I mentioned it in my today's video. Yes, this is 100% confirmed info by people who command the Russian formation which did this. How do I know? Well, I know many things which sometimes are not for public disclosure until they are mentioned by "holders of information". So, on one operational axis Russians took this Swedish Commander (and equivalent of Lieutenant-Colonel) POW. He was guarded by one of the Baltic states security detail--easy-peasy for the level of Russian guys who disposed of them. So, this officer, staff officer for VSU (AFU) exhibited a level of tactical and operational "ability" which, for the lack of a better word, is not even rudimentary--it is fairy taleish. He really believed that if his formation attacked in a designated sector Russians were supposed to retreat, nay, run and that this guy's troops would reach objective no problem. Ooops, but for some unknown, incomprehensible reasons, not only Russians defended their objective, but, damn, they unloaded a firestorm and then, would you believe it, they counterattacked. This is not what they teach them in NATO's military academies.
When I say that NATO officer corps is utterly unprepared for modern war, I mean it. Remarkably, you can sort of address this on a tactical level in a sense that you can teach them to maneuver and consider the opponent--and even that is useless under modern conditions. But the problem is both on tactical and operational level is that Russians outrange and outfire ANYTHING NATO can bring to bear. I am on record--Iraq War experience counts for nothing and, in fact, is a huge obstacle. This also explains a bunch of the American loser generals (like Ben Hodges) suffering form an acute case of butthurt and professional envy. It is now a confirmed fact--NATO doesn't understand the role of air defense in modern war. In their mind it was supposed to to be always this:
When comparing our ability to find the enemy against a near-peer threat such as Russia (or an increasingly capable China), significant friendly capability disadvantages immediately become apparent and must be offset. FM 3-0 defines reconnaissance as “a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”4 By this definition, we must look at every capability, across all domains, to understand the existing disparities in our ability to collect information against current threats.
This middle segment "Conduct large-scale ground combat" disappears. Technically, the US could (not will) "find the enemy", but that's about it, the doctrinal pivot of the US Armed Forces of bringing the long-range fires to bear disappears also. No, the US still has the lead in terms of satellite-based ISR (Russia is catching up), per pure signal recon--well, that's complicated. Russians jam better than anyone in the world and then there is this teeny-weeny detail of pre-positioning. So, you see-this Swedish commander was thinking that he would be facing those peasant Ivans with pitch-forks and hiding behind piles of Russian corpses and running away at the first glance of NATO equipment guided to battle with NATO (his) tactical and operational brilliance. But, but ... well, you know the story now. Doctrinal catastrophe is not visible to the average Joe, but it is the most profound catastrophe NATO faces when they have to understand how amateurish and militarily impotent they are. The cognitive dissonance is a bitch.
So, somebody in the US Army (not Ben Hodges let alone Kellog) was thinking in the right direction in 2019.
Russian integrated air defense systems (IADS) make sustained air superiority questionable, especially at the beginning of operations when geographical proximity to positioned Russian forces enables their deliberate emplacement. With our current systems, we will only be able to create temporary windows of superiority with great effort. The Russians employ IADS at every tactical level, from battalion to division, with a focus on finding and destroying U.S. fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. They are also steadily working toward overmatch in the field of counterfire radar, fielding a variety of systems across the depths of their formations and with varying levels of capability. This might enable the Russian fires complex to “out attrite” our own counterfire capabilities, leaving them with the only systems on the battlefield.
Too bad, they didn't recognize the scale of the NATO tactical and operational rut which prevents the most important thing--internalization of the issue--guiding you to correct decisions. They wanted to try, they did. Somebody tell Trump--the US Army didn't produce a general the scale of Erich von Manstein or Georgi Zhukov, or Konstantin Rokossovsky in the last 80 years. Russia did, and that's what makes the world of difference.