... Frozen Assets and the start of denying the access to the Black Sea.
... about Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech and why he had reasons to warn West about the end of its, often grossly exaggerated, hegemony. This is the 2007 piece (in Russian) by Major General Vasilenko, then the Superintendent of the 4th Central Scientific-Research Institute of Russia's Defense Ministry. The article (at that time) was called Asymmetric Response but already then indicated a growing superiority of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. That was the time when the US toyed with the yet another iteration of SDI--a mostly money laundering machine. Get a load of this:
The achieved technologies and the created domestic radar-absorbing materials make it possible to reduce the radar signature of warheads in the extra-atmospheric section of the trajectory by several orders of magnitude. This is achieved by implementing a whole range of measures: optimizing the shape of the warhead hull - a sharp elongated cone with a rounded bottom; rational direction of separation of the block from the missile or the separation stage - in the direction of the toe to the radar station; the use of light and effective materials for radar-absorbing coatings applied to the unit body - their weight is 0.05-0.2 kg per m2 of the surface, and the reflection coefficient in the centimeter frequency range of 0.3-10 cm is no more than -23...-10 dB and better. There are materials with screen attenuation coefficients in the frequency range from 0.1 to 30 MHz: in terms of the magnetic component - 2...40 dB; for the electrical component - by less than 80 dB. In this case, the effective reflective surface of the warhead can be less than 10-4 m2, and the detection range can be no more than 100-200 km, which will not allow intercepting the unit with long-range interceptor missiles and significantly complicates the operation of medium-range interceptor missiles.
Mind you, this is 2007 but already then Russia had KSP PRO, literally--the Complex of Means of Overcoming Anti-Missile Defense--which was rendering the US AMD effectively useless because it wouldn't be able to fully track and develop firing solution at MIRVs. Today is 2025, the end of it, but attempts to create now a Golden Dome in the US are met in Russia with smile. Again, from 2007, the same piece:
In this regard, another method and the corresponding means of counteraction come to the fore - small-sized atmospheric decoys with a working altitude of 2-5 km and a relative mass of 5-7% of the mass of the warhead. The implementation of this method becomes possible as a result of solving a two-fold task - a significant reduction in the visibility of the warhead and the development of qualitatively new atmospheric decoys of the "wavelet" class, with a corresponding reduction in their weight and dimensions. This will make it possible to install up to 15-20 effective atmospheric decoys instead of one warhead from the missile's multiple-warhead, which will lead to an increase in the probability of overcoming the atmospheric missile defense line to the level of 0.93-0.95. Thus, the overall probability of overcoming the 3 frontiers of a promising missile defense system, according to experts, will be 0.93-0.94.
Today, against the background of Russia's several breakthroughs in missile technologies, the probability of overcoming ANY layered missile defense, be it Golden or even Diamond Dome, is approaching 1 and, bar some possible malfunctions of delivery systems, ensures an overwhelming and devastating response. This is some background of Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech and explanation of futility of any AMD when one doesn't have technological capability for defense.
... that Russians are blind, naive and stupid. Especially against "plans" and ruses kindergarten child can see through.
Zelensky’s election call a ploy – Putin aide. Kiev only wants a ceasefire, which Moscow believes it will use to rearm and regroup its military
Liberation of Seversk opened the road to Slovyansk and, in a classic 404 and its curators' manner, these idiots unleash ... PR "offensive" at ... Kupyansk. Well, here are some views of this PR "offensive" (I mean it--it is PR) aka (in Russia) "meat storms".
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 3-2. Successful offenses share these characteristics: 1. Audacity. 2. Concentration. 3. Surprise. 4. Tempo. See ADP 3-90 for more information on the purposes and characteristics of the offense.
So, as you can see yourself--those suicidal "offensives" lack pp. 2, 3 and 4, and result in getting own forces into the fire cauldron and their annihilation. But as I noted, most what Western "military thought" afforded us is PR and BS. Reality, however, is traditional--all attacks have been repelled with massive casualties to 404 terrorists. Here is today's map of Kupyansk.
News from the Russian washing machines and dishwashers industry. I was mistaken, I stated about 90 nanometers in 2026. Well, stupid me))
The research institutes MERI and NIITM, which are part of the Element Group of Companies, have completed the creation of the first cluster systems in Russia for plasma-chemical deposition (PCB) and etching (PCT). These installations will make it possible to produce integrated circuits according to 65 nm topological standards on wafers with a diameter of 200 mm and 300 mm. The institutes are among the five world leaders with competencies in the creation and production of such equipment. The main executor of the project was MERI, which provided the construction of clean production facilities, the installation and connection of prototypes of equipment, the development of technological processes and their testing. NIITM, in turn, became the main co-contractor, developing the equipment itself and taking part in the tests. Installations for the level of 65 nm on 300 mm wafers will provide, among other things, the long-term need for domestic microelectronics, said Vasily Shpak, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. According to him, the modularity of the platform is of particular value, since it allows you to work out processes on existing equipment and serves as the basis for the transition to more subtle technological processes. Element explained that the equipment makes it possible to use the units both at existing and planned production facilities, where technological standards implemented on 200 mm wafers are used.
Shpak complained last month about "underfunding" of some of the programs to the order of 33 billion Rubles. It is significant sum but not huge. 90 and 65 nm topology covers overwhelming majority of military (and space program) applications and, judging by the fact that lithography for 65 nm is ready, next step--wild guess ... I don't know. It is known that demonstrators for 25 and even 14 nm have been in existence in Russia for at least couple of years. Per useless functions for smart-phones, Russians do not mind using Xiaomi's products. So, you see, now Russian shovels and washing machines will become deadlier and ARE already being controlled by C4ISR structure which rivals, and even surpasses in some aspects, US military. Don't tell Sarah Paine, though, especially about roads.
Because US edukeishinal institutions produce such ambassadors to Russia like this cretin:
“It is the classic fallacy of our time that a moron run through a university and decorated with a Ph.D. will thereby cease to be a moron.”
People like Paine wouldn't be allowed anywhere near any military educational facility in Russia as a person utterly unqualified to teach anything other than, at best, some history in the middle school. How the person with absolute zero military education and command experience can teach "strategy" without trivializing it to the point of fairy tales fed to the creme de la creme of the US officer corps is mind-boggling. But then again, she wouldn't understand most of the operational and strategic level writing in Voennaya Mysl (Military Thought) even when translated and explained to her by real professionals. You merely need to be an articulate ... moron.
... Hooley guy, a very unfortunate second name in Russian.
