Yeah, here is the Russian kid who grew up in Baku early 1970s. Guess what was popular then in USSR and especially in Soviet Union's soft belly--yes, Bollywood movies. Easterns!!! Guess what were my feelings seeing legendary Amitabh Bachchan first in Slam Dog Millionaire and then in Great Gatsby with Leo. It was a delight. But it was Sholay, which went into Soviet theaters as The Revenge And The Law which made it for us. Yes, even after Soviet release of legendary Mackenna's Gold which created a stampede at Soviet movie theaters and is forever my favorite Western (Gregory Peck, Omar Sharif, Telly Savalas, Eli Wallach--what's not to like). But it was Bollywood star Hema Malini who captivated us. Yeah, yeah, I know, it is cheesy, but goodness gracious, did we believe in those magnificent Bollywood guys and women;-)) Hema Malini, I salute you!!! And who can forget your dance, one for the eternity..........(did Die Hard have an idea;-)))?)
Friday, February 26, 2016
Thursday, February 25, 2016
I Cut My Pointy (Index) Finger On The Right Hand
Right in the middle of the tip of the finger. It hurts to type and me, being an old-fashioned fart, who usually wrote his reports and combat training plans (and letters to my wife) using a regular pen, it is difficult to use a middle finger (no pun intended) on the right hand and I am no 10-key person. In the end, it is all about tip-tip-tip....
So, be patient with me--I type but very slowly;-)
Sunday, February 21, 2016
About Zircon (3M22) Yet Again.....
It is really becoming redundant to talk about it, but I will state it anyway, yet again: we are in the age of missiles. Yes, aircraft carriers are magnificent ships and they carry with them a certain, fairly high, level of prestige for those who operate them but they are....drum roll...not the future of the naval warfare. They stopped being that once the range of the anti-shipping missile became comparable with the range of the carrier launched aircraft. Once Soviet Union started launching these missiles from submerged submarines--the game was over. As Commanders Joseph A. Gattuzo and Lori J. Tanner (both carrier aviators with enormous experience) stated in their Naval Forces In The New Century:
"Money spent
furthering manned aircraft technologies and programs—the CVNX (proposed Nimitz-class
carrier replacement) being one of them—is like polishing cannonballs so they
will fly a little farther."
Original by Gattuzo And Tanner
So, now Russia announced what have been known for a while: that Russian Navy is about to procure hyper-sonic 3M22 anti-shipping missile known also as Zircon.
A lot of rumors circulate about this missile but what is known more or less for sure is the fact that this missile has a speed in excess of Mach=5 and the range varying anywhere from 500 to 1000 kilometers. The procurement of this missile signifies two major facts:
1. Russian material science is pretty good if it ensured that this missile is capable of sustaining the extreme temperatures associated with such speed at very low profiles of flight;
2. The problem of sensors, namely radar head (seeker), operating in a plasma environment, which is the result of this speed, have been resolved.
These are really bad news for aircraft carrier "trade-unions" (using Elmo Zumwalt's definition) both in US and in Russia. The reason being almost guaranteed inability of current and near-future air defense systems to deal with this threat. It is one thing to intercept ballistic high flying target at the ranges of 100s of kilometers, totally another is to do so in the case of a sea-skimmer which flies with the speed of about a mile a second and whose detection is effectively limited by the radio-horizon, which, depending on the height of the radar antenna and the altitude of said Zirkon, doesn't leave much time at all, if any, to develop a firing solution. Depending on these and other meteorological and radio atmospheric factors the range could vary anywhere from 20 to 40 miles. Obviously, there is always the issue of the AD screen, with ships in the task groups positioned away from the main target, which is carrier, and, of course there are patrols at the remote edges of the Carrier Battle Group. Well, doesn't matter--there are simply no means today, nor there will be any tomorrow, capable to reliably intercept this kind of weapons. Yes, I know, I know, those almighty lasers and other blasters but even they, those mythical weapons which exist mostly in the demonstration videos and the minds of enthusiasts, are not the answer. Why so, I will not discuss it here. Because after all, it is about Zircon and once the first hull capable of carrying this missile (or rather many of them), modernized Admiral Nakhimov hits the waves in 2018 after her modernization (with Peter The Great planned to do so in 2022), the naval warfare as we know it will cease to exist officially. The age of true Distributed Lethality will be upon us, while aircraft carriers will have to change drastically or be relegated to the role of the museum exhibits, for those which will survive. Tactical, Operational, Strategic and Economic realities, when salvo of 4-8 missiles, with the total cost of about 10 million dollars can sink 20+ billion dollars of hardware, not to speak of denying it the objectives, became such that they are impossible to be ignored anymore.
Monday, February 15, 2016
Colonel David Glantz Awarded
Probably one of the most important military historians of our age, US Army Colonel David Glantz, by the order of Russian Defense Minister, was awarded the Medal For Strengthening Combat Unity.
Glantz' Award (In Russian).
There are not enough words to describe a significance of this man and his co-author, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan House, for modern WW II historiography and, especially, war at the Eastern Front--simply no rivals in knowledge, integrity and scale. Colonel Glantz, I salute you, you did USA and Russia proud.
Below is the the extract (vypiska) from Sergei Shoigu's Order: For significant personal contribution to strengthening of combat unity and military cooperation.
