Tuesday, December 31, 2019

You Can Read Me Now In US Naval Institute Blog.

Russian Navy, Mission Found?

You may read my new piece on some doctrine-technology issues in today's USNI Blog post. Link is below. 

Let's Try Q & A And Whatever Else Sticky Post

Here is the post which I will try to keep sticky for people to ask questions and share their thoughts which are not on topic. This, I think is known as Open Thread. Fire away.

You May Read Me on Unz Review Too.

Here is the full list of articles by me at Unz Review. 
               Andrei Martyanov Archive at Unz. 

Friday, January 18, 2019

World Cup 2018.

I promised that I will be posting on this event. It was the best World Cup ever and the drama between Russians and Croatians in one of the most magnificent games ever played (yes, I remember semi-final between West Germany and France in 1982 and divine Scuadra Azzura (Juventus, wink, wink) and Enzo Bearzott from the same year, I also remember US national team of Bruce Arena robbed of semi-finals in 2002), but when you see Berlin (some of it Russian) going berserk from Russian national team, after Mario Fernandes' (the greatest Russian Brazilian who ever played the game) goal after Alan Dzagoev's serve, you have to adjust your bearings. 

I remember this 7 months ago and what happened to any Russian then:

And then Berlin going like this. Football is more important than politics, it is more important than war--it is life itself. Here is Berlin that day. 
Madness, that is how we like it. 

Ah, it is Friday, I forgot, let Natalia Oreiro take it from here:
I will, at some point of time, write about incredible US national team at WC 2002.  

We Have Been Through This Before, Haven't We?

Last time, the US got lucky that Soviet Union had a person at its helm who was hell bent on destroying the country and, as a consequence, shut down any serious expertise in the issue of what came to be known as SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), aka Star Wars. Serious experts in USSR (military and scientists) desperately tried to inform Gorbachev that this SDI thing was mostly bluff and cartoons. They were ignored, Gorbachev needed an excuse, as Yakov Kedmi termed it, for meeting American "partners" in a doggy-style manner. We all know what happened next and, as usual, the United States learned all the wrong lessons from this. 

American idea of keeping a homeland completely defended from any kind of attack is understandable, it is also utterly utopian. Yet, acting both on wrong geopolitical (and historic, I may add) assumptions and out of interests of powerful military-industrial complex lobby and totally corrupt political system, US tries to repeat what she perceives her greatest triumph in the Cold War 1.0, facts and real history be damned.  So, the United States decided to: 
As they say, the more things change, the more they stay the same. While some are afraid of the arms race between the US and Russia (and China), truth is--this race never stopped. American political and intellectual top has become so sterile in terms of its, well, intellect, that the only thing it is capable of is to remain an old dog incapable of learning new tricks. This, plus a desperate desire to bury INF Treaty, which comes down to "intercepting" Iranian (LOL) missiles at Russian borders. But Deja Vu doesn't stop here. As ever confused German diplomacy starts its so familiar from 1980s, in slightly more modern arrangements, tune:
Maas sings here from the American music sheet and it is totally expected from Germany. As I wrote some time ago, it is all about a generational lag in weapon systems between US and Russia. People in Pentagon are not idiots, at least some of them, they can calculate probabilities, required forces (missiles), math expectations etc. So, they know the score:

1. No system, unless it is based on a dramatically radical new technology, based on some bizarre physical principles (no, not lasers) can intercept any of Russia's newest weapons. This is decades away. Putting something ABM in Alaska against the background of RS-28 Sarmat or Avangard which can attack from any direction (how about through Mexico), is akin to treating 4th stage aggressive cancer with aspirin. But:

2. Pouring money into some systems, which are immensely expensive, will be good for US military-industrial complex which will greatly improve employment statistics and the fountain of desirable fat bonuses and new sinecures for retiring Pentagon people will erupt with a renewed force. 

Probably, the first indication that 1980s SDI trick will not work as desired is Russian rather nonchalant reaction to all this. Obviously, Lavrov expressed regret that INF Treaty is all but over (Russians know that START will follow) and all that chit-chat, but Russian military solution is already in place and what is left is to observe in amusement how the United States will continue to bankrupt itself by "investing" into something totally useless. There is another hypothesis here too: those people in the US who, actually, tried to study Russia, they couldn't fail to notice that Russia's recent (since mid-2000s) economic breakthrough was achieved by means of revitalizing Russian military-industrial complex (MIC), which was used as locomotive of hi-tech development. This will not work in US since Russian and American MICs are genetically different and have different effect on respective economies. For starters, incidents of Russian MIC producing enormously expensive dubious systems are dramatically lower than is the case in the US. 

As per actual weapons--the reason this whole thing is utopian and wasteful is because Russia (and reportedly China) is far ahead in developing anti-satellite weapons, which will act as interceptors for any space-based weapon systems thus degrading greatly any possible response. Here is 2017 report of the Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coates to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:
We need to be very clear on what is going on, especially after March 1, 2018 public arrival of a new paradigm in warfare--the US was put in a position which she thought she would never be in--a necessity to respond and to catch up. Destruction of Arms Control regime and attempts to replay Cold War 1.0 are such responses. Many observers, me included, noted already in 2014 that the United States was put into zugzwang, when each next move deteriorates position. Why it is so, my next book looks into these issues. In the end, nobody forced the United States to unilaterally abandon ABM Treaty in 2002, she did it completely on own volition and, may I add, wrong assumptions. And that was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. 

Tuesday, January 15, 2019

Some Thoughts On Russian "Opposition".

