Those Who Planned...

 ... this FUBAR in Kursk for VSU--some even state that the whole idea originated in London, not surprising then with the level of UK's military--was obviously planned by amateurs. You see, they are still obsessed with operational indices, such as the length (range) of advance, the speed of advance and other purely Hollywood representations of war taken out of serious operational context and real military science. Well, you remember this, I recon...

The American Army as it is now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air and in tanks, and in knowledge of the use of combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these...

This is from Patton's diary in 1945. This is also the guy who never fought first rate Wehrmacht at the height of its strength and who faced in Lorraine... 10 German tanks. Who also completely made up a story of his "rivalry" with another propaganda inflated average commander such as Rommel. Not to mention, of course, him and his media chihuahuas taking credit for Ardennes and as the foreword to his diary states:

The creeping arrogance, the hubris, which would cost the American Army so dearly in Vietnam. Summing up the achievements of his troops in crushing the German counterattack of December 1944, Patton with pardonable pride claims to have “moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States—possibly in the history of the world... No country can stand against such an Army.” These memoirs are valuable not least in showing, however unwittingly, that a disastrous presumption of invincibility took root in the ranks of officers who led the American military after World War II. 

So, there you have it, pure delusion, with, obviously, people like Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Vasilevsky or Tolbukhin among many others, should they have been alive, having a Homeric laughter from the statements from a man who is venerated in the US Army as someone of a huge import in warfare, while being known primarily for his big mouth and outlandish claims. So, in the end, VSU lost by different estimates around 10-11 thousand its "best" troops, who encountered a real army. 

The result was expected--Ukie propaganda, while those "groups" who survived initially are now, also as was expected, corralled into the pockets within forests (zelenka as it is known in Russia) and being methodically annihilated, while some groups which are still loose in near border localities are being hunted down and killed. They never controlled anything more than at best 100-120 square kilometers of terrain with some hamlets (now it is reduced to low tens square kilometers at the most) and those "indices" mean nothing when the main task of the war on operational and tactical level, unlike it is the case with strategic Clausewitzian truism that the main object of war is to compel the enemy to do our will, is to KILL the opposition's armed force as much as possible. Russians are really good at it. In fact, they are the best in history. 

But, but, as I am record--once one begins to learn the military history based on Patton and Rommel, one is bound to lose its wars. Not to mention the fact that Russia finally paid serious attention to this "military bloggers" sewer and even shitty British propagandists from tabloid Moscow Times had to admit:

Russians are having a field day today with memes, which may have something to do with reality, that Ukrops got into Kursk Oblast to steal toilets, microwaves and washing machines;)) 

Now a sort of a trivial pursuit... Name which physical advantages--the only one that matter in the end--the US Army, as described in Field Manual 3-0, Operation, 2022, holds over Russians;): Position, Range, Speed of movement, Technologically superior capabilities, Terrain and weather. Good luck locating them;)

Remember This?

If you don't, I'll remind you...

Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach ulcers. The G2 also identified a new series of German formations designated voIksgrenadier divisions). These hastily constituted divisions numbered only 10,000.  

They also deployed the whole 5 to 10 tanks apiece for the whole three "panzer divisions". Yet, evidently this is not what is being taught to the cadets of the USMA at West Point or officers of US Army War College (including the Patton At Bay historic narrative), because this "great" general failed to fight through even these Wehrmacht troops, of sorts. But now, guess what, this is not a joke--I checked--this is what VSU "accepts" as its troops:

People are now fully eligible for service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine are in "Disability Group III," comprising people who: 1. Are missing or blind in one eye 2. Are partially deaf 3. Have a tracheotomy 4. Have jaw defects that prevent normal chewing 5. Suffer from dwarfism (<130cm for men) 6. Have a missing or nonfunctional arm 7. Have an amputated leg up to the thigh 8. Are missing fingers 9. Are missing both feet 10. Have a pacemaker implanted 11. Have only one working kidney 12. Have only one working lung 13. Have suffered from "traumatic castration" 14. Have a brain abscess (!) 15. Have a substantial skull defect 16. Have Parkinson's (!) 17. Have extreme scoliosis 18. Have severe chest deformities 19. Have "severe adrenal insufficiency" (it's a war eh?) 20. Have no bladder.  