Mosquitoes On The Move
As was totally expected, one of the Buyan M-class MRKs Zelyonyi Dol, escorted by Project 266 Minesweeper Kovrovets passed Bosphorus yesterday on their way to the Eastern Mediterranean to join there with Russian Navy's task force. At this stage it is unknown what is the configuration of Zelyonyi Dol's missile suite but I would speculate that it contains not only land attack cruise missiles. I have a hunch that this muscle ship is there primarily for the anti-shipping role. I could be wrong, of course, but should, God forbids, things go hot between Turkey and Russia, Russia has more than enough cruise missiles which can be launched from within Russia's territory and air-space.
Huge thanks to Anton Blinov for his excellent ship-spotting work.
She is an old gal and saw a lot. Still does the job. |
Saturday, February 13, 2016
Thursday, February 11, 2016
Run To The Hills, The US Military Is Doomed. No, Wait....
Ah, the panic, oh, the suffering of the armies of flag-waving uber-"patriotic" fanboys. US Military is in "ruins" and evil Russkies are about to encircle Chicago and bomb the hell out of Detroit, which, at this point, will make no difference for Detroit whatsoever. That is what armchair "strategists" take from Lt. Colonel (Ret.) Daniel L.Davis' piece in The National Interest:
Before those who read this piece and are about to commit seppuku or go apoplectic, I would suggest--do not leave this world as of yet. And here is the reason, or, rather reasons.
1. US Armed Forces still remain the most potent force in the world, especially US Navy.
2. American soldiers and sailors are among the best in the world.
3. Lt. Colonel Davies said NOTHING new what has not been known to anyone with even the modicum of analytical ability and knowledge of modern (20th-21st Centuries) military history. In fact, this phenomenon, which Lt.Colonel Davis refers to, is endemic in the American system. And I don't mean just the process of acquisition and procurement of the weapons. I also mean US media-military-industrial complex which acts totally within Hollywood paradigm of Dream Factory or, in layman's lingo--BS. Granted, that it takes sometimes Paul Verhoeven's tongue in cheek genius to bring a piece of reality into the contemporary la-la military toys' world of media universe.
And here I am forced, yet again, to deviate from writing Military Power and write something which was, otherwise, planned for that series of the posts. Let's, for starters, give definition to all those terms: Hyperpower, Superpower etc.
"The truth is, the United States is nowhere near as powerful and dominant as many believe."(c)
If we will look in the history of the term "Superpower" we may see how it came to be defined as it is defined in Wiki:
Superpower is a word used to describe a state with a dominant position in international relations and which is characterised by its unparalleled ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale. This is done through the combined-means of technological, cultural, military and economic strength, as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. Traditionally, superpowers are preeminent among the great powers (e.g., as the United States is today).
If we will look in the history of the term "Superpower" we may see how it came to be defined as it is defined in Wiki:
Superpower is a word used to describe a state with a dominant position in international relations and which is characterised by its unparalleled ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale. This is done through the combined-means of technological, cultural, military and economic strength, as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. Traditionally, superpowers are preeminent among the great powers (e.g., as the United States is today).
Superpower
Is the United States a superpower? Absolutely! There is no even discussion about that, what discussion MUST be about is how much "super" is in this "superpower", what the doughnut, so to speak, is filled with. That MUST be the focus of a discussion. Since this blog is driven mostly by military-political and geopolitical issues, let's start with....yes, military power. A Hard Power, so to speak, as defined by late Samuel Huntington.
Here, Davies makes (almost) a correct observation.
"In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there was great celebration in America that the crushing military victory over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” and demonstrated the United States was now the world’s sole military superpower. That was no empty bluster. Even Beijing and Moscow were impressed and openly lamented they were militarily inferior. Americans across the board were optimistic and proud. However justified that pride might have been at the time, it quickly mutated into distasteful arrogance. Now, it is an outright danger to the nation."
Why almost? Here is why. This statement proceeds from ignoring the state of development of the Soviet Armed Forces circa 1990 and here we have a problem. The problem is in what, by that time, Gorabachov and his "team" represented both metaphysically and in terms of their "activity". Long since discredited both at home and abroad, and thrown into the dust bin of history, this "statesman", due both to his incompetence and cowardice, followed a path of destruction which resulted in the geopolitical shock of the millennium. While US side tends to emphasize, for obvious reasons, as Lt.Colonel Davis does, that Moscow was impressed (I don't know how China even factored in here--it wasn't even a first rate military power then), the term "Moscow" must be explained. And here what was happening then:
1. Moscow by 1991 was not a homogeneous (or monolith) entity. The de-sovietization was in a full swing and the first and strategic goal was to ultimately discredit Soviet Armed Forces as one of the main pillars of the Soviet State. This absolutely doesn't mean that Soviet Armed Forces didn't have issues--they did and some of those were huge and required serious reforms. But nobody in Soviet military circles, who had a minimum of professional common sense, had any illusions about staying power of Saddam's Army. The military reputation of Arab "allies" in the Soviet Union was approaching zero. So, the question was not if Saddam could resist coalition, which comfortably pre-deployed without any interference from Iraq, but how fast will it collapse. It was the speed with which Iraq was defeated that impressed "Moscow". That was a military anomaly. And so it remains even today. Traditional Arab militaries' utter tactical and operational incompetence, inadequacy in operating even the "monkey models" of weapons were legendary and very few in the Soviet Armed Forces had any illusions.