I deliberately used "opposition" term, instead of more traditional "liberals", for a reason--at this stage I see less and less difference between most of the politico-ideological fringes in Russia be that "liberals", self-proclaimed "nationalists" or, even, some "communists" from, what Alexander Rogers astutely termed as CPRF (Commercial Party of Russian Federation--you know, "communists"). There is very little difference between these people and media which serve them. Practically all of them are hysterical and, as was noted not for once (this relates to any media), are populated by office plankton which fancies themselves "journalists". This is an eclectic public which is badly educated and has no serious professional or human skills but, because they have degrees in "journalism", "economics", sociology, what have you, they think that they know things. They don't in regards to any field which actually requires serious expertise, forget serious system analysis.

As I stated not for once--modern world became so complex that ability to use iPhone or, even, write some app counts for nothing where systematic education and ability to grasp complex reality is required. Person with degree in the so called "journalism" does not have cognitive apparatus for passing judgements on even basic technological and industrial topics, forget military ones--that is a wowser. Such a person surely will not be able to write Manufacturing Plan (say for leading edge of the wing of aircraft), nor will.... nah...whom am I kidding here--most of them don't know shit from shinola. Add here, usually, egos larger than cathedrals, arrogance and organic disagreement with policies (usually from liberal, that is libertarian, perspective--that is, it is all about me, me, me) no matter how good or bad those policies are and you get this BS from known mouth-piece of Western "business circles" rag Kommersant which drops the "news" (5 days ago) about Russian MC-21 narrow body aircraft being under threat because the West stopped providing composite materials for MC-21's "black", that is fully composite carbon fiber, wing (in Russian).  

The fact that trio of losers who wrote (or were ordered to) this piece forgot to mention that such a "threat" was realized already in 2015 and that there was a reason that UAC (United Aircraft Corporation) responded to publication and to Kommersant's "sources" which were used for writing this load of crap, as totally contrived, seemed not to bother them. Of course, they know better, because they are...journalists. But, as you may have guessed already, in the world of liberal (and so called "patriotic") hamsters this publication created yet another shitstorm about "Putin Vse Slil" (Putin Flushed Everything Down). And here we come to the key issue--it is not surprising that it is very difficult to find bio (or basic CVs) info on all those liberal (and "patriotic") journos. Who would want to flaunt their incompetence. But hear me out. It was this same Kommersant which 8 month ago, in April 2018, started spreading not only fake (I called it immediately, in Russian) but deliberately provocative info about allegedly 7 Russian aircraft destroyed at air-base Khmeimim in Syria. Well, Kommersant was spreading this BS based, yet again, on its "sources" in MoD. Boy, was there a revelation when their "source" turned out to be nothing more than amateur Roman Saponkov who decided to become a freelance "hero-reporter" and who, most likely himself was BSed by his Syrian "sources" of the level of janitor in the convenience store near Khmeimim most likely. 

Inevitably the BS was utterly debunked with a single SU-24 having its empennage slightly damaged by a shrapnel--damaged parts were replaced within 24 hours and the aircraft continued to fly combat missions. Saponkov doubled down on his BS and, basically, should be treated as a pathological liar and a man with zero military experiences. But Kommersant really DOES know what it is doing and for WHOSE benefit it is constantly spreading all kinds of BS. After shistorm created by this rag subsided somewhat and, as usual, all premise of this shitstorm turned out to be mostly a disinformation, specialists started talking. For starters they reminded these panic-mongers that already in 2015 things were rolling:
Russia aims to regain its leadership in the carbon fiber sector and the production of strong, lightweight composite materials used in construction and industry.   
So, basically for people who spread such a BS it is beyond their grasp that after Match 1, 2018 Putin's speech to Federal Assembly they should have made a note to themselves that they know very little. But significance of that speech was not in new weapons, by now even Russian "opposition", while cringing, already knows inside that they are fools. No, the significance of Kinzhals, Zircons, Avangards, what have you is in the fact that such missiles use large percentage of carbon fiber and other composite materials in their assembly. So, one is forced to ask then--can the nation which develops such breakthrough materials which allow weapon systems to remain under control and functional while flying in the cloud of a hot plasma, develop a carbon fiber material for a wing of a commercial aircraft? Well, for people with even an iota of common sense the answer seems obvious. This is not to speak of the fact that Kommersnat's BS was already debunked. But now recall this, recent "vbros" (throw in of fake info). Another BS spread, gleefully by Russian "opposition" media.

Of  course, this too was debunked, but couple days ago, Russia, as if taunting this bunch of Russian urban know-it-all office plankton, announced that Concern Tehnodynamica completed trials of fire protection and oxygen systems for both SSJ-100 and MC-21 (in Russian) thus continuing to increase the share of the domestic parts in both aircraft to such a degree that no "sanctions" will matter. But my issue is not with Russian industry, which continues to produce state-of-the-art technology, both military and civilian, totally out of own resources but with this extremely narrow circle of pretentious "market analysts", merchandisers, marketing specialists and holders of other degrees in recognition of a good Scotch from the bad one and Ph.Ds in the brands of smartphones, designer clothing and jewelry. Do they even feel (I don't think they have brains to grasp) this sense of own uselessness other than in the fields no serious person cares about? I give them this, though, they are useful tools (and many of them subsist on foreign grants and stipends) and idiots in a titanic war combined West, under American guidance, unleashed on Russia and Russian people. But that is the point--these are precisely the people who can produce nothing of value, beneficial to either own nation, or humanity and who can only sell ignorance and disinformation in the world in which their "reporting" is nothing more than trash thrown out daily on a dumpster where it truly belongs.    

