Well, REAL Combat ...

 ... and marketing are two things which shouldn't be used in the same sentence. 

And these were Houthis. I don't use the term "paper tiger" lightly. When I use it--I mean it. But then again, I will not be able to produce a movie "Top Gun: Maverick". I do not have qualifications ...

Live And Learn...

Oops, I didn't know that it is already deployed on some ships but International Naval Salon 2021 (aka IMDS-2021) in St. Petersburg did produce some sensations in weapons, and the most important of them is the introduction of the new AD complex Resurs (Resource) which is already deployed on a number of Russian Navy's corvettes. First, in Russian, creators of NPO Almaz and Fakel explain:

Two missiles, one medium to short range (from 1.5 to 40-50 km) 9M96M and short range 9M100 (from 0.5 to 15 km), both in VLS. The complex is designed based on principle "one target-one missile" and full "shoot and forget" capability. Now get this, read attentively: 

«любая корабельная РЛС обнаружения» с достаточными характеристиками точности может дать целеуказания комплексу «Ресурс», - добавил Павлов. Это сделает установку комплекса на существующие корабли дешевле.

Translation: Any ship detection radar with enough accuracy can provide targeting for Resurs, added Pavlov. That makes the installation of the complex on existing ships less expensive. 

He also stresses that it can attack any number of targets. But read attentively what is underlined and highlighted in yellow. Basically anything which has VLS can carry a mix of these missiles which can intercept pretty much anything flying above M=3.5. Suddenly, even such platforms as project 21631 missile corvettes can carry a number of such missiles and serve as AD umbrella for a strike group of similar ships, because it will be able to launch Poliment-Redut's 9M96 too in the nearest future.

This is an evil weapon system (wink, wink) which changes a lot in a complex calculus of modern naval warfare and yet another demonstration of a good weapon system's design which seeks a maximum combat efficiency for a good price. I am not sure about feasibility of installation of 3C14 on something like a fishing trawler but it could be a damn humiliating proposition for any combat aircraft (not to speak of a salvo of Harpoons) to be shot down by anything, which carries Positiv-ME radar and 8 UKSK cells, at a distance of 100 kilometers. After all, who knows what do they carry in their VLS cells. Damn, things become very complicated. 

In other news. Western journos and "experts" suck. Duh! 

‘Many US commentators have never BEEN to countries they comment on, see entire world from Washington perspective’ – Stephen Kinzer

In related news--the sky is blue, the water is wet and Pope is Catholic. Is he?

N-th Battle of the Atlantic.

I hate historical parallels, I especially hate them in military history and operational art. Yes, I know--we should learn from history and I totally support that and do it myself. But for goodness sake, what is the operational and tactical value of the Battle of Lepanto for modern naval combat? What is the value of lessons of Peloponnesian War for modern world? US as Athens? Or as Sparta? Really? A collection of contrived "analogies" (same as the US being a Rome) good only for consumption of uneducated pundits. Thucydides Gap? Isn't it all what is in the foundation of a disastrous US military and foreign policies written by none other than all kinds of neocon "scholars" trying to find historical symmetries where there is none?  And so it continues:

“But it harkens back to some of the hard lessons we learned in World War II where in 1942 the Germans were sinking us left and right”

My quarrel with otherwise grimly (almost) realistic piece on US Sea-lift, symptomatically titled You Are On Your Own, is not even in the absurdity of NATO "fighting" Russia in Europe even under the assumption of fully secured Atlantic SLOCs--US military professionals (not some political D.C. generals) they know the conventional warfare score in Russia's vicinity and no amount of boasting and bluster can hide a simple fact that any configuration of NATO forces around Russia will be decimated conventionally. This is  not to mention the obvious fact that Russia has no intentions whatsoever to attack Europe, so the scenario can only be discussed within the framework of NATO attacking Russia. My quarrel is with this:

The lessons from World War II are on the minds of many in the U.S. military’s high command when it comes to logistics.

And what those lessons might be, may I ask? What, building Mulberry? I don't know what those people think but even the strictest of EMCON is not going to make much difference in case of NATO's (well, mostly Anglo-American) war against Russia, since no one as of yet knows how to deal with Liana, specifically designed for targeting and what to do with the ranges of modern anti-shipping missiles which are now in many hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. So, I may ask, and how does this relate to tactical and operation reality of the naval combat of the 21st century?

