Sentimentality Is Understood ...

 ... but this is filled with overstatements. 

S-3 Viking sub hunter has a warning for Russia’s navy

States the author and continues with ... triviality: 

The S-3 Viking left frontline service years ago, but its record stalking Soviet submarines still hangs over today’s naval standoffs in the North Atlantic and Arctic. As Russia leans harder on undersea power to challenge NATO sea lanes, the Viking’s history reads less like nostalgia and more like a pointed reminder of what a dedicated carrier-based sub hunter can do to a fleet that underestimates it.

The reason this piece is a) trivial and b) therapeutic is simple: ANY submariner in the world knows that the WORST enemy of any sub, be it Russian, American, Chinese (especially Chinese) or British with French is ASW/Patrol aircraft. The truism goes--if you see the P3 Orion/P8 Poseidon/Il-38N in periscope--you are dead. Vikings were excellent ASW aircraft, deeply respected both in the US Navy and by Russians. But here is the trick, once long-range anti-shipping missiles entered the fray the issue of Flaming Datum grew in significance because as of 2025 even with Jet-powered aircraft such as S-3 Viking was or P-8 Poseidon is--you need to still get low and slow to allow MAD to search for any kinky signature. And as you might understand everything revolves around Operational Sweep which say ASW helicopters (the only ASW aircraft available for ASW duties on carriers) cannot provide in the times when your Datum is many hundreds kilometers away. Here is a very crude explanation of the POD (Probability Of Detection) depending on Operational Sweep. 

And here is a reminder (again), that in modern conditions, the Flaming Datum (a position from which enemy sub can launch at Carrier Battle Group) could be removed from the US Navy force up to 1,500 kilometers--this is the area of 7 million square kilometers. Nothing today can ensure security of any NATO's fleet in the open ocean against the carriers of P-800 Onyx (1,000 + km range) and 3M22 Zircon (1,500 km range). And I will remind you AGAIN--this is how search area looks like:

Good luck, especially considering NATO's air defense systems. Correct, Russians looked at the "warning" and decided to change not just rules of ASW chess, but simply change the chessboard. That is why Sergei Lavrov yesterday stated what I was stating for the last 11 years. As per S-3 Vikings--excellent ASW jets for their time, a feared and respected enemy:

I know some of my friends will have a sentimental moment. We all do once in a while. 

Why They Are Nervous. Short Excurse Into the Modern War. Part 3.

This is a first Soviet submarine launched (submerged, mind you) anti-shipping missile P-70 Amethyst (Ametist):

It was a further development of a venerable P-15 Styx. P-70 had a maximum range of 80 kilometers (Wiki as always is full of shit) and was subsonic at M=0.9. This was 1968. In 1972 more advanced anti-shipping missile P-120 Malakhit started to be procured both on surface ships and submarines.

Malakhit, with its range (launched from submerged SSGN) of 120 kilometers and traditionally massive (500 kilograms) conventional warhead (it could also be a nuclear one) presented a new challenge to the US Navy. A single Charlie-class (pr. 670) SSGN could carry 8 of Ametists for this sub first versions, or 8 Malakhits for Charlie II (pr. 670M). 

While the problem of Flaming Datum (recall, it is when sub is detected while launching its weapons) for all navies was well known before. It was one thing when a submarine launched a salvo of even long-range torpedoes, thus creating a Flaming Datum, a swarm of 40 kilometers range and around 40 knots torpedoes was bad enough problem in and of itself (especially when armed with nuclear warheads), but it was a completely different situation when there was a salvo of missiles, flying with the speed of a fast commercial jet, and which created a datum in a very respectable distance from target. That was a whole new game.  

As you already know, something like P-120 Malakhit was creating the necessity for, say Carrier Battle Group, to be on alert constantly and have enough ASW capability to sweep a moving area of A=3.14 x 120^2= 45,216 sq. kilometers practically non-stop. In general, any CBG always looks like a floating ASW and Air Defense theme park. This is how CBG looked in 1970s and continues to look with some "adjustments" (some of them inspiring awe in their recklessness) even today. 