UPDATE: Ah, lovely. Today 01/16/19 (or 16/01/19 for Europeans) the General Director of Aerocomposit company, Anatoly Gaidansy, in his interview to popular weekly Arguments and Facts (AiF) humiliates and wipes the floor with incompetent BSers from Kommersant (in Russian), while assessing their BS as: 

                      Это полнейшая техническая безграмотность

Translation: this is a complete technical illiteracy. 

My question is to Gaidansky: Anatoly, what did you expect from those losers from this liberal cabal in Moscow, the knowledge of composite structures and how their specifications are formed and applied? I am sure those advanced girls and boys from Kommersant and other "market" publications can tell us all a lot about AS9100, ah..well. In late Soviet times, during Gorbachev's disaster, the only use their newspapers would be good for as a toilet paper only. In Stalin's times they would be...well, they wouldn't be. 

Sunday, January 13, 2019

A Wowser.

If you haven't heard, you better hear it now. 
I think by now you might have guessed who this initiative originated from. I am also smiling sarcastically when reading about State Department having "concern". US so called "diplomacy" is the most aggressive mindless incompetent war-mongering institution without equals in the world, this is not to mention the fact that in terms of military-strategic realities most American so called "diplomats" don't know shit from shinola. I do, however, conceive, as I stated not for once, that actual professionals in Pentagon do have better idea about consequences of war and as such could be (yes, I know--sounds bizarre) one of those few checks which MAY work in impeding somewhat lunatic ideas emanating from the very political top. 

In related news,  as Der Spiegel reports.
Since arriving in Berlin as U.S. ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell has flouted diplomatic conventions and attempted to interfere in domestic politics. He has since become politically isolated in the German capital.
Spiegel, of course, being nothing more than globalist mouth-piece, still notes:
These days, the spotlight on Grenell seems to have grown dimmer, though not necessarily by choice. He still tweets assiduously and he never seems to say no when Fox News calls, but in Berlin, he has largely become isolated. The powerful avoid him. Doors have been shut. Few politicians to the left of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AFD) and the populist-conservative Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Merkel's center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), want to be seen with him.  
Why so? Well, because US "diplomat" just sent out a truck load of letters to German companies warning them that they better quit Nord Stream-2 or else (in Russian). Grenell, however, far from being an exception is a rule of contemporary American "elites" who are utterly illiterate, narcissistic and arrogant--needless to say, until this pool of utterly unqualified dimwits is removed from power and new competent and realist (not in American "realist" sense) crop of people is grown and elected into power, the United States will continue its decline, hopefully without unleashing a global war. 

Friday, January 11, 2019

I Didn't Do Fridays Really In A Long Time.

One of the most underrated bands who were drown in the lack of any talent of grange in 1990s. 

Them rocking in1989 in Moscow...

Meanwhile, let Woodstock smoke nervously aside watching 1.6 million people really rock in 1991 in Moscow. 


They Say It Is A Set Up. Sure.

But last time I checked all presidents have TV crews follow them. How many presidents have people taking photos with them? 

It is a crying  out loud shame that he still has to drive Mercedes in St.Pete but Aurus is coming up nicely and is basically sold out already. Plus, we all know, Vladimir (no, it is not Vlad) is a Germanophile, of sorts. So it is OK for now. In the same time--I hate to be his FSO. Will they take a bullet for him? I would, but then again--I am not FSO (thank God!).

Trash Talk, Pop-Corn, That's The Entertainment!

Boy, it is a shitstorm in media since one of PLAN's Admirals, Admiral Lou, started chest-thumping a week or so ago:
I agree, this statement, which may or may not be true, comes across as rather rude and in many respects as a simple bravado. There are number of reasons, including purely ethical ones, that these kinds of statements should be made in a professional manner and not without accounting for the history of the issue. But Lou's statement didn't go unanswered and James Holmes today, in The National Interest (where else) returned the trash talk in a very emotional piece. Holmes exclaims:
But, while I totally get where Holmes is coming from, one is inevitably forced to remind him that the United States didn't encounter peer or even near peer military power in ages, namely since 1945. But realities of modern warfare, both naval and in other environments are such, that massive military casualties are not only possible--they are most likely. I don't know if former naval officer Dr. Holmes recalls it but other, US Army officer, Colonel Douglas Macgregor had no inhibitions in looking reality into the face in 2011:
“In 110 days of fighting the German army in France during 1918, the U.S. Army Expeditionary Force sustained 318,000 casualties, including 110,000 killed in action. That’s the kind of lethality waiting for U.S. forces in a future war with real armies, air forces, air defenses and naval power. Ignoring this reality is the road to future defeats and American decline. It’s time to look beyond the stirring images of infantrymen storming machine-gun nests created by Hollywood and to see war for what it is and will be in the future: the ruthless extermination of the enemy with accurate, devastating firepower from the sea, from the air, from space and from mobile, armored firepower on land.
And Macgregor is absolutely correct in stating the case in, granted very approximate, numbers of casualties. I don't think Macgregor is well versed in Soviet/Russian military but he is correct in giving order of magnitude of losses when meeting a near peer or peer. 

