There Was An Air Of Excitement ...

 ... in one of the best in the universe concentration of specialists in armor warfare, London tabloid The Telegraph that is, LOL. So, they have been already tasting this sweet victory over those backward Russkies because, as you know, there is no better authority on armor warfare in the world than RUSI, King's College and ... The Telegraph. 

Troops are confident Ajax would be able to outgun and outperform similar Russian vehicles, spotting them at ranges of 8km before destroying them, while senior officials say the vehicles have enough armour to withstand drone bombardments that have become features of the 21st century battlefield in Ukraine.

Yes, yes--UK troops are "confident". But more realistic assessment is not as upbeat. 

The British Army just received its first new armored fighting vehicle (AFV) for nearly three decades, but it is years late, hit by rising costs, is still reportedly injuring its crew, and there are questions about whether it remains relevant in the age of drone warfare. …

Well, this Ajax thingy is a very classic British combat technology, akin to its Chobham armor which sucks, its Challenger tanks not-suited for real war, or, for that matter HMS Queen Elizabeth. But then again, how can you explain to any British general what real modern war is? Impossible, especially since they don't understand the meaning of RUK/ROK and overall netcentric nature of modern battlefield which is and will be controlled by Russia in any war due to massive leaps in both drone and anti-drone technology and AD the likes NATO simply has no concept of. 

So, here is a demonstration from yesterday--this is called situational and tactical awareness and then ... yep, ROK--Recon Fire Complex. 

What needs to be understood--Russians are not resting on laurels, they openly admit some gaps in terms of EW disruption (of course, there is a kinetic way to do so, but that's a whole other can of worms) of ISR by the US. But they are working on it and below the LEO (Low Earth Orbit) NATO ISR means in case of real war will be wiped out. But then again, what do I know ...

I am sure Russia's Combined Arms War College and Academy of General Staff are besieging The Telegraph and The Joint Services Command and Staff College, and of course RUSI, with requests for sending British officers to teach Russians about armor (and combined arms) warfare. British Army is welcome to send its new Ajaxes (before they injure most of their crews) to 404. I am sure SU-25s with Ka-52s, T-90Ms and Kornet crews need some additional R 50,000 for destroyed APC, which goes a long way in Russia. 

In Related News ...

 ... water is wet, fire is hot and ...

The US has been assisting Kiev in carrying out drone attacks on energy facilities inside Russia for the past several months, the Financial Times has reported, citing unnamed American and Ukrainian officials. US officials previously made no secret of their data-sharing with Kiev, but never confirmed their involvement in targeting Russia’s energy assets. When asked earlier in October about Washington’s possible role in Kiev’s strikes deep into Russian territory, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that it was “obvious” to Moscow that “all of NATO and US infrastructure is being used to collect and pass on intelligence to the Ukrainian side.” The FT said in an article on Sunday that Washington started sharing this data after a call between US President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky in mid-July, in which Trump reportedly asked his interlocutor if Kiev could strike Moscow with American-supplied long-range weapons. The White House later claimed that Trump was “merely asking a question, not encouraging further killing.”

This is not news--the US Armed Forces are generally not a real fighting force for real war. Let alone against Russia, but the US military does have some crown jewels, which in case of SMO exist only because the US hides behind backs of 404 cannon fodder and in the case of cowardice and casuistic legality declares itself not a belligerent of the West's war against Russia. Of course, it is and it uses its untouched ISR, primarily orbital grouping, to provide targeting and timing (that one is crucial) for ukrop drone strikes into Russia's territory. 

Now, that Russia demonstrated to the US what escalation dominance is, which the US doesn't have due to a primitive TOE from 1990s and a complete lack of strategic-operational real military expertise, cowards in D.C. are butthurting and coping big time and still cannot grasp the fact that they should go into REAL military-educational institution to get a feel of the model of AD battle and recognize that the only thing they can hope for are those pin-pricks by "leakers", which are inevitable in any missile-drone exchange. Obviously, for these guys the simple truth that even by 1980 Soviet AD could repel a massive missile-air attack at USSR's central industrial district is beyond their grasp since NATO has no serious military educational sector dedicated specifically to the issue of air defense. So, losers continue to drink Kool Aid provided to them by all kinds of info shysters both in the West and from Russia. 

