It Is Official And It Is Over.

While the whole Western media are shaking (incompetence will do this to one) in their boots from Vladimir Putin's address, where he demonstrated, among many things, new RS-28 Sarmat ballistic missile, behind that revolutionary weapon system, one was almost completely ignored by media. Again, "education" based on catch phrases (such a "nuclear weapon) will do this to one. By far most shocking (albeit inevitable) revelation was deployment of a new hyper-sonic missile Kinzhal (Dagger) to regular service with front line Air Force units in Southern Military District. Mig-31 carries this weapon, I am positive any SU-35 or SU-30SM or SU-34 will be able to do it too. Here is a video and CGI simulation. 

The missile is... well, for the lack of better word, is stunning--it is M=10+ highly maneuverable missile with the range of 2000 kilometers. The naval warfare as we know it is over. Without any overly-dramatic emphasis--we are officially in new era. No, I repeat, NO, modern or perspective air-defense system deployed today by any NATO fleet can intercept even a single missile with such characteristics. The salvo of 5-6 of such missiles is a guaranteed destruction of any Carrier Battle Group. 

The mode of use of such weapon, especially since we know now that it is deployed (for now) in Southern Military District is very simple--the most likely missile drop spot by MiG-31s will be international waters of the Black Sea, thus closing off whole Eastern Mediterranean to any surface ship or group of ships. It also creates a massive no-go zone in the Pacific, where MiG-31s from Yelizovo will be able to patrol vast distances over the ocean. It is, though, remarkable that the current platform for Kinzhal is MiG-31--arguably the best interceptor in the history. Obviously, MiG-31's ability to reach very high supersonic speeds (in excess of M=3) is a key factor in the launch. But no matter what are the procedures for the launch of this terrifying weapon, the conclusions are simple:

1. It moves aircraft carriers into the niche of pure power projection against weak and defenseless adversaries;

2. It makes classic CBGs as main strike force against peer completely obsolete and useless, it also makes any surface combat ship defenseless regardless its air-defense capabilities. 

3. Sea Control and Sea Denial change their nature and merge. Those who have such weapon, or weapons, simply own vast spaces of the sea limited by the ranges of Kinzhal and its carriers. 

I don't want to sound dramatic and I knew that there were and are always surprises in Soviet/Russian weapons but today's revelations from the highest podium in Russia about Kinzhal were shocking. The balance of power just shifted dramatically, with it the naval warfare as we knew it is no more. It is OVER!  

UPDATE: Is it beginning to sink?  

A thoroughly neocon and "exceptionalist" rag Foreign Policy suddenly posted, still bile and delusions-filled, but less insane piece titled with precisely the message Putin was trying to deliver globally to the world:

Putin’s Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Is Bigger Than Trump’s.There’s no point in competing with Russia’s new trove of bizarre doomsday devices.

While US "Intelligence Community" may state whatever they want, the issue is not even "bizarrness" of these weapons--in fact, there is nothing bizarre about them at all. The issue is that the United States currently has nothing comparable to this technology and the main, and I quote, message of Putin was:

 You didn't want to listen to us in 2004, now listen to us now.

And yes, Mr. Jeffrey Lewis, it is not just about nuclear weapons--both Avangard and Kinzhal are perfectly capable of conventional munitions. In fact, that is what they primarily are. But then again, I doubt anyone among US mainstream Russia "experts" read 2014 Russia's Military Doctrine and what is stated there in terms of  Conventional Strategic Containment.

In related news, Gazprom started the procedure of annulment of all gas delivery and transit contracts with Ukraine. It is over. Isn't it strange how many times I used the word over in the last 48 hours?

Real Friday's Akulas.

And I mean the way they were and are known, not some Typhoon (after the missile complex) moniker. Project 941 Strategic Missile Submarines, Akula. I post here some photos which convey better than anything I ever saw the mammoth size of those beasts. First is pretty much generic view of those subs near pier.

