A Reminder ...

 ... about Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech and why he had reasons to warn West about the end of its, often grossly exaggerated, hegemony. This is the 2007 piece (in Russian) by Major General Vasilenko, then the Superintendent of the 4th Central Scientific-Research Institute of Russia's Defense Ministry. The article (at that time) was called Asymmetric Response but already then indicated a growing superiority of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. That was the time when the US toyed with the yet another iteration of SDI--a mostly money laundering machine. Get a load of this:

The achieved technologies and the created domestic radar-absorbing materials make it possible to reduce the radar signature of warheads in the extra-atmospheric section of the trajectory by several orders of magnitude. This is achieved by implementing a whole range of measures: optimizing the shape of the warhead hull - a sharp elongated cone with a rounded bottom; rational direction of separation of the block from the missile or the separation stage - in the direction of the toe to the radar station; the use of light and effective materials for radar-absorbing coatings applied to the unit body - their weight is 0.05-0.2 kg per m2 of the surface, and the reflection coefficient in the centimeter frequency range of 0.3-10 cm is no more than -23...-10 dB and better. There are materials with screen attenuation coefficients in the frequency range from 0.1 to 30 MHz: in terms of the magnetic component - 2...40 dB; for the electrical component - by less than 80 dB. In this case, the effective reflective surface of the warhead can be less than 10-4 m2, and the detection range can be no more than 100-200 km, which will not allow intercepting the unit with long-range interceptor missiles and significantly complicates the operation of medium-range interceptor missiles.

Mind you, this is 2007 but already then Russia had KSP PRO, literally--the Complex of Means of Overcoming Anti-Missile Defense--which was rendering the US AMD effectively useless because it wouldn't be able to fully track and develop firing solution at MIRVs. Today is 2025, the end of it, but attempts to create now a Golden Dome in the US are met in Russia with smile. Again, from 2007, the same piece: 

In this regard, another method and the corresponding means of counteraction come to the fore - small-sized atmospheric decoys with a working altitude of 2-5 km and a relative mass of 5-7% of the mass of the warhead. The implementation of this method becomes possible as a result of solving a two-fold task - a significant reduction in the visibility of the warhead and the development of qualitatively new atmospheric decoys of the "wavelet" class, with a corresponding reduction in their weight and dimensions. This will make it possible to install up to 15-20 effective atmospheric decoys instead of one warhead from the missile's multiple-warhead, which will lead to an increase in the probability of overcoming the atmospheric missile defense line to the level of 0.93-0.95. Thus, the overall probability of overcoming the 3 frontiers of a promising missile defense system, according to experts, will be 0.93-0.94.

Today, against the background of Russia's several breakthroughs in missile technologies, the probability of overcoming ANY layered missile defense, be it Golden or even Diamond Dome, is approaching 1 and, bar some possible malfunctions of delivery systems, ensures an overwhelming and devastating response. This is some background of Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech and explanation of futility of any AMD when one doesn't have technological capability for defense.