Theoretically, for any Charlie SSGN in order to kill a carrier, it needed to get in between the Zone of Close and Remote ASW, granted this Charlie (or Charlies) could sneak pass the ASW aviation in the Zone of Remote ASW (patrolled by S-3 Vikings from carrier and P-3 Orion "on call" if need be). Vikings were no joke and, of course, provided a very good operational sweep (I know someone whose heart will be filled with nostalgia and joy), but if that zone was overcome and targeting was received it absolutely didn't mean that this Charlie was out of the woods. Far from it--not only those Vikings were still on station, now Charlie had to face those pesky SH-3 Sea King ASW helos. All in all, it was an extremely hazardous undertaking for those Soviet SSGNs but the real clusterfuck would have unfolded once the salvo was launched from beneath the waves. 

This meant an immediate giving up of own position and creation of a Flaming Datum in most cases (not all). Not only launched missiles would leave a lot of "clues" on the surface, including the registration of a salvo by the E-2 Hawkeye's Radar but the launch would be a significant acoustic event. So, here we are--enter the Flaming Datum. What happens next? Easy: CBG has around 120 kilometers : 1100 (around M=0.9) kilometers per hour by Malakhit = roughly 0.11 of an hour, or about 7 minutes before missiles arrive. So, the Air Defense gets all excited, all those Sea Sparrows air-defense complexes on Spruance DDGs in carrier's escort, as well as Talos (Later, Terrier) AD complexes on USS Long Beach (remember these are early to late 1970s we are talking about) all go on-line. Those airborne F-14 Tomcats start their supersonic dash towards the assumed route of those Malakhits, hoping to intercept them using their AIM-9 Sidewinders, AIM-7 Sparrow or AIM-54 Phoenix missiles. So, whatever it takes and the ballet ensues. 

Meanwhile, those Sea-Kings they already know fairly accurately where the hell broke loose and what do they do? Right, they go for jugular of the Flaming Datum and rush there to do their thing, depending on the range from Flaming Datum and with their maximum speed of 260 kilometers per hour, they can reach datum in anywhere between 20 to 5 minutes. Let's be reasonable and say 15 minutes--this is our Time of Delay or proverbial Tau. As you might expect, Charlie which just launched is now in a full break-off mode and CO and the crew of Charlie know damn well that they need to rush and each minute of Tau increases their chances, especially since Sea Kings do not have MAD and everybody on board Charlie prays that S-3 Vikings will be held at their stations because of the tactical assumption that this salvo could be merely a distraction and even bigger game expects CBG down the road. Like this:

So, for anyone who wants to experience all the "beauty" of operating a dipping sonar, they can get a kick out of ASW by reading this:

Where to Dip? Search Pattern for an Antisubmarine Helicopter Using a Dipping Sensor. 

Or get the load of joy by looking into the theory of sonobuoy barriers, believe me--it is a lot of "fun". I know, my graduation thesis had a lot to do with ASW and those dippings. But as the thesis by Yoash, Atkinson and Kress states: 

A perfect cookie-cutter sensor is a significant simplification. In reality the dynamics of sonar detection are quite complicated and depend upon the acoustic properties of the environment, which impact the transmission loss between the target and sensor (Lee and Kim, 2012). However, cookie-cutter sensors are commonly used in many maritime search and detection applications to generate insight. Random search, the cornerstone model for many search analyses, is based on a cookie-cutter sensor (see Chapter 2 of Washburn (2002)) and often provides similar results to more complicated and realistic detection dynamics (Lee and Kim, 2012). Furthermore, many ASW models use cookie-cutter sensors, including Danskin (1968), Shephard, et al., (1988), Baston and Bostock (1989), and Washburn (2002).

Read attentively, especially highlighted in yellow--this is where in real life tactical acumen of submarine's CO and his crew, training and technical parameters of a sub begin to play a huge role and often draw the line between life and death, between triumph and failure of the hunter and the hunted, who often exchange roles in an instance.  here is a food for thought to you. Think about it, wink, wink. 

FOC (Furthest On the Circle). We will need this reference when we will talk about our times, in 2020s. 

To Be Continued...