   

Now to how people look in comparison:

#1

 and 

             

#2

The question is, even considering the fact that those are very expensive ships to maintain, and plans exist to scrap two out of remaining three, what is going to happen, if somebody among the powers that be decides that it is too early to scrap those beasts? Yes, I am aware that they are not as silent as their younger heirs but Dmitry Donskoi, which underwent a refit as a Bulava SLBM test platform, is still around and doing well. And there were calls from some quarters (in Russian) to retain remaining boats Archangelsk and Severstal' for, and you may have guessed it already, not SLBMs but as Kalibr (and possibly Zircon) carriers. After modernization, of course. You know what is approximate number of cruise (land-attack, anti-shipping and anti-submarine) missiles such a boat can carry? In accordance to Alexandr Mozgovoy, one of the most competent observers of Russian Navy, the number is 396, yes, you are not mistaken three hundred ninety six cruise missiles. This is a devastating fire power and, yes, let's face it, a submerged and very Russified version of a US Navy's good ol' idea of Arsenal Ships.  

Of course, one may (justifiably, I may say) raise the issue of first four Ohio-class SSBNs converted to SSGNs but the similarity between the two will be very superficial. To start with, the idea of Arsenal ship hasn't been born in a vacuum, Soviet Navy's Project 1144 (Kirov-class) nuclear battle cruiser can easily claim the fatherhood of arsenal ships concept since were conceived as...well, arsenal ships, albeit for a Sea Denial mission. But much more is important, when comparing 154 Tomahawks, carried by Ohio-class SSGNs and any Russian Navy's concept or actual sub is the fact that all modern Russian subs carry or will carry large quantities of extremely capable anti-shipping missiles--this is full blown Sea Denial mission, which in layman's lingo means sinking enemy's ships and subs. If sinking is done by current 660 kilometer (350 nautical miles) range P-800 or 3M54 or whatever comes soon in the shape of 3M22, Sea Denial and A2/AD implications become more than just operational or strategic, they become political. Potentially, even a single Akula in Cruise Missile configuration (allegedly Project 941 KU) becomes, after proper modernization, a massive factor without even leaving relatively comfortable confines of the Russia's fleet and ASW patrol aviation zones. 

Are these fantasies or a viable operational (and technological) concepts? Difficult to say, but Russia employed unorthodox technologies not for once, be it on land, in the air or in the sea. Will such a hypothetical modernization of remaining Akulas be expensive? Hell, yes. But so is modernization of Peter The Great, not to mention Admiral Nakhimov. I think those underwater mastodons didn't say their last word yet and considering financial restraints for building a whole new fleet of yet another SSGNs, apart from actively building Yasen-class (Project 885) SSGNs, using of the good ole' Red Oct....forgive me, Akulas doesn't seem to be such a far fetched idea after all. In the end, a decision (a correct one) to modernize a fleet of Project 1155 Large ASW ships is being implemented. You all know a very old principle--If Ain't Broke Don't Fix It. One may add--use it.

About Zircon, Yet Again...

As sources in Russia's Defense Ministry confirmed today, 3M22 anti-shipping missile, also known as Zircon reached the speed of Mach=8 on its trials. This is insane and this is also not-interceptable by any known or perspective air-defense systems. Moreover, more became known about its range, stated to be around 400 kilometers, what this "around" means nobody knows but it was speculated for a while that it is up to 500 kilometers. But that is not what really matters in this news. For me it was a surprise--it was confirmed that Zircon will be launched from standard 3C14 VLS system which is installed on all new Russian frigates and corvettes this adding to Kalibr and Onyx carrying capability. These are not good news for opponents surface component, in fact, these are very very bad news since this capability will be distributed across most platforms, current and perspective, Russian Navy deploys. 

Strategic and operational implications, as I wrote not for once, are immense. Coming of Zircon will change naval warfare forever and will redefine the nature of Sea Denial and A2/AD and it will influence a design and tactics of surface (and submarines) combatants.  Littorals and Remote Sea Zones are about to become a whole lot more dangerous, and I mean a whole lot, like on the order of magnitude. In the end, this is what Russians always were striving for with their constant focus on cost/effectiveness ratio. Currently US Naval Institute Proceedings has my article precisely on that--I don't know if they will accept, I should by the end of April. If not, I will gladly share will all (or on UNZ Review) with my thoughts on the revolutionary change in naval tactics and operations which even  single salvo of two Zircons will bring about. We live in a very dangerous time, we also live inside a game-changing in warfare and this one is a real Revolution In Military Affairs (RMA) which came from very unexpected (for most US military analysts) quarters.  

Mosquito Bite.