2. While trailing in some issues related to communications and computers behind US military, Soviet Armed Forces by 1980s were fast closing the gap, for some it was too fast. Massive "digitizing" started as early as mid-1970s. By 1980s the gap was narrowing very fast and was becoming extremely narrow. It was precisely then, in 1980-1982, when MiG-29s and SU-27s started to be procured in large numbers for Soviet Air Force. Arguably the best strategic bomber of generation, TU-160 Blackjack, went into the production. Other, new and capable, weapon systems were being deployed, including first rate ECM and ECCM capabilities. Computerization was in a full swing. Nowhere this state of the affairs manifested itself more than in the Soviet Navy. Introduction of the submarine launched S10 Granat (SS-N-21 'Sampson' GRAU:3M10) cruise missiles, with the range of 3000 kilometers, in 1986 was one of such many developments. By mid-1980s Soviet Navy was deploying one of the best submarine force in the world and led some of the most advanced research in cutting edge technologies. In the army, the procurement of very advanced T-90 tanks was expected in early 1990s. Here is some CIA report on one of many Soviet Precision Guided Munitions developments:
Soviet Artillery PGMs
So, to put it mildly, talks of Soviet military "inferiority" were greatly exaggerated. But, most importantly, all these military technologies and ability to conduct operations by modern Russia, which became both the subject of admiration and jealousy (and hatred) in the West lately are ALL, without any exception, results of Soviet military technological and operational development of 1970s and 1980s. In the mayhem of Perestroika, which unleashed massive destructive forces in USSR and, eventually, resulted in the collapse of the country, the fact of the Soviet Armed Forces undergoing deep modernization, was forgotten or grossly misinterpreted by the self-proclaimed Cold War "victors" in their own favor against the background of the victory over utterly incompetent, third rate, however large, Arab army. The event almost repeated itself on 08-08-08, during Russian-Georgian War, when it took elements of Russia's 58th Army roughly 60 hours to demolish Georgian Armed Forces (trained and partially equipped by the "West" and Israel) and to open the road to Tbilisi and, eventually, to a partition of Georgia. A lot of rumors and criticism ensued but, with all Russian shortcomings, both real and many others very much fabricated, the result was pretty impressive. Nobody, however, celebrated anything in Russia, Russian Armed Forces in general were subjected to great domestic criticism for not doing the job even faster and more efficiently. Nobody also talked about overcoming Afghan "syndrome", if one ever existed to begin with. Nobody also filled the streets of Russian cities in jubilation when perpetrator of many atrocities terrorist Shamil Basayev was liquidated. The reason for these very much tame attitudes was very simple--most Russians did not and do not consider Georgia a serious military power. They also view Chechnya wars as tragic necessity.
Being "impressed", which did take place, and resigning as the prime military power are two very different things. It took Yeltsin and his coterie of criminals, overt and covert, who put in place suicidal economic and foreign policies which effectively demolished the remnants of the Soviet Armed Forces without creating new Russian ones. That came to tragic "fruition" during First Chechen War, when badly trained, supplied and constantly betrayed at the top political echelons of Russia, Russian Army still managed to take Grozny, while paying a steep price. However, even during those grim times, Russia remained a nuclear power which was still unassailable by anyone, including "sole military superpower" which came to all the wrong conclusions out of its triumph in Iraq. Self-proclaimed "victors" in the Cold War still never conquered Russia, never marched at the Red Square in parade of the victors (except on 9th May 2010 as dear guests and WW II Allies), never fought Russia, yet, for some inconceivable reasons equated, even weakened and humiliated, Russia to Iraq. A massive, and very dangerous, misjudgement, amplified greatly by triumphalist and incompetent US media, on part of US military and policy makers occurred.
The issue in early 1990s was not that the volume of Russian arms deliveries collapsed, for obvious reasons, the issue was that wrong conclusions were made on the account of this collapse. Evidently many, not all, Western analysts based on their, often wrong, perceptions of Russia's realities in 1990s, concluded that American conventional superiority was a given and that Russia was a done deal. What they didn't see was an enormous Soviet scientific and industrial potential behind Russian military development. True, Russia's military-industrial complex was left to fight for its survival alone. But by 1994 Russia opened new export markets, such as UAE or Malaysia, or even South Korea. Weapons which went there were effectively Soviet weapons and those should have given a very serious shock to the Desert Storm triumphalists. That is when the issue of, in the words of Lt.Colonel Davies' "the truth is, the United States is nowhere near as powerful and dominant as many believe", should have taken a center stage at US doctrinal and political discussion. But this didn't happen and having a human and political buffoon in Kremlin seemed to define West's perception and vision of Russia.
The fact that even in 1990s Russia was selling abroad some of the most advanced weapon systems which were on par, and, sometimes, better than the best US could offer not only abroad but for itself, generally, went missing on many people. Post-Desert Storm triumphalism reigned supreme both in media and in political establishment. The obvious fact that fighting non-existent Iraqi Air Force, which was nothing more than hodge-podge collection of basic aircraft, the core of which were 236 Mig-21s, "monkey versions" of 1950s design jets, was not the same as fighting trained and determined Air Force which operated MiG-29s, SU-27 and monster of an interceptor MiG-31s also went missing on many. Iraq's "Integrated Air Defense", a favorite cliche by US media, was nothing more than a collection of outdated, easily suppressed, obsolete missile systems. All that, and much more, was lost on people who declared the "end of history", the unfolding of "New World Order" and other cliches for the consumption of a jubilant public. The very notion that what Russia was selling on the global weapons' market place being as good, if not better, than what US had to offer seemed blasphemous for some. The "American Way Of War" was pronounced to be the only way and US military technology to be the best and that was it.