Holmes, after some general political talk and rebuttal of Lou, goes on emotional defense, and you already guessed it, of US Navy's Aircraft Carriers. Some points Holmes makes are valid:
Whether the PLA could sink two carriers thus depends on its ability to detect, track, and engage vessels operating from opposite sides of the Pacific, and it depends on how U.S. carrier-group commanders handle fleet operations at sea. It remains to be seen (except perhaps in the spooky realm of classified intelligence) whether China’s array of satellites, sensors and other surveillance assets can find and track moving task forces in the vast emptiness that is the Pacific Ocean with any real precision.
True, nobody realistically knows how good Chinese reconnaissance and targeting systems are and if they are survivable in case of a conflict at all. In the end, how accurate realistically is Chinese DF-21, said to be the first ballistic anti-shipping missile in the world, nobody knows. And here is the deal, Chinese do tend to overstate own capability and the first proof of that is steady, continuous purchase of Russian military technology, including a rather substantial number of Russian-made anti-shipping missiles. So, how credible is Chinese anti-carrier threat? It is certainly not just a bluster, China does have at least some capability to inflict the damage or achieve at least mission kill--in case of the fairly short (granted it stays conventional) conflict in theater that is as good as sinking. One also cannot discount gigantic energies hyper-sonic missiles, even in the inert, that is without explosives, release upon the hit on a target. After all Rods from God was RAND's idea--it is as American as baseball (sorry, Canada) and apple pie (sorry, Germany), as is even more terrifying weapon such as a Gay Bomb or even a Fart Bomb--what an evil twisted mind would come up with such a weapon of mass fartification and well, the other one, you get the idea.    

I don't think Holmes' bringing up USS America's SINKEX applies here because if any CVN's ammo storage detonates or its nuclear reactor is damaged we may indeed talk about a complete kill of the ship with horrendous casualties to boot--a scenario which must be avoided. But Holmes still tries to make operational and tactical case for CBGs. 
Task forces can also operate in congested waters, mingling with other traffic to clutter an enemy’s tactical picture. They can operate near shore, using coastal terrain to mask their whereabouts. They can make foul weather their friend. And so on. Creative options exist for forestalling an America scenario and have for many years. U.S. naval commanders should harness familiar standards from World War II and the Cold War while devising new methods of operational concealment, guile and deception.  
I disagree with the argument of congested waters and traffic--this is precisely the environment which will provide good intelligence and targeting precisely for reasons Holmes invokes in his argumentation--other people also learn their lessons and any fishing vessel with basic radar and Beidou, GPS or GLONASS receiver can provide very good real time coordinates of CVN. James Holmes teaches in US Naval War College--he MUST know that salvos of ANY anti-shipping missiles are done, depending on type, as the tangents of a circle with the radius of, roughly, Vcarrier*tfrom detection, or with account of the obsolescence of the targeting data when the datum is a single identification. It is precisely in the cluttered waters where CBG and its heart--CVN are identified easiest and intelligence is provided. Here is the scheme of the salvo by anti-shipping missiles by three SSGNs with the coverage of the area of probable CBG location. 
A big arrow is a general course of CBG when intelligence is verified. That large circle is an area of the launch of ASMs by SSGNs, small one--is CBG's location probable at the launch time. And that brings us to a funny situation, with my piece at Colonel Lang's site few days ago stating, and I quote myself:
While diesel-electric or non-nuclear submarines of PLAN can play crucial role in defense of China's littoral, operations in the open ocean require nuclear-powered submarines. China has problems with this particular type. While PLAN's program of building surface combatants is extremely impressive, nuclear submarines remain its Achilles heel. As one Russian naval analyst observed in July 2018, citing also US Office of Naval Intelligence Report, modern Chinese nuclear powered submarines lag seriously even behind American and Russian third generation nuclear submarines, such as project 671 RTM (NATO Victor III-class)  in terms of quieting—a key, albeit not the only one, tactical and technical characteristic of a submarine.[4] Nobody can predict when and if China will be able to match its nuclear submarines' capability, and a surface force required for support of their operations, with that of the US Navy's but it is obvious that this issue must be high on a priority list of Chinese strategists. Lesson from Admiral Gorshkov can help. The lesson is simple—there is no modern powerful and balanced navy without powerful nuclear submarine component armed with modern weapon systems. 
And here is the news, PLAN, for now, doesn't have submarine force which is even remotely competitive both in numbers and quality with the US Navy's submarine force. All bravado on both sides apart, US submarines in the Pacific are overwhelmingly superior to PLAN's nuclear subs (SSKs are a separate issue). Currently the US Navy operates 32 Los Angeles-class + 3 Sea Wolf-class + 15 Virginia-class SSNs = 50 SSNs ALL of whom, including older L.A. class SSNs are superior to anything PLAN can deploy in terms of nukes, which is roughly 9 nuclear subs, only 6 of which could be considered relatively modern (Type 093). Period. Yes, PLAN does deploy a substantial number of conventional SSKs, but again, this fleet of subs is good only for a relatively short distance deployments in defense of own littoral. 

We are talking here about overwhelming advantage US Navy enjoys over any PLAN's surface or nuclear power submarine force beyond the First Island Chain. I am not even talking here about remote segments of SLOCs. Yes, Chinese are improving, yes, they are gaining both capability (such as destroying US aircraft carriers) and some operational experience, but it takes much more than that to command the seas. I will also avoid describing some info (very reliable one), I just mention it, that testifies against Chinese tactical and operational maturity, for now--I underscore that, for now. But namely for now PLAN, for all US Navy's huge institutional problems, is not a real competitor in one domain, which today defines command of the seas--underwater. US submarine force is simply better, much better and that's the reality, which Admiral Lou should have considered and James Holmes remembered when trying to respond to Chinese naval officer. As per carriers--you all know my attitude to these ships as being in the process of removal into the niche of pure power projection against weak powers, and at this stage one has to ask the question I raised several days ago while talking to Arctic Fox:


Something tells me that not only it can but it will be. Once this happens, we might as well forget about surface fleet as we know it today. That will be the entertainment.   

