... a bit what is going on--from Marat. This is how radical increase in operational tempo looks like. Just one of the operational axis among many others.
This is Konstantinovka. The only analogy to all that is this:
The only difference is that Russian spiked crusher can also move. Note: NATO militaries will learn nothing, as always, because they "studied" fairy tales provided to them by 404's GUR and VSU. I know who those "strategists" are--they are not strategists, they have no clue. Good story-tellers, though.
Technically, Allies liberated more territory of Germany than did the Red Army. Of course, explaining to followers of Patton's "view" on combined arms that geographical metrics, such as captured territory or distance covered per day, while important are secondary to main objective of the war of a complete physical annihilation of the enemy forces, will be exercise in futility, one should still keep in mind that there are still very many fantasists in NATO military top brass, who couldn't recognize what they were looking at when, say, Russian Army was setting into a strategic defense in the end of 2022 and completely bought own (illiterate, I may add) BS of successes of VSU, based solely on Russians seeing no strategic-operational sense of killing own people in empty fields.
Rewind back to 1945. Two weeklong Battle of Berlin alone--look up the butcher's bill--makes pretty much most of the proceedings on the Western Front look rather timid.
But, of course, Germans learned absolutely nothing, and it was expected from the nation who saw its own catastrophic defeat by Soviet Union as a ... correct--catastrophe, with or without ample historical justifications for full annihilation of the Third Reich, Nazi Germany that is--catastrophic defeat is catastrophic defeat after all; trauma stays no matter what. Americans liberated Germany; Russians "destroyed" it--that's the ideological setup for the so-called German "democracy". Here are "lessons" for modern Germany:
And nothing could be done about it. Certainly not "liberation". In related news--it is always the same:
Because he forgets to mention that in major powers' war even the most expensive air defense systems such as Aegis and coupled to it SM family of missiles are not designed for fighting in high-supersonic, let alone hypersonic, anti-shipping missiles' saturated environment. Salvo Model has good predictive powers, while SMO demonstrated what modern air-defense should be and the US is NOT in this game. Yes, drones and other flying cheap things do matter, but in real peer-to-peer competition targeting is provided by fusing an enormous data, including from space-based assets.
In the end, there is always S1 and its newest and very cheap anti-drone missile Gvozd (Nail).
Together with disruptive EW and anti-optronic systems widely used in SMO, the solution is already here and it was already demonstrated to an astonishing effectiveness in Syria when defending Khmeimim air base. But as I am on record, I doubt that the US (and the West) are capable of applying lessons to their AD and other weapon systems since... Well, I'll be talking about this in my next video.