I Didn't Want To Do It...

... but a bunch of fanboys write about alleged "response" to me by this Simplicius guy. Comments appear in this blog under my video etc.  So, let me demonstrate to you how to obfuscate this issue:

1. Recall my constant requests since ISR "piece" by this S guy (in reality compilation of headlines), I even did my own research, trying to answer simple question: WHO IS Colonel Falichev, no serious data? Guess what, this is response from the S guy:

While I certainly don’t begrudge him such thoroughness and demanding standards, I will simply note that nothing Falichev said was debunked but rather his military standing was merely called into question. This is not a response directly to Martyanov, of whom I am a fan though he appears to be less so one of me, but rather an answer to the few requests of my own audience I’ve gotten to make a response on the matter. I like for people to have their own minds and agency in making determinations, so the only things I’ll say is that firstly, Falichev’s piece was obviously published in the official Russian Army journal, hosted on their own official site:

And then he proceeds to "answer" whatever BUT the question of WHO Colonel Falichev is.  He certainly goes into copious amount of "elaborations", including, for some reason, posting biographies of the Editorial Boards of Army Digest and Military Thought (the latter one featuring prominently in my latest book's bibliography), remarkably, with all those board members having their bios known, their academic backgrounds and service being public, Mr. S still doesn't answer the question I posited from the get go: WHO Colonel Falichev is. I later elaborated--WHAT, namely military academy, did he graduate from, which will constitute his VUS (Military Registration Specialty). No answer, but Falichev bio matters a great deal. Yet, Mr. S speculates:

In this case, for instance, the takedown of Falichev could imply that I don’t use good sources in my research—but you can clearly see the contrary is the case. Not only is the Russian Army journal I used a top source, its own Editor-in-Chief has an unassailably storied career, having graduated from three different top command schools:    

You see how it is done? "Implied", I do not imply anything:

2. ... I specifically ask a simple question of military-academic background of Colonel Falichev, which determines if he has professional engineering background to pass his opinions on the issue of ISR in general and netcentric operations in particular or is he merely a military journalist with anecdotal (and rumor collection) "knowledge" of the issue. If Falichev has engineering command VUS, has experience serving as officer-operator of TsAMO (General Staff) or operational level staff officer among many other things, then his opinion is worth something. If he is not, then he merely provided a compilation of "facts" based on somebody's opinions which can differ dramatically on many issues, including what is known as "smoking room bashing" by officers. That's what professional military magazines exist for--to publish all kinds of views.

3. Then comes this issue of ISR and netcentricity in which there are satellites and there are Satellites. Starlink is called such because it is primarily communications constellation whose main purpose is to provide broad band data-links. It can provide some valuable sign-int but that's about it. The main threat for Russian Armed Forces in the field (and the sea) are the so called "spy satellites" which provide the "view" of the battlefield in optical and electromagnetic diapasons and this is primarily anchored to air assets such as E-Sentry, P-8 Poseidon, RC-135, drones and other aircraft. If Falichev doesn't understand that ALL of them fly in the international air space near Russia's borders (especially Crimea) and CAN NOT be shot down without escalating the conflict to the WW III levels, I don't know then why he begins to talk about two different ISR systems operating under completely different sets of circumstances, with NATO ISR having a gigantic advantage operating behind the wall of International Laws and Conventions regulating air and space activity in peace time. Does Falichev know the effects of RUK/ROKs in SMO zone? Does he understand what "R" stands there for? 

And here is the main issue, again, can somebody finally tell me who Colonel Falichev is? Having his full article would help too, I cannot access Army Digest, I have access to Military Thought, though. For those who want to read up of Netcentricity, at some time Lt. Colonel Kondratiev wrote extensively on that. Now, here is how I explain (for laymen) what Sensor/Data Fusion is which is in the foundation of modern ISR in 2019. 

Here I post some pages--the introductory level explanation of NCW and Fusion. 

Why the area in the lake in which the boat can possibly be located becomes not quadrangle but ellipse--that's the whole science of probabilistic analysis and based on sensor fusion and it is some damn serious math (algorithms) which are operating at the back end of network.  Here is a very basic representation:

If you want to see some math behind it, here is some interactive Kalman Filter. These are very basic things required (imperative) for understanding of modern ISR. But the question remains: WHO is Colonel Falichev because he should understand the unprecedented scale of netcentric operations Russian Armed Forces conduct in 404 and conduct extremely successfully granted with some hiccups, but this is a normal process. 

