My Talking Head On Hypersonic Weapons Again.

My talking head on hypersonic issues and how they relate to policies.  

Pershing II was never a "hypersonic" weapon. Speed alone is NOT what defines a weapon as hypersonic. The issue of required force aka наряд сил. Believe me, Google translate will not provide a proper translation. 

Now They Finally Admitted It.

Take a gander at that. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suddenly admitted that, how to put it politely, the United States is indefensible against serious enemy. Like, you know, Russia. And even if the United States invests into the extremely costly CMD (Cruise Missile Defense) things are not exactly working out for the US. 

Limitations of the CMD Architectures That CBO Examined: The illustrative architectures that CBO examined would be subject to several important operational limitations.• The defenses would have limited capacity—eight LR-SAMs and two fighters at a particular time and location. A raid consisting of many LACMs could overwhelm them. For example, a Yasen-class guided missile submarine in the Russian Navy can reportedly carry up to 32 LACMs (3M-14 Kalibr) in its eight vertical launchers.

You can get acquainted with the whole thing by just following the link above. CBO also provides a map, a very useful one, which in this blog and in my books was discussed non-stop and is at the heart of the matter. Here it is:

It is all fine and dandy until one notices this phrase by Vice-CJCS who says that:

The best way to defend the United States from a cruise missile attack may be to focus on where adversaries are keeping the ships and aircraft that could fire such a weapon and not take a broader approach to counter any possibility. 

Now look at the map above, again. Now recall what I wrote two years ago:

Well, what can I say: 3.14 x 1000^2=3.14 million square kilometers of potential search area for a single submarine carrying Zircons. For comparison, 3+ million square kilometers is the area of India. Good luck coming up with the location probability density mapping for this one. Putin went further and simply confirmed that any carrier of Kalibr family missiles is capable of carrying Zircons. OK, the picture of a modernized (that is Kalibrized) pr. 949A (Oscar II-class) SSGN carrying  somewhere between 20 to 50 Zircons is kinda the stuff of nightmares for any surface combatants, but it is what it is. 

Then recall, that already now Russian Navy takes deliveries of a new Kalibr 3M14M with a range of 4,500+ kilometers, which means 2,800+ miles, and this range is not even on CBO's map. Rightly so, because such strikes can be carried out without leaving defended zones for carriers of such missiles, ranging from surface combatants to submarines, to strategic bombers. That was the whole idea behind creation of new missiles by Russia--to force the enemy to deal with them only at the terminal, thus leaving precious little time for detection, tracking and shooting them down. This, mind you, applies only to subsonic land-attack missiles of Kalibr family, everything else in Russian arsenal flies either high-supersonic or hypersonic which is not interceptable in principle by modern means at US disposal. In this case the probability of the leaker is defined merely by probability of normal functioning of the cruise missile. 

Surely, the  geographic peculiarity of the United States is such that frontal defense against the ocean's "background" is a natural choice:

But the ranges of modern cruise missiles are such that, as CBO's report generally admits, this all is good primarily for non-state actors and regional powers trying to attack US territory. In case of Russia and her land-attack cruise missiles, the salvo could be delivered not only by a direct path from a launch point in the ocean but also by means of bypassing future CMDs over land be that Mexico or Canada. In this case, the detection of missiles becomes a daunting task due to:

1. Submarines with missiles being still within the area of the ocean which requires a very large patrol force to conduct an exhaustive ASW search even in case of a reliable datum, e.g. it may take duty Patrol/ASW aircraft 3-4 hours to get to datum to start with, which leaves ample time for submarine to break off; 

2. Detection of terrain hugging stealthy missiles of 3M14(M) variety over the ground is an extremely difficult task because of the ground clutter and other interference. 

3. Launch from a new iterations of "bastions" making any attempts to counter launch itself impractical. 

Here is a demonstration of a salvo of a combined surface-submarine force of Russia's Pacific Fleet at the state of Washington, without leaving a well defended position near Kamchatka Peninsula. 

So, basically, what CBO and JCS are arguing here for is... a lower end, when compared to Russia, limited national air-defense which could be, and most likely already is, too little too late, once one considers a trajectory of evolution (if not revolution) of modern missile technology which already sees ranges of 10,000 kilometers within reach. While 9M730 Burevestnik (Petrel) has basically unlimited range and hypersonic terminal speed. So, in this case the proposal for such a CMD in the United States is more about feeling good because doing something in this field and, of course, good work program for Pentagon's contractors. But CBO's readily admits:

Although CBO’s illustrative Architectures 1 through 4 would provide CMD coverage of the contiguous United States, they would have limitations. First, some of CBO’s calculations of system performance are based on best-case assumptions. For example, radar detection ranges might be less than the distance to the horizon if the architectures’ radars had difficulty distinguishing low-altitude or stealthy LACMs from ground clutter (radar reflections from the surface). Second, imperfect tracking information would decrease the effective reach of SAMs and fighters because they would not fly the shortest route to their target. The range of results for each architecture should account somewhat for such uncertainties. Finally, other factors, including limited shooter capacity, the need for positive identification of targets, and measures that adversaries could take that would decrease the effectiveness of the system—such as programming LACMs to fly indirect routes, launching LACMs close to the border or coast, or using faster LACMs—are worthy of consideration by policy-makers weighing the merits of fielding a national CMD system. Addressing those limitations would increase costs.