In an Oct. 5 presentation at the Atlantic Council, Foggo pulled up an image of the immense landing and sustainment force on the beaches of northern France in 1945 to demonstrate what was made possible by containing German submarine activity in the Atlantic.

“Operation Overlord. Look at all that stuff,” he said, pointing at the picture. "That would not have happened if we had not won the Second Battle of the Atlantic. That battle raged during the first few years of the war and the Germans almost brought us to our knees using the Wolf Pack tactics.”

Now they propose the Fourth Battle of Atlantic. Well, will Russia try to interdict Atlantic SLOCs in case of aggression against herself? You can bet your ass she will, but that will have very little to do with "Wolf Packs" and their "tactics". In fact, submarines will play only limited role in that. Today, any target, especially large merchant ships, is detectable and targeting information is provided in real time to weapon systems instantly. Not even strictest EMCON will prevent passive over-the-horizon means detecting and developing targeting for the opposing (well, Russian) forces. And then, of course, apart from modern C4ISR complex come all those funny high-supersonic or hyper-sonic missiles. That is where all those WW II "lessons" become absolutely irrelevant since ranges and velocities of modern cruise missiles is an entirely different combat paradigm which makes operational experiences of the past simply obsolete and inapplicable.

Indeed, it is possible to play with simplest Salvo Equations numbers when one begins to consider that most anti-shipping cruise and aero-ballistic missiles are launched beyond the ranges of carrier aviation, granted that carriers and their battle groups survive. In the end, it all comes down to how many bombers (and fighter bombers, such as SU-34) and their fighter escorts will Russia be able to provide. Something tells me that the number will be substantial, especially with mobile S-400s being redeployed closer to Russia's borders thus providing additional security for air-deployment from airbases in Russia. I guess simple middle-school compass and decent map will do in giving an idea that approaching Western Europe for any vessel will be an ordeal with very high probability of a tragic outcome. Any "flank" port facilities in Mediterranean and Baltic Sea become a complete exclusion zones, thus leaving only West-most extremities of French and Dutch port facilities tentatively (well, mostly theoretically) available for any kind of supply of this hypothetical US force which will be deployed in Europe to fight those aggressive Russkies. So, in this case, the title of the article is correct. One is also forced to appreciate Russian base at Khmeimim and the role it may (will) play in shutting down approaches to France and Portugal. Just as a reminder, the distance between Akrotiri AB and...well, let's put it this way--it is not going to last long. The question in this case which matters most is--because conventional campaign in Europe against Russia is unwinnable, when will the US in this scenario decide to use nuclear weapons as the last resort? We may only guess...  

A Rail Gun Myopia.

Make no mistake--I get it: new technology, electric power, some futuristic looking setup and a nice demo pictures and... and... drum roll--a promise of new capability. This is how the US Navy's Rail Gun program was and is being "sold". For people who are not well-versed in naval warfare I may make a simplified description of several major geometric figures which define it:

1. A straight line (angles--bearing, azimuth, course, path etc.). The derivative of this line is a directed segment aka vector--matters great deal; 

2. A sector--well, it is self-explanatory;

3. Most important: A Circle--it's radius being a range of anything from radar to weapons. It's first derivative being a sphere which either protrudes (with great deformations) up--into the air, or down--into the water. 

Why is this important? It is important since this is how any decent naval professional views the world around himself when at the sea on a combat patrol.  Modern combat technology increased the radii of those naval circles tremendously, that, in its turn, brought a revolutionary change to naval and air (and even ground) combat. This became possible, apart from generally incredible development of C4ISR capabilities, due to the combat ranges of  anti-shipping cruise missiles (ASCM) growing by the order of magnitude since 1960s. And here is the issue: we already know that we live in a hyper-sonic paradigm with modern ASCMs capable of launch almost 700 kilometers (700/1.852=378 nautical miles, or 437 statute miles) from the target just on target's current (or even obsolescent) geographic coordinates. For air-launched ASCMs such as X-32 the range grows to 1000 kilometers. The salvo of missiles launched from the surface combatant or from submarine from this maximum distance will reach the position in between 20 and 5 minutes--depends on the velocity. Now draw the circle with the radius of 700 kilometers--you may scale it (say, 7 centimeters) on the piece of paper to do so. We count the area: pi x 700^2= 1, 538, 600 sq. kilometers. This will be, roughly, of course, the area you would be able (granted reliable targeting information) to cover with you ASCMs, apart from the fact that your ASMC DO have active radar (and other) seekers which have the range of detection of surface targets up to 70 kilometers. Here is what the area of 1.5 million square kilometers looks like, roughly. 