Bordering On Surreal...

And I mean this:

I wrote in 2017 about the lead Russia was taking in anti-satellite weapons. The US has a larger satellite constellation, Russia by now has much more advanced anti-satellite weapons. S-500 and S-550 are fully capable anti-sat systems at orbits up to 1,000 km where most important US ISR assets, especially low orbit Keyhole satellites, are. Plus, of course, there are inspector-satellites capable to change orbits and do their thingy, like they did with the latest Keyhole optronic satellite by circling it and photographing its optic zooms. That means that in case, God forbid, of war just spraying it with special paint would be enough to turn it inoperable. Of course, there is always an option of exploding near it, but why lose good inspector capable of doing the trick on a number of enemy sats. So, now this:

WASHINGTON, Feb 15 — RIA Novosti. Washington is interacting with Moscow on the topic of a new "threat to national security" of the United States, allegedly related to Russia's deployment of anti-satellite weapons in space, said John Kirby, coordinator for strategic communications at the White House National Security Council. "We are in the process of consulting with our allies and partners. We are in the process of interaction with Russia on this issue," he stressed. According to Kirby, US President Joe Biden is receiving the necessary information and has already "ordered preliminary discussions with leaders in Congress, direct diplomatic contact with Russia, allies and partners, as well as other countries of the world." At the same time, the official noted that the dialogue with Moscow will not reveal the "problem of trust," adding that there are opportunities for cooperation.

"Cooperation", really? How delusional those people are? Historic Russia once, in a feat of unjustified trust, extended the hand of friendship to the West--the hand was slapped away and attempts on demolishing Russia never stopped since then. Now, what we all observe--military impotence and incompetence of the West have been exposed and, as I am on record for the last 7 years, the US lost the arms race. The only which United States military has is its edge in the quantity of space-based assets. Russia is already starting to expand greatly her satellite constellation through SFERA project. 

 

P.S. Who knows what those Peresvets are capable of. 

Why I Pay Little Attention To Explosions And Military Porn.

Yesterday, one of our friends, Andrew, provided a link to a wonderful discussion between Col. Macgregor and LTC. Shaffer:

Is the Outcome of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Preordained? Col. Douglas Macgregor and LTC Tony Shaffer

It is an excellent discussion of two professionals, granted I strongly agree with Macgregor on George C. Marshall and, naturally, completely disagree on Patton complaining about "constantly relieving everybody". Patton wouldn't last a month on the Eastern Front. Here is the video extract of the audio of this very same podcast, which is crucial in identifying operational and strategic realities of SMO. 

It is crucial because Macgregor correctly points out the fact of ISR complex being continuously employed by Russian forces and providing targeting 24/7. What Macgregor doesn't call by its name is, in fact, a first strategic use in history of fully networked battlefield against NATO, which, naturally, thought that it knew how to fight Netcentric war. 

I dedicate a large portion of my second book describing what it is and how it works. I explained, giving a proper due to late Admiral Cebrowski, that already in Soviet Union issues of netcentricity were being developed at a very rapid pace, without calling them such. Russians certainly used the term "network" (сеть) but didn't call it netcentric yet. 

Such an idea is not a new one. The Soviet Navy realized similar principles in its premier anti-shipping missiles of the 1980s and 90s, P-700 Granit (NATO SS-N-19 Shipwreck), which were fully networked in the salvo, able to communicate with each other, and capable of completely autonomous operations, including targets’ distribution within the salvo, and Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM), and they were fully shoot-and-forget weapons. For the mid-1980s this was an extremely impressive and, in many senses, revolutionary capability which was due to an explosive development of data processing technologies. 

We also should not forget MiG-31 and its ability to serve as a node in the network of up to six similar fighters and ability to distribute a salvo of air-to-air missiles. And, of course, Soviet Air Defense was into both networking and sensor fusion since 1960s. And that is what Russia's ISR complex does in SMO--it "leverages" netcentricity and provides excellent sensor and data fusion. Macgregor speaks about only 7 minutes it took Russian Navy from receiving the intel about VSU moving its forces into one of the storage facilities near Kiev, receive targeting, develop firing solution and launch. Macgregor admits that this is an impossible task for the US Forces. 

