a valuable opinion on issues of which, no matter amount of the materials they may dig up in open press and comic books, they will never have even semi-professional grasp of. So, Omar Lamrani is as "military expert" as I am Chinese, but then again--no serious professional will bother oneself with working for such outfit as STRATFOR. Reputations are difficult to built and are easily lost.

Here is a review by real American military and intelligence professionals on this STRATFOR outfit.

Stratfor is a sleazy outfit. It was established as a money machine by George Friedman and a former Texas Congressman (now out of the picture) who served at one time on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. His being the co-founder along with the presence in the vicinity of numerous retired military people and civilian officials helps explain the selection of Austin as the company’s home.  They hustle; everything they do smacks of a hustle.  They exploit the student interns while playing on their desire to partake of the mysterious and the romantic.  Those they do hire for regular positions get the skimpiest of wages.  Expertise and languages are little valued.  Their hallmark tool is an electronic pair of scissors. One student had spent four years as an interrogator for the U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He served as an employee of a contract firm there. His first assignment as a junior member of the Stratfor team was to prowl around the Rio Grande Valley looking for stuff on the drug cartels; he never had been there before.

And this is how utter operational-strategic and technological rubbish is re-utilized and regurgitated in the American media.  

Why Mathematical Models Break Down. And Why Our Life Depends On That-1.

It is in human nature to quantify things—nothing is wrong with that. Quantification allows us to see some order in otherwise seemingly chaotic things, it also allows to predict the outcomes based on those quantifications. Sometimes predictions pan out but often they do not. As the events of the last 20 or so years showed us, no mathematical model, no matter how sophisticated, can properly predict global strategic balance, even despite availability of what became known as a "Big Data". Two things do not allow to trust such a modeling fully:

1. It matters WHAT data and WHO counts it. A famous meme of GIGO—Garbage In, Garbage Out did not appear out of nowhere—recall a complete trash all US pollsters were providing prior to the latest US Presidential Elections. This example alone is a good illustration of a dreadful influence biases provide even in something as large politically as electing POTUS. Then, of course, comes WW II and how it was "interpreted" in the West. 

2. Anything related to strategy and military is inherently human at the very foundation, and as such it is stochastic in nature, that is susceptible to the introduction of random variables and those variables sometimes become this proverbial monkey wrench which screws up all, even perfect, plans. In the end, the data itself MUST be full and reliable—otherwise one gets Wall Street reports on the state of economy, which are as reliable and are as connected to the actual reality as I am a NASA astronaut. 

For a former military professional who had to deal with some operational issues and who survived the collapse of the USSR, it was always fascinating for me how the outcomes may be influenced by accumulation of sometimes really insignificant disruptors which literally change the state of the affairs almost instantaneously and dramatically—in global matters a decade or two is not that long, really. In historic terms it is altogether—an instant. Dmitry Orlov is very good in describing some of the factors which, in particular, influence collapse on a societal level. But my point here is simpler—it is to give some insight on how things go haywire in military-political field and how they lead to a gigantic outcomes. 

I am aware--people do not like math. But hear me out here, the math presented herein is not really that difficult. At least, I tried to exclude any kinds of even remote references to differentiation (and integration) which necessarily accompany all kinds of models—it will all be within very basic algebra of a middle school level, at least I tried to keep it there. So, here it is: The Global Status of the Nation. One of the methods (models), which is based on the body of works by all kinds of geopolitical thinkers from Mahan, Morgenthau and, eventually, RAND Corporation. Some notable Russian thinkers also contributed to it. It is, indeed, natural for people to have a number on anything. So, many thought for more than a century about how to put "a number" on the might of the nation. In my book I gave a brief review of the CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) and reviewed some of the predictors for military victory as well as the components of the status of nations. 

So, here is the (Nation's) Status Model developed within the framework of the massive project titled Complex System Analysis and Modelling of Global Dynamics, which was done on the base of the world-renown Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of Russian Academy of Sciences. A lot in this model also was taken from RAND's estimates of national might. Well, here is this general formula. 