As I wrote some time ago about Russian Navy's newest Karakurt-class small missile ships, these ships will have a very potent air defense system, navalized Pantsyr, installed on them. This was confirmed today by Deputy Defense Minister of Russian Federation Yuri Borisov at the ceremony of laying down latest project 22800 (Karakurt) MRK "Shkval" (Squall) at Pella shipyard, not far from St. Petersburg.  Unlike other, now very famous, Byan-class (project 21631) MRKs, armed only with rudimentary Gibka air-defense complex, navalized Pantsyr gives 800-ton Karakurts  ability to not only effectively defend themselves against a variety of air threats but even perform AD functions while operating as escorts. 

It is too early to speculate on what this navalized Pantsyr will be, but it is clear that its naval version will retain both missiles and guns in complex. It is an extremely intelligent system and it brings a completely new capability to a small ships which already pack a tremendous punch both in anti-ship and land-strike configurations and are capable to operate up to 3,000 miles from the base.

It was a dream of Admiral Aube, known for his fanatical support of Jeune Ecole,  to see such a fleet operating on the high seas. Well, looks like his dreams, as well as validation of Jeune Ecole concepts, have finally been fulfilled....150 years later. Talk about maturity of technology. Mosquito fleet is coming out, missiles and guns blazing, to change naval warfare forever. We are, as incomparable Captain Wayne Hughes wrote, in missile age and there is no escaping it.  Complex networks of MRKs, SSKs, land based aviation, integrated vertically and horizontally, capable to absorb a blow and then strike back with immense force--we are at the cusp of a revolution in Sea Denial and A2/AD.

   

Perils Of Mosquito (re-opened).

So, the news are that two hulls of Project 1241 Molnya missile boats which remained in the state of limbo for a while will be completed by the shipyard Vympel to specifications of Project 12418 missile corvettes. 

Molnya (Lightning) To Become A Thunderbolt (In Russian) 

For those who do not remember, those ungainly ships went into existence as Tarantul-class missile boats in 1970s and even US Navy had one  (former DDR Navy's Hiddensee) serving at Naval Air Warfare Center in Maryland in 1990s. Latest iterations of venerable Tarantuls, however, are a different game. Project 12418 corvettes are armed with....drum roll..16 Uran-E (Switchblade) missiles. 

Here is the model: 

 Here is a movie:

 Here are Vietnamese Navy's (export) versions:

There will be obvious upgrades, including latest electronic suite for corvettes for the Russian Navy. 

What does it all mean? Considering the fact that in Sea Denial and A2/AD business a salvo means a lot, it means that theoretical salvo of Russian Navy in the theater, where these corvettes will be serving, grows by additional 32 anti-shipping missiles. That is a lot, to put it mildly without resorting (which I will eventually) to the specifics of Salvo Equations and coefficients which constitute them. Obviously, such corvettes have very limited Air Defense (for now) and no ASW suites to talk about, but they fit perfectly into the littoral A2/AD settings where other heterogeneous forces will be taking care of air defense and ASW. Now consider the fact that Russian Navy is actively building Project 22160 Patrol Ships (these ones carry UKSK and have a very respectable air defense) and this clearly indicates that Russia is building her Navy "from the shore" thus indicating a very defensive posture. Will Russia eventually build full blown Blue Water Fleet? Here is the puzzle: will it be Power Projection or Sea Denial Navy? I guess the latter is the most likely scenario.   

The Perils Of Mosquito (conclusion).

I was about to continue with fairly extensive conclusion on the topic of Mosquitoes when, well, Russian Navy, or, to be more precise, Red Banner Caspian Flotilla simply demonstrated what those small missile ships, granted, accompanied by a larger corvette Dagestan, can do. The file on REAL distributed lethality is, finally, open. 4 ships, with total displacement of about half that of a single destroyer and the price tag even less than that, launched the salvo of 26 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea. Some time later, those missiles hit 11 targets of terrorists in Syria--about 1500 kilometers away. Strategic ramifications of this are colossal, it was clear already before, but after today it became a reality of an immense power of modern missile weapons and those seemingly "unimpressive" platforms which carry them. After all, the range of Kalibr is up to 2500 kilometers and GLONASS' combat (not civilian) CEP  (Circular Error Probable) is rumored to be about 0.4-0.6 meters, that is 1.5-2 feet. 

Will Russia put active homing device on Kalibrs? Possible, but 5000 kilometer range cruise missiles are already in line for procurement.

P.S. Now I have to rewrite almost completed article for Proceedings submission. The article about, and you may have guessed it already, what else--Mosquito fleet.  