This, not some explosion of the NATO equipment propagated by all kinds of TG channels, is what drives NATO completely mad. This, plus the fact that Russian forces operate on a completely different strategic and operational logic which is NOT present and developed in the Western militaries. The fact that national economy, armed forces, foreign policy, security apparatus and political top operate as a unified and well coordinated mechanism is beyond West's in general and American in particular experiences. It is simply NOT there. 

So, start your stop-watches, ladies and gentlemen, before two Euro-poodles, Macron and Von Der Lugen, will be told by Comrade Xi to go pound sand when they visit Beijing in a desperate attempt to... whatever those Euro-losers are trying to accomplish, which is primarily a PR. Can you imagine a 6 year old kindergarten kid trying to sell penny-stock to a 60 year old successful hedge fund manager? There you go. It is the world of  tangibles, not BS. And winning the SMO is the most tangible of them all and they sense it in the West now. But it is too late.

Me On Some ISR Issues.

Including responses to those jumpy guys who want to shoot everything in the air and space. 

I also ask question on how you can operate 70 ton vehicle anywhere.

Speaking of Harpoons.

Konashenkov today confirmed that several "launchers" of Harpoons have been annihilated by Russian Armed Forces, namely by OTRK Iskander (in Russian). They have been destroyed in Berezan of Odessa Oblast. Here is this Berezan town. 

Berezan is located in about five miles from the shore of the Black Sea and it is totally natural for Ukies to move their equipment constantly but it goes without saying that anti-shipping missiles such as Harpoon should be located for launch within reasonable distance from water to "squeeze" as much as possible from their range which is rather very limited--220 kilometers for air launched (AGM-84) Harpoons. Those who watched my video yesterday, with my second comment on the wet dreams of Philip Breedlove, I posted there this illustration of the range to which any Harpoon carrier should get to have a chance at launching at Crimean Bridge). In Russian this is called рубеж пуска (launch line or range) and as you can see--it is not easy to put it mildly. 

All of this space is totally within Russian or Russia-controlled territory and waters and that leaves pre-positioning areas for those Harpoon launchers naturally within this search area: 

So, we are looking at approximately (and high probability density distribution) 160 x 50 = 8,000 sq. miles area to be searched. It is fairly large but with a number of space-based and signit assets Russia has it is totally possible. That fate also befell many of the US weapons shipped to Ukraine and we are now in the full blown ISR warfare between Russia and the US. US is losing and Russia openly warned about knowledge of US personnel's location both at the front lines and in C2 centers. Wiping them out with high-precision weapons is not difficult. As some of the personnel of LDNR militias says, they know when they face US and UK groups, and I quote, "because they fight better than current VSU and they know how to maneuver, but it is not going to help them." This is from the report by Alexander Kotz. 

As I already stated not for once: Pentagon and CIA planners of VSU "offensive" which was to start in early March and was forestalled by Russia launching SMO on 24 February, have miscalculated, again. It is one thing to plan operations against Taliban or Saddam's Army, totally another to plan something against Russian Armed Forces and especially based on ignorance of Russia's military-industrial capability. As I already quoted my good media buddy Colonel Trukhan:"They (Pentagon) are not going to out-think us". Rings especially true on the anniversary of a cataclysmic clash of Soviet and Wehrmacht's armor at Prokhorovka during Kursk Battle in July of 1943. 

Anyone among those "planners" even bothered to look at the scale and scope of that battle? While one may legitimately challenge History's Channel's numbers, traditionally under-reported for German side, the forces that clashed at Kursk were (per Glantz and House, page 217) 1,337,166 (among them 977,219 combat troops) for the Red Army and 777,000 for Wehrmacht, Red Army tanks: 3,400. Wehrmacht: 2,451. Artillery for the Red Army: 19,794, Wehrmacht: 8,170. Combat aircraft for Red AF: 2,650, Luftwaffe: 2,500. This mass of troops and equipment clashed on July 5 and it all resulted on July 12, 1943 in a cataclysmic event at Prokhorovka. So, the question is: what strategic and operational experience US and UK planners have to face in a form of Russia's General Staff? Right. The answer is obvious. And that is the primer for today.