Well, many people in US, actually, thought otherwise. Especially those who bothered to at least check on state of Russia's military once in a while and who had real military experience. It was Colonel Douglas Macgregor's Breaking The Phalanx, which came out in 1996 which rang some bells. There were others, such as, later in mid-2000s, Professor Roger Thompson with his, shocking for some, Lessons Not Learned.
But no matter how many, or, rather, few professionals were trying to address some serious doctrinal, operational and technological issues, the post-Desert Storm delusion endured and resulted:
1. In horrendous strategic miscalculations which led to Iraq catastrophe, among many others;
2. A complete loss of situational awareness on the account of emerging or "returning" superpowers, who, like Russia were able not only to narrow or even close military-technological capability gaps but to come up with the lead in some crucial areas.
All it took for the shit to hit the fan in US was a salvo of, actually, very mature Kalibr complex from small missile ships of Russian Caspian Flotilla at the terrorist targets in Syria, plus demonstration by the "rusty" elements of Russian Air-Space Forces an operational tempo and the range of Precision Guided Munitions which US thought only its forces had. The question here is not in the fact of US mainstream media having an aneurysm from this fact or, the fact that most of US political establishment resides in geopolitical la-la land, or, if one may, parallel universe, no. The question here is that it was happening all along, in the open, since mid-1990s not only Russia demonstrated its military development openly, in fact, Russian Military Industrial Complex aggressively promoted its technologies and tactical and operational concepts which came with those at the international weapons markets, it was done in the best marketing way possible. What, didn't US military know that Kalibr and Onyx missile complexes were in production since early 2000s? Didn't they know that super-maneuverability in aircraft development was becoming a mainstay and that new development radar technologies (yes, pioneered by Russia) were making stealth even more vulnerable? I don't doubt for a second that US military was aware of that. But maybe, just maybe something wrong is not with Russia but with this whole US leviathan military-industrial-media complex. This monster thought that the future of war is still in blowing badly trained Arab pilots in their badly maintained obsolete aircraft from the sky, or fighting in the ECM (ECCM) free environments, or with the opposition which never had any stand-off weapons. Well, should they have studied real Russian/Soviet military history, they should have known better.
Now, we all face a hysteria in US media, when it became obvious that military capability gap not only closed or narrowed, but some non-US weapons, such as game-changer Zirkon hyper-sonic missiles to be procured, together with revolutionary Armata platforms or with S-500 coming online soon are simply beyond current US technological capability. Yes, this is not Arab military, it is from the country which smashed Wehrmacht at the peak of its might. But I will elaborate more on that back in my Military Power series. As for now, US still remains a military superpower and will remain one for a long time but it will be more and more constrained by emerging advanced military technologies and operational concepts which will require US "response" on such a financial scale that F-35 or LCS will look like a pocket change and how US will be able to afford it--it is not for fainthearted to understand.
Is the United States a superpower? Absolutely! There is no even discussion about that, what discussion MUST be about is how much "super" is in this "superpower", what the doughnut, so to speak, is filled with. That MUST be the focus of a discussion. Since this blog is driven mostly by military-political and geopolitical issues, let's start with....yes, military power. A Hard Power, so to speak, as defined by late Samuel Huntington.
Here, Davies makes (almost) a correct observation.
"In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there was great celebration in America that the crushing military victory over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” and demonstrated the United States was now the world’s sole military superpower. That was no empty bluster. Even Beijing and Moscow were impressed and openly lamented they were militarily inferior. Americans across the board were optimistic and proud. However justified that pride might have been at the time, it quickly mutated into distasteful arrogance. Now, it is an outright danger to the nation."
Why almost? Here is why. This statement proceeds from ignoring the state of development of the Soviet Armed Forces circa 1990 and here we have a problem. The problem is in what, by that time, Gorabachov and his "team" represented both metaphysically and in terms of their "activity". Long since discredited both at home and abroad, and thrown into the dust bin of history, this "statesman", due both to his incompetence and cowardice, followed a path of destruction which resulted in the geopolitical shock of the millennium. While US side tends to emphasize, for obvious reasons, as Lt.Colonel Davis does, that Moscow was impressed (I don't know how China even factored in here--it wasn't even a first rate military power then), the term "Moscow" must be explained. And here what was happening then:
1. Moscow by 1991 was not a homogeneous (or monolith) entity. The de-sovietization was in a full swing and the first and strategic goal was to ultimately discredit Soviet Armed Forces as one of the main pillars of the Soviet State. This absolutely doesn't mean that Soviet Armed Forces didn't have issues--they did and some of those were huge and required serious reforms. But nobody in Soviet military circles, who had a minimum of professional common sense, had any illusions about staying power of Saddam's Army. The military reputation of Arab "allies" in the Soviet Union was approaching zero. So, the question was not if Saddam could resist coalition, which comfortably pre-deployed without any interference from Iraq, but how fast will it collapse. It was the speed with which Iraq was defeated that impressed "Moscow". That was a military anomaly. And so it remains even today. Traditional Arab militaries' utter tactical and operational incompetence, inadequacy in operating even the "monkey models" of weapons were legendary and very few in the Soviet Armed Forces had any illusions.