Thursday, January 10, 2019

Desperate Times, Desperate Measures, Or Should I Say Fantasies?

OK, I already stated a number of times that, bar some very few exceptions, The National Interest magazine is primarily a teenager-oriented publication and its military "experts" (apart from few real ones who contribute once in a while) are mostly products of "humanities" education who, for some unknown reason, think that they have faculties and backgrounds to comment on military "stuff". Such "experts" as Michael Peck (who is no expert) continue to "deliver". Here is the latest (cough...face-palm) from Peck based on some fantasy from DOD:
He (Peck) bases his upbeat piece on this:
Obviously Peck lacks understanding of what is this all about and makes this hilarious statement: 
Sea-skimming missiles have been the nemesis of surface warships since the 1970s. Weapons such as France’s legendary Exocet, America’s Harpoon or Russia’s Zircon threaten even the most powerful warships with destruction.  
I would have called upon either Sir Patrick Stewart or Sergei Lavrov's "Fail" meme but I'll spend some time explaining (I doubt he will learn or even will be aware of my futile effort) to him why this statement of his (above) is preposterous.

1. Placing subsonic and fairly easy targets for advanced air defense such as Exocet or Harpoon in the same sentence with 3M22 Zircon, which is completing its trials and already reached speed in excess of M=8 is akin to putting 1960-s Volkswagen Beetle on the speed track of Formula-1 and asking to compete with team Ferrari or McLaren. And here is some basic physics, see below:

2. Since the times of high supersonic (M=3) SS-N-22 Sunburn (aka P-270 Moskit) anti-shipping missile, which is designed to conduct violent maneuvers on terminal, some teeny-weeny problem appeared with anti-missile defense of the fleet, any fleet. If my Alzheimer doesn't fail me, the ratio in terms of dynamic loads (aka g-forces) required for air-defense missile to intercept ANY anti-shipping missile are supposed to be 3 (three) to 1 (one), that is three times larger than that of the anti-shipping missile. Thus the issue was and is not just in early detection of an attacker (I am talking only about SINGLE missile now, for the clarity of picture, reality is--those fly in salvos), however crucially important in terms of time for developing firing solution this is, it is also about ability of air-defense missiles to guide themselves to the point of intercept of the ASM. 

3. If we are talking specifically about Moskit, the rumor has it that this missile can withstand sustained g-forces well in excess of 30g. Under this scenario, very-very roughly speaking, the intercepting missile must have the ability to maneuver with 30x3=90g loads sustained. Good luck doing this with short-burning AD missiles. As an example, superb Russian Tor air-defense complex' missile can maneuver with loads of up to 30g and take out targets flying with up to M=2. M=3 Onyx or M=2.9 3M54 Kalibr also maneuver violently at terminal. In general, the higher the speed is, the more g-loads maneuvering missile experiences.

4. Now comes this M=8+ maneuvering (look at air-ballistic Kinzhal which also maneuvers at M=10) Zircon and, if to omit a funny scenario when someone will try to shoot at it from behind Zircon's traverse course angles (+90 degrees from perpendicular to the missile, roughly speaking--a catch up mode) trying to catch it, which is impossible, even in the impossible scenario of literally shooting straight-ahead at approaching Zircon, one has to ask a question what are g-loads in this situation? Mind you, I am talking about grossly primitive, bordering on vulgar scenarios.

5. Of course, they in TNI do not know that AD missile do not fly in straight line and even in the case of straight flying M=8 target while shooting in a front sector of the approaching ASM the trajectory of the AD missile(s) will represent a curve towards point of intercept. Again, I underscore that these are vulgar scenarios, in real life, however, things will look very different because g-loads and approach trajectories of modern very high supersonic or hyper-sonic anti-shipping missiles are enormously complex and impose practically insurmountable limitation on existing Air Defense systems. 

Recall what numbers (I tend to support at least the order of magnitude of those numbers) circulate about key characteristic for 3M22. I quote myself:
While early detection is important, under present and foreseeable level of intercept means it becomes an absolute impossibility to intercept modern true hyper-sonic weapons. I'll explain it with the numbers in hand. Let us assume that modern and best US Naval air defense system's single missile has a probability of intercept of a single 3M22 Zircon 10 times (10!!! I deliberately change the actual order of magnitude) better than it is known to really be. Let this probability of intercept of single missile Ps=0.3. How many air-defense missiles then will be needed to intercept a single (again, unrealistic scenario)  3M22 with reliable probability of kill (defeat) Pdefeat=0.95. Let's write formula:
Now we plug our numbers:

                            0.95= 1- (1- 0.3)^n


                            0.05 = 0.7^n
We logarithmize both sides:


Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.356675)

                   n= -2.995732/-0.356675=8.4

So, it takes roughly 8 missiles to defeat a single 3M22 under the ideal imaginary conditions and with capability of an air defense complex increased 10 fold--way in excess what even the most advanced (and non-existent, I may add) means may provide. Considering even this fantastically ludicrous scenario it comes as no surprise that the salvo of say 10 hyper-sonic missiles on CBG will require pretty much a whole Arleigh Burke-class Flight III DDG having nothing but AD missiles in its MK-41 90 cells, granted that this too is impossible scenario since all ships, other than CVN, in CBG carry other means, such as TLAM, in their MK-41s. Plus, no one puts AD missiles (you may check times required for their salvo on you own) on a single platform--those are distributed between escort ships and that in itself imposes other limitations. But, as I stated from the beginning--these calculations were done based on simply ludicrously favorable for defending side scenario. 