Don't despair—this formula is as simple as a toilet. To get to the value of Status at any given time you have to merely multiply the values. In it, S(t) is a measure of a nations global status. S(t) merely stands (as a function of time) for Status of the nation in given time. In this formula FA(t) is a value (again—time dependent, hence (t)) of a function of "influence" which is not related to geopolitical factors and accounts for the product of values obtained for quality of governance, economic and military independence, plus additional factor of being in coalition etc. The formula for this is not difficult, albeit long, and with a calculation of a factor of governance based on expertise. We will omit reviewing this factor and go directly for G(t)—a geopolitical potential of the nation. Here, we go for the formula and this is how it looks:

In this formula all Xs with subscript stand for shares of the nation in global indices of: T-territory, D-demography, E-economics, M-military. Numbers above are exponents or the power to which those indices must be raised. These ARE very easy indices to find since all of this data is in the open. That is with a huge exception of the Military index. But let's do some simple math exercise—let us compare G(t)s of say US and China, accepting FA(t) for both of them as equal and thus easily disposed of in our basic analysis. Let's see how the United States looks in its main Xs in G(t) formula. For that we go to Internet and get data there, let's count things for the US and China:

T--territory for the US will be almost the same as China's, both have about the same size of territory, but let us be anal about it and go for 9.147 million square km for the US (and, consequently—9.326 for China). Consequently the SHARES in the global scheme of things are as follows: US—6.13% of global land mass (I use round number of 149 million for the World's total land mass) and China's-6.26%. 

D--demography, easy. The United States' population is 322 million, China's—1,404 million. Consequently the SHARES in the global population are as follows: US—4.31% of total population (I use round number of 7,467 million for the World's total population) and China's-18.8%.

E—economy. Easy again, we go for PPP as normal people do and here it is: US GDP is (per CIA)—19.36 trillion, China's—23.12. Consequently the SHARES in the global GDP are as follows: US—15.24% of total GDP (I use CIA's round number of 127 trillion for the World's total GDP) and China's-18.2%.

M—military. Before I announce a train wreck here, ask yourself a question when looking at the formula of G(t) why XM, that is military component not only has the largest exponent (0.43) of them all, beating even Economy and why Military needs its own formula for calculation? Here is the formula: 

Where M1 is a Share of the nation in global military expenditures (I need to hear warning bells and sirens going off like crazy now) M2 is a military potential of the nation's Army, M3 is a military potential of nation's Navy and, finally, M4 is a potential of a strategic nuclear forces. The immediate question which arises here is HOW does one calculate PROPERLY all those indices. Let us calculate comparative G(t)s and, as a consequence, S(t)s for the US and China based on assumed military parity, that is American XM=Chinese XM=1. Just an example, not real indices. So, G(t) for the US will be, using basic scientific calculator: 

0.5*(1+1^0.43)*6.13^0.11*4.31^0.19*15.24^0.27 = 

0.5*(1+1)*1.22*1.32*2.09=3.366  

For China this will look like this:

0.5*(1+1^0.43)*6.26^0.11*18.8^0.19*18.2^0.27 = 

0.5*(1+1)*1.22*1.75*2.19=4.676

As you can see here, China squarely beats the United States for a title of the nation with the most geopolitical status, granted that we initially assumed that both nations have the same value of function of influence FA(t) and that their  XMs are equal--but they are not and the main REAL, tangible, component which will define most of those status bids is precisely this very XM and how it is interpreted correctly by serious analysts. That I will review in the next post. Needless to say, however, any calculation of national power and status without serious review of doctrinal, strategic and operational issues is a complete baloney--but that is what Western so called "expertdom" was doing for the last few decades. We all know the (catastrophic) results...

To Be Continued...

      

Wait A Minute! Again?