2. While trailing in some issues related to communications and computers behind US military, Soviet Armed Forces by 1980s were fast closing the gap, for some it was too fast. Massive "digitizing" started as early as mid-1970s. By 1980s the gap was narrowing very fast and was becoming extremely narrow. It was precisely then, in 1980-1982, when MiG-29s and SU-27s started to be procured in large numbers for Soviet Air Force. Arguably the best strategic bomber of generation, TU-160 Blackjack, went into the production. Other, new and capable, weapon systems were being deployed, including first rate ECM and ECCM capabilities. Computerization was in a full swing. Nowhere this state of the affairs manifested itself more than in the Soviet Navy. Introduction of the submarine launched S10 Granat (SS-N-21 'Sampson' GRAU:3M10) cruise missiles, with the range of 3000 kilometers, in 1986 was one of such many developments. By mid-1980s Soviet Navy was deploying one of the best submarine force in the world and led some of the most advanced research in cutting edge technologies. In the army, the procurement of very advanced T-90 tanks was expected in early 1990s. Here is some CIA report on one of many Soviet Precision Guided Munitions developments:
Soviet Artillery PGMs
So, to put it mildly, talks of Soviet military "inferiority" were greatly exaggerated. But, most importantly, all these military technologies and ability to conduct operations by modern Russia, which became both the subject of admiration and jealousy (and hatred) in the West lately are ALL, without any exception, results of Soviet military technological and operational development of 1970s and 1980s. In the mayhem of Perestroika, which unleashed massive destructive forces in USSR and, eventually, resulted in the collapse of the country, the fact of the Soviet Armed Forces undergoing deep modernization, was forgotten or grossly misinterpreted by the self-proclaimed Cold War "victors" in their own favor against the background of the victory over utterly incompetent, third rate, however large, Arab army. The event almost repeated itself on 08-08-08, during Russian-Georgian War, when it took elements of Russia's 58th Army roughly 60 hours to demolish Georgian Armed Forces (trained and partially equipped by the "West" and Israel) and to open the road to Tbilisi and, eventually, to a partition of Georgia. A lot of rumors and criticism ensued but, with all Russian shortcomings, both real and many others very much fabricated, the result was pretty impressive. Nobody, however, celebrated anything in Russia, Russian Armed Forces in general were subjected to great domestic criticism for not doing the job even faster and more efficiently. Nobody also talked about overcoming Afghan "syndrome", if one ever existed to begin with. Nobody also filled the streets of Russian cities in jubilation when perpetrator of many atrocities terrorist Shamil Basayev was liquidated. The reason for these very much tame attitudes was very simple--most Russians did not and do not consider Georgia a serious military power. They also view Chechnya wars as tragic necessity.
Being "impressed", which did take place, and resigning as the prime military power are two very different things. It took Yeltsin and his coterie of criminals, overt and covert, who put in place suicidal economic and foreign policies which effectively demolished the remnants of the Soviet Armed Forces without creating new Russian ones. That came to tragic "fruition" during First Chechen War, when badly trained, supplied and constantly betrayed at the top political echelons of Russia, Russian Army still managed to take Grozny, while paying a steep price. However, even during those grim times, Russia remained a nuclear power which was still unassailable by anyone, including "sole military superpower" which came to all the wrong conclusions out of its triumph in Iraq. Self-proclaimed "victors" in the Cold War still never conquered Russia, never marched at the Red Square in parade of the victors (except on 9th May 2010 as dear guests and WW II Allies), never fought Russia, yet, for some inconceivable reasons equated, even weakened and humiliated, Russia to Iraq. A massive, and very dangerous, misjudgement, amplified greatly by triumphalist and incompetent US media, on part of US military and policy makers occurred.
The issue in early 1990s was not that the volume of Russian arms deliveries collapsed, for obvious reasons, the issue was that wrong conclusions were made on the account of this collapse. Evidently many, not all, Western analysts based on their, often wrong, perceptions of Russia's realities in 1990s, concluded that American conventional superiority was a given and that Russia was a done deal. What they didn't see was an enormous Soviet scientific and industrial potential behind Russian military development. True, Russia's military-industrial complex was left to fight for its survival alone. But by 1994 Russia opened new export markets, such as UAE or Malaysia, or even South Korea. Weapons which went there were effectively Soviet weapons and those should have given a very serious shock to the Desert Storm triumphalists. That is when the issue of, in the words of Lt.Colonel Davies' "the truth is, the United States is nowhere near as powerful and dominant as many believe", should have taken a center stage at US doctrinal and political discussion. But this didn't happen and having a human and political buffoon in Kremlin seemed to define West's perception and vision of Russia.
The fact that even in 1990s Russia was selling abroad some of the most advanced weapon systems which were on par, and, sometimes, better than the best US could offer not only abroad but for itself, generally, went missing on many people. Post-Desert Storm triumphalism reigned supreme both in media and in political establishment. The obvious fact that fighting non-existent Iraqi Air Force, which was nothing more than hodge-podge collection of basic aircraft, the core of which were 236 Mig-21s, "monkey versions" of 1950s design jets, was not the same as fighting trained and determined Air Force which operated MiG-29s, SU-27 and monster of an interceptor MiG-31s also went missing on many. Iraq's "Integrated Air Defense", a favorite cliche by US media, was nothing more than a collection of outdated, easily suppressed, obsolete missile systems. All that, and much more, was lost on people who declared the "end of history", the unfolding of "New World Order" and other cliches for the consumption of a jubilant public. The very notion that what Russia was selling on the global weapons' market place being as good, if not better, than what US had to offer seemed blasphemous for some. The "American Way Of War" was pronounced to be the only way and US military technology to be the best and that was it.