In other words, the scenario is built primarily around some "rogue" power (state or group) getting its hands on container type Kalibrs (3M14s) which could be carried by all kinds of commercial vessels and while it is certainly something in terms of defense, in case of serious conflict and if built, this CMD will be of a very limited use against peer, but then again, if, God forbids, this comes to Russia striking the United States proper conventionally, it wouldn't matter because the most likely final state will be a nightmarish scenario of nuclear exchange between Russia, US and, likely, China. This, must be avoided by all means. But the most instructive about this CBO Report is admission of what I wrote about for the last 7 years, in fact, much longer than that--new, radical military technologies are already here and it is them, which forced the United States to face a bankruptcy of its views on warfare and its self-proclaimed primacy in the military-technological sphere. Don't tell me that I didn't warn about it, I, sure as hell, did. Do I have a smile on my smug face right now? You can bet your ass--I do. I love "I told you so" moments. Well, I am a mere mortal sinner;))

Some Fast Thoughts On 2nd Fleet.

In the news since last week is the revival of the US Navy's 2nd Fleet, as reported by Fox. 

NORFOLK, Va. –  The U.S. Navy formally re-established its 2nd Fleet on Friday, intensifying its focus on the North Atlantic Ocean where the Russian military is operating at a pace not seen since the end of the Cold War. The change is mostly organizational. It revives an Admiral-level command dedicated to overseeing American warships as they deploy between the U.S. East Coast and the Barents Sea, off of the coasts of Norway and Russia. The revived fleet also reflects a broader change in U.S. military strategy. The nation's primary concern is shifting from terrorism in the Middle East to America's growing competition with Russia and China.

Putting all this BS mambo-jumbo about "democracy" and values aside here we may all come together in admitting that in one assessment US Navy is absolutely correct--the era of a great power competition is back. Speaking in purely military, not ideological terms, the 2nd Fleet will have to, as was stated:

Having a 2nd Fleet allows the U.S. to work more closely and effectively with its NATO allies, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Gary Roughead said in an interview. And they will be better prepared to respond to potential Russian aggression.

So, what this "potential Russian aggression" is? Very simple, and hear me out, unlike US Army or USAF which are known to be "defending" the United States anywhere but near the United States, the US Navy IS an actual defender of the nation and North America. It doesn't mean that US Navy doesn't participate in good ol' American business of bombing weak nations into the stone age, but operationally and strategically US Navy is, indeed, the force which is tasked with defense of US proper, including from this hypothetical Russian aggression. 

The potential "Russian aggression" has a very specific name--Russia's submarine forces, ranging from upgraded project 949A (Oscar II-class SSGN) capable of carrying up to 72 Kalibr-family missiles, to the Project 885 (Yasen-class SSGN) capable of another 32 missile mix, including Oniks, which is also capable of TLAM function but with a shorter range than 3M14. 2nd Fleet will have a gigantic area of responsibility if it wants to counter Russian subs which, inevitably, will go into the areas suitable for launch at targets inside the US and, knowing those ranges, one can easily imagine where a line going parallel in roughly 2400 kilometers from the US East Coast will be. It is a very large area and it will require a rather impressive operational sweep to keep it under some control against very silent Russian subs. 

While there is a lot of talk about Sea Control, the funny thing here is that in this particular case 2nd Fleet will be more in a Sea Denial, rather than Sea Control, mode. One of the reasons for that being the fact that famous GIUK Gap, a proverbial choke point of the Cold War 1.0 and of late Tom Clancy's wet dreams, loses all of its appeal for a number of key reasons most important of them being:

1. Russia is not fighting this "Fourth Battle of Atlantic" as some top brass in US Navy declared. It is a load of propagandist contrived crap. As the crow flies, the distance from Murmansk to the East Coast of Iceland is about 1,200 miles. 1,200 x 1.6=1920 kilometers. Do you get my drift? Now ask yourself a question why suddenly Norway came into focus. 

2. This means NO serious surface NATO component (in case of, God forbids, things going "hot") will survive the "breaking through" salvo of Kinzhals, X-32s and, well--you get the picture...

3. That means a much freer passage of Russian subs into the Atlantic Ocean than it was the case during the Cold War 1.0 when massive NATO ASW and other surface and submarine forces were operating in this Gap. 

4. Russia is not really fighting this war because Gorshkov Soviet Navy's Flank Strategy (Med in the South and Baltic and Atlantic  in the North) is not necessary anymore--Russia is not intent on "invading" Europe nor support her "socialist" (nowadays all NATO members) flanks by means of interdicting Atlantic SLOCs, considered crucial for Western Europe to resist those nasty Russkies about to invade (from 1945 through 1989) Western Europe. 

Russian subs are needed in Atlantic to keep a revolver to the temple in case of not hypothetical but a very real aggression from the US. Obviously all kinds of combinations are possible here, including (who knows--I just speculate, don't take it too seriously) a possibility of Avangard being deployed on some of Russian Navy's strategic missile subs, together with a growing fleet of strategic bombers capable of carrying a very long range missiles. So, from this point of view US Navy does face an actual strategic task to hunt down those Russkies to prevent, at least from the ocean, a very probable retaliatory salvo if someone in Washington will go completely mad. Russia is not going to attack unless attacked first. That means a lot of ASW and a lot of other operational and, most importantly, psychological adjustments for US Navy, which in this case finds itself in a very unusual role--facing real no-go exclusion zones and a range of missile threats inconceivable even 10 years ago. Will 2nd Fleet be up to the task? I guess we'll see. I hope good movies will come out of it, if we all survive...