There you go. Can you imagine what is happening now in Russian internet after getting acquainted with these requirements (Pentagon will never wash itself off this--they played a crucial role in killing hundreds of thousand VSU personnel)? But then again, when one studies warfare through Hollywood and sycophants, what do you expect? Man, blind midgets with two feet and fingers missing with brain abscess--I am sure Russian General Staff is trembling with horror. No, they do--those people are top notch professionals with morality and honor running in families for generations, they cannot accept lowlifes war criminals as equal military professionals. You do not eat from the dumpster, when you can buy food from the grocery store, do you? This is why Ukraine War Crimes Tribunal is getting readied.  

Alastair Crooke Says What Needs To Be Said.

Yes, in the eyes of the Washington Establishment I am a subhuman. I am Russian, Slav etc. Most people in the US Congress view me as subhuman, James Clapper views me as subhuman, so do many Pentagon and CIA people. Here are the words of one of the America's most celebrated heroes, who substituted his rather very average military abilities with a very outstanding ambitions, big mouth and a proper attitude:

The difficulty in understanding the Russian is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not a European but an Asiatic and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinaman or a Japanese and, from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. In addition to his other amiable characteristics, the Russian has no regard for human life and is an all-out son of a bitch, a barbarian, and a chronic drunk.

So, it comes naturally in the West to very many in "establishment" and it is, certainly, a driving attitude for neocons. 

Russians are, certainly, viewed as subhumans by 404 inhabitants. But don't just attribute it to neocon fanatics and uncultured hacks, much of the American "elite" always viewed Russians as subhumans, it was also a defensive reaction of which I write constantly--US "elites" have been always subpar lacking centuries of cultural conditioning and nourishment. What is the defense then against 1,000+ years of history of Russia, her immense military history and a high art which makes NYC look like a local county antique store across the... well, yes, Hermitage? Of course, it is suppressed jealousy and, as a consequence, hate and the traditional West's rationale for that is the race, subhumanity of the hated other. Patton was a military mediocrity, naturally extolled in the US as a military genius, one tends to do so when having no clue about WW II, but it was him who stated that "we fought the wrong enemy". And here we are today. 

In reality, Patton knew that he was a junior student of a modern combined arms warfare of scale he couldn't even grasp looking at people of the statue of Katukov who had behind his belt with his brigade and then army defeats of Guderian, battle of Rzhev, Stalingrad, Kursk, taking of Berlin--the accomplishments Patton could only dream about. In his diary Patton wrote about Marshal Tolbukhin as "inferior man", not willing to accept the fact that he was simply out of this league of military leaders the scale of Tolbukhin. In this respect, Patton is a pattern and representative of MO of the US "elites" who, with some notable exceptions, for the most part never had and do not have class. This explains a lot in terms of attitudes, whatever racial, ethnic or cultural factors are at play for modern Washington and Europe. I am on record--the US does not produce statesmen, it can't.

Ike-Intro.

This post or, rather, a series of posts was long in the making since required a significant thinking and re-thinking (and recalling) of many details of WW II and Western Allies approach to that war, and, I think, it is as good time as any to start writing about Dwight D. Eisenhower and his role both in WW II and, as a consequence, in what followed until his famous farewell speech on 17 January 1961 from the White House. I stated not for once, that we all still live in the world which was largely formed in the crucible of battles of WW II and it seems it is a good idea to revisit some very important (and crucial) events of that war. So here is a short intro:

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It is  rather an arduous task to discuss WW II, namely European Theater of Operations, with many Americans who, as strange as it sounds, are more or less acquainted with the peculiarities of Allied operations after D-Day. The reason for this difficulty is simple--it is normal to be patriotic and have many biases associated with such a position. The amount of books in the US dedicated to European Theater is immense, so is the number of different TV shows and, of course, there is always Hollywood which is hugely responsible for developing of those American biases when dealing with WW II. Yet, it is, very often, precisely this gigantic number of "studies", narratives, stories and reflections on Allied operation in Europe which creates a problem--for an average American it simply becomes impossible to dig for the truth, especially for the one which requires at least basic understanding of issues of military strategy, operational art and, to a certain degree, tactics. Moreover, understanding of how those three interact and how they relate to a larger military-political picture is even more difficult task, since requires a good grasp on realities of a war, and especially the war as complex and brutal as WW II. Hence, Hollywood and pop-history. 