Well, many people in US, actually, thought otherwise. Especially those who bothered to at least check on state of Russia's military once in a while and who had real military experience. It was Colonel Douglas Macgregor's Breaking The Phalanx, which came out in 1996 which rang some bells. There were others, such as, later in mid-2000s, Professor Roger Thompson with his, shocking for some, Lessons Not Learned.
But no matter how many, or, rather, few professionals were trying to address some serious doctrinal, operational and technological issues, the post-Desert Storm delusion endured and resulted:
1. In horrendous strategic miscalculations which led to Iraq catastrophe, among many others;
2. A complete loss of situational awareness on the account of emerging or "returning" superpowers, who, like Russia were able not only to narrow or even close military-technological capability gaps but to come up with the lead in some crucial areas.
All it took for the shit to hit the fan in US was a salvo of, actually, very mature Kalibr complex from small missile ships of Russian Caspian Flotilla at the terrorist targets in Syria, plus demonstration by the "rusty" elements of Russian Air-Space Forces an operational tempo and the range of Precision Guided Munitions which US thought only its forces had. The question here is not in the fact of US mainstream media having an aneurysm from this fact or, the fact that most of US political establishment resides in geopolitical la-la land, or, if one may, parallel universe, no. The question here is that it was happening all along, in the open, since mid-1990s not only Russia demonstrated its military development openly, in fact, Russian Military Industrial Complex aggressively promoted its technologies and tactical and operational concepts which came with those at the international weapons markets, it was done in the best marketing way possible. What, didn't US military know that Kalibr and Onyx missile complexes were in production since early 2000s? Didn't they know that super-maneuverability in aircraft development was becoming a mainstay and that new development radar technologies (yes, pioneered by Russia) were making stealth even more vulnerable? I don't doubt for a second that US military was aware of that. But maybe, just maybe something wrong is not with Russia but with this whole US leviathan military-industrial-media complex. This monster thought that the future of war is still in blowing badly trained Arab pilots in their badly maintained obsolete aircraft from the sky, or fighting in the ECM (ECCM) free environments, or with the opposition which never had any stand-off weapons. Well, should they have studied real Russian/Soviet military history, they should have known better.
Now, we all face a hysteria in US media, when it became obvious that military capability gap not only closed or narrowed, but some non-US weapons, such as game-changer Zirkon hyper-sonic missiles to be procured, together with revolutionary Armata platforms or with S-500 coming online soon are simply beyond current US technological capability. Yes, this is not Arab military, it is from the country which smashed Wehrmacht at the peak of its might. But I will elaborate more on that back in my Military Power series. As for now, US still remains a military superpower and will remain one for a long time but it will be more and more constrained by emerging advanced military technologies and operational concepts which will require US "response" on such a financial scale that F-35 or LCS will look like a pocket change and how US will be able to afford it--it is not for fainthearted to understand.
Sunday, February 7, 2016
The Independent Is Shocked, So Is Israel. So...? (Conclusion)
So, we already identified couple of crucial facts of Russia's military development which combined "West" simply refuses to acknowledge. But even when it does, it is incapable to INTERNALIZE them--that is make them a real factor in its considerations. The reason for that is hubris, an immense one, which clouds judgement in the best case scenario. In the worst--well, it becomes the run of decapitated chicken who still thinks it's alive. In this case, in conclusion to this review of the Independent's article, we may simply state that, in the end, it is West's hubris which is the major factor in its continuous "shocks" regarding Russia's military. After all, it is "West", especially its Anglo-sphere which continuously self-proclaims itself the victor and a driving force behind everything there is in war. Enter Israel.
I recall reading Alexander Prokhanov's interview of some major Israeli Rabbi to Prokhanov's newspaper Zavtra (Tomorrow) late 1990s--very early 2000s. It was a horrendous time in Russia. In that interview this rabbi, in full seriousness, talked about Israel helping Russia to get into the hi-tech, including military, realm. He, if my memory doesn't fail me, also mentioned something to the effect that Israeli submariners can "teach" Russian ones a thing or two. You can find this interview, I am sure, in Zavtra's archives and if the piece on submariners is not there, I still did encounter it, probably, in some other source. If it will become that crucial for discussion--I'll find it. Now, this is not to say that Israel doesn't have anything to share. On the contrary, Israel played a big role, as an example, in helping Russia in drone technology, by selling some of its drones. But there was something really bizarre in the audacity with which this rabbi was assuming that Israel's, undeniably respectable, "hi-tech" could contribute much to Russia's military and economy in general. Mind you, that this was the time (very late 1990s--early 2000s) when what is seen today by the world as "newly" resurgent Russia's military might was already in the process of either trials or transition from pure R&D into the IOC status. Just to give an example, it was then that arguably best combat helicopter in the world, Ka-50, combat tested itself to a great effect in the Second Chechen War. International Air Power Review later gave rave reviews to this helicopter.
Advanced submarine development, albeit retarded by Yeltsin's criminal regime, still proceeded with creating new submarines and weapons--today they are afloat. Just to name a few. Even then, barely alive Russia was still capable to compete on the international arms trade market with her superb weapons ranging from advanced fighters to air defense complexes. Appearances of Russian combat jets at Farnborough or any other aircraft shows elsewhere was always a show stopper. Yet, the condescension continued unabated. And here is why I introduced this rabbi.