Let us now try way more realistic numbers for Ps=0.05 and see where this whole thing takes us in first approximation. 
 0.95= 1- (1- 0.05)^n


                            0.05 = 0.95^n
We logarithmize both sides:


Using calculator's ln function we get simplest linear equation:

                 -2.995732= n*(-0.051293)
                  n= -2.995732/-0.051293=58.4

So, as you can see it would take (again, under ideal conditions) roughly 58 AD missiles to defeat a single Zircon. Judging by a huge wave of alarmist pieces in US mass-media about hyper-sonic weapons, the level which I never encountered in my long years in the US, the message is definitely sinking in. This is not to mention that one is really pressed hard trying to imagine simultaneous launch of even 25 AD missiles from all escort ships in CBG, let alone 58 or even more (in hundreds) required to defeat a salvo of hyper-sonic attackers on CBG. It is all simple fantasy having no relation to actual real life and combat.

Even in this simplest model (distributed salvo is calculated with a more complex formula--not the point here) it is clear that even under the most favorable conditions, Michael Peck's grasping for the last exceptionalist straw:         
But radar robot boats would give their targets a little more time to prepare.  
Is nothing more than hack's delusion in a desperate attempt (a feeble one) to put a lipstick on a pig of a new warfare paradigm and now very real Revolution in Military Affairs which is sweeping the globe, changing with it the whole balance of geopolitical power. But I wrote one book about it and am writing another one (should be done by Summer, otherwise my publisher will strangle me) precisely on this topic. Let's hope that this Revolution will serve as a starting point for new, much calmer and much saner world without bullies and where great powers can find a new equilibrium, a peaceful one. 

Tuesday, January 8, 2019

Citius, Altius, Fortius, Etc.

The Olympic motto which translates, from Latin, as Faster, Higher, Stronger is fully applicable to weapon systems' design, granted that sometimes Higher becomes Lower. Russia takes these principles to heart when making her weapons and it is not difficult to predict, really, what comes next. As TASS reports:
Anyone with even rudimentary understanding of modern warfare and technology can easily arrive to the (correct) conclusion that TLAM variant of 3M14 with 4,500+ kilometer range immediately translates into some anti-shipping variant of 3M54 whose range is measured not in high hundreds (currently it is officially 660+ kilometers) but in thousands kilometers. All, I underscore, all signs in missile development by USSR/Russia were pointing to one destination for decades now--very high velocities (current 3M54 accelerates, while violently maneuvering, on terminal approach to almost M=3) and very long ranges. It seems Russian Navy is moving into this territory steadily. 

Ramifications are enormous--they allow even weak in terms of air-defense carriers of such missiles to stay way out of ranges of any, including aircraft carrier attack jets, adversary's weapon systems and turn even mosquito fleet, properly integrated with national reconnaissance/targeting system, into peer to even most advanced and expensive weapons of the opponent. If terrifying Kinzhal requires MiG-31K or TU-22M3M to launch, 3M54 (and 3M14M TLAM) and what, it seems, comes after that can strike from anywhere to anywhere on any types of targets. In TLAM variant--4,500+ kilometers, not too shabby once placed on ocean-going ships such as pr. 22350 Gorshkov-class or submarines. So, striking US East Coast doesn't even require crossing GIUK gap, while the strikes on US West Coast could be easily done by missile ships and submarines from Kamchatka's immediate littoral under the umbrella of ASW and Air Defense aviation. This was coming for sometime and it is simply normal, natural development of the weapon systems which Soviet, and now Russian, Navy made the core of its striking power, you know--like in Olympic motto.  

Strategic Missile...Boat, literally?  Looks like.

Saturday, January 5, 2019

My New Piece On Naval Strategy And China.

At Colonel Lang's blog at which I have a privilege and honor of being a contributor.  
Late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov at the peak of the Soviet naval development in late 1970s to mid-1980s continued to stress his seemingly simple idea, first officially articulated in his 1976 treatise The Sea Power of the State, that modern (Soviet) navy must be balanced.[1] Gorshkov's idea of balanced fleet was that of a navalist, who envisioned modern navy capable to conduct global operations ranging from amphibious landings, to global anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, to nuclear deterrent. Yet, throughout Gorshkov's long tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy one platform above everything else remained dominant in his thinking—a submarine. Unsurprisingly, 1968 Time magazine cover featured image of Admiral Gorshkov superimposed on the background with a submarine at the periscope depth. With all the Soviet Navy's impressive development of its surface fleet at that time, these were primarily submarines which USSR developed at a break-neck speed and eventually equaled or surpassed US Navy's submarine forces not only in quantity but in quality too, with even US Navy grudgingly admitting in 1988 that project 971 (NATO Akula-class) nuclear submarine being the best in the world.[2]  
This is an excerpt. 

Friday, January 4, 2019

He Died Two Days Ago. RIP Chris Kelmi.

Closing Circle, Chris, you closed it....

It was merely 30+ years ago... 

Why Smoothiex12?