My personal experiences with these uniquely American attitudes and biases throughout the years ranged from being overwhelmed by militant ignorance on anything WW II related to me, a former Soviet military professional, explaining actual facts of US Army military planning and operations to a number of people who would pass, under normal conditions, for people "well-versed" in US WW II military history. The case in point is me, not for once, being forced, with quotes and even scans of documents, to debate many American WW II history buffs that Operation Cobra was a result of Omar Bradley's idea and planning and that General George Patton was merely an attribute to this operation. But it is almost impossible to break through American Patton's myth, which was enhanced immensely by the famous movie with George C. Scott's genius (and detached from actual war reality) performance, which won him an Oscar. As Ladislas Farago noted in his book, when the movie came out in West Germany early 1970s, Germans couldn't understand how" an obscured American general merited a movie", when there was not one made about Zhukov, Montgomery or even Rommel. But that is what constitutes the main problem--a Hollywood version of WW II and of Allied operations in Europe. Idealized view of the WW II, as merely a combination of artsy maneuvers conducted by military leaders who were modern reincarnations of Napoleon and who were ready to "breakthrough", "pursue", "envelop" or "annihilate", continues to persist in the US. Patton, who was just another Army Commander, and by far not the most remarkable one, among very many generals of anti-Hitler Coalition, merited two major Hollywood motion pictures, while Allied Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower got himself a 1979 TV mini-series and a rather obscured, yet again TV, 2004 movie with Tom Selleck as Ike--hardly an appropriate tribute to a man, who not only was a huge part in American push, together with incomparable George Marshall, for the Second Front but effectively stopped the war in Korea and went on to become a truly great American President, especially viewed from today's vantage point, against the background of a number of mediocrities who since occupied the White House. In US WWII mythology Ike was and is hardly a persona who fits into American perception of the war, which is not surprising--most Americans simply have no grasp of realities of the warfare in general and of WW II in particular and that is a travesty. 

While Hollywood portrayed Patton as a hand gun whipping, fearless "leader" ready to literally lead his Third Army to, well, even Moscow, Ike's balanced, no-nonsense approach to the realities of his high command, while being militarily admirable, made not a very good material for Hollywood. Yet, both Eisenhower and Patton represent an inherent and, probably, irresolvable contradiction of contemporary American military history, since are counter positioned a strategic and operational reality and a myth, and this brings to the fore the issue of scales and proportions, which is crucial when dealing with WW II. The question is then this: was Ike a great general? 

Here is the catch: real military leadership under conditions of WW II had absolutely nothing to do with the qualities exhibited (and greatly embellished later by his propagandists) by Patton. As studies of his campaigns, especially his debacle at Lorraine, pointed out (such as review by Dr. Christopher Gabel for Combat Studies Institute at US Army Command And General Staff College at Leavenworth, KS) Patton's exploits were "ruthless and reckless". The question is, then, why reckless. It will be answered later. To understand this issue one has to look at the realities of the Western Front's South by Fall of 1944. Realities were such that the Third Army faced "Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and  others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach ulcers. The G2 also identified a new series of German formations designated voIksrenadier divisions). These hastily constituted divisions numbered only 10,000." It is hardly a force to be compared to Wehrmacht circa 1941-43 but that is mainly the force on fighting which Patton's mythology is built in the US and the one which obscures serious strategic and operational choices Ike was facing since he, unlike Patton, had two large Army Groups under his direct command and was the one, who, among very few others, was responsible for finally turning Overlord into the actual operation--a command and leadership level of which Patton could only dream about and for which he was ultimately unqualified. But, if one discounts Patton's mythology, which is strictly a local American phenomenon and the one which complicates and, in fact, impedes understanding of WW II dynamics, was Ike, in the end, a good military leader? The answer to this question can be found in identifying qualities which realistically were required for the prosecution of such a war as WW II was. It is immediately possible to say that Ike was qualified to do so and the only debate which is possible here is the one of a style not of a substance of what Ike was doing, especially once one begins to go back to 1941-42 and see how Eisenhower, then assuming the position of the head of Marshall's OPD, viewed European Theater and that will require an excurse into the Sledgehammer ideas. It all comes down to this: 

  

To Be Continued.....