History is often ironic. And in what one can only see as a grim historic irony, Afghanistan asked Russia for help: from economy to training and equipping Afghan military. Here we go again, don't we? Will Russia respond favorably to this request? Possibly, and this will be totally justified from the geopolitical point of view, but the times when Soviet Union built most of Afghanistan infrastructure for ideological and humanitarian reasons are gone. Today Russia likes to be truly compensated for what she does and this is the only way. Does Afghanistan have money to pay for Russia's services? Probably not. But some sort of compensation may be worked out and Afghanistan will have to provide some important geopolitical favors to Russia. In the end, Russians know damn well that in Afghanistan no matter how much good you do you will end being an enemy. As the summary of Paul Robinson's and Jay Dixon's book states:

    The Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with large-scale economic and technical assistance for nearly twenty-five years before invading in 1979 and then in- creased the volume of assistance even further during the 1980s in an effort to prop up the government and undermine the anti-Soviet insurgency. None of this aid made any lasting difference to Afghan poverty. As in so many other countries, foreign aid did not promote economic growth. Using unexplored Russian sources, this book describes and analyses the economic and technical assistance programs run by the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s through to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and places them in the context of both Soviet-era development theories and more recent ideas about the role of institutions in fostering economic growth. In some respects Soviet development theorists were actually ahead of their contemporary Western counterparts in realizing the centrality of institution-building, but they proved unable to translate their theories into practical solutions. The reasons why their assistance programs failed so completely in Afghanistan remain compellingly relevant today.

I think Russia is not going to repeat mistakes of the past. 

Military Power (Cont'd 4).

To close off the cultural, that is Military Personnel argument (in reality, there is no closing it off--it is a vast issue which was around for ages) we may state thusly: 

1. It is possible, and it is done, to quantify military personnel's training (that is "quality"), it is also possible to predict with some probability the level of this quality under different conditions;

2. It is impossible to quantify, unless creating some bizarre metric, the cultural element in military personnel, since it is essentially unquantifiable element. It also varies with postures. People in defense of their own nation do fight and often fight desperately. Red Army's capturing Berlin was also defensive fighting, it was also a revenge one, after experiencing what Axis did on Soviet territory. WW II, however, is a very special case in every senses and we will discuss this in the future. 

Conquering nations such as Russia, USA (that is purely theoretical issue), modern India or China is, of course, beyond anybody's conventional military capabilities, including within this listed group of nations against each-other. Will Americans fight for their country to the last breath if one considers a purely fictional scenario of the US being attacked by massive land force? Most likely they will, at least "middle-America" will, and I do not mean the Red Dawn drek of a movie and an idea. In general, when speaking of the Military Personnel, feel free to create your own mental "models, you may come up with some interesting conclusions but, to really close off this part of discussion of the CINC model--read Tolstoy's War And Peace. No better testament to the travails of a military man exists. And the history, cleaned from tendentious (mis)interpretations, is of great help here........

 

2. Military Expenditure;

3. Steel/Iron Production;

4. Energy Consumption;

Composite Index Of National Capability (CINC) separates these three. Well, too bad for CINC, I, purely out of my evil intentions, put them together as a single entity and give it a title of ECONOMIC DETERMINANT. In fact, what CINC model lists is by far not enough in determining Military Power. Yes, I agree, all three must be the part of the metric but, yet again, they are necessary but not sufficient enough in modern world. Let's elaborate. And here we must separate Military Expenditure from Steel/Iron Production and Energy Consumption. All of them are still economic metrics but Military Expenditure is a budgetary affair and here we open a very special can of worms, because this expenditure must be taken into consideration within NON-linear doctrinal framework. It also must be considered within properly calculated Gross National Product. 

Let's take Russian and US Navies, as an example. US Navy, out of its doctrinal (and operational) needs, spends colossal sums of money on building and maintaining its fleet of CVNs or, in layman's lingo, nuclear aircraft carriers. In fact, even today, US Navy remains primarily carrier-centric navy and, until very recent events, viewed its carriers as:

1. Most important asset in Power Projection, which remains a primary function for the whole US Navy.

2. Some American naval people still think that CVN is alpha and omega in fighting against other fleets in the ocean. This may or may not be true but what matters here is that US Navy has the largest carrier fleet in the world and, in this fleet, a colossal monetary value. 