OK, it's Friday, so let's address an existential issue of this blog and, in general, of my internet persona. I'll start with a small very real and creepy fact--we learned about it through COSTCO which couldn't properly process our card several years ago, namely of my wife's (I believe she was returning something), because there is another Andrei Martyanov living on the US East Coast and his wife has the same name as my wife. Well, it took COSTCO 20 minutes to figure this out and, needless to say, we were entertained, to put it mildly. So, when trying to open all kinds of accounts, including this blog at the Blogspot--guess what, all those Martyanov sons of bitches interfered greatly in the process of account name choosing, plus other people, of not Martyanov's variety, for some goddamn reason, also loved ALL monikers I love--I may share with one of them, under which I am known at famous Balancer's forums in Russia, Popsicle. Yes, this damn moniker was also taken, as were all others. 

After numerous attempts of trying to find an original for be that some forum or gmail, after hours of desperation, I, completely randomly, tried Smoothie, as you may have guessed it, this too was taken. It was only after adding X12 that my agony was over--this moniker was available! So, I succumbed to the association with a risky internet name but I was glad to have something, which after years became closely associated with me. Sadly, as I learned it the hard way, as it turned out many sites which specialize in internet camera pornography (such as live shows) have, periodically, ladies (I am not sure about gay men) who go under monikers such as Smoothie (Duh!) while performing masturbating acts for the internet cameras. I know for sure, I can see referring websites and once in a while I have visitors (very few of them) who stumble upon my blog through the search for specific ladies with Smoothie monikers. I, obviously, do not do pornography on camera, because the only category of viewers I can attract will be that of the old ladies on medicaid and this doesn't pay much, so, naturally, I concentrate on military-political analysis, plus my wife would strangle me anyway. I, however, can only imagine shock to the people who search for pornographic Smoothies when they stumble upon this blog and witness the most atrocious type of masturbation--an intellectual one. 

But this is not the end of my troubles. Here comes a big one. You see this guy? 
This is Andrei Martyanov, a famous Russian sci-fi and fantasy writer (dressed here in the old uniform of Soviet air fleet, before WW II, I believe, could be wrong). He graduated Military Medical Academy and worked for Russia's Emercom as a doctor. This is NOT ME. I already had few occasions on which people in the US thought that this was me. Well, this Martyanov is a decade or so younger than me and, of course, he never graduated my Alma Mater and never served where I served. You all saw my mug at the cover of my book and, as you can see, I am nothing like Martyanov, you know--the other one, or ones, for that matter. Here is the real one:

Look into these eyes, these are the eyes of a man tortured by mortgage, irregular garbage pickup schedule and lack of sleep. That's me and I have no relation to Martyanov above me, nor, for that matter other Martyanov sons of bitches, on all continents, who conspire daily and nightly to steal my glorious, widely popular in very narrow circles, identity. So, whenever seeing SmoothieX12 moniker popping up amidst a truck load of links to pornographic sites in internet searches, know then--it is me who labors day and night to clear a good name of all kinds of Smoothies (both drinks and humans)  by means of engaging in a wonderfully boring business of studying reports and reading news on geopolitical and military matters. So, it is Friday and the time to relax, and not in a front of the camera, if you know what I mean;-))    

Thursday, January 3, 2019

People Who Really Matter.

While Western mass-media sewer (and circus) continues its miasma-generating cycle non-stop, so much so that people who have some decency left can not take this anymore, such as William Arkin of NBC, what really matters and people who really matter remain beyond the focus of this swamp. Too bad, because when Yuri Solomonov speaks, all those Western and many, allegedly Russian, military "experts" better listen. The Chief Designer of strategic ballistic missiles of Topol and Bulava fame, Solomonov spoke recently to Russia's Argumenti Nedeli (Arguments of the Week) weekly, including on video. It is a long interview (in Russian) and Solomonov speaks on a variety of issues, including creation of Russia's brand-new heavy rocket which will take Russia to the Moon and beyond and, of course, he speaks about strategic stability and about, in particular, US ABM technology. Here is one of his opinions:
– Нет, бояться этого не надо. Всё, что связано с существующей противоракетной обороной, давно уже перестало быть тем, что относится к категории военно-технических средств, и «переросло» в военно-политическую область. То есть на самом деле и в общих словах эффективность этих средств ПРО чрезвычайно низка. Другое дело, что когда мы говорим о средствах противоракетной обороны, расположенных на Европейском континенте, это угроза совсем другого типа. Эти средства противоракетной обороны могут быть переоборудованы в средства нападения. И это действительно стоит учитывать.
Q. Several words about US anti-missile system which will be deployed in Northern Europe and Alaska, in order to intercept our intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads. Please tell, should we be worried?
A. No, don't worry about that. Everything what is related to existing anti-missile defense long ago stopped being a military-technological matter and migrated into military-political field. In reality and in general words the effectiveness of these ABM means is extremely low. Another matter, when we talk about means of anti-missile defense deployed in European continent, this is the threat of a totally different type. These means of anti-missile defense could be reconfigured into strike means and that must be taken under consideration.

Solomonov articulated here, again, Russia's worry about Aegis Ashore installations in Romania and Poland and possibility of those armed with TLAMs (It will happen one way or another, Solomonov thinks otherwise--we'll see, will be glad to be wrong). But Russia's worry is not just TLAMs whose launch will be detected and facilities will be obliterated within minutes, it is also not far fetched to state that most of those TLAMs will be intercepted by VKS. Russians worry about people in US, and there are plenty of those around, with "experiences" in law, journalism, political "science" and "economics", who still believe that there is a chance of "defeating" Russia by some strike of TLAMs while being able to sit out the shitstorm which will engulf Europe after that. Yes, I kid you not--there are people like that in the top echelons of US government and they do have a say in formulation of what passes in US for foreign "policy", that is a combination of bizarre ideas and delusions which are totally foreign to any competent policy--that is what defines it as US foreign policy. 