 

The Perils Of Mosquito--III

The existence of the missile boats as a class of ships, in Soviet/Russian case, was predetermined not just by their relatively low costs but because of the operational concept, which later became known as Gorshkov's Line. Or, in other words, the farthest edge (kromka) of the area from which the enemy attack on Soviet coast could be launched. The idea was to deny the enemy operational freedom on this line. Surely, capital ships of the Russian Navy theoretically could deal with this threat but, the thinking went, they were far more effective in meeting the enemy beyond the limits of 800-1000 mile ranges, on the high seas, way beyond the ranges of enemy's weapon systems. 

In 1992 US Navy produced its famous operational concept From The Sea, which later, in 1994, was updated to Forward From The Sea.  

Forward From The Sea 

In this document US Navy clearly stated its purpose, which since then changed very little. The United States would attack anyone who has access to sea if it thinks it is necessary: 

How the Navy Operates

Forward...From the Sea provides the basis for a simple, yet powerful, operational concept of how we will operate to carry out expeditionary operations. We conduct forward naval operations both to ensure unimpeded use of the seas and to project American influence and power into the littoral areas of the world. Expeditionary operations achieve U.S. objectives across the spectrum of the National Military Strategy. They are a potent and cost-effective alternative to power projection from the continental United States and are suited ideally for the many contingencies that can be deterred or quickly handled by forward-deployed forces. Expeditionary operations complement, enable and dramatically enhance the effectiveness of continental power-projection forces when a larger military response is needed.

  Our attention and efforts will continue to be focused on operating in and from the littorals. The landward side of the littoral can be supported and defended directly from the sea. It encompasses areas of strategic importance to the United States. Seventy-five percent of the Earth's population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major commercial centers lie in the littorals. These are the places where American influence and power have the greatest impact and are needed most often. For forward-deployed naval forces, the littorals are a starting point as well as a destination. Tactically, the distance we reach inland from the sea depends on terrain and weather, the contributions of joint and coalition forces, the potential adversary's capabilities, and the nature of our mission. The mission may require us to exercise our considerable reach and operate far inland.(C)
 

For any, even removed from naval realities, observer the language and the spirit of this concept is obvious. It is global, it is aggressive and it is, well, good only against the third rate navies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and, with it, disappearance of US Navy's only rival on the high seas played a very bad trick with US naval doctrinal thinking. Conventionally US Navy could easily defeat the remnants of the Soviet, now Russian, Navy but there was a slight "problem"--Russian Navy didn't want to fight on the high seas. In fact, in 1990s, it could barely deploy there. But things changed since. The change was in electronics and computers and, well, in the way Russia was governed. While the army of US "analysts" and "Russia experts" was busy compiling, yet again (what's new), a picture of rusty, drunk, incompetent Russia, Russian Navy was thinking in the framework which was diametrically opposite to From The Sea concept--it can only be described as From The Shore. Indeed, Russia has no business of "Force Projection" globally. In fact, even if Russia wanted to get herself into this business of blowing shit up on the remote shores, where would she "project" it, against whom? As of today, Russian naval assets either have or are on the way to the full blown conventional stand-off capability against any shore, including against targets in North America, and even these capabilities are deployed in purely  defensive posture.                          
      
Thus, the defense of the nation's shores  from the sea, which is known today as fancy abbreviation A2/AD (anti-access/access-denial) becomes the foundation of Russia's naval thinking as it should and for a very simple reason--Russia does not want to fight with the US near its coast line, the United States, on the other hand, sleeps and dreams about dominating coast lines of the states it considers hostile to the US national interests (whatever those may be between Monday and Friday of the same week) and Russia fits the bill here perfectly. President Obama, after all, compared Russia to E-bola and ISIS. Recent developments in the Black Sea (Sea Breeze, anyone) obviously have a flavor of good ole' Cold War and the statements coming from high positioned US military people testify to the fact that many in Pentagon and its neocon political handlers are barely fighting urges to get Russia into some sort of the confrontation with the "West". Russia does not want to fight, so, as the old saying goes, if the mountain doesn't walk to Mohamed, Mohamed walks to the mountain. USS Donald Cook was playing Mohamed, together with other NATO ships, for quite some time. 

USS Donald Cook and Ukrainian ship Hetman Sagaydachnyi maneuver near Crimean shores.  