Now comes the question: does Russian Navy want carrier(s)? Yes, it does, but not for Power Projection and, certainly, Russian Navy never will transform itself into the carrier-centric navy. In fact, Russians do not consider Power Projection to be an ultimate doctrinal necessity. Russian Navy, as it was with the Soviet one, still thinks that carriers are needed primarily for provision of combat stability (boyevaya ustoichivost') of own naval force while fighting enemy's naval force. Power Projection capabilities, in this particular case, come as merely an afterthought or, if you will, free lunch. I, in the first post on Military Power, already posted an excellent interview by Admiral Stansfield Turner to The Christian Science Monitor, where he succinctly describes the method in assessing necessities in one or another force combination. So, if the US Navy has and operates its 11 large nuclear carriers should Russian Navy try to reach this number? Absolutely not and the question here is not even in the fact that it will be economically not feasible for Russia to do that but in the fact that there will be no competent answer to the doctrinal question of WHAT FOR. The maximum number of carriers which Russia needs under the ideal conditions are 4-5 large nuclear ones, not counting good ol' chap Admiral Kuznetsov and even this number may vary depending on the evolving (declining?) role of carriers in real naval war. A lot will depend on how fast hyper-sonic Anti Shipping Missiles will come on line.  In the end, Russian Navy will need carriers for defense of  motherland and fighting enemy force at the maximum distance from own shores. More over, Russian navy does not need such a colossal amphibious force that exists in US Navy.

So, how do we compare then the expenditure? US Navy spends on the order of magnitude more on its carrier and amphibious force than Russia does or ever will. Does it make US Navy more powerful purely on this metric? Well, not quite, if one considers the fact that Russia is not going to use carriers for purposes US Navy does, that is police the third world shitholes and bomb those shitholes with impunity into oblivion. The US Navy IS, undeniably, the most powerful navy in the world, but expenditure comparison here is not an exact science here because, as you may have guessed already, if I am not going to buy a $3.5 million 20 acre luxury ranch but am content with living in good enough $200,000 condo, it is really difficult to compare. So is the case here with carriers. I underscore, if Russian Navy ever, which I doubt it is going to happen, will get to this number of 4-5 nuclear carriers in its order of battle NO expenditure comparison will still be correct. Russian carriers will serve a very specific role of defending its group against....well, we'll leave it at that for now;-)    

In general, this metric of expenditure should be considered with what Russian military was using for ages now--cost/effectiveness criteria. And that is a very tricky criteria when one considers the fact that Russian Navy is in a full distributed lethality transformation mode and this is having a massive impact globally. After all, a single missile corvette of Project 21631 Buyan with the price tag of roughly $160 million "loaded" can wreck a havoc which could be measured in billions of dollars in hardware. That is a pretty damn good cost/effectiveness ratio. But here we are sliding into the operational issues and they will be discussed later. In general, an easy conclusion could be made here: while understanding that large parts of military expenditures globally are nothing more than racket and extortion, still they cannot be viewed outside of doctrinal and operational framework. Period. If one wants to compare military expenditures more or less objectively one must use, at the very least, cost/effectiveness criteria within doctrinal and operational framework. 

                  

Can Cause Real Massive Damage For Affordable Price

In the end, using WW II analogy, heavy PzKW VI Tiger is considered by some to be the best tank of WW II. It just had one "minor" problem, it was over-engineered, very expensive and very limited in numbers, not to mention its propensity for breaking down. I guess the medium T-34 came on top in the end for a reason or, rather, many of them. 

                   

Very Expensive, But Can Kill A Whole Large Country. 

I would abstain here from playing with, however basic, math but it is counter-intuitive--larger expenditure does not, in fact very often, absolutely does not mean larger military power. It is also a...ahem..cultural issue. But as I said previously, war is one of the facets of culture. Saudi Arabia has a very expensive armed forces 

Saudis' $80.4 Billion Military Budget 2014 

but, realistically, it is almost comical to consider it a serious military power capable of achieving any serious regional, forget global, objectives. Russia, meanwhile, for $10 billion less in her 2014  military budget, procures weapon systems and trains its personnel to the standards which are beyond the grasp of said Saudi Arabia which is constantly featured in all kinds of baloney "military power" ratings purely on expenditure merit. You can easily find many of those "ratings" on your own, but here is the list of expenditures.      

List of countries by military expenditures

So much for expenditures.....

To be continued.......