The other level of this delusion is precisely what Solomonov defines as a military-political, that is unrelated to technology, matter--some kind of pressure or spoiling instrument which should alter Russia's "behavior". This is where we also observe a very severe case of delusion since it is akin to trying to influence a guy carrying loaded Mossberg 12-gauge shot gun with Daisy bi-bi gun. "Influencing", in general, works in dyadic relations only when one side can make the other side hurt in order to condition its responses, that is to say influence its behavior (Pavlovian responses that is)--the United States long ago lost this ability, after March 1st 2018 (in reality, much earlier) this ability was completely reversed, with Russia having more options for response and thus being very flexible. Solomonov merely elaborates on what is already clear for a long time to anyone with even rudimentary understanding of the process of calculation of required force and about response-head-on (otventno-vstrechnyi) strike. 

In a clown show by Al-Jazeera with such "experts" as Pavel Falgnehauer, Richard Weitz of Hudson Institute went as far as stating that latest news on Avangard "do not fundamentally change" the calculus of Russian-American nuclear deterrence, since both sides still retain the ability to mutually "overwhelm" each-other defenses. 

Well, this statement, indeed, could have been made only by an "expert" with degrees in political "science" and "economics" not by professional. Weitz is no professional, he is an agenda-pusher from RAND-induced "think-tank" and has no expertise in modern warfare, Solomonov, however, does. In fact, he is the guy with a world-class top level technological education and military service, you may have guessed it already, in Strategic Missile Troops. Solomonov thinks, when one considers well-known inability of US missile defense to stop even single primitive North Korean missile, and is explicit in defining new military paradigm. 
В этом смысле ядерный потенциал Соединённых Штатов как был мощным, так и остаётся. Другое дело, что, приняв на вооружение несколько модифицированную систему по сравнению с той, что была в Советском Союзе, мы создали новое поколение наземных и морских стратегических ядерных сил, которые минимизировали затраты на их создание благодаря унификации. За последние 10–15 лет мы ушли далеко. С точки зрения тактико-технических характеристик и характеристик, которые вытекают из условий боевого применения, по сравнению с западными аналогами. Это то, чем мы сегодня обладаем по сравнению с американскими аналогами – с точки зрения инвариантности к меняющимся внешним условиям. Ну, например, это появление более совершенных систем ракетной обороны. Например, нанесение ответного удара в более жестоких условиях упреждающего удара, живучести, сохранение средств боевого управления и связи в критических ситуациях неожиданной агрессии и т.д., всё это создало наше преимущество. Действительно, имеет место опережение американцев минимум на 10–15 лет. Это не значит, что они этого не сделают. Если займутся, лет через 
10–15 смогут сделать то же самое.
- Кто дышит нам в спину? Нам и американцам. Я имею в виду членов ядерного клуба.
– Никто. С точки зрения возможности нашего стратегического ядерного потенциала мы далеко впереди. Это не хвальба. Это объективно.
A. (In this sense) the American nuclear potential was and remains strong. Another matter that, by accepting a somewhat modernized system, when compared to the Soviet one, we created a new generation of land-based and naval strategic nuclear forces, which minimized our expenses due to their unification. In the last 10-15 years we moved very far, from the point of view of tactical-technical characteristics and characteristics which are defined by the conditions of combat use, when compared to Western analogues. This is what we have compared to American analogues--from the point of view of invariance to new, changing external conditions. For example, such as the appearance of more advanced anti-missile defense systems. As an example, a response strike under much more difficult conditions of a preventive strike, survivability, retention of the means of control and communications in critical situations of unexpected aggression etc., all that is our advantage. Indeed, we lead Americans by 10-15 years. This doesn't mean that they will not be able to do the same. If they put their minds to it they can do the same.  
Q. Who is breathing down our necks? I mean us and Americans, I mean members of the nuclear club?
A. Nobody. From the point of view of our nuclear potential we are far ahead. This is not bravado, it is objective. 

So, I would suggest Mr. Weitz to read attentively and take in what Solomonov said a week ago and try to understand a simple military truism which today is as valid as it ever was--those who can control escalation, control the war and they create conditions for victory. It is especially true for nuclear age--here it comes--because Russia can conduct strategic strikes at US proper both in nuclear and conventional way and that opens the whole other strategic (and political, and philosophical) can of worms altogether. Continuous deployment of hyper-sonic weapons by Russia today, be that 3M22 Zircon, Kinzhal, Avangard and whatever comes next after them, together with other stand-off weapons, allows Russia to defeat any combination of threats WITHOUT resorting to nuclear weapons. I cannot convey enough a significance of this paradigm shift in warfare, nor can I foresee all ramifications of this, I just know that they are gigantic. But then again, the US either rethinks and cleanses her whole "expertise" field, especially in relation to Russia and warfare, or she will continue to believe in validity of her, mostly wrong, assessments of the outside world and will either stumble into disastrous conflict or will completely fade away as great power. 

P.S.  I will comment later on China's military role in all this--I have some piece on that--I may try first to run it by Ron Unz.  
P.P.S. Recall Frank Herbert's Dune and convention on the use of the atomics--if used without authorization by Landsraad, any house would be completely destroyed. In related news, any Bulava SLBM is capable of carrying several hyper-sonic highly maneuverable blocks capable to provide conventional strikes.