While Inevitable Unfolds...

... for 404 and NATO, Nikolai Patrushev visits Borei A-class boomer Emperor Alexander the Third. She is for now at the North, but it is a Pacific Fleet SSBN. 

Next in line, this time for Northern Fleet, is Prince Pozharsky, which should be commissioned this year. 

I want to stress, Russia's strategic missile submarines production is impressive, to put it mildly and is increasing the gap with the US not just in state-of-the-art platforms but with latest versions of Bulava SLBMs capable of delivering of hypersonic gliding blocks. This is a generational loss, against the background of the delays of both Sentinel ICBM and Columbia-class SSBN. Hence the leak from uber "classified" (LOL) nuclear weapons guidance form the White House. 

Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat. In a classified document approved in March, the president ordered U.S. forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.

It is a classic approach to "do something", which is nothing but PR and simulation of meaningful activity, when initial conditions are clear and no matter what one does they cannot change anymore. Here is GAO giving some heads up:

All six offensive hypersonic weapon efforts GAO identified have placed a high priority on delivering quickly, with all intending to deliver a “minimum viable product”—one with the initial capabilities needed for users to recognize value. Four of the efforts, however, are not soliciting user feedback to determine what capabilities to include in their minimum viable product, a leading practice for product development identified by GAO in July 2023. In addition, four efforts have not adopted leading practices for using digital engineering tools, another leading practice for product development. These tools include virtual representations of physical products. Employing modern digital engineering tools and directly soliciting user feedback both have the potential to speed up the design process, reduce costs, and develop a more usable product. While DOD has identified and analyzed cost risks, the cost of these weapons is difficult to estimate. This is in part due to DOD's limited experience developing and fielding hypersonic weapons. For example, the Navy's estimate for Conventional Prompt Strike—among the most mature cost estimates available—compensates for the lack of quality historical data by relying heavily on the views of subject matter experts. Expert views are best used sparingly, as they can be prone to bias, unless estimators analyze and account for that bias. Addressing this and other issues in accordance with GAO leading practices for cost estimates could provide Navy decision-makers a more accurate estimate.

As I already stated--you cannot buy technical expertise based on technological and engineering culture which is utterly alien to the United States and its weaponry. Absolutely the same goes for operational and strategic experiences of Russia, which are also beyond reach now. It is all about "limited experiences". If that hasn't been enough, the shit accumulates on ISS:

Notably, NASA's Commercial Crew Program Manager Steve Stich obliquely referenced this during his most recent press availability on July 25. Stich was asked whether NASA would certify Starliner for operational missions if the vehicle returned to Earth autonomously but ultimately safely. "There are a lot of good reasons to complete this mission and bring Butch and Suni home on Starliner," he said. "Starliner was designed as a spacecraft to have the crew in the cockpit. The crew is integral to the spacecraft."

Port concerns

The International Space Station has two docking ports for crew vehicles, and these must accommodate both Crew Dragon and Starliner. At present, one of these ports is occupied by the Crew-8 spacecraft, which is due to return to Earth fairly soon. The other port is occupied by Starliner. One source at Johnson Space Center said the concern is that NASA cannot afford to "brick" one of its two crew docking ports. For this reason, if NASA decides to return Starliner autonomously, it must be certain the undocking software update will work.

This is becoming ridiculous. Wait until they will tell us (it is already known) that undocking may create problems and the damn thing can damage the port, in the best case scenario, in the worst... well, let's not go there. 

Meanwhile, somebody begins to suspect something. 

It is called Operational Art, that even a setback could be turned into operational-strategic success.