Unlike demonstration of flag in the littorals of Arab countries, operations near Russia's littoral can, but hopefully will not, present any NATO's navy, or combination of those, with the number of problems they never encountered before. Unlike previous encounters with, mostly Arab, navies and greatly talked up (a favorite term of media pundits is "integrated", e.g. "Saddam has integrated air defense") military capabilities or, rather, lack thereof, the encounter, as an example, in the Black Sea, in case of the hypothetical hostilities "from the sea" will have a very different profile, because Russia, unlike previously crushed "military powers", DOES posses genuinely integrated defenses. Every single element of Russia's A2/AD is truly integrated into the very complex system of national Command and Control which:

1. Is already partially capable of providing what Admiral Cebrowski (or Garstka, or Alberts) would call a GIG (Global Informational Grid)  aka Virtual Battle Space. Yes, Russian littoral defenses start at the bottom of the sea and go up, way up, in fact to the places Russians opened the door to others--space. Including this very important targeting system known today as Liana. Last rumors I heard is that it is already on-line, but what do I know. This is the system which provides targeting data to anti-ship missiles. For those who do not know what targeting data is I would say that it is a pretty simple thing: it is either bearing (azimuth) and distance (range) to the surface target or add here the elevation (or angle of elevation) for aerial ones. This data could also be, which is just fine for ASMs, such as Yakhont, geographic coordinates, aka lambda and phi, known as geographic altitude and longitude. That's targeting in the real time. 


2. Apart from space means, including the only other global positioning system--GLONASS, Russia has, on every theater, what NO other nation crushed by NATO ever had--Russia has actual, combat-capable Air Force. Including the planes which are known as AWACS and we are talking about arguably the best airborne radar in the world. We are talking A-50 Airborne Early Warning System.

Inside A-50

3. Russia's Black Sea Fleet, quite urgently, recreated the separate brigade of SSKs, with first hull arriving to Novorossiisk (via Sevastopol, I am sure) shortly, if not already. NATO DID NOT encounter a competent and state of the art submarine force...ever. 


4. And then, of course, came Mosquitoes, which I predicted were inevitable on the Black Sea Fleet even before return of Crimea home. Russia needs salvo on the Black Sea--that is, the number of the missiles which will reach and overcome saturation threshold of the NATO's naval missile defenses, that is, as we all understand, SPY-1D and Aegis. What is saturation threshold, that it is the number of missiles at which AD system implodes and allows the "leaker" through, remains the matter of speculations. However, judging by the late 1990s scandal with US Navy trying to obtain Russian target drones based on  AS-17 Kryptons remade into SSST (Supersonic Sea Skimming Target) for training--the issue is really serious. Since then M=3 ASMs with the active radar homing (Yakhont, for example, sees targets from 70 kilometers) and EECM package became mainstay of Russian Navy and not only that. Suddenly, fairly indefensible from the air, unless external air defense cover is used, project 21631 Buyan (you see, no Osas or Komars anymore) missile ships began to appear on the Black Sea. 

Here they are at Novorossiisk Naval Base getting ready to be included in the Fleet's order of battle

The thing with these ships is that with the displacement of about one ninth of Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and the price tag of about the same proportions, that is about nine times less expensive, they can provide the coverage for the whole Black Sea. One, of course, has to consider three points above that. The brigade of such ships can also provide a salvo to the strategic depth of land theater of operations or, speaking plain language, such ships can strike any city in Europe or, can strike land targets in the Persian Gulf while themselves being in the Caspian Sea. 

Suddenly getting small is becoming fashionable, after all, 1-2 Klubs will take out any large surface combatant. And single Yakhont, certainly, will have no problem destroying the target of LCS-1 or LCS-2 caliber, which, as we all remember, were designed to fight in littorals. Russia has it for small missile ships, the new project 22800 Karakurt, which will carry a navalized version of famous Pantsyr Air Defense Complex. 

Project 22800 Karakurt

  
And all that is just the start of what many already are calling a silent revolution in the naval warfare. 19th Century proponents of Jeune E'Cole would have been ecstatic today should they have lived to see the coming age of missile as a main striking weapon of the fleet. This and, well, this electronic mambo-jumbo with all those beyond horizon radar, multi static sonar, massive jamming capabilities (I should have put point 5 for that, I will), Net Centric Warfare and other things which moved navies away from pure platform-centric posture towards networks and integration with other forces. After all, it takes, under some conditions, 8 missile salvo by150-million dollar ship to destroy about 5-6 billion dollars of the hardware. And the numbers matter, as legendary Arleigh Burke told Elmo Zumwalt:"We need numbers"(c).