   

This is the circle--range which allows one to keep under the aim the territory which is roughly a half of Western Europe. By 2020s we all will live in a hyper-sonic (M=5+) cruise missile paradigm. We also know that 3M22 did reach M=8, we also can see ranges to grow even further, AI becoming even more sophisticated, trajectories varying from sea-skimming to stratospheric extreme maneuvering--all making those missiles NON-interceptible by any existing and short to mid-term perspective anti-missile means. And the question then is this: which new "capabilities" does the rail gun program provide? The answer is--none, zilch, nada. 

The Navy’s Much-Hyped Electromagnetic Railgun May End Up Dead In The Water

It is an interesting piece but I disagree with the title--it is not "May End Up", it already "Ended Up" as nothing but some technology demonstrator for hipsters. A Tesla of the weapon systems. It became a classic case of "polishing a cannon ball in hopes that it will fly further."  The projectile (which costs an arm and a leg) of rail gun flies with Mach=6? OK, did those rail gun enthusiasts check modern ships' designs as of lately? No, well--they better start learning fast that most modern ships will succumb to a regular high explosive shell of any modern naval gun with caliber of 76 mm and higher. But get this, boys and girls:

“In 2015, SCO realized that the HVP, originally conceived as a specialized shell of the railgun, was just as effective when fired from a conventional powder cannons like the Army’s 105mm and 155mm M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers and the Navy’s deck-mounted Mk 45 5-inch guns. A May 2016 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment found that large caliber guns could fire an HVP between 10 and 30 nautical miles at Mach 3, faster than conventional unguided rounds. We thought railguns were something we were really going to go after,” then-Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work stated at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. in May 2016. “But it turns out that powder guns firing the same hypervelocity projectiles gets you almost as much as you would get out of the electromagnetic rail gun, but it’s something we can do much faster.”

But, but they said that the round originally should fly the whole 100 nautical miles when fired from the rail gun. Assuming it would have been that (I doubt it greatly, but just for the sake of argument), this is how rail gun range would compare (rail gun in blue) to a capability of ASCMs:

   

  

Some will say that I miss the point and those projectiles would be great against some third world shitholes, but, wait a minute, against shiholes without any competent and well armed forces even regular shells are doing just fine. Same effect for a much smaller expense. Does it mean that those whom the United States got used to bomb with impunity into the stone age now developed an immunity to a classic 5-inch shell or good ole Tomahawk and now could only be scared shitless by new projectile fired from the rail gun? Obviously not, but now, as it was the case with Israel attacking Syria in 2013, modern ASCMs can easily out-range and outperform any projectile fired from any rail gun, especially when they have a good targeting and can reach far beyond the horizon. Will such missiles proliferate? You bet. They already do. Iran eventually will reach some serious anti-shipping capabilities, China and India--they are getting there. So, what will be the point then to bring the knife to a gun fight? This is the main, existential question to American R&D and procurement practices, which Colonel Daniel Davies called "an outright danger to the nation. Perhaps nothing exemplifies this threat better than the Pentagon’s dysfunctional acquisition system."

We entered a missile paradigm some time ago and today missile technology takes us to a completely new capabilities that change not only tactics, they change the outlook of operations and of strategy. No amount of the prohibitively expensive exotic and useless in real combat technology is going to change it. Ranges, velocities, maneuverability,  AI, stealthiness of missiles will only continue to grow until some new technological paradigm unfolds--probably with full robotics, actual combat lasers and other energy weapons which will change the nature of war, but for now: 100 miles range, projectile of M=6, try harder to impress anyone with any knowledge. For now, however, these good ol' guys don't go anywhere and they are there to provide relatively short range solutions both against surface baddies and against shore--a fraction of cost of the rail gun and a very satisfactory effect.