I do respect Israel's military history and Israel's military successes are definitely deserved. They are worthy of studying and lessons learned of applying but, with the help of primarily US media, Israeli's military experience was advanced into the position of military absolute, forgetting completely, what was the framework of Israel's military victories. Not until Colonel Norwell De Atkine's famous article "Why Arabs Lose Wars", was any serious attempt made in US to actually put Israel's victories in perspective. And perspective was peculiar. Israel won its victories against supremely incompetent opponents not conditioned in the least to fight modern combined arms warfare. Below is Atkine's article and it is very instructive in regards to Arab militaries, while is full of BS in assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Why Arabs Lose Wars
Atkine's sentiment is echoed by Colonel Sergievsky, a former Soviet military adviser to Syrian Army in 1973, in his essay with telling title "One Must Not Fight Like This". The article was published in mid-2000s in The Digest Of Air Defense (Vestnik PVO) but, sadly, the issue since disappeared from internet. I do, however, have the PDF of the original. How Israeli's military experience started to dominate US is, of course, a whole other matter, which is from the political and ideological field, dominated for decades now by neocons, but nobody ever announced the end of the pecking order in military affairs. Let's speak in broadsides. For Israel, who does not produce own advanced combat jets, submarines, neither SSK (provided by Germany) let alone nukes, doesn't have own space program, doesn't have a lot, including a real ability to produce all of that simultaneously, it seems really bizarre to be "shocked" by anything from the nation (Russia) whose military history and accomplishments dwarf that of Israel. It especially rings true against Israel's demographics, where former Soviet/Russian citizens constitute about a quarter of Israel's population. Surely, Israel must have good understanding of Russia, but does it? Judging by the latest "shock" it has no clue. Either that or Israel really thinks it is such a big shot in military affairs.
I remember talking to one of my American acquaintances about 7-8 years ago, the guy had M.S. in nuclear engineering and worked at the naval shipyard. I told him, Russians probably will continue to suck at producing microwave ovens and good cars (turned out I was a bit off), but, I told him, they will never stop producing world-class weapons, even under the most severe of the circumstances. IDF experienced those weapons, even in the hands of badly trained people, several times, including Wadi Saluki Battle where Hezbollah units, armed with Kornet ATGMs created very serious problems for Israel's much touted Merkava tanks, which turned out to be no match to Kornets. Kornet ATGMs went into the production in mid-1990s, precisely the time when West wrote Russia off. It will continue to do so and that what we all should expect. The reason for that is simple, and I wrote about it many times--West simply does not get Russia, period. Any voices of reason and competence in the field will continue to be ignored or suppressed. The image of Russian primitive barbarian must be preserved at all costs, even when it builds space stations, leads the world in advanced weapon systems' design, dominates the global market of advanced nuclear power generating, even when this barbarian produces world class literature and music--all this doesn't matter to some large strata of West's in general, and Anglosphere's in particular, "elites" whose ignorance, incompetence and visceral hatred of anything Russian define them. This is not going to change soon, if ever. So prepare for more "shocks".
Advanced submarine development, albeit retarded by Yeltsin's criminal regime, still proceeded with creating new submarines and weapons--today they are afloat. Just to name a few. Even then, barely alive Russia was still capable to compete on the international arms trade market with her superb weapons ranging from advanced fighters to air defense complexes. Appearances of Russian combat jets at Farnborough or any other aircraft shows elsewhere was always a show stopper. Yet, the condescension continued unabated. And here is why I introduced this rabbi.
I do respect Israel's military history and Israel's military successes are definitely deserved. They are worthy of studying and lessons learned of applying but, with the help of primarily US media, Israeli's military experience was advanced into the position of military absolute, forgetting completely, what was the framework of Israel's military victories. Not until Colonel Norwell De Atkine's famous article "Why Arabs Lose Wars", was any serious attempt made in US to actually put Israel's victories in perspective. And perspective was peculiar. Israel won its victories against supremely incompetent opponents not conditioned in the least to fight modern combined arms warfare. Below is Atkine's article and it is very instructive in regards to Arab militaries, while is full of BS in assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Why Arabs Lose Wars
Atkine's sentiment is echoed by Colonel Sergievsky, a former Soviet military adviser to Syrian Army in 1973, in his essay with telling title "One Must Not Fight Like This". The article was published in mid-2000s in The Digest Of Air Defense (Vestnik PVO) but, sadly, the issue since disappeared from internet. I do, however, have the PDF of the original. How Israeli's military experience started to dominate US is, of course, a whole other matter, which is from the political and ideological field, dominated for decades now by neocons, but nobody ever announced the end of the pecking order in military affairs. Let's speak in broadsides. For Israel, who does not produce own advanced combat jets, submarines, neither SSK (provided by Germany) let alone nukes, doesn't have own space program, doesn't have a lot, including a real ability to produce all of that simultaneously, it seems really bizarre to be "shocked" by anything from the nation (Russia) whose military history and accomplishments dwarf that of Israel. It especially rings true against Israel's demographics, where former Soviet/Russian citizens constitute about a quarter of Israel's population. Surely, Israel must have good understanding of Russia, but does it? Judging by the latest "shock" it has no clue. Either that or Israel really thinks it is such a big shot in military affairs.