To be continued.........

The Perils Of Mosquito-II

The idea of a small ship capable of carrying out large tasks is, certainly, not new. After all, already mentioned, Jeune Ecole imagined naval combat being conducted by the swarms of small torpedo and cannon-boats, which would be controlled by the telegraph. One of the main factors which influenced Jeune Ecole was the invention of the shell and Canon-obusier (or shell-firing cannon) by Henri-Joseph Paixhans, which changed drastically, including an improvement in accuracy, the main striking weapon of the fleets--naval gun. Russians demonstrated the effectiveness of Canon-obusier in the Battle Of Sinop in 1853, when Russian Squadron defeated Turkish Fleet. The shell-firing cannon came of age in this battle. It also made it onto the small ships.

We know the rest of the story, that is until new weapon emerged. 

This weapon sent shock waves through naval world, when on 21 October  1967, Israeli Navy's INS Eilat was sunk by a two-missile salvo of Soviet-made Anti-Shipping Missiles (ASM) P-15 Termit (Styx), launched from Egyptian Soviet-made Komar-class (Project 183) small missile boat. The fact that the boat with 61 ton of displacement could sink a 1700 ton destroyer not by a torpedo seemed obscene at the time. Well, it is not obscene anymore. As Operation Trident by Indian Navy in 1971 demonstrated to a devastating effect--few Osa-class (project 205) boats armed with Styx  ASMs were capable to achieve a strategic result despite a minuscule displacement of combatants. And then, of course, came Falkland War which was an eye-opening experience for many in Anglo-Saxon naval community. Royal Navy did its duty well and won the war but paid a steep price. ASM not only has arrived as a viable naval strike weapon, it has arrived as THE weapon of the naval warfare, which was a really bad news for the US Navy's carrier trade union. 

Sure, one may say (and many do) that mosquito ASM capabilities are really not that great. Sure they are not by the very fact that this kind of fleet is called Mosquito for an engineering (and Russian convention of naming its missile boats classes after mosquitoes)  reasons and is not capable to carry an immensely important component of ship's defense--a capable Air Defense Complex. Left to its own devices, any missile boat ends like the Libyan Fleet in the action in the Gulf Of Sidra in March of 1986 against....US Navy. The chances of these few Libyan boats, armed only with Osa Air Defense Missile Complexes against overwhelming fire-power of the US Fleet were, frankly, approaching zero. But in this operation, as well as in Falkland War, both US and Royal Navies fought what was essentially Sea Control Battles against the opponents who would attempt to challenge them in what today could be termed as A2/AD  (Anti-Access/ Area Denial) framework. Argentinians, although defeated, fared incomparably better than Libyans. It took Royal Navy's HMS Conqueror and outstanding performance of RN's pilots from British carriers to break Argentina's attempts to deny Royal Navy access to the occupied islands. 

The outlook for the Mosquito fleet, however, changes drastically  when it is deployed and used  properly. And, as both successful (sinking of Eilat) and disastrous (Battle Of Latakia) for Arabs use of the missile boats demonstrates, they can be used from the naval base location, without any deployment even within nations' littorals. The problem with Arabs, though, was in the fact that....well, to put it mildly, they had neither means nor abilities to use their boats effectively. In fact, in this funny business of Sea Denial, A2/AD, what have you, the main thing is, as Admiral Sergei Gorshkov pointed out in his The Sea Power Of The State  (not the Sea Power AND The State as it is known in the West), interaction.  In other words--you want to deny the enemy access, say, to your littoral, be ready to do it with the use of heterogeneous forces which will be able to interact--that is act in concert towards achieving the same A2/AD goal. For the green water fleets, and it is there where the bulk of the "mosquitoes" to be found, which are run by even mildly competent leaders--the main task will remain to provide conditions for the missile boats to launch their main weapon. To do so, they will need to avoid the fate of Libyan missile boats in the Gulf Of Sidra. That means two major conditions to be fulfilled against the navies which count Force Projection as their main doctrinal goal and that leaves us with very few navies in the world, headed, of course, by the US Navy and its whole structure honed for blowing shit up anywhere in the world where alleged US national interests are "threatened"--these conditions are viable Air Defense and ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare). Today, there is only one navy in the world, which can provide, however barely, the existence and survival of its mosquito component against any adversary--Russian Navy. Russians always had pretty good understanding (and experience) of the shortcomings and advantages of the missile boats and that is why today, Russia develops not one but two different types of the missile boats, which will be able to fill the niche inside the heterogeneous forces package, capable to deliver needed amount of high explosives to the pre-determined location at the pre-determined time. In fact, Russian navy deploys today the only boats in the world capable of purely naval combat (that is against surface targets) and for the strikes to a strategic depth on such theaters as Europe or launch missiles from Caspian Sea to Persian Gulf. 