I remember talking to one of my American acquaintances about 7-8 years ago, the guy had M.S. in nuclear engineering and worked at the naval shipyard. I told him, Russians probably will continue to suck at producing microwave ovens and good cars (turned out I was a bit off), but, I told him, they will never stop producing world-class weapons, even under the most severe of the circumstances. IDF experienced those weapons, even in the hands of badly trained people, several times, including Wadi Saluki Battle where Hezbollah units, armed with Kornet ATGMs created very serious problems for Israel's much touted Merkava tanks, which turned out to be no match to Kornets. Kornet ATGMs went into the production in mid-1990s, precisely the time when West wrote Russia off. It will continue to do so and that what we all should expect. The reason for that is simple, and I wrote about it many times--West simply does not get Russia, period. Any voices of reason and competence in the field will continue to be ignored or suppressed. The image of Russian primitive barbarian must be preserved at all costs, even when it builds space stations, leads the world in advanced weapon systems' design, dominates the global market of advanced nuclear power generating, even when this barbarian produces world class literature and music--all this doesn't matter to some large strata of West's in general, and Anglosphere's in particular, "elites" whose ignorance, incompetence and visceral hatred of anything Russian define them. This is not going to change soon, if ever. So prepare for more "shocks".
................................................
Saturday, February 6, 2016
Just Stumbled Upon In The News
It is kinda redundant to speak about real West European decli...I mean values of tolerance, but those pesky Russians seem to not get the message. Indeed, what can one say--barbarians, like me;-) I always thought that beating the shit out of anyone who assaults my wife or daughter is absolutely natural and is the only appropriate course of action, in fact, that's what real men do, but what do I know.
"The refugees tried to flee but were quickly captured by the Russians. They then took them out to the street and gave them a beating they will remember.
Police arrived to break up the fight but locals report that they threw a
few punches at the refugees before arresting 33 of them. Eighteen
refugees were in such bad condition they had to be take to the hospital. Police decided to let the beatings slide and didn’t file a report. The only thing they could confirm was that there was “a mass brawl involving refugees.”"
Meanwhile, Russians continue to betray European "culture" and being barbarians by beating the shit out of bringers of tolerance and diversity, who, for some reason, tend to grope, rape, assault women, steal from older man etc., thus "enriching" European "culture".
Tuesday, February 2, 2016
Another UTTER uber BS
I have no respect for The National Interest magazine nor for pseudo-military (and pseudo-scientific) BS it spreads. I also view (in)famous Jane's with a great deal of irony, politely speaking--these were the guys, who on the eve of Debaltsevo disaster were spreading Ukronazi propaganda about how the victory for criminals in Kiev was at hand. But I DO respect Royal Navy. It is a Navy with glorious history and one which, actually, has the experience, however bloody, with modern naval combat--a true, however limited, one. So, when I read this:
"NATO submarines are seeing “more activity from Russian submarines than
we've seen since the days of the Cold War,” Royal Navy Vice Adm. Clive
Johnstone, commander of NATO's Maritime Command told IHS Jane’s. He added that NATO submarines are encountering “a level of Russian capability that we haven't seen before.”
I understand that neither Mr. Majumdar nor TNI's staff know what Коэффициент Оперативного Напряжения--КОН (Coefficient Of Operational Tension (Strain)) is, but I fully expect Royal Navy's Vice Adm. Clive
Johnstone to know that. Let me elaborate:
КОН, to put it in layman's lingo, is the ratio of the days a ship is on the combat patrol (at sea) to the number of days in a year. So, when we say that this coefficient is 0.5 it means that the ship is in the sea for 365/2=182.5 days. It is one of those operational coefficients which are considered strongly when planning combat training and operations in the sea (ocean). Yours truly had experiences with KOH=0.7, while I also knew some conduits for suffering who had this greater than 1. Yes, I know and their family life was not exactly exemplary. Now, consider this: even a brief excursion into Wiki, gives us a number of the Cold War Soviet Submarine Fleet for 1990 at:
63 ballistic missile submarines
72 cruise missile submarine
64 nuclear attack submarine
65 conventional attack submarine
72 cruise missile submarine
64 nuclear attack submarine
65 conventional attack submarine
--------------------------------------------
264 subs of all types.
Now a military "secret".... drum roll....the KOH for Soviet subs varied. For example, for older SSBNs (boomers) of Delta-I class it could be as low as 0.2, meaning that this class was on patrol only for 73 days out of 365. It means that while some subs were on patrol, others were in the dock or in refit. For younger Deltas-III (667 BDR) or even younger Delta IVs (667 BDRM) the KOH could be higher, sometimes substantially higher. As per multipurpose Victors-III (671 RTM) or Akulas (971) this KOH could be even higher. And then were those SSKs--that is a separate story altogether. So, in order for us to be objective, let us assume a very low KOH=0.3 for all classes of Soviet Cold War subs. Let's multiply: 264 x 0.3 = almost 80. This means, that NATO navies had to deal with 80 Soviet subs on patrol every day, from Soviet littoral to Pacific and Indian Oceans. Which rings about right for this old fart cold warrior like me. FYI, US Navy's boomers had a higher KOH, as an example.
Now, going back to Wiki, for the Russian Navy:
60 subs of all types. Let us assume KOH for those of 0.4 (newest types are still on trials). Well, you know the answer, don't you? 60 x 0.4 =24, and even this number is way too generous. In reality, it is smaller than that, probably about 20 at best. So, if Admiral Clive
Johnstone thinks that having 4 times less combat patrols is comparable to "the days of Cold War", I don't know, really. But it is in the open and fanboys of all colors will get on it shortly. Meanwhile, life is full of BS and there is NO reason whatsoever to propagate even more of it, especially when detached from the larger framework of doctrines (in Russian Navy's case--of Sea Denial) and operations. As per Russian subs--yes, they are pretty good but then again, what did they expect--that Russian Navy would fight with 14" guns and steam? No, really........