    

I propose, that the development of these kinds of ships (boats) and of the missile complexes they carry is completely new, paradigm-shifting, development but before I continue, hopefully during the Labor Day weekend, I want to make some important points. 

Disclaimer: I know, there are armies of internet "warriors" who browse world-wide-web constantly in search of the virtual fights and who do not understand that behind all this fancy military lingo is the reality of the combat with blood, suffering, torn limbs, horrible burns, torturous deaths. I am terrified by the possibility of Russia and US going to war, but I am also terrified by the blood-thirst of all kinds of patriots who are ready to fight somebody, while sitting in the chairs as I am doing now. 

I have a profound respect to US Navy, its glorious history and many people, who served and still serve there, some of those people are my closest and dearest friends and they are not war mongers. However, the continuation of the posts on mosquito fleet, inevitably, will lead to a description of the scenario which is in the air, but, hopefully is not becoming a reality, in which US Navy will try to test Russia's littoral defenses and this scenario will, certainly, involve participation on a massive scale of Russian Navy's mosquito capabilities, which, as some already guessed, will be covered in the air and from beneath by necessary means which, in Russian language, are called Naryad Sil  (Required Force--what is Naryad and why it is called as such, in English it means dressed, is a separate discussion;-)   Meanwhile, I leave you with the question of why late Admiral Cebrowsky's (hell, try Zumwalt and his Project 60) ideas of Street Fighter will not work in US. 

“Severodvinsk” launched cruise missile

The Perils Of Mosquito-I

When incomparable Captain Wayne Hughes published his seminal Fleet Tactics And Coastal Combat, I guess, Mahan worshipers and Carrier Trade Union (c) went apoplectic.  

              

                             

To write about "missile era", "coastal combat" and describe small, missiles' armed US Navy's fictional Cushings to demonstrate an example of real naval combat--that is a heresy in the US Navy, which, as none other than Elmo Zumwalt put it, got used to "travel first class". Yet, Hughes' book gained a cult status among both naval aficionados and professionals, some of whom, such as Admiral Blair (at a time, C'n'C of Pacific Command) or Vice Admiral Lauthenbacher Jr. (at a time, Deputy CNO), gave the book and the author absolutely rave reviews. I can only join in my deepest admiration for Captain Hughes and his brilliant mind. 

The ongoing disaster with LCSs and huge issues with AD/A2 for US Navy only underscored the problems which develop with the fundamental premise of the Sea Control (that is, largely, US Navy) fleet, as Hughes puts it, is "Saying that navies don't "purchase and possess real estate" as armies do is to emphasize the navy as a means toward the end of controlling an enemy on the ground. Rarely is the center of gravity of a conflict on the sea or in the air." The international consensus, at least for the last two decades, is that the US Navy is doing just fine when providing the freedom of the seas and keeping Shipping Lanes Of Communications (SLOC) open. The set of the problems emerges within littorals, the coastal combat and US Navy's function of  Force Projection when it is against, and you may have guessed it already, peer or near-peer power. Of course, the US Navy thinks that it can fight and win the battle on the high seas, or open ocean, against any enemy and here US Navy has ample reasons to think so--it is, presently, undeniably the most powerful navy in the world with a superb naval tradition and combat history. But magnificent naval battles Americans won against Japan on the WW II teach only limited lessons on the modern combat. Why it is so is quite obvious--nuclear weapons and anti-shipping missiles. 

US Navy, at least its Carrier Trade Union, doesn't like anti-shipping missiles. So much so, that I will simply post here the scan from Admiral Zumwalt's marvelous memoirs  On Watch:    

              

You can easily make your own conclusions on what can only be described as the sabotage of anti-shipping missiles (ASM) development in the US Navy. No surprise then, that even today US Navy cannot deploy any true supersonic, let alone hyper-sonic, ASM. But here is the issue--some other power, of which we speak not as of yet--does have those and, apart from understanding their utility for fighting on the high seas, it developed this absolutely atrocious idea that those Mach 2-3, long range ASMs, with the development of miniature solid state electronics and improvement in propulsion could be very valuable in the littoral. Moreover, one doesn't have to spent 12 billion dollars to attain the saturation threshold of ANY air defense system to solve this one and only, most important, contemporary problem of any navy--the problem of a "leaker". In fact, this could be done for a relatively small price and can (and it did) solve the issue of the safety of own littoral. After all, the final target the fleet is on the land. It is there, where hostile government has a seat. 

For decades, during the Cold War, naval staffs of both US and USSR were calculating the probabilities of success, respectively, in attacking and defending the Soviet/Russia coast. And it was then that Russians invoked the spirits of Jeune Ecole  and its radical, for its time, ideas that, as Theodore Ropp summarized it about Jeune Ecole:

1. The weaker fleet would stay at its bases and refuse combat.

2. The stronger would be forced to do the same, for fear of the torpedo.

3.The only significant naval activity would be commercial warfare.

4. Warfare would be absolutely merciless, disregarding the laws of war.

You can read Eric Dahl's brilliant expose on Jeune Ecole in Naval War College Review here:

NET-CENTRIC BEFORE ITS TIME The Jeune École and Its Lessons for Today 

 We do not concern ourselves here with pps.3 and 4, since they require additional, and extensive, elaborations, but pps.1 and 2 capture the essence of the Coastal (or Littoral) Combat superbly, when pp.1 is corrected with addition of a single caveat:

The weaker fleet would stay at its bases and refuse combat on the high seas.    

In the littoral, however, under the defensive umbrella of own coastal aviation, screens of SSKs, which are honed for operations in this type of waters, the weaker fleet, armed with modern ASMs and well networked, becomes a true deadly menace for any navy. What used to be called a mosquito fleet becomes capable of sinking any enemy ship thus rendering enemy's capital ships useless when trying to "project force"  and that may have truly strategic, and even global, ramifications. Just like that. This reality is beginning to dawn on US Navy. Hence, however disastrous, program of LCS, which was based on Admiral Cebrowsky's "Street Fighter" concept (correct one, I may add).  In the end, FERs (Fractional Exchange Rates) do define the outcome and there is no better exchange rate (including financially), then to provide conditions for 1 billion dollars worth of assets do the job  on the force whose monetary value runs into tens of billions, while its mission could be killed by about 10 to 15 million dollars worth of leakers.  This is an excellent exchange rate from any point of view. Thus is A2/AD issue which torments US Navy today--at least it is an indicator that the Navy with so much combat history is trying to stay realistic, despite a horrendous news of the production for the sequel for Top Gun ;-) That is scary......

           

To be continued.....

Russia's Navy Day

It is the last weekend of July and, as tradition goes, it is Navy Day in Russia.  It was celebrated on all 4 Fleets (including snafu in Sevastopol with URPK's dummy launch) and Caspian Flotilla. Celebration in Baltyisk (the main base of Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet) was marked by the visit of Putin and a bad weather. They still did produce some bang for a buck (or, rather, for free) and all this showmanship for public, but most important things were happening on board of the newest Russian frigate Admiral Gorshkov (project 22350) and were hidden from the eyes of general public. 

There, on board of Russia's latest frigate, new Naval Doctrine was announced. Well, it is not really a doctrine, nor is it purely naval, but for a government run by journalists (Rogozin) or Civilian Engineers (Shoigu) the latest "edition" of the Foundation of the Marine Policy had some very important points. Those who can read (speak) Russian can find them here:

Marine Doctrine

Most important of those points is, finally, recognition of a simple fact that full independence from foreign technologies in shipbuilding industry is a must. This, plus, of course, recognition of NATO as a main threat to Russia's national interests. This alone signals a massive shift from "re-integration" with Europe to a completely independent maritime policy, which will, inevitably, lead to a development of both green water naval capabilities and, eventual, emergence of blue water capabilities which would lead to a global Sea Denial Force--what this author was calling for years. The more things change, the more they stay the same........